

PHENOMENOLOGY AND NEW RHETORIC

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A monograph presented in conjunction with the
Conference on New Rhetoric
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
Santa Barbara, California

Recorded presentation followed by a discussion among the Fellows of the Center on
Wednesday, February 25, 1970

KEYWORDS: new rhetoric, phenomenology, self-reference, projection, projective misconstruction

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Introduction

This paper has three purposes. It attempts first to describe in general terms methods of investigation proper to strict phenomenology and to new rhetoric. Second, it advances certain recent developments in phenomenological method which appear to be of potential significance in a variety of areas of study, including that of new rhetoric. Finally, several suggestions are made with a view to bringing portions of phenomenology into close connection with certain of the basic concerns of new rhetoric. The paper as a whole arises out of a tradition of epideictic rhetoric, since its fundamental concern is to promote a group of values shared by a community. The nature of these values and of the community advocating acceptance of them, will become clear shortly.

Section One: Phenomenology

§ 1.1 The general nature of phenomenology.

Ch. Perelman has made the following observation:

Initiation into a given discipline consists in communicating its rules, techniques, specific ideas, and presuppositions, as well as the method of criticizing its results in terms of the discipline's own requirements.
[TA: 100]*

I will attempt to direct my comments in this general fashion in communicating the nature of the phenomenological undertaking. The specific discipline which will be described here forms a specialized portion of the relatively little known field of phenomenology. I do not propose, however, to give a general survey of phenomenology. Nevertheless, I recognize

* References frequently cited in this paper are abbreviated in the following manner:

- [TA: 100] refers to page 100 of Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric; A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1969).
- [IJPA: 5] refers to page 5 of Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, trans. John Petrie (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1963).
- [CSDI] refers to the Conference on the New Rhetoric at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, January 19-21, 1970. When cited in conjunction with a paper, [CSDI] indicates that the paper was presented at the above Conference.

that some background material is in order, in terms of which certain recent developments in the field can be described. My comments can neither do the job of an introduction to phenomenology, nor can they reflect more than a small portion of recent phenomenological research. I say this so that the reader's expectations may be realistic.

Phenomenology, when first approached, seems excessively top-heavy with what appears to be a high-flown terminology, and a paucity of concrete illustrations. The reason for this dearth of examples lies in the nature of the phenomenological undertaking. Phenomenology, as will be seen, would attempt to re-interpret experience, beginning with what is most fundamental. Because nearly all examples embody concepts which themselves stand in need of phenomenological clarification, I will almost always be forced to refrain from giving concrete illustrations. I realize, on the other hand, that this limitation will sometimes restrict how well the reader will grasp what the task of phenomenology is. This handicap to communication is, at least in part, inherent in the nature of the discipline; furthermore, I cannot provide the reader with an idea of the range of issues basic to phenomenology, as to do so would require expansion of the discussion beyond what is relevant and of interest vis-à-vis new rhetoric.

Phenomenology is not, in my opinion, susceptible to a general definition which would encompass the divergent views of those who have been called, or who have called themselves,

"phenomenologists." The field of phenomenology is now criss-crossed by a multitude of special orientations and sometimes incompatible schools of thought. Phenomenology is certainly not alone in this lack of internal unity, and it will not be my intention to construct bridges which might deceptively veil disagreements in orientation between the various species of phenomenologies.

When I use the term 'phenomenology', what I shall intend is a more or less clear-cut field of research which can be represented by means of a series of selective idealizations of positions taken by certain of the outstanding figures of phenomenological literature. I use the phrase 'selective idealization' in the sense that none of the positions I will represent in ideal form consistently are expressed in that form, for a particular thinker will frequently develop through a succession of views. What I shall do is to represent a certain domain of inquiry by reference to positions some phenomenologists have adhered to, even though a position may later have given way to a quite different view unrelated to the kind of phenomenology the development of which I should like to describe.

Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, a former Head of the Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco, has written:

The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any [continental] philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary,

phenomenology is in its infancy. The average American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real import of what is said into the kind of analysis with which he is familiar.... No doubt, American education will gradually take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophical literature. ("Philosophic Thought in France and the United States", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XI (1951), 380.)

It would, as I have suggested, be difficult to respond to this challenge by giving a general definition of phenomenology; within a given set of restrictions, however, the task is made feasible. It has been suggested by many phenomenologists that what unites them is not their common acceptance of a group of conclusions, but a common method and common concern for a collection of philosophical issues. Such a statement is to be found on the prospectus sent out by the publisher and later printed at the head of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, whose editors included Edmund Husserl, Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfänder, Adolt Reinach, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Oskar Becker. A portion of that statement runs as follows:

It is not a system that the editors share. What unites them is the common conviction that it is only by a return to the primary sources of direct intuition and to insights into essential structures derived from them that we shall be

able to put to use the great traditions of philosophy with their concepts and problems; only thus shall we be in a position to clarify such concepts intuitively, to restate the problems on an intuitive basis, and thus, eventually, to solve them, at least in principle.

It is a general description of a position, but not one which can be said unambiguously to identify a strictly phenomenological approach; certainly, the place "intuition" plays in a return to "primary sources" is not clear.

In a letter of September 2, 1770, to Johann Heinrich Lambert, Kant expressed enthusiasm for the notion of a "negative science" - a phaenomenologica generalis - which was to precede metaphysics as a purely propaedeutic discipline. This idea of phenomenology as providing a Critique of Impure Reason influenced the development phenomenology was to take later at the hands of Edmund Husserl. But that influence became somewhat etiolated in the later life of Husserl, and particularly so in the period after Husserl's death, when 'phenomenology' took a place in titles of less critical studies of the field in its more existential and humanistic implications. The notion of phenomenology as a strict science rapidly came into decline; the idea of pure scientific phenomenology generally has little affinity with contemporary phenomenology. It is this portion of phenomenological research which I will comment upon, while I will describe a few recent

developments which have been made in this area. I should like to suggest early in this discussion that it was phenomenology in its pure scientific form which may be pointed to as the father of its later existentialist variations. For philosophers of an existential persuasion, it should be of some interest to note that very different kind of philosophy which led to the hybrid "existential phenomenology."

To an extent, it can be argued that scientific phenomenology developed in sympathetic agreement with Descartes' belief that each philosopher must make his own radical beginnings, in which he is to adopt his own reasoned judgment as ultimate arbiter. Perhaps it could even be said that Edmund Husserl made his philosophical mission the development of a scientifically effective Cartesiansism in this sense. Husserl demanded that concepts basic to our theories of theories and theories of action be thoroughly and rigourously explored. Such a thorough exploration, he believed, is a pre-condition for adequate understanding. This task requires that the investigator bring no assumptions to his work which he cannot bring to full clarity, or show to be deducible from other presuppositions which are fully grasped. Husserl developed a procedure whereby the field of experience can be elucidated, free from the distortion of pre-critically accepted prejudices. This procedure he

considered to be scientific in the sense that phenomenological analyses would reflect the scientific rigour of the deductive sciences, rather than the scientific rigour of the inductive natural sciences. It is to a brief description of Husserl's phenomenological method that I will now turn.

§ 1.2 The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

Of significant influence to the development of Husserl's phenomenological method were two programmatic ideals, one suggested by Franz Brentano, and the other by Carl Stumpf. In Brentano's two works, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt: 1874; complete edition 1924-28) and The Origin and Knowledge of Right and Wrong (Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis: 1889), the idea is developed of an investigation of idealized types, in which a selective experience of the essential features of phenomena is described, though not in great detail. In Stumpf's Appearances and Psychological Functions (Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen: 1906), the concept is developed of phenomenology as a neutral pre-science investigating the "building materials" of the special sciences. Both Brentano's notion of an investigation of idealized types, and Stumpf's idea of a neutral pre-science

concerned with the foundations of the various sciences, exerted a strong effect upon Husserl's thought.

