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Ownership is (likely to be) a moral foundation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2023

Mohammad Atari Open the ORCID record for Mohammad Atari [Opens in a new window]  and
Jonathan Haidt
Mohammad Atari
Affiliation:
Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA matari@fas.harvard.edu
Jonathan Haidt
Affiliation:
Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY, USA jh3390@stern.nyu.edu
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Abstract

Boyer presents a compelling account of ownership as the outcome of interaction between two evolved cognitive systems. We integrate this model into current discussions of moral pluralism, suggesting that ownership meets the criteria to be a moral foundation. We caution against ignoring cultural variation in ownership norms and against explaining complex, contested moral phenomena using a monist approach.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e326
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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