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WHAT EMOTIONS ARE ABOUT

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“Emotion: disturbance of the mind, vehemence of passion.” So writes Samuel Johnson, and the term, as used by Hume (and its French near-equivalent, as used by Descartes), is indeed reserved for mental disturbances and “vehement” passions. Our current usage of “emotional” preserves this older meaning. So should I change my title to “what passions are about”? The trouble with this proposal is that we today tend to think of passions as vehement emotions, so I might gain intelligibility with the ghosts of Descartes, Johnson and Hume, but lose it with my contemporaries. We speak of the “emotive theory of ethics” where Hume, perhaps even vehemently, would have eschewed this term, doubtless preferring “passionate theory of ethics” (if theory has to be foisted upon him), or perhaps “sentiment theory,” or “taste theory”. We have a terminological problem in this area, one which psychologists solve by talking, like Kant and Freud, of “affect,” and following Spinoza in individuating different “affects”. This will do as a convention among intellectuals, but will scarcely do to communicate to ordinary intelligent and ordinarily passionate people what it is we are discoursing about. If “emotion” has moved away from “emotional,” and “passionate” has moved away from the old more neutral “passion,” the English “affect” has no ties at all to anything anyone thinks themselves familiar with. The adjectival forms “passionate” and “emotional” seem to be used of persons who have not just strong passions and intense emotions but ones that vary dramatically. Later I shall be suggesting that variety is indeed of the essence of these states, so that the meaning

of these adjectives points us in the right direction. We do not have any adjective analogous to “emotional” and “passionate” to describe the person temporarily or permanently prone to strong or abnormally variant forms of “affect”. “Affected” certainly won’t do, and “affectionate” means something quite different. What then am I going to be talking about? About most of what Descartes, Hobbes and Hume called our passions, all of what Darwin and recent philosophers call our emotions, most of what Spinoza, Kant and psychologists from Freud onwards call “affect” or “affects”, hoping that the full list of seventeenth and eighteenth century passions, of nineteenth and twentieth century emotions, of seventeenth to twentieth century affects, would be more or less the same, or inter-translatable. I am not talking only about what “upsets” or “disturbs” the mind, but also about mild amusement, about nostalgia, about normal hope, regret, curiosity, interest, which merely animate the mind, keeping it from that apathy or absence of all passion which Hobbes called “dullnesse,” a running down of the living mechanism, a diminishing of “endeavour,” signally the approach of death. “For as to be without Desire is to be Dead, so to be without strong Passions is Dullnesse.” (*Leviathan*, Ch. 8)

This quotation from Hobbes highlights one important difference between Hobbes’, Descartes’ and Hume’s “passions”, and both our “emotions” and our, but not Spinoza’s, “affects,” namely that desire (and conscious motive) are included in the passions, indeed for Hobbes and Spinoza desire is the key passion. Since we tend to contrast “conation” with “affect” or emotion, while they did not, and since I do not intend to try to do justice to the rather special aboutness of desire, I shall restrain my sentimental preference for the old term “passion,” and stick with the term “emotion” in its neutered modern philosophical usage. Emotions in this sense need not move us very much, only enough to yield evaluations, to “affect judgment”. Certainly they need not disturb in the sense of derange the mind. They range from the vehement (rage) to the mild (boredom), from the functionally disruptive (ecstasy and despair) through the functionally restorative (hope and resignation) to the functionally nearly essential (attention and minding).

Why should one think there is any one phenomenon which is the aboutness of this great range of mental states, and in particular a form of aboutness that can be at least implicitly compared, perhaps contrasted, with that of states of desire and of belief? One should

not. One should keep an open mind on this. The intentionality of love may be quite different from that of amusement which may not be so different from the intentionality of conviction or disbelief. But keeping an eye on the full extent of the range of human emotions should check the tendency to too quick generalization about them.

Emotions in this bastard sense I am adopting are different from moods in that they typically have objects, are about something, not everything, while moods, if they are about anything, seem to be about nearly everything. Nostalgia is an emotion—it is nostalgia for some roughly intended set of vanished joys, but depression is a mood—a sense that everything is hopeless. We can ask what makes a person depressed, solemn, irritable, euphoric, defensive, and sometimes get an answer, but the answer need not tell us what they are depressed about, what occasion they are solemnizing, what irritates them, what they are taking great joy in, what they are defending themselves against. Moods are either objectless, or have near all-inclusive and undifferentiated objects. They sometimes involve emotions searching for appropriate objects. The irritable person can be said to be set on finding an occasion for anger, but the depressed person need not be on the watch for an occasion for focused grief. She is more likely to be quite apathetic, not on the watch for anything. Emotions affect judgment, and moods affect emotion. I put moods aside, although in the end I think we will not be able to understand everything that relatively focused emotions are about except by connecting them with these fairly general or generalized states that we call moods. (Let me also say that I do not think we can understand cognitive states without linking them with moods, with the normal cognitive “good mood” of interest in one’s environment in general, or with deviations from that mood. Bad cognitive moods affect thought and cognition, as other bad moods affect emotion and desire states.)

Descartes pointed out two very important features of emotions. In his first work, the neglected *Compendium Musicae*, he emphasized that music, both through tonal variation and through rhythm, can powerfully affect the emotions of the hearer. Rousseau and then Darwin later repeat this obvious truth, suggesting that speech develops in a species already affected by tonal variation and already able to produce this at will—that we were singers before we were speakers. This is, I think, a great theory of the origin of language, and semantics might be quite transformed if we took the musical chord and phrase as the semantic unit of which words and sentences

are a special case. But that is not my present topic. Descartes, Rousseau and Darwin note and emphasize what no one as far as I know would deny, but what too few attend to, the fact that our emotions are sensitive both to tone and to rhythm¹, and are expressed in tone of voice and rhythm of speech. The other important fact about our emotions that Descartes notes is that at least some of them have “deep” objects, that behind the immediate object stand the ghosts of all the other objects which that specific sort of emotion has had in this person’s history, and maybe also the shadows of those that it will have. The full sequence of objects of my fear, or my love, or my revulsion, will reveal some quintessentially feared, loved, or revulsion-inducing object. Descartes’ example is the revulsion experienced at the touch of a cold earthworm, the rustle of leaves in the dark, the unexpected appearance of one’s own shadow. These all are, he says, revulsion at the thought of death, and in particular the thought that some cold worm-filled corpse, some ghost, some shadow, will be one’s own. Even if one has doubts about the specifics of Descartes’ depth psychology, he surely is on to something very important about emotions here, a feature that Darwin elaborates, when for example he analyses the expression of disgust as an incomplete repetition of a spitting out movement, or a nod of affirmation as a lowering forward of the head as if to receive offered food. This would make food the deep object of acceptance, false food the deep object of disgust. Emotions can have historically layered and so deep intentional objects, whereas other states of mind may be closer to being about no more than what they seem at the time to be about. Or, perhaps better, if an occurrent dispassionate thought’s content is more than what it seems to be, the more is not a historically “deep” referent, but only a more “distant” one. Thoughts trail implications, leading us as it were from one node on a tree or vine to its other branches, but emotions can lead us to their own perhaps multiple and interlocking roots, in personal history or in our species’ history.