Of his phenomenology, Husserl says:

I attempt to guide, not to instruct, but merely to show and to describe what I see. All I claim is the right to speak according to my best lights - primarily to myself and correspondingly to others - as one who has lived through a philosophical existence in all its seriousness. (Krisis, Husserliana VI, 17)

Husserl's phenomenology would attempt to turn back to the sources of which excessively hasty thought has lost sight. The principal use of his phenomenological method is to permit a critical examination of what is indubitably given, before pre-critical impurities rush in, in the form of prejudices concerning the world and opinions obtained from individual cases taken from the world of facts. The elimination of these impurities is accomplished through various reductions, two of which are distinguished here: first, there is the eidetic reduction, in which reference to the individual and particular is dropped, permitting a description of phenomena, freed from the complications arising from considerations of particular cases. (I digress to point out that a similar "reduction" is performed under a different rubric in modern dimensional analysis and similarity theory. There it is included under the heading of "generalized analysis.") Second, the phenomenological reduction, which in Husserl's writings is sometimes synonymous with his transcendental reduction,

requires the suspension of belief in existence, while an injunction is established against transcendent references. This second reduction may be thought to comprise a declaration of unconditional and unprejudiced scientific neutrality.

Judgment consequently is suspended on questions of existence and transcendence, and on all matters of fact. Together with these, assumptions grounded in fact and theories relating to the natural world are bracketed. Views pertaining to the world as it ^{is} naively and unquestioningly accepted are set aside as hindrances to a clear description of things as they are given in experience.

With naive assumptions out of the running, scientific transcendental phenomenology attempts to investigate any concept or object from the standpoint of those conditions which must be granted, and without which the concept or object becomes impossible. The natural sciences, taken in general, attempt to study phenomena with an end to discovering the most fundamental principles governing the structure of those phenomena and of their behavior in a variable environment. Phenomenology, on the other hand, attempts to bring to light the principles involved when the possibility of a given phenomenon is thrown into question. Phenomenology performs analyses on the level of the possibility of phenomena, while the natural sciences undertake to understand physical phenomena on the level of

their given, factual and general structure. Transcendental philosophy has made clear that the conditions which must be granted in order to provide for the possibility of a given phenomenon, will at once be those conditions underlying the investigation of that phenomenon from the standpoint of the special sciences. For this reason, pure phenomenology was characterized by Husserl as the science of sciences, or the theory of theories.

Definitions articulated from the standpoint of Husserl's scientific phenomenology are to be based on a recognition of the essential connections given between the things a definition attempts to connect. Furthermore, phenomenological descriptions must rely, first, upon direct insight into essential structures of phenomena, and of their modes of representation in consciousness; and, second, upon direct intuition as the source and final test of all knowledge, faithfully to be assimilated in phenomenological descriptions. The still unclarified notions of the "given" and of "direct intuition" are the final grounds to which an appeal is made for justification in phenomenological investigations.

In connection with his notion of the original given sources, Husserl admonishes the investigator

not to hunt deductively after constructions unrelated to the matter in question, but to derive all knowledge from its ultimate sources, from principles seen authentically and understood as insights; not to be diverted by any

prejudices, by any verbal contradictions or indeed by anything..., even under the name of "exact science", but to grant its right to whatever is clearly seen, which constitutes the 'original', or what precedes all theories, or what sets the ultimate norm. ("Entwurf einer Vorrede zu den Logischen Untersuchungen" (1913), ed. by Eugen Fink, in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie I (1939), 116-7)

Specifically, Husserl's notion of "the given" arose in a controversy over whether or not givenness should be positivistically restricted to particular experience. It was Husserl's observation that there are factors in the material of experience which direct or structure experience in channels not of the choosing of the subject; it is to these objective elements that Husserl's doctrine of givenness is meant to draw attention. Husserl says little more of "the given" than this.

Now, as far as the notion of "direct intuition" is concerned, Husserl speaks of intuition or insight into general essences, which are expressed in relation to a study of representative examples. Such a study provides the basis for any generalizing "ideation". Representative examples are subjected to free variation, so that a general essence emerges from a collection of examples in which individuating characteristics are subordinated to the principle conditioning their unity. The task of ideation extends, moreover, to a methodical grasp of conditioning relationships obtaining between general essences. It is in the particular, though

somewhat vague, sense that representative examples can yield a judgment concerning their essential structure, and in the sense that essential relations between general forms of structure can be rigourously determined, that phenomenology is said to rely upon the intuiting of phenomena in which, Husserl believes, all genuine knowledge finds its last verification.

He maintains that

Every type of first-hand intuiting forms a legitimate source of knowledge; whatever presents itself to us by "intuition" at first hand, in its authentic reality, as it were, is to be accepted simply for the thing as it presents itself, yet only within the limits within which it presents itself. (Ideen I, § 24)

The notion of these "limits within which the intuited presents itself" is not fully developed in Husserl; it will become the subject of further discussion somewhat later.

By way of a partial summary to this point, it can perhaps be said that the original vision of scientific phenomenology consisted in a desire to elucidate the conditioning structure, the constitution, of phenomena, the essential forms of which express the nature of the domain of possible experience. Husserl's desire to clarify these "foundations" appeared in the context of what he believed to be a crisis in scientific endeavor: be observed that the faith in science as a panacea for all the ills and problems of our time was confronted by a

rapidly spreading loss of this faith by front-line research scientists, particularly in relation to the development of modern quantum theory and relativity physics. After World War I, Husserl saw that science was greatly in need of a philosophy which could restore its relevance to the deeper concerns of man. For Husserl, the theoretical foundations of science were becoming increasingly obscure, while the relationship of science to life was becoming correspondingly tenuous. It was his conviction that scientific phenomenology could meet these needs.

In its concern over "foundations", phenomenology was to be a "first science", where the beginnings of theory were to be subjected to careful and rigorous analysis. In this sense, Husserl felt himself the perpetual beginner; he says in self-appraisal of his task:

Even though for practical purposes the author had to tone down the ideal of his philosophical ambitions to those of a mere beginner, he has, at least for his own person in his old age, reached the perfect certainty that he can call himself a true beginner. He could almost dare to hope that, if he were granted the age of a Methuselah, he might still become a philosopher. He has been able to pursue the problems of a descriptive phenomenology (the beginning of the beginning) further and further and to develop it in examples instructive at least to himself. The encompassing horizon for the work of a phenomenological philosophy has unfolded according to what may be called its main geographical structures, and the essential layers of problems and the methods of

approach fitted to them have been clarified....
 [But the approach phenomenology recommends]
 will not be able to help anyone who is already
 sure of his philosophy and of his philosophical
 method, and hence has never experienced the
 despair of one who had the misfortune to fall
 in love with philosophy and who, even as a
 beginning student, was faced with a choice
 in the chaos of philosophies, yet became
 aware that he really had no choice, since none
 of these philosophies had provided for real
 freedom from presuppositions and none had
 sprung from the radicalism of autonomous
 responsibility for which philosophy calls. (Ideen I,
 Preface Eng. ed.)

It is common knowledge that Husserl's scientific phenomenology failed to develop; its potential followers inclined away from the ideal of phenomenology as a rigorous science. The reasons for this failure are many, some of which reside in real or apparent deficiencies in Husserl's proposed phenomenological method. At times, Husserl's methodology failed to achieve real rigour; at other times, his phenomenological reductions were not carried out with sufficient care, so that impurities filtered through into his results. It is nevertheless my belief that his intensive studies and sense for rigour suggest much that merits genuine respect. I do not wish to condemn his approach, although its shortcomings are perhaps many; rather, I should like to describe a related approach, which, in my estimation, is less open to criticism than Husserl's methodology. I have developed and proposed this approach elsewhere under the title of "A Relativistic Theory of Phenomenological Constitution". Certain of the essential notions involved

in this approach will be summarized in what follows.

§ 1.3 A new approach to phenomenology: de-projection.

