Abstract
In this commentary, I critically discuss the respective views of Gert and Beauchamp–Childress on the nature of so-called common morality and its promise for enriching ethical reflection within the field of bioethics. Although I endorse Beauchamp and Childress’ shift from an emphasis on ethical theory as the source of moral norms to an emphasis on common morality, I question whether rouging up common morality to make it look like some sort of ultimate and universal foundation for morality, untouched by the dialectics of time and reflective equilibrium, was an equally good move. As for Gert’s magisterial conception of common morality, I conclude that certain elements of his system are controversial at best and woefully inadequate at worst. He has a tendency to find in common morality what he himself put there, and his highly restricted conception of duties of assistance strikes this reader as ad hoc, inadequately defended, and unworthy of a project whose goal is to lessen the amount of misery in the world.
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Notes
Unless explicitly noted, all subsequent references to this text will be to this current (sixth) edition.
Note that Gert’s inclusion of ideals and virtues here justifies his consternation at Beauchamp and Childress continuing to label his approach an “impartial rule theory” [8, p. 371].
The curious reader might well wonder how it is that such duties can be ascribed exclusively to state governments if they are not also shared in some fashion by the citizens they represent. In addition, Gert’s position here would rule out the very possibility that, should a given government fail to uphold its responsibilities to its citizens, those responsibilities might well shift not only to other states, but also to other bodies, such as NGOs, international corporations, or, ultimately, to citizens of other countries. Although I believe that Gert is mistaken on this point, I will not pursue this issue further here.
This passage was borrowed from my essay, “The Way We Reason Now: Reflective Equilibrium in Bioethics” [9].
Although Beauchamp and Childress seriously doubt that the principles and virtues of the common morality will ever change, they readily admit that the principles’ scope of application has expanded to include coverage for women, minorities, etc.
Although Gert implies otherwise, this was precisely the mission that both Kant and Mill set for themselves.
Perhaps a more helpful gloss on this element would stress one’s being in a position to prevent the harm while also incurring the least amount of risk or burden to oneself.
The closest he comes is in his (inadequate) response to Dan Brock in [16].
Gert or a libertarian might respond at this point that this judgment on the part of the bottom billion fails the test of impartiality. They are clearly just looking out for their own interests. But could not the same be said of well-off people in developed countries who refuse to assist? Our desire to maintain our current consumerist lifestyle might depend upon economic or political advantages that we may not deserve. To assume that we do deserve them may be to beg the question.
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Thanks to Sahar Akhtar, Tom Beauchamp, Jim Childress, Bernard Gert, Bonnie Steinbock, and Carson Strong for helpful discussion and comments on previous drafts of this paper.
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Arras, J.D. The hedgehog and the Borg: Common morality in bioethics. Theor Med Bioeth 30, 11–30 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-009-9093-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-009-9093-5