Abstract
Contemporary accounts of luck, though differing in pretty much everything, all agree that the concept of luck is descriptive as opposed to normative. This widespread agreement forms part of the framework in which debates in ethics and epistemology, where the concept of luck plays a central role, are carried out. The hypothesis put forward in the present paper is that luck attributions are sensitive to normative considerations. I report five experiments suggesting that luck attributions are influenced by the normative features of the case, and not merely by descriptive notions like agential control or modal fragility. I discuss the implications of this effect for theories of luck and debates in ethics and epistemology.
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Notes
For simplicity, I restrict the incompatibility thesis to blameworthiness, though similar arguments might apply for praiseworthiness.
The thought seems to rely on the assumption that luck is a ubiquitous and irremovable element of human life.
Most discussions of moral luck trade in examples of resultant luck, and I think it is fair to say that the jury is still out regarding its compatibility with blameworthiness (Nagel 1979; Statman 1993). In epistemology, veritic luck is widely held to be incompatible with knowledge (Axtell 2001; Engel 1992; Gettier 1963; Pritchard 2005, 2008; though see Baumann 2014; Greco 2003 for a different position).
Another type of luck that has been claimed to undermine blameworthiness and knowledge is luck in the circumstances (or evidential situation, in epistemology) one encounters. Again, there is debate on how real the threat is. (For discussion in ethics, see, e.g., Doris 2002; Harman 2003; Kamtekar 2004, for discussion in epistemology, see, e.g., Axtell 2001; Engel 1992; Harman 1973; Vahid 2001).
A flurry of counterexamples (e.g., Lackey 2008; Latus 2000) has led to ever more complex formulations of the account. For example, Latus notes that the rising of the sun is a daily event that is beyond my control and is highly significant for me, but it seems wrong to say that I am lucky every morning. Riggs (2009) amended the account to deal with these sorts of counterexamples. According to his formulation, “E is lucky for S iff (a) is (too far) out of S’s control, and (b) S did not successfully exploit E for some purpose, and (c) E is significant to S” (Riggs 2009, p. 220), where exploitation is something like using the belief (or knowledge) that E will obtain as part of one’s future plans (see Riggs 2009, p. 216, for the thought experiment that purports to establish condition (b), see also Broncano-Berrocal 2015; Coffman 2007; Levy 2009 for so-called ‘mixed-accounts,’ that is, accounts with both modal and control conditions).
It seems obvious that it is for the patient.
Note that Pritchard’s formulation does not make reference to a subject. He argues that a philosophical theory of luck should deal with “luck as an objective phenomenon” (Pritchard 2015, p. 154).
The relevant notions of “match” and “mismatch” turn out to be subtler to spell out than one might at first expect; I discuss some of the issues that arise in Sect. 5.1.
The results were virtually identical when the dependent variable was the luckiness of the agent. For the sake of space, I will not discuss these results any further. Suffice it to say that the pattern of results observed for luckiness of the event was observed for luckiness of the agent. This was true as well for Study 3 (luckiness of the agent was not measured in Studies 2 and 4).
In other words, the probability account predicts a main effect of outcome (where bad outcomes should be judged luckier than good outcomes) and no interaction. In contrast, the normative match effect predicts an interaction reflecting the impact of normative mismatch.
From, members of the UC Berkeley faculty, “Open letters calling for cancellation of Milo Yiannopoulos event,” The Daily Californian, January 10, 2017.
From Anna Mitchell, “Let Milo Speak,” The Stanford Review, February 12, 2017.
Proponents of the lack of control account might suggest that bad outcomes lead us to ascribe more control to the agent, and consequently less luck to the event, explaining the main effect observed in the results (cf. Alicke 2000). Fans of the modal account, in turn, could propose that given a bad action, the possibility of a bad outcome seems modally closer. And thus, if a good outcome obtains instead, people would be led to posit luck. This explanation would be able to account for the effect of normative mismatch on luck attributions.