In its most general form, this proposal may be understood in terms of the development of a logically sound methodology which can provide the basis for a meta-discipline capable of investigating, on a cross-disciplinary level, concepts most basic to disciplines to which scientific methods are fundamental. It is my belief that such a methodology can be developed which will provide a useful and significant framework and method for the interpretation and investigation of the essential constitution of the domain of possible experience, and thus of certain of the theoretical foundations of the sciences. A careful application of this methodology to the task of clarifying these foundations, would complete the successful achievement of the goals of scientific phenomenology.

The methodology developed in answer to this need is intended to establish a procedure for determination and correction of a form of invalid reference involved in conceptual misconstructions in foundation work in phenomenology, as well as in concepts basic to the sciences, concepts which phenomenology would seek to elucidate in relation to

the essential structure of experience.

I turn now to a brief exposition of this methodology and of the type of conceptual misconstruction which it is intended to avoid and to eliminate.

Expressions in a natural language are essentially relative to a specific region of discourse. In a similar manner, a form of relation in mathematical logic or a sign or symbol of formal language is relative either to particulars related in the given manner, or to a definite formal system. Objects in general are relative to a given universe of meaning. An identifiable phenomenon of whatever kind is relative to a determinable region of identification. Etc. In general, it is possible to characterize any phenomenon or theory in relation to other phenomena or theoretical entities to which the phenomenon or theory is essentially relative. In this way, the propositions of a non-euclidean geometry are essentially relative to that particular system of geometry for their sense and truth-value. These patterns of relativity are to be found in every discipline; the network of relativistic relations constitutes or provides the foundation for a discipline's internal unity.

An analysis of these kinds of relations can yield some interesting results: it can be demonstrated that if

two things are connected by a relation of essential relativity, then to affirm one out of connection to the other is logically inconsistent. As an example, consider a Cartesian coordinate system simply as a certain kind of system which permits definite means of identifying the position of objects in terms of an ideal origin in the framework. An object, the Cartesian coordinates for which are given, is represented in such a way that its position can be located in a Cartesian coordinate system. If these coordinates -without coordinate-translation - are thought to locate the object from the standpoint of a Polar coordinate system, a conceptual misconception results. By a 'conceptual misconception' I mean a 'logically invalid proposition resulting from an improper operation with a set of conceptual structures'.. The particular type of conceptual misconception which is of significance here is termed a 'projective misconception', or, more simply, a 'projection'.

The notion of projection is then defined to be understood in the sense that the process of reasoning is a process of coordination. Correct reasoning presupposes valid coordination; incorrect reasoning results from improper coordination. A 'projective misconception' is a form of inadmissible coordination. Consequently, in order to eliminate and to avoid this variety of improper

coordination, the method of 'de-projection' is evolved. De-projection is consequently introduced as a procedure for the clarification and restoration of the regulation of coordinations in accordance with the structuring principles essential to the constitution of a given system.

Now, a frame of reference is the constitutional system that gives to an investigatory enterprise the possibility of its structure, while it both insures the possibility of the enterprise having a point, a direction, a sense, and allows for identifying references within the total structure of the framework itself. An identifying reference is such that an ascription to that which can be the subject of an ascription establishes that what is ascribed and that to which ascription is made, are one and the same. Such an ascription determines the references to that which is thereby identified such that the subject of the identification is fixed within a structure which allows for the possibility that the same subject can be re-identified.

I will refer here to a coordinate as a determinant of reference to that which can be the subject of an identifying reference. A coordinate is therefore essentially identifiable within the coordinate system which provides for its possibility. For a coordinate to be identified as such, it must represent in germinal form, as it were, a frame of reference having a constitution derived from the essential

structures of the coordinate system to which the coordinate belongs. In other words, it is in essential relation to the structural principles of a given coordinate system that a coordinate possesses its character as a coordinate of a certain system. Specification of a coordinate involves at least implicit reference to some coordinate system. This view can be compared to Wittgenstein's claim that "A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless, the whole of logical space must already be given in it...." (Tractatus: 3.42) Reichenbach adds that "...every partial domain characterizes the total field." (The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge: 103)

By a 'coordinate system' I mean a system from the standpoint of which the possibility of identifying reference is provided to the class of objects studied in the context of the framework of a particular discipline. Thus, a frame of reference is constituted by a conditioning coordinate system. It should be clear that these uses of the terms 'coordinate' and 'coordinate system' are not the same as the corresponding uses of these terms in mathematics.

The fact that the essential structure of a coordinate system is implicit in any coordinate of that system, permits the use of coordinates without explicit mention of the coordinate system they implicitly entail, and is constitutive

of the complex wherein a coordinate has sense.

If any particular is considered in relation to its proper coordinate system, the particular must be specifiable by certain coordinates. Following Quine's dictum "no entity without identity" (Linsky, Referring 27), it is evident that there can be no particular not a particular without specifiable coordinates. This is evident because (a) the essential possibility of a particular necessarily involves the possibility of identifying reference, (b) the possibility of identifying reference is guaranteed only by the constitution of a frame of reference, and (c) identifying reference requires coordinate specification. A particular is a particular if and only if it has certain specifiable coordinates, in the sense that a particular is defined as that which can be the subject of identifying reference.

There is a tendency to forget or disregard the coordinate systems entailed when reference is made to different kinds of particulars. Most frequently, this amounts to a disregard of the presuppositions involved in those systems, and, derivatively, in any of the various branches of theoretical investigation. When the presuppositions our tasks involve are overlooked, when there is neglect to render explicit the coordinates of a particular or class of particulars, reasoning is vulnerable to a

variety of misconstructions, one of the more significant of which I have called a 'projection'. A projection appears to characterize some or all of the coordinates of a particular as independent of the coordinate system entailed by these coordinates.

A coordinate is meaningful and valid only if applied within the limitations prescribed by the regulating principles essential to the coordinate system proper to it. If a coordinate is expressed within a coordinate system having structural principles incompatible with those the coordinate requires for its possible sense and validity, the result is meaningless.

Particulars consequently are necessarily relative to the context which provides for their possibility. This relativity, in turn, is essential to the structural constitution of a coordinate system. Projective misconstructions result from ignoring, or from ignorance of, the essential relativistic constitution of a coordinate system. The procedure of de-projection would avoid such misconstructions by rendering explicit in practice affirmation of the essential relativistic constitution of coordinate systems.

Through a description of the constitutive elements of a particular, de-projection retrieves to that particular its coordinates which, qua projected, are regarded as independent of the coordinate systems entailed by these

coordinates.

In describing a particular or class of particulars, an attempt is made to enumerate the coordinates proper to that particular or class. As already noted, this involves a description of the references essential to the possibility of the particular. De-projection specifically relates to the referential character of coordinates. Since this referential character is essentially a relative matter, de-projection is a tool for dealing with the relativistic nature of coordinate systems.

The essential structure of a particular may entail one or more coordinate systems. Clearly de-projection is facilitated in cases where only one coordinate system is necessary for a particular both to have sense and to express correctly the coordinative structure of its system. Such a coordinate system may involve two or more sub-systems - at least two being necessary for projection to be possible. This simpler case is taken as paradigmatic of the others.

Consider a coordinate system whose structural principles are known, since it will facilitate the discussion here to avoid having to deduce them from a given particular. For example, consider a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system which allows for the possibility of reference to length, width, and height, expressed by the four coordinates (x,y,z) , (x_1,y_1,z_1) , (x_2,y_2,z_2) , (x_3,y_3,z_3) , which together represent the vertices of a

tetrahedron. Here is a framework which permits use of the language of volumes. Insofar as volumes are describable in terms of similarly ordered coordinates, volumes so described are limited to this particular coordinate system for their sense and validity.

Suppose now that a second coordinate system expresses volumes of the first by "projecting" the coordinates limiting those volumes upon a concave surface, say a section of a sphere. A grid on this surface permits reference to the points so formed. Assuming that no two vertices of the tetrahedron "project" upon the same point on the surface, there are four coordinates (α, β) , (α_1, β_1) , (α_2, β_2) , (α_3, β_3) which correspond respectively to the "projected" vertices having the same subscripts in Cartesian notation.

