Abstract
Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states.
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This paper has grown out of comments I made on Fodor’s paper “Revenge of the Given,” delivered at The Steven Humphrey Excellence in Philosophy Conference: “Content and Concepts: A Conference on the Philosophy of Mind” at the University of California, Santa Barbara, February 14, 2004. Thanks to Jerry Fodor for useful feedback, and to Barry Loewer for discussing with me the ideas that went into this paper.
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Balog, K. Jerry Fodor on non-conceptual content. Synthese 170, 311–320 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9585-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9585-x