Introduction

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Śaivism, and particularly tantric Śaivism, is most often treated as a ritual system or as a doctrinal system based on ritual theory, and is generally regarded as a subdivision of Āgama and Tantra literature. Without denying or ignoring the importance of ritual, this volume seeks to examine some of the philosophical and theological foundations of Śaivism, the theoretical framework that makes it a *darśana*.

In this perspective, much attention is paid in the present volume to the ways in which Śaiva authors situate their doctrines in the philosophical context of the period whose golden age is from the ninth to the eleventh centuries: its relation to and debate with Buddhist theoreticians, the influence of dualist and nondualist thinkers who belong to competing schools or religious currents, etc. This focus requires detailed analysis of the works of Śaiva authors, the close study of their philosophical vocabulary and their argumentative strategies, which may directly or indirectly confront opponents of different persuasions.

Although the nondualist Kashmirian school does figure prominently in this volume, Śaiva philosophy should not be restricted to it, or to doctrinal debates within the dualist and nondualist Kashmirian Śaiva systems. Therefore, in addition to exploring interactions with other philosophical traditions, this volume also concentrates on Śaiva theoreticians who preceded or followed what is usually considered the classical period, and includes the Pāśupata *darśana* as well as other doctrinal developments after the eleventh or twelfth centuries.

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Almost all the papers published here were first delivered, mostly in more succinct versions, at the panel entitled 'Śaiva philosophy', organized by the present editors, within the *Āgama and Tantra* Section of the 15th World Sanskrit Conference in New Delhi (January, 2012). The idea to organize such a panel came from Lyne Bansat-Boudon, at the 14th WSC in Kyoto (September, 2009), which already saw a significant number of papers dedicated to Śaiva philosophy. Scattered in different sections (*Philosophy* as well as *Āgama and Tantra*) of the Kyoto conference and at different sessions, they could not always be discussed by all the interested participants. Given the growing scholarly interest in this subject, it seemed appropriate, both for practical reasons and in order to reflect the independent status of Śaiva philosophy as a branch of study, to organize a special panel dedicated to it at the 15th WSC.

The initial goal of the organizers was to encourage cooperation and debate in the style of a workshop; thus, it was suggested that papers should concentrate on or at least include the presentation and analysis of relevant textual passages in Sanskrit. These passages were to give the raw material for debate and provide a textual foundation for more general problems to be discussed. Although the panel could not function as a real workshop due to restrictions of time, the discussions that followed each presentation proved to be fruitful for all parties involved and shaped the final version of the papers. True to the spirit of the panel, the focus on the primary sources remains the dominant feature of the essays collected in the present volume.

I. Śaivism and Before: The Early History of Some Śaiva Concepts

The first two papers attempt to uncover and reconstruct the early history of Śaiva doctrine and philosophy, whose numerous aspects remain obscure due to the limited extent of the surviving material. These papers propose to bring to light elements of early Śaiva doctrine that are hidden in the works of commentators, who give us their own interpretations of some of the crucial doctrinal points of early Śaivism.

The opening paper by Diwakar Acharya focuses upon a central issue in Śaiva philosophy, namely the origins of the concept of innate impurity (*mala*) and its role in Śaiva initiation in that early period that preceded the opposition between the Siddhānta and what later became nondualist Śaivism. After showing that this concept changed and developed gradually within the earliest Śaiva scriptures, the article attempts to find the source of this notion outside the Āgamas and explain how and why it evolved. Firstly, it is shown that Buddhist criticism, such as Dharmakīrti's, of the way in which ritual Śaiva initiation was said to function may have played an important role in the development of the idea of innate impurity. Secondly, since the Pāśupatas were the direct precursors of classical Śaivism, a comparison is made with their idea of sin and the role of initiation in their system. This comparison leads to an inquiry into the ways in which the Vedic notion of sin may have influenced the development of the concept of *mala*.