Now, if it is thought that the coordinate system proper to coordinates (α, β) , (α_1, β_1) , ... allows reference to "volumes", an instance of a projective misconception is encountered. For the points on the concave surface certainly do not describe volumes at all within that coordinate system. Application of the concept of volume is restricted here to the original Cartesian system which allows for the possibility of references to volumes. Insofar as the coordinates (x, y, z) , (x_1, y_1, z_1) , ... refer to their correlates on the concave surface, and in so referring result in the above confusion, the Cartesian coordinates are "projective", in the strict sense of the word. But the sense in which they refer to (α, β) , (α_1, β_1) , ... is not

in itself sufficient to explain the above misunderstanding; references from (x,y,z) to (α,β) , from (x_1,y_1,z_1) to (α_1,β_1) , ... can be described in a third coordinate system, K, in which specific principles express relationships between all eight coordinate determinations. The projective misconception here is necessarily founded upon such a coordinate system which at once provides the conditions necessary for the initial two coordinate sub-systems. The misunderstanding vanishes when it is recognized that the coordinates (x,y,z) , ... are determinations in a coordinate system in which volume is a permissible concept, and that the coordinates (α,β) , ... are determinations of a coordinate system in which the concept of volume is meaningless and its application illegitimate.

The system K, then, is the context for a projection. But as soon as its constitutive principles are understood, once the coordinates of its two sub-systems have been de-projected, the references essential to particulars in system K are found to be implicitly relative to that system for their validity and sense, and are articulated according to the principles governing the respective constitutions of its two sub-systems. And once this is recognized, projective misconstructions in the system are eliminated.

The above projection is contrived and the misconception sufficiently obvious that projective misconstructions following upon it would probably never take place.

Essentially, de-projection is a procedure intended to clarify the structures necessary for the possibility of the

referential character of coordinates. As seen, the descriptive enumeration of these references at once describes the constitution of the coordinate system which permits such references. The relativity of a coordinate to its proper coordinate system(s) is a relativity constitutive of the structure of the coordinate system(s). When, therefore, the misconstructions implied by disregarding this constitutive relativity are circumvented by heeding the constitutional principles necessary for the possibility of the structures examined, analyses introduce, as it were, no supplementary content, presuppositions, or assumptions. (Note the similarity between this procedure and Husserl's reductions.)

De-projection is empirical to the extent that its analyses are directed toward subject matter which can be experienced. It implicitly treats the conditioning principles of possible structures. Its demonstration of elements and relations as essentially constitutive of the structure of a concept or theory, is deductively scientific.

As a procedure intended to lead to accurate description, its formal structure is tautologous - for in making explicit the constitutive elements of that which is described, de-projection reaches a point where it is clear that the affirmation of a concept or theory must at once be an

affirmation of those constitutive elements guaranteeing the possibility of that concept or theory. It is precisely because de-projection is empty of content that it can authorize a transition from one formulation to another, while guaranteeing their equivalence, and without risking the introduction of error. A tautology is useful because it is devoid of content. But it should be clear that although a tautology is empty of content, it is not devoid of meaning.

Not all inconsistent formulations are projective. A projection is a particular form of invalid coordination which must satisfy the following conditions:

- (1) A projection requires as a condition of its possibility that a particular be disconnected from certain of its essential relations to the coordinating structure required for its possibility. In other words, there must be a severing of the essential relativity of the particular to its context.
- (2) The particular must be asserted to be in certain respects autonomous from its context. Reference must be made to the particular in such a manner that denies or ignores one or more essential determinants of its contextual relativity. The coordination is projective in these respects.

It should be understood that these two conditions must be satisfied by any projection from the standpoint of an analysis of its essential structure. It is not as if a projective misconception takes the form of an explicit severing of essential contextual relations - although this

may be so in deliberately constructed cases. But this condition of explicit severing of essential coordinative relations must be satisfied once the projection is expressed in the form of an assertion that specific structures are not essentially connected to the context.

The first condition specifies that a particular is to be considered as dislocated from its essential contextual relativity. The second condition specifies that this dislocation is to be formulated in the form of an assertion of the autonomy of the particular from its context. The first condition denies the possibility of the particular by separating the particular from the context necessary for its possibility. After F.B. Fitch, such a denial is termed 'self-referentially inconsistent.' The separation involved is strictly speaking impossible, so long as reference is actually understood as intending a certain particular. However, what is said of that particular - namely, that it is autonomous from the context conditioning its possibility - comprises a self-contradictory and projective assertion. From the standpoint of de-projective analysis, the above separation must consequently be considered a mistaken separation.

The second condition, then, asserts the particular while excluding the grounds for its possibility. Thus, a projective misconstruction would attempt to disconnect two

or more things which are essentially relative to one another, where this essential relativity of the one to the other is necessary in order for either to be possible.

The elimination of projections follows according to the rules given in the coordinating structure of the context within which the projection is made. As such, this elimination also follows the rules of coherent parametric analysis. The principle central to the notion of parameter is a field of variation limited and controlled by identity conditions. In a parametric formula, it is possible to discriminate (1) a constant or identity condition, (2) a class of particulars called the field of variability, and (3) a rule of order or set of relations holding between the particular determinations. Parametric analysis would attempt to arrive at an unambiguous definition of a given parameter, while asserting that the limits of its variability, and hence its application and extension, not be violated.

Three distinct moments of analysis are made prior to the de-projective correction of a projective misconstruction. First, the constitutive coordinative structure of the concept or theory must be adequately described. This description must specify the essential restrictions imposed by this structure upon possible coordinations. Second, the assertion involved in the projective misconstruction must be explicitly formulated. The formulation will specify the nature of the projective demand by designating the nature

of the asserted autonomy of the given concept or theory from its conditioning context. Third, the opposition of the projective demand to the regulative principles of the context must be verified to result in a contradictory and meaningless formulation.

Together, these preliminary analyses render explicit the constitutive structure of the given context and demonstrate that reference to the concept or theory in question is at once a necessary reference to those constitutive elements guaranteeing the possibility of that concept or theory. De-projective analysis is completed with a reconciliation of the constitutive coordinate structure with the misconception which was originally in opposition to that constitution. This final phase of de-projection involves a correction of the projective coordination, imposing upon the coordination regulation according to the regulative structure of the context, which in turn, conditions the possibility of reference to the given concept or theory.

§ 1.4 The two approaches to phenomenology.

I have briefly described Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science. Phenomenological methodology was seen as providing the basis for a science which sets the

task for itself to study the general nature of all science. Phenomenology, according to this view, is a science of maximum theoretic generality capable of investigating the transcendental foundations of the various scientific disciplines, its own transcendental foundation included. I have chosen to replace or perhaps re-formulate phenomenological methodology along more clearly defined lines. De-projective methodology would attempt to make of phenomenology a meta-discipline in the sense of Kant's notion of a "negative science". But, I do not believe that this discipline can afford to remain wholly negative, and so, in the corrective phase of de-projective analysis, a given projective concept is replaced by a logically sound concept to serve the non-inconsistent functions of the original concept.

The constitution of such a de-projective phenomenology provides the basis for a variety of important forms of reference. Fundamental conditioning patterns of relativity are brought to light in relation to regions of possible experience essentially structured by those patterns of relativity. The framework of de-projection provides for the possibility of re-identification of given members of the class of phenomena which it seeks to investigate.

This class of phenomena is defined to comprise the

class of objects constituted in relation to certain given "attentional characters", - that is to say, the possibility for the correlation of such "attentional characters" with a given particular is constitutive of the system entailed by reference to the particular. The notion of attentional characters is best left undefined for my purposes here. It is sufficient to understand that a variety of egological modification or pragmatical reference to a subject is intended. Thus, phenomena are objects of reference which are given in terms of a system guaranteeing the possibility of a general sort of pragmatical reference to a subject. A pre-critical introduction of such notions as "consciousness", "subjectivity", "intentionality", "psychical act", etc., would defeat the purpose of methodical de-projective analysis. In a neutral sense - neutral with respect to any such pre-critical distinctions - the class of phenomena can be considered coincident with the domain of possible experience.

