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Philippe Mongin (1950–2020)

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Daniel Andler, Claude d’Aspremont, Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich, Marc Fleurbaey, François Maniquet, and especially to Antoine Billot, Brian Hill, Bertrand Munier, Alain Trannoy, and John Weymark for their comments.  We also thank Françoise Forges for providing the photo, and for kindly agreeing to read a draft of the text.

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  1. Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Jean Baccelli

  2. CY Cergy Paris Université, Cergy, France

    Marcus Pivato

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  1. Jean Baccelli
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Correspondence to Marcus Pivato.

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Baccelli, J., Pivato, M. Philippe Mongin (1950–2020). Theory Decis 90, 1–9 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09789-7

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