The author thus proposes that after an initial borrowing of the Pāśupatas' concept of sin (*pāpman*), which is not fundamentally different from its general *dharmaśāstric* understanding, early Śaiva ritual theory posited that Śaiva initiation

was efficient in removing it radically, unlike Vedic and Pāśupata *dīkṣā*. However, this idea most probably found itself under attack by other schools such as the Buddhists. In response to such attacks, the concept of innate impurity (*mala*) evolved. Innate impurity eventually came to be seen as a universal substance, albeit with varying effects on individual bound souls.

The second paper deals with the early history of the Pāśupata doctrine itself. Peter Bisschop demonstrates that the Pāśupata term *pañcārtha* or 'five entities' must have first referred to sets of five items that were different from the more theologically defined pentad expounded by Kauṇḍinya, the commentator of the *Pāśupatasūtra*s. These five elements originally seem to have referred to aspects of Pāśupata practice, but they received a more theoretical reinterpretation by the author of the commentary (in the fourth to fifth century CE). Bisschop also shows that many (often unattributed) citations found in the commentary may help us to uncover aspects of the doctrinal history of the Pāśupatas that have long remained unknown, or that have often been seen only through the commentator's interpretation.

II. The Śaivism of Kashmir: Dialogues and Debates

The second, core part of the volume concentrates on the Śaivism of Kashmir, understood as comprising both the nondualist and dualist currents. Since several contributors work on nondualist Kashmirian Śaivism (i.e. the Pratyabhijñā or, in a broader sense, the Trika) as their main field of research, most papers in this section deal with the nondualist school. They offer detailed discussions on issues that are also raised by the dualists, here represented by Rāmakaṇṭha (Watson).

The argumentative strategy of the Śaivas in medieval Kashmir is one of the main topics of this section. The papers examine debates in which both dualist and nondualist Śaivas were engaged (see Ratié concerning the Sāṃkhya theory of causality), as well as the interactions with rival systems when debating various doctrinal points, such as the rather general question of the existence of the Self. The opponents include the Sāṃkhya (Bansat-Boudon and Ratié), the Śāntabrahmavāda (Bansat-Boudon), the Nyāya (Watson), Buddhism, especially that of Dharmakīrti and the Vijñānavāda (Watson, Torella, Bansat-Boudon), the Mīmāṃsa (Torella, on *grāhya/grāhaka*; Bansat-Boudon on *bhāvanā*) and Bhartṛhari (Torella, Nemec). These interactions involve much more than the critical examination and refutation of the opponent's tenets, and may even go as far as to rewrite an earlier work of a different persuasion, as does Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra*. While engaging in a dialogue, the proponent can adapt and reformulate, both explicitly and implicitly, the argument of his adversary in an infinite number of ways, from silent adoption to a dialectical inversion.

Moreover, three of the papers (Bansat-Boudon, Nemec, Torella) offer material for re-evaluating Somānanda's, Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's individual contributions to the history of the Pratyabhijñā school. Without questioning the integrity of the *guruśiṣyaparaṃparā* of the school or its doctrinal coherence, these re-evaluations may shed more light on the historical development of Śaiva philosophy.

The first paper, by Lyne Bansat-Boudon, intends to reconsider some key concepts of nondualist Kashmirian Śaivism whose interpretation and translation have generally been the subject of a silent consensus. In addition to an inquiry into seemingly paradoxical compounds such as *cidghana*, 'mass of consciousness'—given that *cit*, 'consciousness', is usually conceived of as *rasa*, 'fluidity', in this system—the author examines some crucial but sometimes rather elusive notions (such as *sphurattā*, *spanda*, *bhavanakartṛtā*, *bhāvanā*) as well as the triad of the *mala*s and their nomenclature, and proposes new translations of these terms that may better reflect the underlying philosophical content.

