Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to defend utilitarianism from the popular objection that it makes moral theory depend improperly upon uncertain factual information and calculations which may produce violations of individual rights or liberties. This objection is a more subtle variant of the general Kantian complaint that utilitarianism makes morality improperly contingent upon empirical facts about historical, socioeconomic circumstances, the consequences of actions, institutions, etc., thereby allowing individual liberties to be sacrificed in order to maximize the collective welfare. Three main arguments connected with the uncertainty-objection are delineated in Rawls' work, and are seen to be fallacious. It is concluded that a suitably sophisticated form of rule-utilitarianism need not base liberty on any impermissible kind of uncertainty in moral theory. This analysis is contrary not only to what Rawlsians and other Kantians nowadays typically argue or assume in criticizing utilitarianism, but also to what some of the leading critics of Rawls have said about his anti-utilitarian stance.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ball, S. W.: 1986, ‘Economic Equality: Rawls Versus Utilitarianism’, Economics and Philosophy 2, 125–44.
Ball, S. W.: 1987, ‘Choosing between Choice Models of Ethics: Rawlsian Equality, Utilitarianism, and the Concept of Persons’, Theory and Decision 22, 209–24.
Ball, S. W.: 1988, ‘Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction’, Biology and Philosophy 3, 317–48.
Ball, S. W.: 1989, ‘Facts, Values, and Normative Supervenience’, Philosophical Studies 55, 143–72.
Brandt, R. B.: 1983, ‘Problems of Contemporary Utilitarianism: Real and Alleged’, in N. Bowie, ed., Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century, Hackett Publ. Co., Indianapolis, Indiana.
Brandt, R. B.: 1988, ‘Fairness to Indirect Optimific Theories in Ethics’, Ethics 98, 341–60.
Daniels, N., editor: 1974, Reading Rawls, Basic Books, New York.
Donagan, A.: 1974, ‘Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?’, repr. in W. K. Frankena and J. T. Granrose, eds., Introductory Readings in Ethics, Prentice-Hall, Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey. Orig. publ. in M. Bales, ed., Contemporary Utilitarianism, Doubleday (1968).
Feinberg, J.: 1972, ‘Justice, Fairness, and Rationality’, Yale Law Journal 81, 1004–31.
Hare, R. M.: 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford University Press.
Hare, R. M.: 1981, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1982, ‘Some Epistemological Advantages of a Rule Utilitarian Position in Ethics’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VII, 389–402.
Rawls, J.: 1971, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J.: 1980, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy 77 (No. 9, entire issue), 515–77.
Rawls, J.: 1985, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 14, 223–51.
Rawls, J.: 1987, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7, 1–25.
Singer, M. G.: 1977, ‘Justice, Theory, and a Theory of Justice’, Philosophy of Science 44, 594–618.