Where, for Husserl, "dubitable nature" is bracketed, projective misconstructions are eliminated in de-projective analysis. An "essential residuum" is left for each: for de-projection, a de-projectively clarified field of phenomena; for Husserl, indubitable consciousness. At times, these residua overlap; usually, however, they do not, and

there the similarity to Husserl's phenomenological reduction breaks down.

In conclusion, I should like to say the obvious, namely that not all I have suggested was said with an expectation that it would be transparent after a single reading. This has been something in the nature of an intentional shortcoming, so that I might attempt to outline in practice, rather than in survey, some recent ideas in the tradition of scientific phenomenology. If an approximate although not altogether clear notion of the nature of its enterprise has emerged, then I should consider my discussion here successful.

Section Two: New Rhetoric

§ 2.1 The concept of a new rhetoric.

In my exposition here of what is to be understood by a new rhetoric, I proceed, as in § 1.1, by means of a series of selective idealizations. That is to suggest, once again, that, like strict phenomenology, a new rhetoric has not been proposed without the appearance of certain ambiguities which make it difficult to represent without bias its sphere of concern. For this reason, reference is made to "a new rhetoric", i.e., to one ideal representation reflecting certain views of some of its advocates.

The recent conference at the Center on "The New Rhetoric" leads me to think it might be excessive to include a more or less self-contained exposition of Ch. Perelman's ideas on the matter.* For my purposes here it will be sufficient to consider a group of concepts which, although not concerned with the acquisition of practical rhetorical techniques, relates to what may be called the theoretical basis of a new rhetoric. I will consequently distinguish between (i) argumentation functioning to bring about foundational elucidation in a sense related to that discussed in §§ 1.1-1.3, (ii) the structure of argumentation which effects the positive adherence of individuals

* They are to be found in [TA] and [IJPA].

to a particular point of view, and (iii) the practical means for accomplishing (i) and (ii). Certain notions fundamental to (i) and (ii) will be examined in what follows.

Perelman states that

the rhetorical dimension is unavoidable in every philosophical argument, in every scientific discussion which is not restricted to...calculation but seeks to justify its elaboration, and in every consideration of the principles of any discipline whatever....
["The New Rhetoric" CSDI 7]

This "rhetorical dimension" has to do with the first principles or values upon which deductive and inductive results and the conclusions of argumentation in general are based. Thus Richard McKeon would define 'argumentation' in relation to a self-conscious and conscientious inquiry into "sanctified values." [CSDI] These values are not to be equated with the axioms or primitive propositions chosen in connection with a particular system of reasoning; rather, they provide the basis for that choice. Therefore it can validly be claimed that "all discussion presupposes adherence at the outset to certain theses, failing which no argument is possible." [TA: 54. Cf. also pp. 65ff]

In this sense, a new rhetoric would provide the foundation for a discipline whose domain of inquiry extends over the presuppositional structure of assertions in relation to the modalities of the credence that underlies the selection of that structure. By implication, the practical dimension of rhetoric will consist in influencing the nature and degree of assent given to those assertions.

The theoretical basis of new rhetoric is, then, the foundation for argumentation in McKeon's sense. Like most general theories, the modality of this foundation is possibility*: possible presuppositions, possible conclusions to which they can lead, in relation to their capacity to convince and persuade, comprise the material for study.

§ 2.2 The concept of audience-relativity.

Since rhetoric, as it is described here, inquires into the values which motivate both the choice of basic principles and the degree to which they are adopted, it is but a small step to realize that one or more individuals are essentially relative to this choice. For it is individuals who choose, give assent, believe; individuals are swayed, persuaded, convinced.

Because the modality of argumentation is possibility, it is easy to see that an individual who is amenable to persuasion enters into consideration only as a possible individual. To that extent, he can be considered to represent a group of similarly constituted individuals. Thus, an auditor is regarded "as a specimen of a whole category of listeners." [TA: 39] Such a

* This view has been argued by McKeon, e.g., during [CSDI], and by Perelman, whose formulation reads: "The domain of argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible, the probable, to the extent that the latter eludes the certainty of calculations [modality: necessity]." [TA: 1]

group of individuals, or category of listeners, is said to comprise an audience. It follows immediately that "it is in relation to an audience that all argumentation is developed."
[IJPA: 138]*

It must also hold, then, that argumentation is weak or strong relative to an audience.** Standards by means of which the strength of argument can be measured reflect a rhetorical choice as to the values such strength is to embody. Measurement of the strength of argument is therefore possible only with reference to a particular standpoint, incarnated in a group of individuals. Essentially, then, the theoretical basis of a new rhetoric will be pragmatical.

§ 2.3 The concept of universal audience.

An argument is addressed to one or more individuals. If they are similarly constituted in terms of commonly accepted values, they comprise an ideal single audience. Now, if a group of individuals are similarly constituted vis-à-vis their common adherence to a set of tenets of rationality*** used as a final

* Remarks on the relativity of rhetoric to an audience are found in [TA: 7, 14, 19, 21, 25, 110, 507, and passim.].

** Perelman made this observation during [CSDI].

*** Perelman defines "the universal audience" in terms of "that invariant faculty, present in every normally constituted human being, which is reason." [IJPA: 127] Consequently, "the universal audience" may be regarded as an "incarnation" of the concept of reason.

norm in argumentation, then the audience they form is termed 'a universal audience'. I call such an audience 'a universal audience' rather than 'the universal audience' because I am ready to admit a plurality of different sets of "tenets of rationality". My justification for so doing will be found in §§ 3.3 - 3.4.

Since any group of individuals who together adhere to a set of values is said to comprise an ideal single audience, a universal audience is to be regarded as an ideal construct. [Cf. IJPA: 169] The sense in which it is considered an ideal construct is this: It has been noted that arguments are relative to the individuals granting the first principles or values without which argumentation is impossible. An argument is here said to be "properly addressed" if the individuals of the group to which it is addressed share the first principles of the speaker to a degree sufficient to allow for the possibility of argumentation. If an argument is properly addressed, then the relation between speaker and hearer(s) fulfills the above condition, and argumentation can proceed. In that case, the speaker might be said to "have in mind" or "intend" an ideal audience which in fact is realized. On the other hand, if an argument is improperly addressed, then argumentation is obstructed, and the "ideal audience intended" by the speaker does not correspond to the constitution of the audience - an audience which he fails to address. If the concept of audience is relativized, as it has been here*, in terms of the relation

* The identification of variations in audience-concept does of course rely upon standards permitting the assessment of such

between speaker and hearer, then it is clear that there can be no one ideal universal audience.

Thus, the concept of universal audience is constituted in relation to a common postulated agreement over a set of first principles. Variations in the intended universal audience may be determined in relation to different sets of standards for what is, for example, real, true, and objectively valid. Other standards may be used, for example, those pertaining to level of competence, degree of insight, or whatever. [Cf. TA: 33]

It should be clear that the distinction between a universal audience and an audience which is not universal, is drawn on the basis of the characteristics of the first principles commonly accepted by individuals of the group. When these first principles can be legitimately termed 'tenets of rationality', then the group may be characterized as a universal audience. Perelman restricts these tenets to those upon which deductive or inductive analysis relies. Argumentation, as I have described it, includes at least several varieties, two of which relate to deductive and inductive argumentation. When argumentation occurs relative to a non-universal audience, the audience may be termed (as does Perelman) a 'particular audience'. I prefer, however, to permit more flexibility, and would therefore distinguish audiences on the more neutral basis of the kinds

variations. A framework applying these standards does not, clearly, lay any claim to being in any sense an "absolute" framework; it is, as it were, a meta-universal audience, which is no more absolute itself than the various universal audiences which it serves to characterize.

of facts which the audience accepts. The nature of such basic fact-sets will be clarified in § 3.3.