The deep object of revulsion is not the same, although it may have interesting links, with the deep object of disgust and of fear and of hatred. This feature of intentional depth points up an important surface feature of emotions, namely that their variety is a classified plurality. We have names, and up to a point inter-translatable names, for emotion types, whereas we do not have anything like this for belief types or for intention types. (We do for some desire types, such

as hunger, thirst, and lust.) Having said this about belief and intention, I want immediately to query it. It may be as silly a comparison as to say "we have names for emotion types but not for disgust types," for belief may be one among the "cognitive attitudes," intention one among the "conative attitudes," as disgust is one among the "affective attitudes". Is there a fixed spectrum of thought modes or moods, or of conative moods, as there seems to be for emotional modes or moods? Or is this also a silly question, because of its apparent assumption that cognition, conation and affect are distinct genera? I want to suspend judgment for the moment on the relation of emotion to the rest of our mental lives, and on the relation of our lists of emotion types to any other lists we can or do make of apparently other mental types (be they illocutionary acts and their inner analogues, moods of verbs, or whatever). I will stick with the plain fact that we *do* list emotions. Descartes lists forty-one of them, Hobbes forty-six, Spinoza forty-eight, Hume about twenty, and so on. Most of these philosophers assumed that we are always in some emotion state or other, so that their lists give us the range of human emotional "weather," as it were, and it is intrinsic to weather that it vary. Hume imagined a variant of Plato's simple sea creature², a consciousness "reduc'd even below the life of an oyster"³ whose appetitive life was one monotonous hunger-cum-thirst. This one-desire consciousness is barely conceivable, but a one-emotion emotional life is inconceivable. To have any emotion one must have a range of emotions. Even if we have a "ruling passion," if we are prone to some emotions more than others, we will all have some familiarity with the full range. We will notice dramatic emotional *changes* in our fellows, and displays of unusually intense emotions, more than we notice slow changes and "calm passions". But we know the range, and can list the colors on our shared emotion spectrum.

This fact, that we can make lists, means that, in addition to apparent or immediate particular objects, and to the "deep" objects these lead us back to, emotions can be seen also to have "formal" objects, and we will distinguish as many formal objects as we distinguish different emotion types. The deep objects will be for each individual of the same diversity—they will be the paradigm or original particular objects for the formal objects of a given emotion type. Thus disgust will have as its formal object the unpalatable, presumably having as its deep object whatever first was falsely accepted as mother's milk, then on tasting rejected in disgust. To explain any ordinary

case of disgust we need to tell a historical and associational story showing how the current immediate object can “represent” the unpalatable substance. Representation will come into emotion not primarily through the beliefs or evaluations directly implied in a current emotion (since these need not *represent* the perceived facts of our current situation nor their felt significance for what we care about) but in the way this emotional episode repeats and represents a series of past emotions of the same type, terminating in the original, so “deep”, or “paradigm” object.

One might choose some other word for this relationship between the hypothesized original and so paradigm object of disgust and each subsequent object of it, and reserve “representation” for a relation between a linguistic or other mental item and what it refers to, but that would seem perverse. We have plenty other words, such as “reference,” for the word (or thought) to rest of world relationship, and we have well entrenched uses of “represent” for what one person does for another, so that it is irresistible to say that all the later objects of love represent or are representatives of the mother, the first object of love, and so on for other emotional attitudes. Later loves do not merely refer us back to earlier loves, though they do have this implicit anaphoric reference. They also reenact earlier loves. I shall say that the current loved person is the *representative* (not “representation”) of the original loved person. The implication that anyone or ones has *made* this one play this role, intended them so to represent, or that anyone controls some system of representation in which they have this role, is unwanted, and hereby cancelled.

What one wants and gets in the term “representative” (but does not have in “sign”) is the implication that the question “What makes this a suitable representative of the represented?” can come up. For our understanding of, and sometimes our criticism of, an adult person’s emotions will require us to look not just at what *does* serve as representative of the original objects of the infantile emotions, but also at how and with what degree of success they can play those roles. They need to be somehow *like* the represented, to do the job, and this is not true of signs nor necessarily of symbols. When we are in a position to select someone to represent us on some matter, in our system of “representative government,” or as an ambassador overseas, then we do try to pick one who is “really representative” of us—to pick a radical to represent conservatives, or a Canadian to represent Americans, would be to pick unsuitable representatives

for the task at hand. So the only suitable representatives of the unpalatable or nauseating things, the only suitable representatives of the loved mother are lovable motherly ones, and so on. These representatives are successors and memorials to what they represent, and they represent all their predecessor representatives as well as the ultimate one represented. They are like runners in a relay race, taking the stick from each other, each replacing the one who led off with that stick, and, if they stumble, failing to carry through on what each of their forerunners entrusted to them. Or like kings who believe that their dynasty rules by divine right, as God's representative—as each king passes the crown on at death to his successor, the ones whose king he is can say "The king is dead. Long live the king." So it is, on this Cartesian-cum-Freudian story, with our loves and disgusts. Each object of a given emotion sort takes over from its predecessors, and what is expected of it depends on their earlier performance. This is not to deny that we also expect some growth and maturation, rather than just repetition and "true representation".

There is of course no reason why one and the same person or thing should not at one time be the object of several emotions of another person, even for fairly long periods. The Freudian story indeed virtually requires that fathers originally be both loved and revered, so there may be subsequent father figures repeating that mixture of emotional roles. The mixture itself may become "fixed," so that there will be a tendency to find father figures, to get this complex role filled—the father is dead, long live the father. Infantile mixed emotions will set (perhaps corrigible) paradigms. But even emotions which did not get mixed through coming to share the same object in infancy can of course get mixed, for a time, later. Something which is the object of my revulsion may also be the object of my curiosity, or even of my reverence, and not necessarily because of infantile associations between those emotions. Christian education, for example, may associate the three emotions just listed. (It is however very hard to think of cases of mixed emotions for which some likely infantile scenario does not also suggest itself.) An emotion, Freud says, is the precipitate of a reminiscence.⁴ Not only might it be a (usually unconscious) reminiscence of an infantile mixed emotion, but it might be a mixed reminiscence of several infantile emotional episodes, each of them setting an emotional role that the current object of my mixed emotion has inadvertently stepped into.

