Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-5nwft Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-26T15:38:45.286Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Judith Baker  and
Philip Clark
Judith Baker
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, Canada
Philip Clark*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
*
E-mail: philip.clark@utoronto.ca
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and Jennifer Lackey gives both speaker and hearer an essential role in testimonial justification, rejecting both reductionism and anti-reductionism in favor of what she calls dualism. After distinguishing a weaker and a stronger notion of buck-passing, we show how anti-reductionists can use the stronger notion to motivate their position, and to answer Goldberg’s and Lackey’s challenges.

Keywords

Epistemology of testimonytestimonial knowledgetrustassurancedualismreductionismanti-reductionismright to defer
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , 2018 , pp. 178 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Burge, Tyler. 2013. Vol. 3 of Cognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, David, and Hilary, Kornblith. 1997. “Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the ‘A Priori’.” Philosophical Studies 86: 1–20. 10.1023/A:1004268430546Google Scholar
Cole, Caitlin A., Paul L., Harris, and Melissa A., Koenig. 2012. “Entitled to Trust? Philosophical Frameworks and Evidence from Children.” Analyse Und Kritik 34(2): 195–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faulkner, Paul. 2007a. “On Telling and Trusting.” Mind 116(464): 875–902. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzm875.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faulkner, Paul. 2007b. “What Is Wrong with Lying?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(3): 535–557. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00092.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Faulkner, Paul. 2011. Knowledge on Trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gelfert, Axel. 2014. A Critical Introduction to Testimony. Bloomsbury: A&C Black.Google Scholar
Goldberg, Sanford. 2006. “Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge.” In The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by Jennifer, Lackey and Ernest, Sosa. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 127–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, Sanford. 2007. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511487521CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, Sanford. 2008. “Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 1–36. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00113.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Graham, Peter J. 2006. “Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?” Philosophica 78: 105–127.Google Scholar
Hinchman, Edward S. 2005. “Telling as Inviting to Trust.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(3): 562. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00415.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hinchman, Edward S. 2014. “Assurance and Warrant.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14(17): 1–58.Google Scholar
Lackey, Jennifer. 1999. “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49(197): 471–490. doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lackey, Jennifer. 2008. Learning from Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.001.0001Google Scholar
Malmgren, A.-S. 2006. “Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?” Philosophical Review 115(2): 199–241. doi: 10.1215/00318108-115-2-199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McMyler, Benjamin. 2011. Testimony, Trust, and Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794331.001.0001Google Scholar
McMyler, Benjamin. 2013. “The Epistemic Significance of Address.” Synthese 190(6): 1059–1078. doi: 10.1007/s11229-011-9871-2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moran, Richard. 2005. “Getting Told and Being Believed.” Philosophers’ Imprint 5(5): 1–29.Google Scholar
Nickel, Philip J. 2012. “Trust and Testimony.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93(3): 301–316. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01427.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Orozco, Joshue. 2010. “I Can Trust You Now … But Not Later: An Explanation of Testimonial Knowledge in Children.” Acta Analytica 25(2): 195–214. doi: 10.1007/s12136-009-0085-x.Google Scholar
Owens, David. 2006. “Testimony and Assertion.” Philosophical Studies 130(1): 105–129. doi: 10.1007/s11098-005-3237-x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reid, Thomas. 1997. An Inquiry into the Human Mind, edited by Derek, Brookes. University Park: Penn State University Press.Google Scholar
Ross, Angus. 1986. “Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?” Ratio (1): 69–88.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest. 2010. Knowing Full Well. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 10.1515/9781400836918CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, Stephen. 2014. “Sosa on Knowledge from Testimony.” Analysis 74: 249–254. doi: 10.1093/analys/anu040.CrossRefGoogle Scholar