Abstract
Essentialists suppose that for every individual, if that individual exists at any possible world, then necessarily that individual exemplifies some non-trivial qualitative property essential to it, as such. Anti-essentialists deny this. One important argument leveled by some anti-essentialists against essentialism takes the form of a thought experiment, one originally introduced by Chisholm (Nous 1(1):1–8, 1967), sometimes referred to as Chisholm’s Paradox (CP). In this essay, I defend essentialism against CP. I begin by presenting the argument and showing how it leads to a contradiction of the essentialist thesis. I then consider one of the most popular solutions to CP to date, that given by Salmon (Midwest Stud Philos 11:75–120, 1986, Philos Rev 98(1):3–34, 1989, Philos Top 21(2):187–197, 1993). Next, I critique Salmon’s proposal and show that it is an insufficient response on behalf of the essentialist. And finally, I propose a novel solution to the paradox and discuss why it is that many metaphysicians in the past have found CP plausible, despite being fallacious.
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Notes
From Nick Drake's 1971 album Bryter Layter (Side 2, Track 3).
I understand the difference between qualitative properties and non-qualitative properties as indicated by Cowling (2015); e.g., things like mass and shape count as the former; things like “being Napoleon and being next to Obama” count as the latter (p. 275).
See Menzel (2017) for a full explanation of what I intend to designate by the term “possible world.”
The reason I have defined anti-essentialism in terms of “non-trivial” qualitative properties is because there may, in fact, be no metaphysicians who would seriously consider the thesis that an individual could exist at some world while exemplifying none of the qualitative properties that it exemplifies at the actual world. Such metaphysicians would say that, even if particulars are not entirely bare, they are, at least, as Lewis (1986) put it, “pretty scantily clad” (p. 242). I am grateful to my anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.
I am classifying haecceitists among those who subscribe to anti-essentialism. Speaking loosely, haecceitists have equal right to be considered both essentialists and anti-essentialists. In a very weak sense of essentialism, they might fall into the class of those who subscribe to essentialism, since they too suppose that the existence of any individual at any possible world necessitates that that individual possess the (non-qualitative) property of being identical to itself. In a more traditional sense of essentialism, by which I mean qualitative property essentialism, however, they clearly fall into the class of anti-essentialists. Since I am concerned here only with qualitative properties, I am lumping them into the latter, since they too might put forward Chisholm's Paradox as an argument against qualitative property essentialism.
In discussing essentialism throughout this paper, I use examples most consistent with sortal essentialism, the thesis that individuals have essential properties (as discussed below) and that those essential properties are best understood in terms of the sort or kind by which that thing is classified (see, e.g., Brody (1980) and Wiggins (1980, 2001) for more on this position). However, while I use examples from this variety of essentialism, I do not mean all that I say below to apply to this kind of essentialism alone.
My definition of anti-essentialism ought to be understood as a stipulative precisification of the theory. Anti-essentialism has been variously defined. For a related, though importantly distinct definition of the position, consider, e.g., Heller (2005): “Anti-essentialism holds that no thing has any modal properties except relative to a conceptualization—or instance, relative to a description” (p. 600).
In using the term “metaphysically possible,” I wish to distinguish the kind(s) of possibility about which I am inquiring from mere logical possibility and (the very robust) physical (or natural) possibility. Roughly, something is said to be metaphysically possible (relative to our world) if there is at least one world at which that proposition is true that is governed by the same metaphysical laws that govern our world and that world is accessible via our world, as well. See Conee and Sider (2013, pp. 186-198) for more on each of these three grades of modality.
Compare this definition of essentialism to the list of various essentialisms collected by Robertson and Atkins (2018).
It should be noted that “essentialism” might denote a very broad class of metaphysical theses. The variety of essentialism that concerns me here is sometimes referred to as necessary essentialism, so called because those who hold it suppose that, if it is possible that some object exists, then necessarily it must exemplify some particular property or other. By contrast, sufficient essentialists hold that, for every particular thing, there is some property such that, if that property is instantiated at some possible world, then it follows that that individual exists at that world too; that is, for every individual, there is some unique differentiae whose instantiation is sufficient for its existence. Both are very interesting theses; nonetheless, in this essay, I discuss only the former and take no stance with respect to the latter.