The core sememe of light is here analyzed, and an attempt is made to privilege a more philosophical rendering of the omnipresent roots, *sphur*, *sphar*, *sphuṭ* and the related verbs *[pra-]kāś*, etc., against the usual metaphorical translations. It is shown that *sphurattā* and *bhavanakartṛtā* are understood as quasi-synonyms, for they intend to explain the same (idea of) reality, which conforms to the dynamic ontology of the system: Śiva is the Agent *par excellence*, in fact the unique Agent, whose prevailing characteristic is that he is *śakti-mant*, i.e. 'power-ful', and as such ever *effervescent*, utterly free, playful (to the point of being seen as the Naṭarāja) sovereign and blissful, therefore the only Agent of the phenomenal world. The entire universe, which has taken on the appearance of exteriority, is his work, or rather, himself as so manifest.

The concept of *bhavanakartṛtā* (coined by Utpaladeva) is particularly interesting: being recurrently associated with the concepts of *sattā* and *bhavattā*, it merges the two most general verbal ideas, that of the verb *kṛ* (expressing change), and that of the (apparently) non-verb (expressing the unchanged condition), namely *bhū*. This merging appears, nevertheless, to be an oxymoron only in our eyes, for in the Indian context it conforms to the grammatical tradition: 'being' (*sattā*) is 'the action of being' (*bhavanakartṛtā*), which itself entails the 'action of bringing [others] into being', as it happens with insentient entities, which Śiva alone 'causes to be'.

From this point of view, Śiva is not so different from the *paśu*, for he *plays* the role of the *paśu* at will—and thus the three *mala*s, 'stains' or 'impurities', should be understood and translated from the *paśu*'s point of view. The three 'stains' are certainly the results of metaphysical ignorance (*avidyā*), but at the same time are voluntarily imposed on ourselves by ourselves, and by no one else, given that we are not different from the playful Śiva.

When the three *mala*s finally disappear, it is partly due to the effect of *bhāvanā*, in its Śaiva understanding. It is through this 'meditative realization' that the *mumukṣu* attains liberation, seen in this system as *jīvanmukti*, 'liberation in this life'.

John Nemec's article presents the outlines of Somānanda's philosophical system and its relation to that of his direct disciple, Utpaladeva. Somānanda's idealistic monism is described in terms of a pantheism, as opposed to Utpaladeva's panentheistic monism that is based on paired opposites (understood as the modes of consciousness), which were to become the hallmarks of the Pratyabhijñā tradition, such as immanence/transcendence, *prakāśa*/*vimarśa*, subjectivity/objectivity, namely *ahantā*/*idantā*—all of them absent from Somānanda's seminal work.

In contrast with Utpaladeva's *œuvre*, that of Somānanda deserves to be called a 'philosophy of radical agency' (Nemec) in order to describe the speculative

extremism of Somānanda's thought and to reflect his taste for audacious paradoxes. For instance, although conventionally considered inanimate, the humblest pot is said to wish, to know and to act as does the sentient subject, that is, Śiva himself. In other words, Somānanda's whole doctrine is built in such a way that everything contributes to establish Śiva as the Agent, the sole Agent, possessing all powers (*śaktimant*), free, playful, blissful, sovereign. These characterizations of the Lord, which Somānanda's successors take over, are thoroughly examined by Nemec.

Thus, the paper shows that, despite the fact that Somānanda's work saw itself superseded by his student's masterpiece, it nevertheless offered an original and influential contribution to Śaiva philosophy that is as yet under-appreciated.

In the same line of thought, Raffaele Torella intends to reestablish the preeminence of Utpaladeva in the Pratyabhijñā lineage as opposed to Abhinavagupta, demonstrating that it is the former who should be regarded as the uncontroversial master of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. The demonstration is based on the *Vivṛti*, Utpaladeva's long auto-commentary on his *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* [ĪPK], which is essential for the understanding of the Pratyabhijñā doctrine as a whole.

