Article contents
Feminism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2020
Abstract
The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.
- Type
- Original Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2010 by Audrey Yap
References
Antony, L. 1993. Quine as feminist: The radical import of naturalized epistemology. In A mind of one's own: Feminist essays on reason and objectivity, ed. Antony, L. and Witt, C.Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, pp. 185–225.Google Scholar
Ayim, M. 1995. Passing through the needle's eye: Can a feminist teach logic? Argumentation 9:801–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carnap, R. 1937/2002. The logical syntax of language. Trans. Amethe Smeaton. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. 1956. Empiricism, semantics, and ontology. In Meaning and necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 205–21.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. 1963. Intellectual autobiography. In The library of living philosophers XI: The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. Schlipp, Paul A.Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, pp. 3–84.Google Scholar
DeVidi, D., and Solomon, G. 1995. Tolerance and metalanguages in Carnap's Logical syntax of language. Synthese 103:123–39.Google Scholar
Ehrlich, S., and King, R. 1998. Gender‐based language reform and the social construction of meaning. In The feminist critique of language: A reader, ed. Cameron, D.London: Routledge, pp. 164–79.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. 1988. Logical truth and analyticity in Carnap's Logical syntax of language. In History and philosophy of modern mathematics, ed. Aspray, W. and Kitcher, P.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 82–94.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. 1997. Philosophical naturalism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 71 (2): 7–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, M. 1999a. Geometry, convention, and the relativized a priori. In Reconsidering logical positivism, ed. Reichenbach, , Schlick, , and Carnap, . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 59–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, M. 1999b. Tolerance and analyticity in Carnap's philosophy of mathematics. In Reconsidering logical positivism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 183–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gimbel, S. 2002. Politics and the wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung: Neurath and Reichenbach on science and socialism. In Siblings under the skin: Feminism, social justice and analytic philosophy, ed. Clough, S.Aurora, Colo.: The Davies Group, Publishers, pp. 13–37.Google Scholar
Hintikka, M. B., and Hintikka, J. 1983. How can language be sexist? In Discovering reality, ed. Harding, S. and Hintikka, M.B.Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 139–48.Google Scholar
Longino, H. 1983. Beyond “bad science”: Skeptical reflections on the value‐freedom of scientific inquiry. Science, Technology, and Human Values 8 (1): 7–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lorde, A. 1984. The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. In Sister outsider: Essays and speeches. Freedom, Calif.: The Crossing Press, pp. 110–13.Google Scholar
Nelson, L. 1996. Empiricism without dogmas. In Feminism, science, and the philosophy of science, ed. Nelson, L. and Nelson, J.Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 95–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nye, A. 1990. Words of power: A feminist reading of the history of logic. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Okruhlik, K. 2004. Logical empiricism, feminism, and Neurath's auxiliary motive. Hypatia 19 (1): 48–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. 1953. Two dogmas of empiricism. In From a logical point of view. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 20–46.Google Scholar
Richardson, A. 1997. Two dogmas about logical empiricism: Carnap and Quine on logic, epistemology, and empiricism. Philosophical Topics 25 (2): 145–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richardson, A. 1998. Carnap's construction of the world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Richardson, A. 2007. Carnapian pragmatism. In The Cambridge companion to Carnap, ed. Friedman, M. and Creath, R.Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 295–316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ricketts, T. 2004. Frege, Carnap, and Quine: Continuities and discontinuities. In Carnap brought home: The view from Jena, ed. Awodey, S. and Klein, C.Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, pp. 181–202.Google Scholar
Spender, D. 1998. Extracts from Man made language. In The feminist critique of language: A reader, ed. Cameron, D.London: Routledge, pp. 93–99.Google Scholar
Whorf, B. 1956. Language, mind, and reality. In Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. Carroll, J.B.Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 246–70.Google Scholar
- 13
- Cited by