There were two changes with respect to the vignettes of Study 1. First, the probability of the outcome that obtained was fixed to 30%. Second, the description of the outcome was modified to avoid negative constructions. Instead of saying, ‘the patient does not suffer an injury’ (as in Study 1) the vignette read, ‘the procedure succeeds.’ To make it parallel, the description of the bad outcome was modified from ‘the patient suffers an injury” to “the procedure fails.” Analogous changes were made to the other vignettes (see “Appendix”).
There was a main effect of Outcome-Valence, F(1, 393) = 28.34, p < .001, η2 = 0.02, such that participants in the bad conditions were less inclined to attribute luck than those in the good conditions. There was also a main effect of Vignette, F(2, 393) = 4.21, p = .01, η2 = 0.02. Participants attributed more luck in ‘Lawyer’ than in both ‘Surgeon’ and ‘Commander.’
A significant Outcome-Valence × Vignette interaction obtained, F(2, 393) = 3.94, p = .02, η2 = 0.01. The interaction was due to the lack of an Outcome-Valence effect in the ‘Lawyer’ vignette. As mentioned in the text, there was a significant Action-Valence × Outcome-Valence interaction, F(1, 393) = 25.42, p < .001, η2 = 0.06. The interaction was decomposed to further understand the effect. Participants in the bad outcome conditions were less inclined to attribute luck when the action was negligent (M = 2.16, SD = 1.59) than when it was virtuous (M = 3.84, SD = 1.92), t(393) = 6.01, p < .001, d = 0.95, whereas participants in the good outcome conditions showed the opposite pattern. They attributed less luck when the action leading to the good outcome was virtuous (M = 3.04 SD = 1.90), than when it was negligent (M = 4.44, SD = 1.76), t(393) = − 5.30, p < .001, d = 0.76.
There was a significant Action-Valence × Outcome-Valence x Vignette interaction, F(2, 393) = 3.55, p = .02, η2 = 0.01. The Action-Valence × Outcome-Valence interaction was significant in both the ‘Surgeon’ and ‘Lawyer’ vignettes (both p’s < .01), but failed to reach significance in the ‘Commander’ vignette.
There is debate concerning whether, and to what extent, outcome-valence has an impact on causal judgments. Alicke et al. (2011) present evidence suggesting that it does. Their theory of culpable causation posits that actions resulting in bad outcomes are seen as more causal. Recently, however, Cova et al. (2018) failed to replicate their results (the replication was conducted by Ivar Hannikainen). The replication’s results showed an effect of outcome-valence on judgments of blame, but not on causal judgments. For the details of the replication, see https://osf.io/4yuym/.
Again, it is worth keeping in mind that this result does not guarantee that normative mismatch has an independent effect on luck attributions, other factors might be at play (see p. 36).
It is worth noting that the results supported the claim by Alicke et al. (2011) that causal judgments are sensitive to outcome-valence. Contrary to Cova et al.’s (2018) failed replication, irresponsible agents were rated as more causal when the outcome was bad than when it was good. More research is needed to elucidate the conditions in which the valence of the outcome has an effect on causal judgments.
As Sosa (2007) notes, in Gettier cases, an agent’s epistemic virtues explain the existence of a given belief, but they don’t explain the truth of the belief.
What this shows is that blaming the homicidal driver is not in conflict with the incompatibility thesis because the outcome involves no luck. This of course does not, in any way, solve the problem of moral luck. For the problem is whether the two drivers deserve the same blame. As a matter of fact, I think the problem can be formulated without mentioning the term ‘luck’ at all. For example, if two persons shoot somebody in the same way and for the same reasons, but one of them survives because the ambulance arrives faster, don’t they deserve to be blamed in the same manner, since the time the ambulance arrives has nothing to do with them? The point is that these sorts of questions remain prima facie compelling, even without talking about luck. Thanks to Dan Greco for discussion on this point. The example is Greco’s.