Deep objects of pure or of mixed feelings, and the multiple deep objects of some mixed feelings, complicate the aboutness of emotions, but we cannot yet be sure that they complicate it in ways that have no analogues in the aboutness of beliefs, intentions and desires. Certainly desires admit of a very similar sort of account, a story in which something that is deeply and usually long desired is cited to explain the vagaries of current desire with its shifts of apparent object. What we do not get, or do not obviously get, with these other mental states is any *typing* of belief states, intention states, or of all desire states, at all parallel to the familiar emotion types I have been citing and relying on as prima facie examples of "pure" and of "mixed" emotions. What would a mixed intention, a mixed belief, or a mixed desire, be like? We certainly can kill several birds with one stony intentional action, hold a belief that is both very rich in its implications and varied in its support, and want something for rather complicated reasons, but the complexity in these cases seems just that, complexity, not a "mixing" of elements that we can sort out into elements of pure types or stereotypes. Certainly we do not have stereotyped spontaneous bodily expression for particular beliefs or belief types (unless credulous and incredulous faces, affirming nods and negating head shakes, express belief types) and if there are spontaneous expressions of intention types, they seem as flexible as the intentions themselves. To adapt Anscombe, we could say "the primitive sign of intention is doing," but *what* we intend does not always fall into clear types, so our spontaneous doings are not always stereotyped expressions. For one or two desires (lust, desire for cooling air or water) there seem stereotyped expressions, but desires in general are as hard to type as are intentions, and have no stereotyped spontaneous expression. By contrast, it seems the rule not the exception for emotions to have stereotyped spontaneous expressions. The research of Ekman and others found happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, interest, and disgust to have typical facial expressions that were easily recognized cross-culturally, from literate cultures to preliterate cultures in Borneo and New Guinea. Darwin concluded that love does not have a stereotyped bodily expression, even in our culture, and nor do envy, jealousy, or resentment. We have loving, jealous, envious, and resentful *thoughts*, that we can keep to ourselves, keep from being expressed, a lot more easily than we can keep our joy, rage, anger, surprise, shame, or disgust to ourselves. As Hobbes says, "The secret thoughts of a man run over all things,

holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame or blame." (*Leviathan*, Ch. 8.) But surely love is rarely secret, even when unspoken. Darwin himself thought that music evokes the voice tones of love, among other emotions. And as others (such as Eibl-Eibesfeldt, in *Love and Hate*) have emphasized, love does also seem to have the embrace as its natural expression. The spontaneous embrace is itself fairly invariant, but its formalized version, used to greet or welcome someone, shows considerable cross-cultural variation—from kissing to nose rubbing, from handshakes to genitals-shakes (in some New Guinea highlander tribes). Just as formalized aggression takes many ritual forms, while spontaneous aggression is expressed more monotonously, so the variety of human greetings can be seen as ritual vestiges of the full loving embrace, where each comes close enough to smell and taste the other, (Eibl-Eibesfeldt cites a Burmese word "namtschui," the name of a greeting, which literally means an inhaling of a person's smell, and tells us of Eskimo greetings that take the form of nose rubbing and smearing the other's face with one's spittle⁵). Those who greet each other also come within range of arms and knees that might strike, teeth that might bite, and come there without weapon or protection (empty handed and bare headed). Many greetings are, like the mutual handshake, mutual "disarmings," voluntary renunciations of strike capacity (the bow and the curtsy put the legs and knees out of striking action, and even nose rubbing keeps the teeth far enough away from vulnerable ears). Peaceful intent and willingness for some degree of intimacy are what greetings express, and both of these are most fully combined in the full embrace which completely demobilizes arms and shoulders, and may reenact the infant's nestling into the mother's breast, or repeat the protective sanctuary-providing gestures of the loving mother. Eibl-Eibesfeldt writes "Various gestures of granting contact, such as extending the hand, feeling and patting, embracing and caressing, are derived from parental care behavior. Ritualized feeding occurs in greeting in the form of kissing, offering the breast, offering food and drink, and by derivation from this, the exchange of gifts...The origins of man's innate peace signal, smiling, cannot yet be determined with certainty. We have referred to the possibility of a derivation from social grooming. If true then this behavior pattern too is derived from the complex of maternal cherishing actions."⁶ If we suppose that other cases of love imitate mother-child love, then the constancy of the expression of mother-child love in the maternal embrace will suffice

to show that we can include love among the emotions which have species-wide natural expressions. Then we can postulate that these emotions with universally recognizable stereotyped expression give us the basic human emotion repertoire. There are as many basic emotion types as there are expressive stereotypes.

This move is tempting, and can be seen to be what motivates many theorists' wish to list some emotions as primary, others as derivative. It is the explicitly avowed reason why contemporary psychologists such as Tomkins, Izard, Ekman and Friesen regard some emotions as primary, and it can also be seen to be an unavowed reason why Hobbes, Spinoza and other pre-Darwinian theorists selected the emotions they did as basic. (However they all included desire as one basic emotion, which slightly complicates the story here.) Descartes calls his primitive six passions not ingredients in the less primitive, but rather *genera* of which they are species. He of course includes love among the primitives, so this hypothesis, that the recognized plurality of primitive emotion types is parasitical on the plurality of distinguishable expressive stereotypes, will work in his case only if the embrace *can* be taken as the stereotypical expression of love. Descartes comes near to saying that the variety of passions matches the variety of spontaneous expressions, that is of easily recognized and easily distinguished "external signs," when he says that "There is no passion which some particular expression in the eyes does not reveal."⁷ He then generalizes this to facial expression as a whole, emphasizing how easily even the most stupid of us recognize these expressions, and how difficult even the cleverest of us find it to describe what it is about the angry man's face that tells us he is angry, or tells us whether a puckered face is one about to laugh or about to cry.

Descartes seems to think not just that his primitive passions show in eyes, but that all their variants also have eye expressions distinctive to them, so that regret, shame, pride, indignation, amusement, remorse, irresolution, jealousy, confidence, hope, scorn, veneration, "generosity," vanity, esteem and self esteem, will also show in the eyes (and the voice?), if not the rest of the face and body. He seems to think that we can immediately recognize not merely the stereotypical expression of the primitive emotions of our fellows, but also the spontaneous expressions of their specific variations and mixtures. We can follow the variations on the themes of the joyous smile, the loving embrace, the grimace of aversion and the open

mouth of wonder, as well as recognizing the main themes. Descartes' version of the range and interrelation of the emotions whose spontaneous episodic expression we can all recognize is an appropriate accompaniment to his theory of music as a highly structured deliberate evocation of a *play* of emotions, a controlled sustaining of some often unnameable variants of familiar ones, a modulation of them, a shifting to other emotions or moods. All of the followable structure of expressive music, and the interest and enjoyment we take in it, becomes intelligible if we see music as a development both of the expressive power that tone of voice, and other tones have for us, and of the satisfaction we get from our ability to *follow* sequences of emotions that others communicate to us. There is also of course the satisfaction the musician gets from being able in a controlled way to produce these evocative tones, to "feign" stretches of emotional life. Descartes in *Passions of the Soul* makes the secret of felicity lie in the human will's control of human passions, in use of its ability to make or "feign" appropriate ones, and in his *Compendium Musicae* he tries to analyse the means by which music helps us to get ourselves into particular emotional states.

