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A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument

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Abstract

Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of the indispensability argument.

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  1. School of Philosophical and Historical Enquiry, University of Sydney, Quadrangle A14, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia

    Sam Baron

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  1. Sam Baron
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Baron, S. A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. Synthese 190, 2413–2427 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9989-2

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