Notes
Note that this is not a request for something Arpaly declines (legitimately, in my view) to provide, namely “a full account of acting for reasons” (p. 115). I am not saying we need an account of what, in general, it is to act for reasons; I am saying we need from Arpaly an account of when someone who is acting for reasons is acting for reason R in particular.
A similar point is made by Petit and Smith (1990).
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Arpaly, N. Reply to Harman, Stroud and Mason––Nomy Arpaly. Philos Stud 134, 457–465 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9068-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9068-6