Engel doesn’t think that the type of luck involved in the new evil demon is problematic. He merely thinks that it is the type of luck that we must recognize as compatible with knowledge. My point is that we don’t even have to recognize it as luck in the first place.
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Acknowledgements
I want to thank Stephen Darwall, Keith DeRose, Dan Greco, Shaun Nichols, Duncan Pritchard, Anat Shor, and three anonymous referees for their insightful feedback on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to members of Josh Knobe’s Experimental Philosophy Lab at Yale for stimulating discussion and advice. Above all, I thank Josh Knobe for his tremendous help and constant encouragement.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Vignettes used in Study 1
1.2 Commander
1.2.1 Negligent action
About to perform a military mission to rescue a group of hostages, the commander of the team decides to ignore crucial new information that would have altered the original plan. As a result, the chances of a failed mission rise to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the mission fails [does not fail].
1.2.2 Virtuous action
About to perform a military mission to rescue a group of hostages, the commander of the team decides to alter the original plan in light of crucial new information. As a result, the chances of a failed mission drop to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the mission fails [does not fail].
1.3 Lawyer
1.3.1 Negligent action
The night before defending an innocent person in court, a lawyer decides to watch TV instead of preparing the case. As a result, the chances of the lawyer losing the case rise to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the lawyer loses [does not lose] the case.
1.3.2 Virtuous action
The night before defending an innocent person in court, a lawyer decides to go over each and every piece of evidence in order to prepare the best possible case. As a result, the chances of the lawyer losing the case drop to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the lawyer loses [does not lose] the case.
1.4 Vignettes used in Study 4
1.5 Commander
1.5.1 Negligent action
About to perform a military mission to rescue a group of hostages, the commander of the team decides to ignore crucial new information that would have altered the original plan. As a result, the chances of a failed [successful] mission rise [drop] to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the mission fails [succeeds].
1.5.2 Virtuous action
About to perform a military mission to rescue a group of hostages, the commander of the team decides to alter the original plan in light of crucial new information. As a result, the chances of a failed [successful] mission drop [rise] to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the mission fails [succeeds].
1.6 Lawyer
1.6.1 Negligent action
The night before defending an innocent person in court, a lawyer decides to watch TV instead of preparing the case. As a result, the chances of the lawyer losing [winning] the case rise [drop] to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the lawyer loses [wins] the case.
1.6.2 Virtuous action
The night before defending an innocent person in court, a lawyer decides to go over each and every piece of evidence in order to prepare the best possible case. As a result, the chances of the lawyer losing [winning] the case drop [rise] to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the lawyer loses [wins] the case.
1.7 Vignettes used in Study 5
1.8 Detective
A detective has spent the last couple of years working on a case involving an unsolved murder. He believes that he is at the brink of an important discovery. After many hours of interviews with people who knew the victims, and testimonies from those who were at the scene of the crime, the detective narrows down the list of suspects to ten people. He asks to run DNA tests on all ten suspects to finally determine who committed the crime. The district attorney approves the requests and DNA tests are ordered.
The scientist in charge of the DNA tests, who does not know anything about the crime, is tired and sleepy at the moment of analyzing the results. He does not double-check the analyses or makes sure the samples are not contaminated, as is common procedure. He messes up the results and mistakenly informs the detective that sample number 2 matches the target DNA. The detective thus arrests suspect number two. As it happens, suspect number two is the only person who knows who committed the crime and, at the prospect of being charged with the murder himself, tells the detective who the murderer is. The detective thus solves the crime. [He messes up the results and mistakenly informs the detective that sample number 2 matches the target DNA. The detective thus arrests suspect number two. After extensive questioning, it becomes clear that he is innocent. The detective thus fails to solve the crime].
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Attie-Picker, M. Is the folk concept of luck normative?. Synthese 198, 1481–1515 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02137-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02137-5