Abstract
The paper has three parts. The first is a discussion of the values as goals and means. This is a known Moorean distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, with one other Moorean item - the doctrine of value wholes. According to this doctrine the value wholes are not simply a summation of their parts, which implies a possibility that two evils might be better than one (e. g. crime + punishment, two evils, are better than either one of them taken separately). In this first part I will discuss peace as an end value, and war as a means value. The second part dicsusses briefly the issue of sincerity. The third, last and for me the most important part of the paper explores the issue of moral integrity in pacifism: could a pacifist preserve the integrity of the attacker, or, for that matter her own integrity, or must she destroy anyone’s integrity and dehumanize the attacker and also herself?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Cf. James (1970)
Cf. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:417.
Mainly, or almost all of them – but not necessarily all: it is possible to conceive, and it really happens, that such critical conditions like war might also produce good by-products, as Kant would say: Kant, 8:363.
Cf. Weber (1958)
Some of these arguments are well analyzed in Jan Narveson’s “Pacifism”, Ethics 75 (1964/5), 4, reprinted in many collections.
Cf. Norman (1988)
On the “positive” freedom see Berlin (1969)
See A. Augustin, The City of God, Bk. I. Ch. 19.
The concept of integrity has been used here only implicitly. It should be further explored and defined more explicitly. Being one of the most important and most difficult to explain notions in moral philosophy, it certainly deserves independent elaboration. The way it has been used here is, I believe, not unlike the one of Bernard Williams in “A Critique of utilitarianism”, in Smart & Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press 1973, pp. 99ff). It pointed to the distinction between negative and positive responsibility (negative responsibility for one’s own decisions and projects; and, from the utilitarian point of view indiscernible and total, positive “responsibility” for the actuality of the final outcome of what we do, making the responsibility infinite and impersonal, and us accountable for everything we can do, independently of what we decide). However, I think my real source is Kant, his doctrine of universal respect as a necessary condition for the imputability of responsibility to persons – responsibility for what one decides to do and does – and, especially, Kantian ban of the caring for the moral perfection of others: the perfection of others is up to others, we do not have the right to presume that others will necessarily choose what we think is right. The only moral right regarding the others we have is the right to blame them for the wrong they do. But that right would be destroyed if we no longer consider others as being free to decide for themselves, including freedom to choose evil (and attack us, as free and responsible, i. e. blamable, agents). True respect of others includes the acceptance of this freedom of theirs. The right to blame them for the wrongness of what they do is possible only on the basis of our recognition that it is up to them to decide what they will decide. For Kant, cf. e. g. 6:386, 6:392, etc.; cf. also J. Babić, (2004) “Toleration vs. Doctrinal Evil in Our Time”, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, p. 234, for the possibility to choose evil as a part of the description of (moral) person.
A similar argumentation regarding defense of one’s country, might be found in Charlie Broad, “Ought We To Fight For Our Country in the Next War” (1936).
References
James, W. (1970). “The moral equivalent of war”, R. Wasserstrom, war and morality (p. 4). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.
Weber, M. (1958). “Politics as vocation”, from Max Weber: Essays in sociology, tr. & ed. By H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press (A Galaxy Book): New York, p. 122.
Norman, R. (1988). The case for pacifism. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 5(2), 198.
Berlin I. (1969). “Two concepts of liberty”. In I. Berlin (Ed.), Four essays on liberty. Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Babić, J. Pacifism and Moral Integrity. Philosophia 41, 1007–1016 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9459-9
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9459-9