Abstract
For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these structures. Recent experimental research in cognitive science has considerably refined the theory of concepts. Drawing upon the results of that research, philosophers can construct more concrete and empirically defensible representations of conceptual systems. I will suggest that this research supports a modest and useful sense of both normal and revolutionary science, not as epistemological continuities or discontinuities, but as particular patterns of conceptual change.
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Notes
Although the 2006 book was a true collaboration to which all authors contributed essential elements, I should emphasize that what follows is my present personal understanding of these issues. I therefore absolve my co-authors for any infelicities and acknowledge that they may disagree with my selection and presentation of issues on matters of nuance as well as substance.
Here an elsewhere we refer to frame diagrams as ‘partial’ to remind the reader that this mode of representation and the corresponding theories of concepts were developed as alternatives to essentialist theories. For example, we do not claim that there is a specifiable list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of any of these concepts. The suggestion that any particular frame diagram was complete would therefore be misleading.
A question that may be raised at this point is whether this analysis ignores an important point of dispute between Ptolemy and Copernicus. Were not Ptolemy’s models only mathematical conveniences, intended to “save the appearances”, while Copernicus clearly asserted the physical reality of his system? This is a false dichotomy, based on several historical confusions. First, although Ptolemy provided only mathematical models in the Almagest, he immediately supplemented them with physical models, in the Planetary Hypotheses. (The relevant portions are translated in Goldstein 1967). These models were not without problems; they generated a research program among Islamic astronomers that directly influenced Copernicus (Saliba 2007, esp. Ch.’s 4, 6.). Throughout Copernicus’ career, the majority of European astronomers accepted the physical reality of the celestial orbs corresponding to their mathematical models (Grant 1994; Evans 1998, esp. pp. 401–403; Barker 2011, pp. 7–32). So, at the time Copernicus published his book, there was no dispute about the physical status of astronomical models. Ironically, Copernicus himself was prevented from asserting which physical model corresponded to the mathematical model for a given planet because, in most cases, he considered, but did not eliminate, several alternatives. Thus, although he clearly asserted the physical reality of his overall system, he was unable to specify any of its parts in detail (Barker 2009, esp. pp. 88–94).
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Barker, P. The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Erkenn 75, 445–465 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9333-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9333-8