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Is There a Role for Adversariality in Teaching Critical Thinking?

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Abstract

There has been considerable recent debate regarding the possible epistemic benefits versus the potential risks of adversariality in argumentation. Nonetheless, this debate has rarely found its way into work on critical thinking theory and instruction. This paper focuses on the implications of the adversariality debate for teaching critical thinking. Is there a way to incorporate the benefits of adversarial argumentation while mitigating the problems? Our response is an approach based on dialectical inquiry which focuses on a confrontation of opposing views within a collaborative framework.

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Notes

  1. One work which does deal with the issue of adversariality in critical thinking instruction is Hundleby’s (2010) discussion of problems with the adversary paradigm in the teaching of fallacies.

  2. We acknowledge that there are many goals individuals may have for arguing other than the making of reasoned judgments. Our focus, however, is on argumentation as an epistemic practice and the debate over the value of adversarial argumentation as a means for epistemic improvement.

  3. Both Govier (2020) and Aikin (2017) have subsequently modified their positions to focus on adversariality in terms of roles rather than individuals (see Sects. 3.2.2 and 6.2).

  4. We subsequently adopt Stevens and Cohen’s (2019b) term “adversarial stance” (see Sect. 5.1).

  5. See our discussion in Sect. 5.1.

  6. The most favourable context for facilitating such interactive, group-oriented pedagogy is clearly in small classes, which are the ideal for any type of critical thinking instruction. Nonetheless there are ways to work towards this approach in larger classes, including having students work in smaller groups for particular projects and assignments both in and outside of class, using tutorials as a venue for group interaction, the use of interactive online forums, transforming the structure of lecture classes including the uses of techniques such as ‘think-pair-share’ (https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pages/setting-up-and-facilitating-group-work-using-cooperative-learning-groups-effectively/), a ‘flipped classroom’( https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pages/flipping-the-classroom/) or ‘just in time teaching’ (https://jittdl.physics.iupui.edu/jitt/). There are more specific suggestions offered in the Instructors’ Manual to our text, Reason in the Balance, as well as many ideas for changing the dynamics of large classes available on the web (e.g., https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pages/lecturing/-interactive).

  7. A functioning community of inquiry is most easily established in smaller groups. But instructors can work at encouraging the inquiry orientation which underpins such a community through the atmosphere and expectations they establish and their own mode of interacting with students’ questions and challenges. They can, for example, engage students in a discussion about the nature of collaborative inquiry and ask them to come up with what would be appropriate expectations for students of other students, for students of themselves, for students of the instructor, and for the instructor of students engaging in collaborative inquiry. Another important aspect is instructor modelling of the appropriate virtues of inquiry such as open-mindedness, respect for students’ ideas, a willingness to follow ideas where they lead, and an openness to being mistaken and to altering their own view if warranted.

  8. Cf. Stevens and Cohen: “The attitude arguers have in an argument will impact their argumentative behavior. E.g., an arguer with a cooperative attitude will aim to act so that the arguers as a group will identify and correctly weigh reasons applicable to the issue. By contrast, an arguer with an adversarial attitude will behave in those ways she hopes will ultimately help her achieve her goal of winning.” (Stevens and Cohen 2019b).

  9. Aikin (2017) does acknowledge a collaborative dimension in the sense that these moves of critical probing which are necessary for minimal dialectical adversariality and which are oppositional in terms of their dialectical function are “in the service of a broader cooperative goal of dialectical testing of reasons and acceptability” (p. 16).

  10. Stevens (2020) makes a similar claim with respect to the principle of charity—that one ought to try to understand what one’s interlocutor is trying to say despite the fact that this task is “potentially so difficult that it can only ever remain an ideal goal, always pursued, never fully achieved” (p. 7).

  11. Two strategies adapted from those offered by Stevens (2020) might be helpful in such situations. One is trying to change the way an adversarial argument is starting to be structured by persisting in a collaborative inquiry role hoping the other arguer will “shift gears.” The other is to start a meta-dialogue, “asking, for example, why the arguer is so aggressive, or whether they could work together in their reasoning” (p. 17).

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Monica Bhattacharjee for her helpful comments. We would also like to acknowledge the assistance of a Retirees’ Research Grant from the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at OSSA 12, Windsor, 2020.

Funding

This work was funded by a Retirees’ Research Grant from Simon Fraser University.

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  1. Faculty of Education (Emeritus), Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

    Sharon Bailin

  2. Department of Philosophy (Emeritus), Capilano University, North Vancouver, BC, Canada

    Mark Battersby

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  1. Sharon Bailin
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Correspondence to Sharon Bailin.

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Bailin, S., Battersby, M. Is There a Role for Adversariality in Teaching Critical Thinking?. Topoi 40, 951–961 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09713-2

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