Abstract
Connections among Varela's theory of enactive cognition , his evolutionary theory of natural drift, and his concept of autopoiesis are made clear. Two questions are posed in relation to Varela's conception of perception, and the tension that exists in his thought between the formal level of organization and the Jonasian notion of the organism.
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References
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Weber, A. and Varela, F. 2002. Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 97-125 (this issue).
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Barbaras, R. Francisco Varela: A new idea of perception and life. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, 127–132 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020332523809
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020332523809