But if emotions, to be emotions rather than moods, must have apparent objects, and behind them deep objects, then what music produces in us may not count as anything but degenerate emotions. For when music makes us rejoice, there is nothing in particular about which we are rejoicing (except the music itself), when it brings tears to our eyes, it is not grief at some mentionable loss, when it arouses our courage and martial spirit, it is not the will to face any particular enemy or threat that we feel. So should we say that music arouses moods not emotions in us, precisely because there seem to be no intentional objects for the feelings music arouses? We *could* say that, although "mood" seems an odd word for the sort of thrill that some music gives us, the shivers down the spine. If we must give up musical "emotion," then "pleasure-pain" seem at least as appropriate non-intentional phenomena as moods into which to demote musical "emotions". Darwin noted that music arouses some but not all human emotions— he mentions horror, fear, rage, as emotions outside the expressive range of music.⁸ (He is surely wrong about fear, and if he had heard some rock music, I think he would have included rage in the range.) It is true that the words we are prone to use to describe the character of a musical movement are more words like "cheerful," "plaintive," "piercing sweet," "melancholy," "joyous," "mournful,"

which (apart from “piercing sweet”) describe moods as readily as they do emotions, and if they do describe emotions, describe fairly general ones such as joy and sadness, rather than those that typically are highly focused, such as envy or jealousy. Darwin says “The sensations and ideas excited by music, or expressed by the cadences of oratory, appear from their vagueness, yet depth, like mental reversion to the emotions and thoughts of a long-past age.”⁹ But we *do* hear some music as expressive of love and devotion, and they surely are typically focused states of feeling, not diffuse feeling states like moods. We can of course speak of a loving mood, when someone seems particularly prone to loving gestures towards his loved ones, or even prone to find, if need be, new objects of love (this is usually called an “amorous mood,” which is interestingly different from a loving mood) but whatever a moving love song does to the appreciative hearer of it, it does not seem to be to put that one into a loving or an amorous mood (again, I speak of classical not pop music, which may well be different). It is more that it evokes the memory of love, and so revives love, but not a love on the watch for current suitable objects.

Those who claim to get a cerebral satisfaction from music, who disown or despise any music-generated tingles down the spine, are as hard put to say what thoughts, or what mathematical musings, the music induces in them—other than the mental following of the form of the music itself. If they are thinking not feeling while they are rapt up in the music, they can tell us nothing interesting about the content of their thoughts. There are not a sequence of reportable belief states, nor any inferential processes. Does music induce contentless thought and objectless emotions? Is it only the form of both thought and emotion, not its content, that music induces in us? But how can the form of emotion be induced, if the form makes place for intentional objects, and these are precisely what is lacking in the “emotions” we feel while listening to music?

The answer I think is provided by the fact that the emotions in question have formal and deep objects. Normally what dimly evokes the deep objects are apparent objects, the current loved one or disgusting one. What music may do is arouse the “precipitate of a reminiscence” by a shortcut—not via a current object, but by a more direct revival of the memory of past loved ones or lost ones, or of the *general* common features of such ones (the formal object), without needing or providing us with any current focus for that emotion.

Musical emotions differ from ordinary emotions, that is, in going straight to the depths of emotions. Darwin then can be seen to be right, that musical emotions are vague, with respect to their objects, yet also deep. They are vague or general in having no particular apparent object to give matter to the formal object, yet are highly specific in their deep object. They are emotions not moods, since moods have neither apparent nor deep objects. (Of course music may put us in a certain mood, as well as arouse specific emotions.) A version of the intentionality of emotions that makes place both for current apparent objects, and for formal and deep objects (and so for a dim memory of all the previously current apparent objects linked with a given deep object) allows us to recognize in the emotions music arouses both a certain vagueness about its objects and a definite directedness.

We can agree with Darwin that the “depth” of music emotions is a matter of “mental reversion” to the emotions of the past, without necessarily agreeing that the past in question is “a long-past age,” our species’ past. Doubtless that will have to be referred to if we are to get the full causal story of *why* say fear is expressed in high tones, anger in low ones, or why the love song tends to take the range of rhythms and cadences that it does. But to explain the intensity of emotion produced by a Schubert song in an adult human, it will be enough if that unconsciously recalls the loving tones of the parent who sang one to sleep as an infant, we need not go beyond that to the long past age of the species to find the deep object of the emotion aroused in a hearer by a Schubert song. I think that for all the emotions that Darwin believed music expresses—joy, love, devotion, grief, it will be plausible enough to see their objects as infantile so deep objects. For some of the emotions Darwin perhaps wrongly thought music did not arouse—revulsion, fear, anxiety, a sense of the uncanny (which “eerie” music surely can arouse), guilt, it is often implausible to suppose that a person has in fact in infancy first felt these feelings directed at what theorists such as Descartes and Freud postulate as their “deep” objects. If the deep object of revulsion is, as Descartes thought it was, cold and decaying human flesh or if the deep object of fear is death, if the deep object of guilt is, as Freud thought it was, parricide and cannibalism, then such postulated “deep” objects have in most cases to be located not in past infant experience of reality, but in our inherited race memories, fantasies, nightmares. No memory, conscious or unconscious, of

actually touching a cold corpse can explain the revulsion a person may feel at unexpected actual contact with an earthworm, if that person has not in fact ever touched a corpse. Nor can guilt be explained by a memory of parricide if there is no parricide in one's past. A *wish* to kill the father may be dimly remembered, in the case of guilt, but what wish or other occurrent rememberable mental episode in a child's experience could give us the deep content of revulsion that Descartes confidently postulates? Stories about corpses may, in the child who has never seen a corpse, stimulate curiosity and possibly nightmares, but it is the fearful imagination, not the wish-fulfilling fantasy nor the memory, that surely must be responsible for any actual episode of corpse-directed revulsion that could be taken as the infancy paradigm scenario of revulsion. We need then to be cautious in equating the "deep" object of an emotion with the object of the first infancy experience of that type of emotion. We may have to "learn" the deep object by other methods than the awakening of unconscious memories.

