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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
In describing the account of the εἷδη in the Phaedo, Burnet says, ‘they are explained in a peculiar vocabulary which is represented as that of a school. The technical terms are introduced by such formulas as “we say”’. Similarly Taylor has written of the ‘characteristic technical nomenclature’ used in the dialogues, of the ‘technicalities’ of the theory of εἷδη, of ‘the technical phrases of the Phaedo’ The validity of such language has been taken for granted by both these and many other Platonic scholars. But the assumption which it represents—that Plato employed certain words in a significance peculiar to his use of them—carries such wide implications for the history and interpretation of his philosophy that it can hardly be accepted without further investigation. In this article I shall examine the evidence in fifth- and early fourth-century literature about these words which Plato or Socrates is alleged to have transformed into ‘technicalities’: first, εἷδος and ἰδ⋯σ, which I shall assume to be more or less synonymous; second, the various terms used to describe the relation between εἲδη and particulars—,μετέχειν, κοινωνεἶν,παρεἶναι, ⋯νεἶναι,μιμησις,⋯μοιωαις, and so on.
Page 141 note 1 Burnet, in Early Greek Philosophy, p. 308Google Scholar; Taylor, in Varia Socratica, pp. 179, 205, and 215Google Scholar.
Page 141 note 2 So Taylor, in Varia Socratica, pp. 189 and 211Google Scholar; but in The Parmenides of Plato (1934) he translates εῖδος by ‘form’ and ιδ⋯α by ‘figure’. Cf. Field, G. C. ap. C.R. XLIX (1935), p. 19Google Scholar, and Burnet ap. Euthyphro 5d.
Page 141 note 3 Neue, Untersuchungen, p. 323Google Scholar.
Page 141 note 4 It seems to me equally possible that Democritus used the words to mean ‘sense-qualities’, to which, as I shall show later, they were at least as commonly applied. We know from Sextus that he wrote a book IIBPI IΔEΩN, and Theophrastus refers to his doctrine ⋯ν τῖοῖς περι τ⋯ν ειδ⋯ν (unless:Schneider's emendation ειδώ λων is correct); while Simplicius reports of his cosmogony: δινον άπ⋯ το⋯ παντός άποκιθ⋯ναι παντοιων ειδέων (fr. 167). Kranz, following Diels, translates IIερι ιδε⋯ν by ‘Über die Gestalten’, and identifies it with IIερι τ⋯ν διαΦερόντων ῥυσμ⋯ν. Taylor translates it ‘On Primary Bodies’, Both they and other scholars assume that by εἶδη ιδέαι Democritus meant the atoms. But the three points on which this assumption rests seem by no means conclusive. First, Plutarch (Adv. Col. IIIIa) has a statement: εἶναι δ⋯ π⋯ντα τ⋯ς ⋯τ⋯μους ὑπ' αὐτο⋯ καλουμένας, ἔτερον δ⋯ μηδέν. Diels inserted ἢ before ιδέας, but admitted ‘gewöhnlich ändert man ⋯τσμους ιςιως’, a reading which makes good sense and is adopted by the Teubner editor from Wyttenbach, and seems to me preferable to the MSS. version retained by Kranz. Secondly, Hesychius gives as one significance of ιςέα: τ⋯ έλάχισ τον α⋯μα. But there is no explicit reference to Democritus, and the definition might easily be derived from other sources such as the Timaeus (54d sq.). Thirdly, it seems probable that Democritus called the atoms σχ⋯ματα, and therefore likely that he should have used ιδ⋯αι or εἳδη in the same sense. But Aristotle, writing Democritus in the Physics (184D22), mentions σχ⋯μα and εἶδος as two distinct things: και ει ⋯πειρους, ἢ οὓτως ὢσπερ Δημ⋯κριτος τ⋯ γένος ⋯νσχ⋯ματι δέ ἢ εἶδει δισΦερούσας, ἢ και έναντιας. This scarcely seems sufficient evidence to prove the meaning ‘shape’. On the other hand, the implications in Sextus and Theophrastus about the contents of the IIερι ιδε⋯ν indicate that the book must have been concerned with the possibility of knowledge by sensation. Sextus' three quotations all refer to our lack of contact with reality, while Theophrastus is just embarking on his long account of Democritus' doctrine of the senses and the qualities they perceive—hot, cold, colours, etc. The meaning ‘sense-qualities’ suits this evidence better than ‘atomic shapes’, and fits equally well the vague use of ειδος in fr. 167.
Page 142 note 1 C.Q. 1912, p. 183.
Page 143 note 1 Ap. Diog. I, 89. The answer is ‘the year’.
Page 143 note 2 Ch. 1. A more doubtful instance is the beginning of IIερι τ⋯ ⋯ντ⋯ς 21. If the text adopted there by Taylor (ιδέην ⋯λλοιην ἓχειν το⋯ έπιδημιον δοκειται ὠχροτέρην) is correct, ιδέη must refter to the colour of phlegm, not, as Taylor says, to its ‘structure’ or ‘composition’. But f Littrè was right in adopting the θ reading (ὠχρόιερός), the parallel in the opening sentence of the previous chapter (ιδέας αὐτο⋯πολλ⋯ς ειναι κτλ.) suggests that ιδέη means ‘appearance’ in general. In any case this parallel shows that the ιδέη referred to must be that of phlegm, not (as Littrè seems to have thought) that of the patient.
Page 144 note 1 Helena chs. 54–8, To Nicocles ch. 34, and Nicocles ch. 30. To Nicocles was probably written consoon after 374 B.C., and Nitocles between 372 and 365 B.C.
Page 144 note 2 Grube, (Plato's Thought, p. 14)Google Scholar notes a similar transition from physical to mental vision in consoon nection with the use of ειδος in the Cratylus.
Page 145 note 1 Frs. 258 and 263. For μετέχειν cf. also IIερι ⋯ρχαιης 14, IIερι ϕ⋯σιος ⋯νθρώπου 6, IIερι νούσων IV, 40 and 54, Diog. VIII, 27–8, Philolans ap. Menon Anon. Lond. 18. 8.
Page 145 note 2 For παρειναι cf. also IIερι⋯ρχαιης ιητρικ⋯ς 16 and 19, Empedocles fr. 114; Anon. Iambl. 3, 1.
Page 146 note 1 In From Religion to Philosophy.
Page 147 note 1 There is no justification for the assumption of Burnet (ap. Euthyphro 5d) and Stewart, (Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, p. 17Google Scholar) that Socrates' use of the word παρ⋯δειγμα proves his acquaintance with the developed ‘theory’ of εἶδη.
Page 147 note 2 C.Q. XXVII (1933). P. 108Google Scholar.
Page 148 note 1 For Empedocles, cf. Diels-Kranz A94 and B21, but contrast B90. For Menecrates and Philistion, Menon ap. Anon. Lond. 19 and 20. The reason why Philistion called his elements ιδέαι must remain uncertain. It may have been that they were different ‘kinds’ of matter, or that they were associated with quality-things.
Page 148 note 2 De Gen. et Corr. A 1. 314 b25–6.
Page 148 note 3 Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 33 sq.
Page 149 note 1 IIερι τ⋯πων τ⋯ν κατ' ανθρωπον, chs. 41–6, which are clearly not by the same hand as the rest of the treatise. The author cites three views, but it seems evident that the last (the one I have described) is his own.
