Abstract
A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.
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Barnett, D. Against A Posteriori Moral Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 107, 239–257 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014558826464
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014558826464