Still, we may suppose that memory of many of the sequences of past apparent objects of a given emotion type will be at least necessary, if not sufficient, for finding the deep object. Knowing the *first* object, the ancestor-object, along with at least some of its descendants, will enable us to discern the formal object, and may enable us to discern the deep object, even when actual encounter with a case of that sort of object (a corpse, let us say) still lies in our future. It may be anticipated with the help of the imagination, perhaps also of music, before it actually occurs, as presumably some forms of mature sexual encounter are anticipated by sexually curious growing children. So memory of the first actual object of a given emotion in one's life may not be enough to reveal the deep object, but awareness of that object and its successors will be needed to identify the formal object, which itself plays a role in locating the deep object. Depth is depth of significance, not just depth back in time. They are not the same, but nor are they unconnected. It is the sequence of apparent objects of a person's love that will display the formal object, and the temporal pattern in that sequence will help reveal the deep object as, let us suppose, the mother; as the temporal pattern of the apparent objects of revulsion may reveal *its* deep object to lie in the future not the past—in the not yet experienced contact with a cold corpse.

An adequate account of the intentionality of an emotion such as

love or revulsion must then make room not just for a deep as well as a formal and an apparent object, but should preferably be able to indicate whether or not the deep object is the same as the earliest apparent object. We need not only paradigm scenarios,¹⁰ that set the stage for subsequent enactments of a given type of emotion, but also ultimate scenarios where that type of emotion really comes into its own, where it as it were finds its fulfillment. Do we then need places for *four* sorts of emotion-object?—The formal object, the deep object, the infantile object, and the current apparent object? If we made this move, we would expect of course in many cases to find that the infantile and the deep object were identical and, in the case of the infant's emotion of love, the three non-formal objects might collapse into one. Must we postulate so many objects?

One of the jobs we want an account of the intentionality of emotions to do is to locate emotions in relation to desires and beliefs, not just in themselves but also in their dimensions of criticizability, to provide a perspicuous way of seeing if and how emotions (or particular sorts of emotions) can be "false", "irrational", "misguided" (or "misguiding"), how their faults compare with the sort of excellences and faults that beliefs and sequences of beliefs are prone to, the sort desires are prone to, and so on. Any account of the objects of love or revulsion ideally should help us assess cases of love or revulsion, judge their proportionality, their maturity, their "rationality". Ronald de Sousa, who wants to appropriate the term "rationality" for the dimension of appropriateness that emotions possess, gives us an elaborate version of the logical form of emotion ascriptions,¹¹ in which there are *six* places, a place to specify "target", "focus", "motivating aspect", "cause", "aim", and "ground". And none of these six are yet exactly what I have called either the deep or the infantile object, although specifying de Sousa's "proper focus", the "motivating aspect of the focus", and the "cause", will usually involve reference to such hovering non-present objects. It is perhaps surprising that de Sousa does not directly incorporate his own account of paradigm scenarios into his account of the intentionality of emotion, and of the logical form of emotion ascriptions. For, as he admits at the end of his account of the logical form of emotion ascriptions, among the problems still remaining is that of allowing for the typical "redistribution" of our love over time, of its transference "from Mother to Other" (de Sousa, 1987, p. 113), and from one Other to another Other. Such a central fact about at

least some emotions, one would think, should not be demoted to a “problem” that one hopes one’s account might be tinkered with so as to cope with, but rather celebrated as the essence of these emotions, an essence which marks them and their intentionality off from other mental states, such as beliefs and intentions.

Hume remarked on the inertia of emotions, their tendency to outlive the beliefs that provide their cognitive occasions. “Now if we consider the human mind, we shall find that with regard to the passions, tis not of the nature of a wind instrument of music, which in running over all the notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases; but rather resembles a string instrument, where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound, which gradually and insensibly decays. The imagination is extremely quick and agile, but the passions are slow and restive...though the fancy may change its views with great celerity; each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be mixt and confounded with the other.”¹² Hume’s reference here is to opposed passions, such as grief and joy, as mixing and mingling because of the inertial force of the earlier one, but the same effect will also come when new griefs replace older griefs, new loves older loves—“vibrations” from earlier passions of the same type will accompany the newly occasioned passion. This is not the case when the quick and agile “imagination” shifts its views, that is when we update or correct our beliefs about the world we are in. When our beliefs change, we discard the old beliefs with no more sentimentality than a snake has for its old skin. But when our loves or our resentments change their objects, even when new objects in some sense displace the earlier objects of love or resentment, the old passions continue to make their presence felt, the old notes are sustained to combine with the newly sounded notes, enriching and complicating them. The history of a person’s present cognitive state, the story of the transitions leading up to it, is of no more relevance to understanding its content than the history of physics is to understanding the content of the latest theory in physics, but to understand a person’s current emotions one must look at what related emotional states preceded this one, just as to understand current philosophy one must look to its antecedents. Old loves live on, as old philosophical debates live on, both as remembered and referred to in the current debates, and also as echoing around them, affecting their sound and its quality even when not explicitly mentioned.

Our new loves do not correct or revise our former loves as our new beliefs correct and revise our old beliefs. We can afford to discard our old displaced "mistaken" beliefs, because they need have no useful explanatory or justificatory role to play in relation to our current beliefs. But we need our old loves, resentments, and griefs to make any sense out of our current ones, to understand them or to criticize them. Understanding an emotion is not as separable from understanding what led up to it as understanding a belief is from understanding how a person came to hold it. You will have no trouble understanding that I believe that Copacabana is East of Ipemana without needing first to know whether I found this out from a map or from surveying the two beaches from Arpoador point with my back to the rising sun, Ipemana before me, Copacabana behind me. That information might be helpful if you wanted to explain my *false* belief about the relation between the beaches, but is not needed for you to know what it is I believe, truly or falsely. But to understand what I felt while hearing and seeing the wild surf and churning seaweed at Arpoador point, it *would* be helpful for you to know of other sea points I have stood on, to know the beaches and promontories leading up to these beaches and this promontory. Suppose I felt a mixture of exhilaration and suicidal pull towards the pounding sea. *What* I felt then is scarcely distinguishable from what similar occasions it reenacted, and so from *why* I felt it, and felt it so strongly. The *what?* and the *how come?* come together in emotion in a way they do not in belief. Of course in simply putting the label "suicidal attraction to the sea" on my feeling one says something about the content of the emotion, something that would link it with the similar feelings had by all the others who had teetered on the same sort of sea brink, but not much yet about what attracted us all to the swirling waters below. There may be perhaps a universal sea-emotion, which we all know and recognize, and which will be enough to give content to my Arpoador feeling (and to its predecessors on other sea promontories). To recognize it will be to find it as self explanatory as the belief that the sun warms. No individual case histories will be needed. The sea just *does* draw us to it, as the sun does warm us, and no more will need to be said. But to the extent that more does need to be said, that the sea's fatal attraction is felt more by some than by others, then individual history, and in particular a history of earlier occurrences of this sort of feeling in these sorts of physical surroundings, will give us what we need.