See Cowling (2016).
As Lewis (1986) famously said: “Well, one man's reason is another man's reductio” (p. 207). This seems to describe this dialectical situation very well.
The reason that I explicitly mention this meta-logical commitment (i.e., classical propositional bivalence) is because it has been frequently discussed within the literature on CP. More on this later.
Chisholm (1967): “Let us call our present world 'W1' and the possible world we have just indicated 'W2.' Is the Adam of our world W1 the same person as the Adam of the possible world W2? In other words, is Adam such that he lives for just 930 years in W1 and for 931 years in W2?” (p. 2).
Chisholm (1967): “One first thought might be that the proposition that Adam is in both worlds is incompatible with the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals… Compare the question: How can Adam at the age of 930 be the same person as the man who ate the forbidden fruit, if the former is old and the latter is young? Here the proper reply would be… that these properties, though different, are not incompatible. And so, too, for different possible worlds… These properties, though different, are not incompatible” (p. 2).
Compare this to Salmon's (1986) formulation, within the context of discussing the material constitution of a wooden table: “If a wooden table x is the only table originally formed from a hunk (portion, quality, bit) of matter y according to a certain plan (form, structure, design, configuration) P, then x is such that it might have been the only table formed according to the same plan P from a distinct but overlapping hunk of matter y having exactly the same mass, volume, and chemical composition as y” (p. 75).
I take what follows to be the standard representation of CP, though usually it is represented elliptically and nowhere else so expressly.
Readers familiar with CP will notice that I have left out a part of the thought experiment, as presented by Chisholm (1967). In the second part of his paper, Chisholm considers the possibility that there is another object at w@, β, that exemplifies a (partially or completely) distinct set of qualitative properties, Σ*. Using the same reasoning, Chisholm then demonstrates that there is some world such that α is Σ* and β is Σ; i.e., that their qualitative profiles have been swapped. The reason I leave out this part of the thought experiment is because, as indicated, I am concerned here only with what I have referred to as “necessary essentialism,” not with “sufficient essentialism,” nor with the even stronger “necessary and sufficient essentialism.” That, e.g., Noah could have had all of Adam's properties and Adam could have had all of Noah's properties is only a problem for those who suppose that there is some sufficient essential property for every individual. So far as I am concerned, in such a world, both retain the non-trivial, substantial, qualitative property of, e.g., being human; and so, this part of the thought experiment does not concern me here. Of course, if Σ and Σ* are completely distinct from one another, then it will concern me, since that would entail that the existence of neither necessitates any non-trivial qualitative property whatsoever—i.e., that non-trivial qualitative property necessary essentialism is false.
The two other most popular responses are likely those given by Forbes (1984) and Williamson (2013). The details of their respective accounts can be given in brief. Forbes's suggestion (F) is, first, that we deny Modal Identity and transworld identity more generally in favor of counterpart theory, and, second, that we allow that counterpart relations are fuzzy. Williamson's suggestion (W) is, like Forbes's, that we challenge MI; in particular, (W) advises that we treat identity statements between individuals at different worlds as neither determinately true nor determinately false.
Salmon (1986): “… the presumption that modal accessibility between worlds is transitive is illegitimate and must be rejected in its unrestricted form” (p. 80). “In deriving the paradoxes in S4, one commits the fallacy of possibility deletion…” (p. 82).
Forbes (1983), p. 172.
On the choice between choosing (S) and choosing some other solution, such as his own, Forbes (1983) says: “We can retain modus ponens, treat the two formulations of the Paradox quite differently, and regard the logical problems involved as pertaining strictly to modal logic” or we can turn to some other solution (p. 178).
Salmon (1993): “As I have argued elsewhere, Chisholm's Paradox is also not a sorites paradox, in the usual sense. It is a paradox about modality” (p. 191).