§ 2.4 Audience-pluralism.

As already noted in § 1.3, valid application of a concept is relative to a frame of reference. From the standpoint of the variety of new rhetoric described here, the constitutive principles of a frame of reference are represented in ideal form in relation to a group of (possible) individuals who have in common adherence to a set of basic principles. In relation to this concept of audience, it can be asserted (i) that "the meaning of notions depends on the [audience-] systems in which they are used..." [TA: 134], as well as (ii) that methods are in general relative to their respective field(s) of application by an audience. [Cf. IJPA: 121] It follows that such concepts as "true," "valid," "real," "good," "just," "likely," "normal," etc., depend upon the framework determining the meaning and use of those concepts.*

In other words, a plurality of meanings and uses of such concepts can be associated with a pluralism of audiences for which these different meanings and uses are acceptable. The statement

* Perelman maintains that the "concept of 'normal' depends on a reference group, that is, on the whole category for whose benefit it was established." [TA: 72]

'What is considered valid by an audience A, and invalid by an audience B, is indeed invalid', requires rhetorical analysis. It may be that there are two different notions of "validity" used by the two audiences; perhaps the statement illegitimately equates the two notions; perhaps again, recourse is made to yet another, more inclusive, concept of validity. The realization that criteria are audience-relative provides the basic guideline in such analysis.

Generally speaking, studies in rhetorical structures will themselves involve adherence to certain criteria. Of particular importance is the following principle: "Rejection of incoherent interpretations is a priori a thing to be recommended." [TA: 125] This "internal rule of interpretation" would appear to be proposed by Perelman as a negative standard for inadmissible forms of argument. The following section will consider one significant standard of this kind.

§ 2.5 Autophagia.

If (i) the truth of opposing the principle of non-contradiction and (ii) the falsity of the view of its adherents are asserted together, then an autophagy results. [Cf. TA: 204] 'Autophagia' is a term used by Perelman to denote self-referential inconsistencies.* He says in this connection that application of a

* See above, p. 28.

rule without care "may lead to preventing its application, indeed to destroying the rule itself." [TA: 203]

Now, a rule, like a concept (which, after all, is used according to rule), is essentially relative to a specific framework. Its application beyond the restrictions imposed by that framework may lead to self-referential inconsistency, as well as to projective misconstruction. Thus, "the analysis of one link of an argument out of its context and independently of the situation to which it belongs involves undeniable dangers." [TA: 187]

An autophagy is a rhetorically inadmissible form of argument. To be brief and to the point, an autophagy denies the possibility of forms of argumentation which must depend for their possibility upon the rule the application of which the autophagy prevents.

Rhetorical analysis, if it is to reject and avoid incoherent interpretations, requires an investigation of autophagia in reasoning. Such an investigation entails "thinking about the validity of the framework...which is to be set up, and thereby leads to an increase of awareness." [TA: 204-5] This investigation also leads, one may add, to coherent forms of reasoning.

In practical rhetoric, rejection of incoherencies is accomplished by means of outright censure:

To display the inconsistency of a group of propositions is to expose it to a condemnation without appeal, to require anyone who wants to avoid the charge of absurdity to abandon at least certain elements of the system. [TA: 195]

A technique of practical rhetoric is to subject advocates of incoherencies to ridicule:

Ridicule...is the weapon that must be used against those who take it into their heads to hold and persist in holding two incompatible points of view without trying to remove the incompatibility." [TA: 206]

Arguments which serve to point out inconsistencies involved in making a thesis must be taken into account to avoid ridicule.

When certain distinctions involve autophagia, rhetoric would serve to break the sanctity of those distinctions. In this, McKeon suggests [CSDI] rhetoric would proceed by inquiring

- (i) What is the function of these distinctions?
- (ii) How do these distinctions fall short?
- (iii) How can these distinctions be re-formulated along a sound argumentative basis?

Consequently, a new rhetoric would admit that arguments remain subject to future revision, particularly so if they should be found incoherent. In this, rhetoric adheres to the "principle of revisability" recommended by F. Gonseth. [Dialectica 6(1948) 123-4]

§ 2.6 The concept of self-evidence.

A. J. Ayer has established three conditions necessary for claims to knowledge: first, the proposition in question must be

true, second, one must be certain of it, and, third, one must have a right to be certain of it. [Cf. The Problem of Knowledge (London: Macmillan 1956), p. 34] Argumentation, in its different forms, would claim to arrive at various types of knowledge; each type of knowledge should accordingly be characterizable in terms of the concepts of truth, certainty, and assertion-right which are utilized. Perelman describes knowledge of a non-deductive and non-inductive sort in terms of

a tested opinion...which has survived all objections and criticisms and with regard to which we have a certain confidence, though no certainty, that it will resist all such future attacks. [IJPA: 117]

In one manner or another, in relation to a particular form of knowledge, the concepts of truth, certainty, and assertion-right are normally considered to arise from, or to be reducible to, a more basic conception of self-evidence. In general, to say of something that it is self-evident means that it can be regarded as a fundamental given upon which the structure of knowledge is based. A proposition which is regarded as self-evident usually is considered to be so in connection with a particular set of concepts of truth, certainty, and assertion-right. Thus, it has been suggested, for example, that a self-evident proposition is such that "anyone who can grasp the meaning of its terms is certain of its truth." [IJPA: 110] The grasp of its individual terms is not of course sufficient; one must furthermore be able to grasp the meaning of the proposition as a whole in terms of the meanings of its

component parts. What exactly such a "grasp" will consist of, will depend on the particular criteria of knowledge agreed upon.

It is appropriate to recall here the distinction normally understood between evidence and what is self-evident. A proposition bears a claim to truth if it can be demonstrated either (i) by one or more additional propositions which are known, or considered, to be true, or (ii) by reason of its own structure, whatever that may be. Evidence is relied upon in (i), where self-evidence would be involved in (ii).

I shall restrict 'evidence' to its use in conjunction with that against which one does not argue. [Cf. IJPA: 134] 'Self-evidence' will relate to the presuppositional structure of a system which is incapable of, or incompatible with, rejection, for the reason that such rejection becomes self-referentially inconsistent, and perhaps projective. [Cf. TA: 101] A self-evident proposition is therefore one which must be accepted if argumentation is to be possible.

It is of interest to mention scepticism over whether what is self-evident in a given system is "really" self-evident. An investigation of this sort of scepticism will show that different concepts of self-evidence are intended, that these concepts are illegitimately equated, or that the sceptical argumentation involves autophagia. The problem here will re-appear in different guise in §§ 3.1 - 3.2.

§ 2.7 Conviction and rationality.

It has been noted that a new rhetoric would investigate the relation between structure of argument and its capacity to persuade and convince.* All forms of argument attempt to gain adherence to "rational" decisions [TA: 62], using this term flexibly in relation to audience-pluralism, as described in § 2.4. Since a new rhetoric attempts to describe the relation between the structural and normative components of argumentation [TA: 463], it will be useful to describe a view which considers a close relation between rationality and conviction fundamental and desirable.

[F]or Socrates the essential characteristic of all...arguments which he pursues is not truth but conviction; the conviction which welds belief to action. It is perhaps this faith which is at the root of Socrates' assurance that virtue is knowledge.

In this way, A. Sesonske, in his article "Plato's Apology, Republic I" [Phronesis 6(1961), 29-36] draws attention to the Socratic concern that argument must go hand-in-hand with a conviction which leads from the realm of philosophic discourse to the world of practical action. The strength of this link between valid argument and commitment to its conclusions as a guide for action depends on the extent to which the argument

* I do not, with Perelman, reserve the term 'persuasion' to application to the adherence of a "particular audience". See [TA: 28, 30].

has persuasive force and can convince the members of an audience that what is true should be adopted by them in their sphere of activity.