It will simultaneously give more detailed content to the current emotion, and to some extent explain it. Just as to make an intentional action intelligible to another person we give a fuller version of *what* we are doing, which at the same time explains why we are doing the more sparsely described action, so too with emotions—the fuller content may explain the partial content. In the case of intentions, the richer version often refers to the future, whereas the full content of an emotion always refers to the past, whatever else it refers to. Emotions are history-laden states of mind.

I have been taking for granted that our emotional reactions are evaluative reactions, and that to endorse an evaluation is to endorse some emotion as appropriate. To find something really disgusting is to find disgust appropriate, to find an action of one's own really wrong is to find guilt appropriate. To find something really good is to find enjoyment and rejoicing appropriate in those who have that thing, envy and aspiration appropriate in those who do not, jealousy in those threatened with its loss, grief and nostalgia in those who have lost it, anger or resentment appropriate in those who are being thwarted in attempts to get it, and so on. Much besides emotions may feed into the endorsement, but then much "besides" the current emotion always feeds into an emotion, if one's past feeds it, and so all the echoes of past guilts feed current guilt, echoes of old envies feed current envies, old enjoyments enrich current enjoyments, old griefs deepen current griefs. Emotions are spontaneous evaluations, but not therefore uninformed ones—past experience as well as innate predisposition informs them. Reflective evaluations will be either attempted corrections of or endorsements of these spontaneous evaluations. That is when reasoning from what we consciously remember and know makes its fallible contribution. The range of our emotions indicates constant dimensions of the human condition, and so the multi-dimensional nature of what has value for us—it is not just a matter of what pleases or pains us, but of what we will recall with nostalgia or with regret, what we feel pride or shame for helping to produce, what we envy or pity in others, what we jealously guard or desperately try to ward off, that whose loss grieves or relieves us, whose dissolution revolts or fascinates us, that the uncertain prospect of which makes us excited or anxious, that whose successful attainment delights or disappoints, whose downfall amuses us or saddens us, or is counted as our victory. Our good is as richly structured as our emotions are varied, and is as historically

conditioned as the emotions that recognize it, from their own special angles.

According to one helpful psychological model of emotions, that of Ross Buck, they are all three-fold "readouts" of the current state of a person's "primary motivational-emotional systems," a readout in that person's consciousness, in involuntary bodily expression, and in internal physiological changes. This makes them "about" the person's current state, about the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of some postulated primary drives (to behavior and expressive behavior). But even on Buck's model, past learning along with current external and internal stimulus are what combine with these "primes" to yield a "readout". So it is not just current state, but current state seen in the light of past states, as well as of imagined possible states, that yields the present emotion. At any one time we have a conception of the range of possibilities for the human condition, and our own past exemplification of some of these possibilities.

All emotions are about our human condition, and our past experience of it. An endorsement or a rejection of the evaluation a given emotion contains will require us to consider not just the future consequences of this evaluation now, but its grounding in the experience of this person, the way it continues, develops, or deviates from some discernible pattern in this person's evaluations of this sort, its coherence with coordinate emotions, with beliefs and intentions, how the developmental pattern compares with what we take to be the normal human one, or the normal one in this society. Emotions appropriate in children (fear of walking on to a busy road) will be inappropriate in adults, regrets appropriate in the old (of never having got to China) will be inappropriate in the young, and so on.

The judgments of appropriateness will require us to take into account where a person is *in her life*, in a temporal path marked out by their personal past, and by the normal prospects for a human person. Childhood, adolescence, youth, maturity, old age, will be *relevant* to the appropriateness of given emotions, in a way it is not to either the truth or the reasonability of holding particular beliefs. This is particularly the case for the emotion of love,¹³ where we have fairly definite (perhaps too definite) views about the appropriate objects of love for a person of a given age. This is not to say that we have any very definite content to give to the formal object of love, whatever the age of the lover. The loved should be lovable, as the feared should be dangerous, the admired admirable. But

whereas we should and can admire all those known to us to be admirable, to fear all recognized real and present dangers, we are excused from loving all the lovable persons we encounter. Indeed I think we can say that the richer our notion of the formal object of an emotion (of the really dangerous, the really admirable, the really worrying, the really wrong) the less need we have to postulate a deep object for that emotion, and when we have deep objects, the formal object is very thin. Perhaps we could say that some emotions are about instances of abstract universals, others are about more concrete universals. There is very little that can be said about lovableness in general—all we can do is give a history of our successive loves. Much more can be said about wrongness in general. However relativized to a certain moral code the notion of wrongness and of appropriate guilt may be, it need not be wholly relativized to a particular person's conscience, and to the *sequence of occasions of guilt in her life*, in the way that love and appropriate love seem to be. It makes some sense to see the mother as a first loved one, setting certain standards for subsequent loved ones. They need not form a sequence of exclusive loves, and there may be a role for sibling-substitutes and father-substitutes as well as for mother-substitutes. But there cannot be a promiscuous loving of all the known humanly lovable in the way we do achieve a promiscuous admiration of the known admirable. We learn from our early admirations in a way that leads to generalization and the formation of standards of admirability. We achieve some sort of grasp of a rich but abstract universal, the admirable. We do this also with disapproval, with amusement and with fear—working out from what happened to be our first encounter with the wrongful, the funny, or the fearful to a more generalized recognition of other instances of the same, with no particular limit on how many things we fear at once, laugh at at once, or condemn at once. Our love is more selective, and the criteria of selection are individual and precedent-dependent. As Richard Wollheim has nicely put it “love does not have a history of accumulation, it has a history of substitution”.¹⁴

It makes some sense to say to the person who is so influenced by his first experience of guilt (say at disobedience) that he feels guilt now only at disobedience of father-figures: “however important your early experiences of guilt were to introduce you to this moral dimension of value, you now should be able to recognize what is an appropriate occasion of guilt on a broader and less “accidental”

basis. Your guilt should not be reserved for all and only the occasions that conform to the precedent set by your infancy experience." We expect adult disapproval, admiration, fear, anxiety, amusement to be backed by some standards, standards others are expected to share. We aim at agreement in our admirations, disapprovals, anxieties, we exchange "justifications" of them. We do not exactly justify our amusement, but we do try to get others to share it, to see the joke. But we do not aim at or even welcome a sharing of our loves. We accept personal idiosyncratic methods of selection, dictated largely by who "happened" to be our first loved one. It is as if that gives each person an internal "constitution," which selects successor loved ones in the way a nation's constitution selects its government. "Lovable" is as empty of substantive criteria as is "constitutional" or "legitimate," until relativized to a certain actual history.