It is well known that the *Vivṛti* had long been lost, and survived only through Abhinavagupta's *Vimarśinī* thereon. Torella has been a pioneer in the quest to recover and edit what remains of the text. He discovered, edited and translated a fragmentary *śāradā* manuscript of the work, which extends from ĪPK 1.3.6 to 1.5.3. It is a short but significant portion of the *Vivṛti* that has thus been brought to light, for it deals with several of the key issues of the doctrine, presented in a debate with the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism. Interestingly, the entire discussion starts with Utpaladeva's reference to *Bhagavadgītā* 15.15, which deals with a triad: memory (*smṛti*), cognition (*jñāna*), and exclusion (*apohana*), as originating from the Lord himself, speaking in the first person: *mattaḥ smṛtir jñānam apohanaṃ ca*. The paper shows that the text of the *Bhagavadgītā* provides good occasion for Utpaladeva to offer a Śaiva exegesis of the verse and to establish those three concepts as three powers (*śakti*) of Śiva, which leads Utpaladeva to posit the nonduality of the individual subject and the universal I-ness.

Isabelle Ratié also examines the ĪPK, but in order to analyze the Śaiva appropriation and transformation of the *satkāryavāda*, the Sāṃkhya theory of causality, according to which the effect potentially exists in its cause.

First, her paper points out the paradox of borrowing a dualist theory (with a dualist goal) in a nondualist argument. While the Sāṃkhya intended to establish the existence of an unconscious Matter (*prakṛti*) as radically distinct from the conscious 'Spirit' (*puruṣa*), Utpaladeva adopts their theory in order to demonstrate the ontological non-difference between Śiva, or consciousness, and the material entities of the phenomenal world.

The article then looks at Utpaladeva's idealistic definition of the relation of cause and effect, rather elliptically expressed in ĪPK 2.4. 3–4, and argues that, as can be inferred from both of Abhinavagupta's commentaries, Utpaladeva may well have developed his arguments further in his now lost *Vivṛti*. In an effort to reconstruct Utpaladeva's entire demonstration, the paper refers to other nondualist Śaiva sources, such as Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* and Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* thereon, whose

reasonings are based on the Sāṃkhya notions of manifestation (*abhivyakti*) and potentiality (*śakti*), at the same time reinterpreting them along Śaiva nondualistic lines. For Utpaladeva intends to solve the aporia inherent in the dualistic distinction between *śakti* and *abhivyakti*, which establishes the separate existence of things and their manifestation (the Sāṃkhya notion of *śakti* designating the unmanifested state in which the effect, for instance a pot, exists before the cause reveals it). However, according to Śaiva idealism, to perceive a pot as a mere external entity is nothing else than misapprehending its essential identity with consciousness, which is the sole cause of the manifestation (both internal and external) of the pot. In order to justify the empirical experience of the subject/object dichotomy, Śaivas take recourse to the notion of *māyā*, thanks to which consciousness, although always manifest as the essence of the object, freely and playfully chooses to ignore its own nature and pretends to be other than itself. Therefore, in nondualist Śaiva terms, *śakti* and *abhivyakti* are to be understood as aspects of the same reality: the pure dynamism of consciousness.

In the course of the above demonstration, Utpaladeva's skilful argumentative strategy of adopting, criticizing and reinterpreting the Sāṃkhya *satkāryavāda* is also deployed to defeat another dualist theory that adopted the Sāṃkhya idea of causality—the Śaiva Siddhānta.

Alex Watson's paper discusses some main features of the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta by examining Rāmakaṇṭha's contribution to the long Brāhmaṇical-Buddhist debate—in this case, between the Nyāya and Dharmakīrtian Buddhism—on the question of the Self, its existence and its nature.

Rāmakaṇṭha (tenth century, Kashmir) belongs to the early period of the Śaiva Siddhānta, which, after it spread also to the Tamil-speaking South, became transformed under the influence of devotionalism and Advaita Vedānta.

