Abstract
An easily recognizable feature of Sartre’s phenomenological existentialism is his conception of freedom. According to a popular interpretation, we are absolutely free, not only from factual constraints, but also free to create and pursue our own values. In this respect, Sartre appears to continue in a radical direction the Kantian project of making room for freedom in a world colonized by scientific determinism and dogmatic moralism. This chapter challenges the popular reading. It argues that Sartre extends the implications of Kant’s conception of freedom, especially concerning the constraining character of imperatives and principles; yet he acknowledges the need for some limitation on a legitimate account of freedom. This limitation is given by the higher-order values (e.g., authenticity) expressed by our free actions.
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Baiasu, S. (2021). Freedom in Sartre’s Phenomenology: The Kantian Limits of a Radical Project. In: Coe, C.D. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology. Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66857-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66857-0_6
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