It is clear in the Meno and in the Republic that Plato did not consider that true knowledge could be bestowed on another; rather, it came only through dialectical involvement in questioning. This process of question and answer, which in Plato assumes the form of dialogue, is governed by the supposition that if truths are arrived at, those involved in dialogue will be compelled by the force of the argument to acknowledge these truths. Not only will they come to accept these truths, but with this acknowledgement will come a fundamental conviction that will over-flow the boundaries of argumentation and will influence them to practice the truths which they have been persuaded to affirm.

It is clear that this connection between argument and practical affairs, between knowledge and action, between the conceptual affirmation of principles and influence upon behavior, can and does break down. It breaks down, as Sesonke suggests, when there is refusal to listen to the argument, when "the hubbub of Demos" drowns out the voice of reason, or when the spoken words are taken as a game, lacking in seriousness.

It was against this breakdown that Plato fought. But why? Why not accept the breakdown and give up the attempt to persuade and convince? Why was the connection between knowledge and action essential to Plato's outlook? It is this question which

I would like briefly to explore.

To Greek thinkers, reason is the very condition for man's having a moral being; by reason they understand that in man which permits him to live for something. The rationality of man is that which enables man to have ideals. The notion of an ideal involves that which is never totally realized, while it also involves that which is in a process of realization. It is by virtue of reason, that man can think beyond the moment and live for an end.

It follows that, in the Greek conception, the moral life is practically identical with the rational life. The best life is the one lived according to the prescriptions of rationality; for it is the life in which action and thought are wedded as means to the end or telos of life, which Plato calls the Good.

Reason, then, is the ultimate condition of morality; it is also the ultimate condition of understanding. An object is intelligible insofar as it is organized according to an end or principle which must be assumed in order to explain it. The more the function, end, or imminent principle of anything can be detected, the more it may be understood.

A man's life is good in the proportion that it exhibits a purpose which directs his action; the more a man's life assumes a structure and a plan by virtue of rational goals, the more his life is good. Man's life becomes intelligible and good in proportion as rationality serves to guide his thought and action.

Now, the connection between rationality and life led according to its prescriptions is conviction. Conviction is the essential link between reason and intelligent, moral action. When this link breaks, Plato's concern begins. His is a concern to maintain and to strengthen the bridge between the reasonable and the desirable; without this tie, morality is rendered impossible.

It is in this sense that a new rhetoric is oriented toward both the structural and the normative components of argumentation. The bond between the two is expressed as a value fundamental to the rhetorical enterprise, a value which that enterprise would advance and promote.

Section Three: Towards a Unified Concept of Reality

§ 3.1 New rhetoric and the doctrine of absolute truth.

Adherence to the notions of audience-relativity and of relativity of standards of rationality to audiences, generates the question whether, according to the view of rhetoric advanced here, there is one truth, or various truths, each relative to an ideal group of similarly constituted individuals. Does this new rhetoric adopt the principles of a bi-valent system, in which a meaningful proposition can be resolved in one and only one of two ways: either it is shown true, or it is shown false?

The position taken by Ch. Perelman is ambiguous: For example, he says:

When a stick is partly immersed in water, it seems curved when one looks at it and straight when one touches it, but in reality it cannot be both curved and straight. While appearances can be opposed to each other, reality is coherent: the effect of determining reality is to dissociate those appearances that are deceptive from those that correspond to reality. ...[B]ecause of their incompatibility, appearances cannot all be accepted together.... [TA: 416]

The concept of "reality" consequent to the dissociation of concepts in the appearance-reality pair, functions to eliminate incompatibilities that may obtain in the sphere of "appearances."

Reality, so regarded, is a norm for distinguishing data deemed of value from rejected data. This norm opposes, in an absolutist fashion, the simultaneous truth of both terms of an opposition. The stick "cannot be both curved and straight." Perelman grants as basic the principle of non-contradiction. [Cf. IJPA: 147f]

On the other hand, he observes that rhetoric has been criticized by those "for whom there was but a single truth in every matter." [TA: 45] This would, by inference, suggest that rhetoric may sanction "more than one truth in a single matter." Certainly this view follows upon an acknowledgement that there are a plurality of sets of rational first principles, where each set supports its own set of truths. Perelman's familiarity with formal systems and with variations in judgment-standards from epoch to epoch, and from culture to culture, should provide him with ample evidence of the existence of such a plurality. Furthermore, it is basic to his concept of rhetoric to "combat uncompromising and irreducible philosophical oppositions presented by all kinds of absolutism...." [TA: 510]

In §§ 3.3 - 3.4, I will suggest how a new rhetoric can accept repudiation of incoherency while it, at the same time, avoids a doctrine of absolute truth.

§ 3.2 Fundamental concerns shared by strict phenomenology and new rhetoric.

It might seem strange at first sight that strict phenomenology and new rhetoric might share common concerns. I have characterized

Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a "scientifically effective Cartesianism," while Perelman asserts in the opening paragraph of The New Rhetoric that his view of argumentation "constitutes a break with a concept of reason and reasoning due to Descartes."

[TA: 1; underlining his] Phenomenology sides with Descartes; new rhetoric opposes him. Must phenomenology and new rhetoric therefore be opposed?

There are important differences between the two in terms of methods employed in practice. For Perelman, new rhetoric seeks to gain ascent to theses which cannot be demonstrated through the use of deductive or inductive techniques. Strict phenomenology, as I have described it, seeks to elucidate the nature of concepts fundamental to a given discipline. It proceeds in this task by means of a variety of deductive logical analysis. The question to consider is 'Are there, in spite of these differences, similarities between these two enterprises?'

My reason for thinking that there are significant similarities between the tasks of a new rhetoric and of a strict phenomenology, is that both are concerned with the most basic principles which must be admitted if a given form of argumentation is to be possible. As Perelman states:

The method of [every]...science implies...a choice ...of the facts deemed relevant, choice of hypotheses, choice of the theories that should be confronted with facts, choice of the actual elements that constitute facts. [TA: 116; cf. also 119]

The nature of this choice is, as noted in § 2.1, investigated in new rhetoric. This choice reflects a value or presupposition without which argumentation is impossible. In relation to my characterization of it here, "a new rhetoric would provide a foundation for a discipline whose domain of inquiry extends over the presuppositional structure of assertions in relation to the modalities of the credence that underlies the selection of that structure." [§ 2.1, p. 35]

Strict phenomenology, on the other hand, is a discipline concerned to elucidate the conditioning structure of phenomena, where phenomena are objects of reference in a pragmatical context. [p. 32] The subject-matter of strict phenomenology is taken in essential relation to a pragmatical basis. The domain of study proper to phenomenology is that of possible experience.

Rhetoric has been presented in its theoretical aspect as argumentation which is essentially related to a pragmatical basis, i.e., relative to a group of individuals who ideally make up an audience. The individual hearer who is to be affected by argumentation has the status in rhetorical theory of a possible individual. [§ 2.2]

Thus, a new rhetoric studies certain phenomena, particularly phenomena of adherence. A. Robert Caponigri has suggested [CSDI] that a phenomenology of modes of adherence be developed in connection with studies in rhetoric. His recommendation would, I believe, provide a potentially useful contribution to research into "the phenomenological foundations of rhetoric."

In a word, the two disciplines are concerned with that

which must be granted for argumentation [cf. p. 35] - and, by extension, discourse in general - to be possible. But what is of particular significance is that each discipline can be of service to the other. Studies in new rhetoric can serve to point out areas phenomenologists ought pay close attention to in developing the phenomenological foundations of pragmatics. In return, phenomenological studies can serve to elucidate the foundations of rhetoric, communicating to contributors to new rhetoric an increased awareness of their own work.

To conclude this section, I shall take the opportunity to enumerate a few of the similarities between de-projective phenomenology and new rhetoric:

- (i) Perelman's reference to value hierarchies [TA: 82] as coordinative structures for the purpose of ranking relative goods of the values they coordinate, comprises a special case of a general coordinative framework.
- (ii) Refutation of autophagia in particular modes of argumentation bears certain similarities to the first condition for a projective misconstruction. [Cf. above pp. 27-28, and TA: § 48 "Breaking of Connecting Links and Dissociation"]
- (iii) Rejection of connecting links in argumentation is similar to the denial involved in the formulation of a projection. [Cf. TA: § 89]
- (iv) In new rhetoric, autonomous use of the material and formal aspects of a problem disappears. [McKeon: CSDI] Similarly, the material and formal components of a phenomenon are essentially relative in de-projective analysis: disconnecting them results in a projective misconstruction.