With the help of useful figures to illustrate various positions, the paper elucidates the arguments of the Nyāya and Dharmakīrtian Buddhism in order to show the ways in which they are addressed in Rāmakaṇṭha's theory. Each pair of opponents is examined in a systematic way: (i) the Nyāya vs. Buddhism; (ii) Rāmakaṇṭha against the Nyāya; (iii) Rāmakaṇṭha between the Nyāya and Buddhism; (iv) Rāmakaṇṭha against Buddhism. The article concludes that Rāmakaṇṭha occupies a middle ground between the Nyāya and Buddhism and establishes the Self as an utterly autonomous (against Buddhism) dynamic (against the Nyāya) consciousness, for which he proposes the analogy of light, seen as a continuous and unchanging process.

III. Nondualism in a Different Guise: The Doctrine of a Practice

The last section of the volume deals with questions of theory and doctrine as they appear in texts on Śaiva religious practice. Both papers examine the notion of 'nonduality' as it is treated in works on *yoga* and ritual. These texts are not possessed of the theoretical and argumentative ambition of philosophical treatises; yet, they present their own understanding of doctrinal questions. While the first paper examines the period preceding the 'Age of the exegetes' through a study of

the scriptural sources then available, the second paper focuses on subsequent developments and on the survival of Śaiva nondualism in the *haṭhayogic* tradition.

Judit Törzsök looks at the ritual and philosophical meaning of 'nondual' and 'nondualism' (*advaya/advaita*) in early Śākta scriptures. She shows that the earliest scriptures use these terms only in a non-philosophical meaning, to denote that they do not distinguish between what is considered pure and impure according to Hindu orthopraxy, whether they are substances, people, or ritual acts. The theoretical statements found in these texts, including esoteric Kaula scriptures, are often ambiguous and do not conform to the tenets of classical Śaiva nondualism. Nondual ontology seems to have evolved gradually, through scattered statements about the nature of god, the phenomenal world, and the way in which ritual is considered to have an effect. It is only in the Krama and related systems that nondualism appears in a form similar to the classical one, as argued in Sanderson 1992.

James Mallinson's article analyzes the possible theoretical sources of classical *haṭhayoga*. It shows that, despite the fact that *haṭhayoga* was a Śaiva appropriation of an older, extra-Vedic soteriological method, it did not adopt Śaiva philosophy on the whole. The nondual philosophy of *haṭhayoga* was mainly produced by the integration of the Vedāntic nondual theory into its system. However, *haṭhayogic* doctrine also incorporated elements of Śaiva nondual philosophy, which thus lived side-by-side with Vedāntic nondualism—a theoretical construct inconceivable in *śāstric* terms. This surprising fusion of the two notions of nonduality, which represented two rival schools in philosophical discourse, may well have been an important factor that ensured the survival of nondualist Śaiva theory after the progressive demise of the system as a whole. Thanks to their survival in *haṭhayoga,* Śaiva tenets thus became part of what was to become in the medieval period the dominant soteriological method in scholarly religious discourse in India.

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While it would be impossible to touch upon all important issues of Śaiva philosophy, it is to be hoped that the papers in this volume can at least demonstrate the range and diversity of philosophical problems and possible methods of inquiry.

Two important aspects of these investigations may deserve special mention, although they are by no means unusual or unexpected. One is that Śaiva philosophy, just as other branches of Indian philosophy, is best studied in a dynamic relationship to other theories and philosophies, as it is constantly in dialogue and debate with them. The other is that Śaiva philosophy is shaped by these debates in the course of its history, as well as by other, historical factors, and therefore can only be studied with particular attention to its historical dimensions. Although these two imperatives are by no means new or revolutionary, they provide us with a basic framework when trying to understand Śaiva texts.

It is along these dialogical and chronological lines that one can hope to identify when and how subtle shifts take place both in particular arguments and in Śaiva philosophy as a whole, while the theoreticians claim to be faithful to what is perceived of as an original, eternal and unchanging divine discourse. This leads us to a third imperative, which is again not a new discovery, but a principle that, in our

view, cannot be emphasized enough: that such subtle shifts within a particular dialogue or in the history of Śaiva philosophy can only be identified if one remains close to the texts.