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Physics and common causes

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Abstract

The common cause principle states that common causes produce correlations amongst their effects, but that common effects do not produce correlations amongst their causes. I claim that this principle, as explicated in terms of probabilistic relations, is false in classical statistical mechanics. Indeterminism in the form of stationary Markov processes rather than quantum mechanics is found to be a possible saviour of the principle. In addition I argue that if causation is to be explicated in terms of probabilities, then it should be done in terms of probabilistic relations which are invariant under changes of initial distributions. Such relations can also give rise to an asymmetric cause-effect relationship which always runs forwards in time.

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This paper was written while I was on an Andrew Mellon postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Pittsburgh, for which I am grateful. I am also grateful for comments from John Norton and an anonymous referee.

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Arntzenius, F. Physics and common causes. Synthese 82, 77–96 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413670

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