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Indeterminacy, identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.

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Correspondence to Elizabeth Barnes.

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Barnes, E. Indeterminacy, identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered. Synthese 168, 81–96 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9314-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9314-x

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