Abstract
According to the thesis of temporal isomorphism, the experienced order of events in the world and the order in which experiences are processed in the brain are the same. The thesis is encompassed in the brain-time view, a popular view on the literature of the temporal illusions. The view is commonly contrasted with the event-time view, which maintains that the experienced order of events reflects the order in which the events occur in the world. This chapter focuses on the conflict between the two views in the contexts of perceptual asymmetry in visual perception and temporal order judgment tasks. It is argued that both views mean slightly different things in these contexts. Accordingly, it is possible for one to endorse both the brain-time view and the event-time view at the same time. On the broader perspective, the chapter illustrates how time order is employed differently by various perceptual processes, resulting in different characteristics from implicit and explicit time perception.
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Notes
- 1.
It is worth noting, however, that I argued for the thesis in Arstila (2015, 2016b). I also take it that the thesis is widely endorsed in science. For instance, Wolfgang Köhler (1947, p. 62) already argued that “experienced order in time is always structurally identical with a functional order in the sequence of correlated brain processes.” More recently, a version of the thesis has figured in the explanations of perceptual simultaneity (Kopinska & Harris, 2004), duration estimation and reproduction (Reutimann, Yakovlev, Fusi, & Senn, 2004; Wittmann, van Wassenhove, Craig, & Paulus, 2010), spatiotemporal illusions (Arstila, 2015; Whitney & Murakami, 1998; Whitney, Murakami, & Cavanagh, 2000), and timing of visual feature changes (Arnold & Wilcock, 2007; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997).
- 2.
For the discussion of the thesis as such in different contexts, see, for example, Grush (2007), Kelly (2005), Kiverstein & Arstila (2013), Mölder (2014), and Power (2010). For the discussion of the thesis complemented with additional qualifications, see, for example, Grush (2009), Lee (2014), and Phillips (2014).
- 3.
At the latter part of the paper, they also argue that if Benjamin Libet’s results suggesting the delay of conscious intention and the backward referrals of time are sound, then the model of consciousness they advocate would explain the results better than the Cartesian theater model of consciousness.
- 4.
On this topic, it is interesting to note that even though many of the almost 30 commentators of Dennett and Kinsbourne’s paper had reservations about the Multiple Drafts model, only one of them challenged the view that subjective time and brain time can come apart.
- 5.
Obviously, if one rejects, as many proponents of the brain-time view reject, the assumption that a temporal comparator tries to deduce the event time from the brain time, then this problem does not emerge.
- 6.
See Holcombe (2015) for a thorough discussion of the evidence supporting this explanation in various unimodal and cross-modal temporal order tasks.
- 7.
Since this position emphasizes the importance of simple latency differences, it has also been called as the simple brain-time view (Yarrow & Arnold, 2015). In the debates concerning spatiotemporal illusions, it is referred to as the latency difference hypothesis, the simple differential latency hypothesis, and the simple differential lag model (Arnold, Ong, & Roseboom, 2009; Chappell & Hine, 2004; Whitney & Murakami, 1998; Whitney et al., 2000).
- 8.
The evidence for the adaptation to a non-simultaneous multimodal stimulus can also be explained by the shifts in decision criteria (Yarrow, Jahn, Durant, & Arnold, 2011). Since such shifts happen at the post-experiential decision level, this explanation concurs with the brain-time view.
- 9.
Paraphrasing William James’ remark—agreed by most philosophers and motivating the lively debate concerning the temporal structure of consciousness—the succession of experience is not the experience of succession.
- 10.
I am deeply grateful to Sean Power, whose help and incisive comments greatly improved the paper.
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Arstila, V. (2019). Time Markers and Temporal Illusions. In: Arstila, V., Bardon, A., Power, S.E., Vatakis, A. (eds) The Illusions of Time. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22048-8_18
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