Salmon (1993), p. 194.
After arguing that Williamson's Paradox, a close variant of CP, is reducible to CP, despite appearances, Salmon (1993) says: “And, of course, rejecting S4 provides a solution—indeed, I maintain, the correct solution—to what I take to be the canonical form of Williamson's Paradox,” and so to Chisholm's Paradox too (p. 195).
Others have recently argued that metaphysical possibility comes in a variety of forms, as well. In defense of S4, for example, Murray and Wilson (2012) have argued that metaphysical possibility is relative to a world as considered “indicatively actual,” and that there is more than just one kind of relative metaphysical possibility (i.e., more than one kind of accessibility relation between worlds). They use this response as a way to respond to CP, as well as Chandler-Salmon style arguments against MT more generally. I do not discuss this option in this paper because I suppose, with Yagisawa (2017) that a response that “produces as many varieties of metaphysical possibility as there are worlds to be considered indicatively actual… seems undesirable” (p. 246). And, at least when speaking of relative metaphysical possibility, “it seems that there is only one kind of possibility that is metaphysical possibility” (p. 246).
i.e., that world possesses perfect causality, temporal persistence of objects, categories that carve it at its joints, and other similar metaphysical laws as those governing w@.
Mackie (2006), pp. 166–167.
Salmon (1984), similarly, supposes that, without MT, impossible worlds can still be said to exist.
Mackie (2006): “… all modal theorists, whether or not they are [radical anti-essentialists], must agree that there are many standard contexts in which the range of de re possibilities under consideration falls short of the full range” (p. 156).
Lewis (1986), p. 240.
I use a theistic example here only to illustrate w@’s contingent actuality. Of course, one need not be a theist in order to suppose that w@ could have been non-actual and that some other world could have been actual in its place.
In setting up this thought experiment, I have used the language of a naïve possibilism, whereby it makes sense of speak of non-actual existents at other possible worlds. For this reason, it might appear that I am excluding an actualist from seriously considering the experiment. I do not, however, think that this is necessary. With a sophisticated enough modal semantics, an actualist might still suppose that, in some sense, our world might not have been the privileged one that it is.
As indicated earlier, the two other most popular proposals to CP in the literature are likely those given by Williamson (2013) and Forbes (1984). Another option, not considered, is to turn to one of these accounts in search of a more plausible solution. However, I hesitate to make this move for the follow reason: Both of these proposals suggest that we deny classical bivalence. Forbes (1983) notes: “Some may think that it must always be preferable to alter our modal logic if the alternative is to change non-modal propositional calculus” (p. 178). I would agree with him on this point and add that there are some, myself included, that would rather make any change in a logical system than change non-modal propositional calculus. And so, for this reason, I pass by both accounts quickly, taking both to involve adopting some highly counter-intuitive principle. If one can only block the conclusion of CP by denying classical propositional bivalence, then one would do better to preserve bivalence and concede the dispute to the anti-essentialist.
Salmon (1993) has mentioned in passing that he believes that “the position defined by the conjunction of infinitely iterated necessitations of [Tolerance] and [essentialism] is at least a coherent metaphysical position, and that S4 modal logic is thereby seen to be fallacious” (p. 192). I have now argued that this is not the case. See also page 188 of the same essay for his statements on “modal tolerance” and “modal intolerance, or essentialism.”
From my survey of the literature on CP, I have seen this suggestion neither advocated for nor mentioned. I take it, then, that this is a novel suggestion for resolving the paradox.
Leibniz (1686) famously held that all of a thing's qualitative properties are essential to it, as such.
This follows via immediate inference. In Classical Logic, it is the inference from an E proposition to its corresponding O.
For useful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to express thanks to: Margaret Uwayo, T.J. Broy, Daniel Dolson, Luke Golemon, Zachary Porter, Adam Waggoner, and my anonymous reviewer at Philosophical Studies.
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Bassford, A.D. A response to Chisholm’s paradox. Philos Stud 177, 1137–1155 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01238-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01238-8