Just as some political reformers want to turn their backs on their group's past, to found a new nation with a new forward-looking enlightened constitution, so some reformers of persons think we do best to turn our backs (if we can) on our personal pasts, to form "rational" attachments, not ones freighted with emotional baggage from the past. However sensible a deliberate break with the past may sometimes be in politics, it is less clear that we can or should avoid a certain conservatism in our personal loves. For what would it be like to ignore precedent, in our attachments to others? Could we just rationally seek out the most pleasure-giving people, and attach ourselves rationally to them? Suppose our rational survey showed that, say, fifty of our acquaintances tied for first place in the hedonic contest, and (very implausibly) that all fifty welcomed our friendship.

Do we just rationally settle in to loving all fifty, and in general, loving others to precisely the degree that they have the qualities we somehow deem rationally lovable? Or do we, worried about the "dilution" of our love over so many love objects, toss a coin to pick the "lucky" one? Would a random choice among equally "well qualified" contestants rationalize our loving better than the selection that would result from our own partly random partly experience-*tried* history of past attachments, developing in the normal way? For the frequent explanation of why we love the ones we do is simply that they happened to come along and step into vacant shoes—no "qualifications" are needed except fitting the shoes, being a suitable successor to whomever is succeeded. In love, and other emotions like it, precedent can be almost all. We love him because we first

loved someone a bit like him. That is the sort of "because" we work with, in "justifying" this sort of emotion. And if pressed about why we loved the first one, the biblical answer is as good as any other: "because he first loved us". The "reasons" we have for loving are essentially historical and origin-tracing reasons.

It has been objected to David Hume's account of what he calls "love" that he analyses "love for reasons," not plain or real love. For he requires that there be some "cause" of love, something fine found in the loved person or in what is hers, some ground of the love. In this way he gets a structural parallel between love and pride—requiring both that our pride be grounded in something fine that is in some sense ours, and that love be grounded in something fine found in the loved person. But this requirement is merely a formal one, and Hume puts no limits on what can please us in others, so count as fine, allowing that in the case of a man's love of his mistress her very faults may count as among the lovable qualities. "When a person is once heartily in love, the little faults and caprice of his mistress, the jealousy and quarrels to which that commerce is so subject, however unpleasant and related to anger and hatred, are yet found to give additional force to the ruling passion."¹⁵ The requirement is really no more than that the lover have some sincere answer to give to the question "What do you find lovable in her?". The answer may be "a grace, an ease...an I know-not-what."¹⁶ A person with self knowledge may be able to reply: "She holds her head the way my mother did, and is as wayward, so that loving her is not dull. I have to compete to hold her selective affection, just as I had to compete with my brothers for my mother's attention." All that is "fine" in the cause of this love may be that it provides opportunity for reenactment of a paradigm love.

The sort of "reasons" a lover has for loving a given person with "the amorous passion" will be personal and historical, to a much greater extent than her reasons for admiring certain heroines, or laughing at certain situations, but the latter will be more personal than her reasons for believing that the earth is round. The reasons for her disgusts and resentments will also be bound up with her idiosyncratic history, and with her first disgusts and resentments, more than her current amusements, approvals and admirations, and much more than her current beliefs are bound up with infantile ur-beliefs. She can cast away childish beliefs, revise ill grounded admirations and disapprovals, maybe develop a less crude sense of

humor, but her earlier loves will benignly haunt her. That very close tie to our own history gives the emotions with deep objects the power they have to confer meaning on our lives, to inspire our justifiable admirations and approvals, to give warmth to our otherwise cool amusement, and to make some of our flatly rational beliefs more important to us than others, to give them relevance and salience. It is only when beliefs become the slaves to our repetitive and lingering passions, when they become "hot cognitions", that our rationally reformed beliefs come alive, become anything more than a dead pile of faultless and useless information. It is because the intentional objects of our emotions are of restricted reflexivity, where the restrictions lie in our personal pasts, that our emotions are "ours" in a way that is less interestingly true of our firm beliefs. Our emotions are ours in the way a constitution belongs to a nation—its own history and its precedents are what help give that constitution its grounds, what provide reasons to have just it.

I assume most of my beliefs to be widely shared, but I do not assume that my loves are, nor all my enthusiasms, nor all my disgusts. I may of course often be wrong in the assumption that we all have common knowledge, shared realizations about the way the world is, and I will take note when differences of belief become evident. I will also note who *does* share my enthusiasms and my sense of humor, and seek them out, take note who does share my loves, and maybe take jealous steps to guard against them. We accept as normal a greater personal variation in objects of emotion than in objects of belief, as we accept some variety in constitutions as normal and proper, but hope for more agreement both in our lists of human rights and in our versions of world history. Even where we do expect agreement in emotion and feeling—taking fear of death, worry about nuclear war, fear of disease, a liking of bright rather than grey days, an attraction to the deep all-swallowing sea, as normal and universal, we expect those universal fears, worries and likings to be mixed up in each individual person with a lot of highly personal unshared ones, which may become intelligible to the rest of us without thereby becoming shared by us. Similarly, even when we demand that other nations respect human rights, or whatever, we still do not demand that they merely mimic our own constitution. There will be ingredients in our own constitution, say protection of some basic rights, that we think any acceptable constitution should replicate, and other parts that make sense given the particular history of this nation, parts we do not

expect other decent constitutions to repeat—we expect them to have their own special features, evoking patriotic fervor in patriots of that nation. Patriotic attachment to some of the special features of our own system, and patriotic feeling on national holidays, will be like personal loves and memorials, constrained but not dictated by the admirations, indignations and enthusiasms that we would try to show to be universally justifiable. What is “personal” in our emotions is like what is “national” in our constitution—both point back to a distinctive history.

Some of our emotions are focused precisely on that distinctive personal history, rather than just at aspects of its current phase. Content and discontent, dismay or amusement, may be directed not just at localized and usually present happenings, but at the emerging shape of one's life, as seen from the current high or low, boggy or firm point. That shape will be the path traced by the sequence of one's successive loves, griefs, ambitions, disappointments, hopes, and despairs, in the context of the paths of one's fellows, past and present. The apparent object of contentment or ironic acceptance can be some situation now, but the deep object is the whole life path, in the context of other paths, life as we have so far found it, and sometimes the deep object will become the apparent object, so that we consciously try to assess how things are going, in a very general sense. Emotions with this sort of very comprehensive object will be meta-emotions, evaluative reactions to the sum total, the sequence or accumulation to date of one's admirations, amusements, envies, indignations, loves, griefs.

