Skip to main content
Log in

The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study

  • Published:
Theory and Decision Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A person is said to be ‘trust responsive’ if she fulfils trust because she believes the truster trusts her. The experiment we report was designed to test for trust responsiveness and its robustness across payoff structures, and to discriminate it from other possible factors making for trustworthiness, including perceived kindness, perceived need and inequality aversion. We elicit the truster’s confidence that the trustee will fulfil, and the trustee’s belief about the truster’s confidence after the trustee receives evidence relevant to this. We find evidence of strong trust responsiveness. We also find that perceptions of kindness and of need increase trust responsiveness, and that they do so only in conjunction with trust responsiveness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bacharach, M.O.L. and Gambetta, D. (2001a). Trust in signs, in Cook, K. (ed), Trust in Society, Russell Sage Foundation: New York.

  • Bacharach, M.O.L. and Gambetta, D. (2001b), Trust as type detection, in Castelfranchi, C., Tan, Y.-H., et al. (eds.), Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies, Kluwer: Dordrecht.

  • Bacharach, M.O.L., Guerra, G. and Zizzo, D.J. (2001), Is trust self-fulfilling? An experimental Study, Discussion Paper no. 76, Department of Economics, University of Oxford.

  • Berg J., Dickhaut J., Mccabe K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–142

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blount S. (1995) When social outcomes aren’t fair: the effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 63, 131–144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bolle F. (1995) Rewarding trust: an experimental study. Theory and Decision 25, 83–98

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolton G., Ockenfels A. (2000) ERC – A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166–193

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charness G., Rabin M. (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817–869

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coleman J. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Belkamp, Harvard

    Google Scholar 

  • Croson R.T.A. (2000) Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 41, 299–314

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dufwenberg M. (2002) Marital investments, time consistency, and emotions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 48, 57–69

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dufwenberg M., Gneezy U. (2000) Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior 30, 163–182

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Falk A., Fischbacher U. (2001) Distributional consequences and intentions in a model of reciprocity. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 63–64, 111–129

    Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E., Gächter S. (1997) How effective are trust and reciprocity-based incentives?. In: Ben-Ner A., Putterman L. (eds). Economics, Value and Organisation. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E., Schmidt K.M. (1999) A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey B., Oberholzer-Gee F. (1997) The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. American Economic Review 87, 746–755

    Google Scholar 

  • Gambetta D. (eds) (1988) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell: Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Geanakopolos J., Pearce D., Stacchetti E. (1989) Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 1, 60–79

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glaeser E., Laibson D., Scheinkman J., Soutter C. (2000) Measuring trust. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 811–846

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guerra, G. and Zizzo, D.J. (2004), Trust responsiveness and beliefs, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization forthcoming.

  • Guilkey D.K., Murphy J.L. (1993) Estimation and testing in the random effects probit model. Journal of Econometrics 59, 301–317

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardin R. (1991) Trusting persons, trusting institutions. In: Zeckhauser R. (eds). Strategy and Choice. MIT Press: Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hargreaves Heap S., Hollis M., Lyons B., Sugden R., Weale A. (1992) The Theory of Choice. Blackwell: Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hausman, D. (1998), Fairness and trust in game theory, Mimeo, London School of Economics.

  • Hirschman A.O. (1984) Against parsimony. Three easy ways of complicating some categories of economic discourse. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 74, 88–96

    Google Scholar 

  • Hollis M. (1998) Trust within Reason. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Huck S., Weiszäcker G. (2002) Do players correctly estimate what others do?. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 47, 71–85

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hume D. (1740[1978]) Treatise on Human Nature. Clarendon Press: Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Jussim L. (1986) Self-fulfilling prophecies: a theoretical and integrative review. Psychological Review 93, 429–445

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCabe K., Rigdon M., Smith V. (2003) Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52, 267–275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orbell J.M., Dawes R.M. (1991) A ‘cognitive miser’ theory of cooperator’s advantage. American Political Science Review 85, 515–528

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pelligra, V. (2000), Goldfish and game theory: a problem of trust, Mimeo, School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia.

  • Pettit P. (1995) The cunning of trust. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, 202–225

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam R.D., Leonardi R., Nanetti R.Y. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press: Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Rabin M. (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83, 1281–1302

    Google Scholar 

  • Schotter, A. and Sopher, B. (2006), Trust and trustworthiness in inter-generational games: an experimental study of inter-generational advice, Experimental Economics forthcoming.

  • Schotter A., Weiss A., Zapater I. (1996) Fairness and survival in ultimatum and dictator games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 31, 37–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wrightsman L.S. (1966) Personality and attitudinal correlates of trusting and trustworthy behaviors in a two-person game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4, 328–332

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zizzo, D.J. (2000), Relativity-sensitive behaviour in economics, Doctoral thesis, University of Oxford.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniel John Zizzo.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bacharach, M., Guerra, G. & Zizzo, D.J. The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study. Theor Decis 63, 349–388 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9043-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9043-5

Keywords

JEL Classification Codes

Navigation