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79. HUME. by BARRY STROUD. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977 Pp. xii + 250. ^7.50 In this, the fifth volume in the series The Arguments of the Philosophers edited by Ted Honderich, Professor Stroud is impressively successful in working out a unified and consistent interpretation of Hume's philosophical writings. To begin with I thought him less successful in the more difficult task of communicating with beginners and Hume scholars alike. But I was gradually convinced that, although beginners have to work hard, the more determined of them are well catered for by the clear, careful exposition of central matters, and that the more expert will be interested to find this sometimes familiar material used in support of the thesis that Hume is to be understood as the scientific student of human nature he claimed to be - not fundamentally a sceptic, nor an advocate of the theory of ideas (which he simply took for. granted) , and emphatically not an analytical empiricist before his time. Many will agree that interpretations and criticisms of Hume often go astray by considering parts of his work in isolation from one another. In opposition to this, Stroud tries to be comprehensive; although, as he acknowledges in his Preface, he does not manage to take into account absolutely everything. It is, perhaps, most to be regretted that no space was found for a consideration of Hume's treatment of religion, since it might well have afforded clues to his strategic aims in philosophy. The neglect of the historical writings is probably less serious, though it would be interesting to read a detailed defence of Stroud's claim that his interpretation makes Hume's history more of a piece with the rest of his work than is generally supposed. After the introductory chapter and a chapter giving 80. an admirable account of the theory of ideas, the following main topics are dealt with: causality and necessary connection (III and IV) ; the continued and distinct existence of bodies (V) ; personal identity (VI) ; practical reason and morality (VII - IX) . Conclusions are summarised in chapter X. The introduction emphasises that Hume is putting forward 'a new theory or vision' of human nature, in which association has the role taken by gravitation in Newtonian physics. Hume takes for granted a rather simplistic version of the theory of ideas, his problem being to determine what has to be added in order to construct a satisfactory account of human nature. He is attempting to extend Hutcheson's treatment of aesthetics and morality to all divisions of human nature. Acknowledgement is here made to Kemp Smith; corroboration of the letter's conjecture that Hume's ethics pre-dated his epistemologa is found in the fact that in Treatise Bk. II reasoning (including causal reasoning) is opposed to passion, whereas in Bk. I causal thinking is credited to imagination (passion) rather than to reason (p. 162 note). Stroud later (p. 186) sees in Kemp Smith's conjecture an explanation of the 'crudity' of Hume's account of moral judgments compared with his treatment of causal statements. This, as Stroud recognises, leaves unanswered the question why the relevant passages of the second Enquiry were not revised in the light of Treatise Bk. I; but Stroud can be forgiven for not going deeply into the relationship between the Treatise and the Enquiries in the present well-packed book. Another point of emphasis in chapter I is that Hume's attempt to discredit traditional rationalism in its own terms is subordinate to his project of developing a radically naturalistic account of human nature. The aim is not fundamentally sceptical (though it seems to me hard to deny that Hume is at times carried away) ; it is rather to prepare the way for his own views. There are, 81. in fact, generally two phases to Hume's procedure: first an exposure of the inadequacy of rationalism, next his own positive account. Accordingly Stroud tries to comment separately on the negative and positive phases of Hume's treatment of causality, dividing it between chapters III and IV, and to an extent tries to maintain the same division in his discussion of the other topics. In chapter III Stroud argues that Hume...

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