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Universal and Exclusive Terms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2010
Extract
Questions about universal and exclusive terms have often arisen in the history of philosophy, and are connected with what, in more recent discussions, has been variously called the principle of “excluded opposites”, “polar opposites” or “non-vacuous contrasts”. This principle has been employed by a number of linguistically-minded philosophers and has in turn been criticized by other philosophers. These critics are, I believe, largely correct, but they have advanced their criticisms in a mainly informal way, making little reference to logic. I want to show that there are various types of universal and exclusive terms which can be classified in a logically rigorous way, and to go on to show that reference to this classification, together with an analysis of relevant examples, enables us to bring out precisely what is wrong with “the principle of excluded opposites”.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , June 1969 , pp. 84 - 101
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1969
References
1 Notably by Grant, C. K., “Polar Concepts and Metaphysical Arguments”, in Clarity is Not Enough, ed. Lewis, H. D., 1963;Google Scholar and by Passmore, John, Philosophical Reasoning, 1961, ch. 6.Google Scholar
2 The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Schilpp, 1942, pp. 364–365.
3 Dilemmas, 1954, pp. 94–95.
4 Historical Inevitability, 1954, esp. p. 32.
5 The Concept of Motivation, 2nd ed., 1960, p. 60.Google Scholar
6 e.g. in The German Ideology, English translation, 1938.
7 2nd edition, 1946, p. 40.
8 The Logic of Hegel, trans. Wallace, 2nd ed., 1892, p. 350.
9 In a letter to Starkenburg, January 25, 1894.
10 The Origins of the Second World War, 1961, p. 102.
11 Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, p. 11.
12 “Self-Refutation—A Formal Analysis”, Philosophical Quarterly vol. 14, 1964.
13 Grant seems to me mistaken when he says, op. cit., p. 264, “It is certainly meaningless to say ‘Everything is material’ in the ordinary sense of ‘material’, and for the reason adduced by the polar principle—namely that here ‘material’ can be contrasted with nothing”.
14 Compare how Berlin, in his discussion of determinism mentioned earlier, suggests a way of making short work of both determinism and complete indeterminism by claiming that both “cause” and “free” must have contrasts. The only other support he offers for his position is a conventionalist appeal to the authority of ordinary language.