- (v) In rejecting incoherent dissociations, both de-projective analysis and new rhetoric make recourse to the following couples: valid-invalid, meaningful-meaningless, consistent-inconsistent, etc. (Such couples are regarded, in de-projective analysis, in relation to specific frameworks to which they are relative.)
- (vi) Both strict phenomenology and new rhetoric attempt to promote and establish certain values regarding rational decision-making. They both possess the character of classical epideictic rhetoric, since, in the fullest sense, both take the question of decision in terms of the education of a listener to a particular world view. [Cf. TA: 48-51]

§ 3.3 Facts.

The starting point of argumentation is always a set of values and relevant facts which serves as a point de repère, and upon which knowledge is based. This is true, whether or not argumentation is viewed as including the deductive and inductive forms of reasoning appropriate to the sciences.

In the matter of persuasion it is often overlooked that the advocate of scientific methods must - since persuading is a practical activity - base himself on the ethical principle that it is better to believe truth than falsehood. [B. Russell, "Reply to Criticisms," reprinted in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. P.A. Schilpp (New York: Harper and Row 1963), p. 724]

It is in connection with this question as to the nature of fundamental rhetorical choice that I should like to explore

the notion of a fact. In the view which I shall recommend, facts become the representatives of basic postulates of reasoning. These "facts" are therefore very different from the class of "facts" which phenomenology would bracket. Rather, facts here will be regarded as "the unshakeable basis of all knowing." [IJPA: 129]

A vague distinction can be drawn between (a) facts which are pointed to as constituting evidence [§ 2.6, p. 45] supporting the conclusion of argument, and (b) facts which must be accepted for argument to proceed. The reason why I suggest that this distinction is vague, is that a fundamental judgment must be made as to what is acceptable as a fact, and this judgment is the same one which underlies both senses which can be given to the word 'fact'.

Both strict phenomenology and new rhetoric presuppose sets of facts appropriate to each discipline.* Something can be acknowledged as a fact only in relation to a set of norms or standards which are usually agreed upon in connection with each of the various kinds of reasoning.** Consequently, it is in relation to these norms or standards that the concept of fact is described.

* For this point, vis-à-vis new rhetoric, cf. [IJPA: 170].

** For this reason, Perelman restricts his own treatment to those sorts of facts which are crucial to non-deductive, non-inductive reasoning. [IJPA: 169; TA 67] I will not follow suit, since I have taken 'argumentation' in a less restricted sense than he does. [§ 2.1]

Facts are relative to propositions asserting them. What a true proposition asserts is a fact. A proposition which is confirmed or verified is, provisionally or otherwise*, asserted to be true.** Thus, "any truth enunciates a fact." [TA: 69] A fact is, once again, what a true proposition asserts, and it is, one may add, that which a false proposition denies. Note, however, that a fact cannot be true or false; facts render assertions true or false.***

Facts are not possible subjects which can be named; they may be asserted, denied, believed, wished, etc. What makes a proposition true or false cannot assume the position of logical subject. What gives a proposition a truth-value can only be expressed as something to be asserted, denied, etc. Thus, what permits the specification of a fact as such, consists in a framework in which relations can be established between an individual (who asserts, denies, ... , a proposition) and the world of things the individual encounters. In other words, a pragmatical framework is necessary in order that facts may be specified and verified.

* On presumed versus observed facts, cf. [TA: 74].

** Richard McKeon has advanced this position. [CSDI]

*** For a related treatment of the concept of fact, see [B. Russell, "Philosophy of Logical Atomism," reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, ed. R.C. Marsh (London: Macmillan 1956), pp. 177-281] and [Morris Weitz, "The Unity of Russell's Philosophy" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Schilpp, pp. 85ff].

To paraphrase Frege*, first there must be an apprehension of what is attended to. Second, there must be a recognition that what is apprehended is factual, i.e., is the case. It is here that verification enters in. Third, a judgment is made concerning the status of what is or is not capable of verification; this takes the form of an assertion. When a judgment is confirmed and asserted, what it asserts is a fact.

§ 3.4 The complementarity of facts.

The channels selected for connecting facts determine the concept of reality one has in view. Assessment of the truth of an assertion is relative to the context in which it is made. This context expresses the framework and system of values to which the members of an ideal audience adhere. A notion of audience-relativity and audience-pluralism can immediately be extended to an acknowledgement of the relativity of facts to the ideal representation of a particular framework by an audience. Thus, what is in this sense factual in relation to one framework need not be factual in relation to another framework.

From the standpoint of a bi-valent framework, two propositions asserted in two different contexts may be found contradictory.

* Gottlob Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," reprinted in Essays on Frege, ed. E.D. Klemke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968), p. 513.

Now, if each assertion is true relative to the context in which it is made, then the facts asserted in the two propositions are termed 'complementary facts'. In other words, facts asserted by contradictory assertions are complementary provided that each assertion is true relative to its proper context. Consequently, contradictory theses which have been verified in relation to different modes of observation can be regarded as asserting a complementarity of the facts they refer to. Certain facts on the quantum level at present appear to be complementary in this sense.

If it is granted that there are a variety of systems equipped with standards for evaluating the real, the true, and the objectively valid, then there is a plurality of objectively real facts, certain of the relations between which are relations of complementarity. Thus,

the assumption of a plurality of modes of rationality calls for the application of the principle of tolerance vis-à-vis these different modes. [Nathan Rotenstreich, "Argumentation and Philosophical Clarification, p. 7, CSDI]

Now, Perelman has argued that "revision [of an axiom] cannot be effected by an argument developed within the system to which the axiom belongs." [TA: 105] If a doctrine of absolute truth is a basic postulate for Perelman's concept of rhetoric, then adherence to a view of the complementarity of facts would be organic to a rather different variety of rhetoric. Whether this is in fact true, must be left for Perelman and his commentators to determine.

But whatever the case may be, Perelman does claim that opposition to the dissociation of appearance and reality "leaves entirely unresolved the problem that is raised by the incompatibility of appearances." [TA: 419] The following questions are at issue: 'Is there in fact an incompatibility of appearances?' 'If so, what is the nature of this incompatibility?' 'Why would such an incompatibility become problematic?' 'If indeed it does, would a vision of reality based upon a doctrine of absolute truth resolve such a problem satisfactorily?' I will attempt to answer the questions, in the same order.

Appearances can only be described to give rise to incompatibility if they are considered to have the same status, and if they are assessed in terms of the same standard or norm. If appearances require different contexts for their possibility, then it can sometimes be illegitimate to place them on the same footing, and to judge them with the same set of criteria. By implication, the question whether facts are incompatible or complementary will turn on whether the facts are asserted in the same, or in different, contexts.

Incompatibility of appearances becomes problematic either when they are illegitimately treated by equating dissimilar contexts, or when they are found to conflict in the same context. A doctrine of absolute truth is not satisfactory if a variety of differently constituted contexts is admitted.

Consequently, it is my suggestion that (i) there is

frequently no need to treat phenomena on the basis of incompatibility, (ii) to do so is often illegitimate, since (iii) there are in fact a plurality of "modes of rationality." [Cf. § 2.3]

The appearance-reality dissociation "expresses a vision of the world" [TA: 420], a vision which can certainly be traced through Descartes' to those of antecedent philosophers. If one considers this dissociation "to be the prototype of all conceptual dissociation" [TA: 415], the de-projective and rhetorical elimination of illegitimate forms of reasoning will effect a view of reality as constituting a multiverse, rather than a universe. A multiverse of phenomena can be studied coherently only if complementarity is accepted as a phenomenon of fundamental importance.