Such summative evaluations will be expected to vary from time to time, both because the “objective” data will grow, and because of changing temporal proximity to high points and low points. Emotions of this sort will function very like moods, indeed may be one sort of mood. Birthday blues and New Year blues are induced by this sort of backward gaze, hard to avoid on such occasions. Like moods, these comprehensive evaluations will change from year to year, or day to day, and like moods they will affect the intensity and character of current emotions. Past emotions will help ground them, but they will understandably alter present emotions. We will call “moody” those people whose meta-emotions vary more than we think their data warrants, as we call “emotional” the ones whose ordinary emotions displace one another with unduly dramatic contrasts. We will not expect others to share our moods, unless we

take them both to have the same interest in the world as we are finding it, and to be able to sympathize with that finding. Just as our loves may be personal and idiosyncratic, not ones we want others to empathize with, so may be our contentment, discontent and amusement with life as we are finding it—the shape we discern will after all be the shape of the history of our loves, as well as of our more shareable emotions. One's love life is not the whole of one's life, but nor is it a thing apart from that life's general structure.

I have argued that our personal past is always what our emotions are about, whatever else they are about, and that some special emotions or moods are directed on the whole emerging contour of that past, at all past emotions with their grounds and their fates. It is high time that I acknowledge that "about" has to be used in a loose sense for this claim to be true. Neither our admirations nor our fears nor our loves are literally about anything. We may be worried or anxious or embarrassed *about* things, but are disgusted, horrified, amused or angry *at* persons or things, ashamed, afraid or proud of things; and no preposition at all need mediate between our loves and hatreds and their objects. (If any is used, it is "of," or "for," not "about," — her love for him, his hatred of her.) But since we can always ask "what is it about her that makes you love, hate, admire her, what is it about it that disgusts, amuses, frightens, outrages, worries you?" and since if I am right the full answer to those questions will always be to some extent biographical, then the graph of her past life can be said to be what all a person's emotions are about.

The variability of emotions from time to time in a person's life, the variability in objects of a given emotion over time in a person's life, the varying personal reasons for such variation, make anticipation of an individual's emotions very difficult without the sort of detailed knowledge of that one's past which we rarely have of one another. Whereas we inhabit a common physical and cultural world, and can assume a pretty similar exposure to that, so take agreement on beliefs as the norm, or can make fair predictions about a person's special ignorance or special knowledge, given a few relevant facts about their education or their past environment, we are more often surprised by other persons' emotions. The common structure of all our biographies give us some bases for correct expectation and for understanding—that we all were born of two parents, went through a long helpless infancy, through childhood and adolescence, soon realized that we can easily wound or kill our

fellows and other living things, learned rules regulating our exercise of this capacity, competed for wanted prizes or positions, found new loved ones and lost older ones, anticipate our own death, clock the passing years. This common experience does give us to some extent a common emotional world. But the individual shape of each person's path through that common world also makes at least some of our emotions hard for others to predict, even when they will matter to those others.

The intelligible idiosyncrasy and incomplete predictability of our emotions goes along with another salient fact about them, namely that we express our current emotions much more automatically than we express our more predictable beliefs. What we clearly express is not always the *object* of a given emotion, but rather the type of emotion. I may see that you are worried or amused, but not see what worries or amuses you. When I see that you are angry, I often will also see whom you are angry with, given the close ties in the case of anger between involuntary expression and likelihood of voluntary behavior to satisfy the desires anger typically arouses. Involuntary expression will often have to be supplemented by extra information, from verbal and other intentional behavior, before it will be clear to a person's fellows not just what emotion she is experiencing but also who or what its object is on this occasion. Still, it is a striking fact about emotional states, that distinguishes them from belief states and many desire states, that they are spontaneously expressed in ways our fellows spontaneously understand. The idiosyncrasy of emotional reaction is as it were compensated for by our relatively easy access to our fellows' emotional states. We may not need or want to share more than formal objects of some of our emotions, but we do often need and want to know what the particular current emotions of our fellows are. For we need to allow for them, sometimes to protect ourselves from their fallout, sometimes to coordinate our own actions and reactions to fit with their reactions and emotion-grounded actions. If it is generally the case that we *do* share commonsense beliefs about the world with those in the same culture and language community, then we have less need for access to our fellows' belief-states than to their emotion-states, in order to know what to expect from them. The more reliable, because non-intentional, expression of emotions has obvious group survival value, whereas there is less obvious need to have case by case access to our fellows' belief states. We can afford even to have them

occasionally lie or be less than candid to us about their beliefs, whereas, had we no candid expression of our fellows' emotions (with their often constituent desires), we would be dangerously ignorant of our own position in relation to them. The idiosyncrasy of our passions makes life interesting, and the difficulty of keeping our passions secret saves it from becoming too dangerous, so that it can last about as long as its interest warrants. As Hume wrote, "the opposite passions of men impel them in contrary directions,"¹⁷ in ways that give morality a regulatory job to do, but it also the case that the change and occasional struggle among our passions "diversify" human life,¹⁸ introducing both individuality and drama into a person's life history, and so making life meaningful enough to be worth preserving, at least for a while. The natural expression of our passions, as well as the regulation of them by morality, makes the interpersonal conflict of passions less than lethal; that there is something heartfelt there to express and control gives its continuance some point.¹⁹

Notes

1. Alisa Carse drew my attention to the fact that our emotions are also sensitive to scent. We can also detect some emotions by smell—we can sometimes smell fear. So far, however, we have no symphonies of smells, and if we show emotion by involuntarily giving off significant odors, this seems a special or limit case of "expression".
2. Plato, *Philebus* 21 D.
3. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 634.
4. Sigmund Freud, *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, 25th Lecture ("Anxiety"), p. 344.
5. *Love and Hate*, pp. 184, 191.
6. *Love and Hate*, p. 195.
7. Descartes, *Passions of the Soul*, Art. 113.
8. *Descent of Man*, Vol. II, p. 735.
9. *Op.cit.*, p. 736.
10. This is an expression used by Ronald de Sousa in *Rationality of Emotion*, pp. 181-4.
11. R(Stfacmp), "where R stands for an emotion type, S for the subject, t the target, f the focal property, a the motivating aspect, c the cause, m the aim, p the proposition specifying the ground." *The Rationality of Emotion*, p. 126.
12. Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 440-1.
13. Love as an emotion implies love as a tie which is there, with or without the emotion, if love the emotion is, as Descartes takes it to be, an

- endorsing response to a perceived dependency relation. (See also Wollheim, pp. 212, 279-80.)
14. *Thread of Life*, p. 280.
 15. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 420.
 16. Hume, *Enquiries*, p. 267.
 17. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 491.
 18. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 438.
 19. Alisa Carse made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and I am also grateful to all members of my 1986 seminar on emotion at the University of Michigan, and my 1987 seminar on emotion at the University of Pittsburgh, for helpful discussions.

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