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A trilemma for teleological individualism

  • S.I.: Teleological Organisation
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Abstract

This paper addresses the foundations of Teleological Individualism, the view that organisms, even non-sentient organisms, are goal-oriented systems while biological collectives, such as ecosystems or conspecific groups, are mere assemblages of organisms. Typical defenses of Teleological Individualism ground the teleological organization of organisms in the workings of natural selection. This paper shows that grounding teleological organization in natural selection is antithetical to Teleological Individualism because such views assume a view about the units of selection on which it is only individual organisms that are units of selection. However, none of the Conventionalist, Reductionist, or Multi-Level Realist theories serve to justify such an assumption. Thus, Teleological Individualism cannot be grounded in natural selection.

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Notes

  1. In the literature on environmental ethics, ‘individualism’ is used to denote a view on which individual organisms enjoy some privileged status (see, for example, Varner 1998). Views on which humans are the sole bearers of moral status and views on which all and only sentient organisms are bearers of moral status are all individualist views in this sense. However, in the philosophy of biology and biology literature, the term ‘individual’ is used in a variety of ways that are not, at least not necessarily, co-extensive with ‘organism’ (see, for example, Clarke 2010). ‘Individual’ sometimes refers to a unit of organization and there are arguments that some non-organisms are indeed biological individuals in the relevant sense. ‘Individuals’ is sometimes used in a way that is co-extensive with ‘unit of selection’ and, arguably, conspecific groups, communities, and organisms might be individuals in this sense. Yet another use of the term is in debates over the metaphysical status of species. One view is that species are individuals as opposed to being a natural kind. The ‘Individualism’ in Teleological Individualism follows environmental ethicists’ use of the term.

  2. For defenses of such views see (Goodpaster 1978; Taylor 1989; Varner 1998; Sandler 2007). Some have recognized teleology as the best available basis for grounding the welfare of non-sentient organisms without accepting that such organisms do in fact have a welfare (Sober 1986; Cahen 2002; Odenbaugh 2010). For criticisms of the view that organisms have a teleologically grounded welfare, see (Feinberg 1963; Agar 1997; Sumner 1999).

  3. The term ‘moral status’ is used in a variety of ways in the ethics literature. It is sometimes used as a synonym for having intrinsic value, having moral standing, being a moral patient or subject, and having inherent worth (See, for example, O’Neill 2003; Sandler 2007; Sandler and Simons 2012; Liao 2010). Here, I use the term to pick out the concept that Teleological Individualists and Biocentrists are most often concerned with: to have moral status is to have a welfare or interests that ought figure into the moral deliberations of agents (Basl 2013).

  4. According to some, having a welfare or interests is sufficient for moral status. For example, Varner (1998) seems to argue for Biocentrism as if this is the case. Singer (2002) and Feinberg (1963) are sentientists that also endorse such a view and are thereby committed to denying that non-sentient organisms have a welfare (see also Korsgaard 2014 on this issue). Others (Taylor 1989; Cahen 2002; O’Neill 2003; Sandler 2007; Sandler and Simons 2012) think there is a conceptual distinction between having a welfare and its having moral significance. Goodpaster (1978) distinguishes between the intelligibility and the normative significance of attributing moral considerability to a being. This distinction roughly tracks the distinction between having a welfare and its being morally significant. For the purposes of this paper, I assume a distinction between having a welfare and its moral significance, but my arguments do not hang on this.

  5. See for example (Goodpaster 1978; Taylor 1989; Varner 1998; Sandler 2007; Sandler and Simons 2012). Even versions of Biocentrism that are not welfare-based often rely on claims of teleology that will implicate Teleological Individualism. For example, Schweitzer (1979) seems to use teleological language to articulate his form of Biocentrism.

  6. There are also accounts of health that are a-teleological. See, for example, (McShane 2004). However, these are typically appealed to in order to assign health to biological collectives.

  7. This is not to presuppose any form of metaethical objectivism about values. What ultimately grounds the normativity of welfare, if it is indeed normative, may be subjectivist in nature.

  8. It is possible to give an account of the welfare of a non-sentient organism that is non-arbitrary even though it is grounded in what humans care about. We could, for example, define what is good for non-sentient organisms in terms of what promotes our welfare. There are, at least plausibly, objective facts about what makes our life go well and what those facts will, in some cases, depend on our concerns, desires, or attitudes. On such a view, what is good for non-sentients will be objectively definable but derivative on the good of another being; non-sentient organisms will not have a good of their own.

  9. For a slightly different take on an account on which organization is based on integrated systems, see (Dussault and Bouchard 2016).

  10. Whether this appeal to the difference between natural and artificial selection is adequate to distinguish organisms from artifacts has been called into question (Basl and Sandler 2013a). Furthermore, so far as artifacts are the results of co-evolution of genes and culture due to cultural selection, it may be that these artifacts result from the same sorts of selection processes as organisms. If that is so, the Biocentrist faces additional difficulties. Special thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this additional challenge.

  11. Readers familiar with the literature on functions will be more familiar with the notion of ‘normativity’ as opposed to ‘teleology’. As ethicists typically use the term, ‘normative’ implies reason-giving. I use ‘teleology’ instead, since, with a few exceptions, proponents of etiological views do not think that functions are reason-giving or provide reasons to do or believe anything. For a discussion of potential exceptions see (Foot 2003; Hursthouse 1999; Thomson 2008).

  12. It may turn out that pluralism is the correct view about functions (Millikan 1999) or that function is not, ultimately, teleological (Cummins 1975; Bigelow and Pargetter 1987; Wouters 2005).

  13. In addition to these conditions, others are often taken to be necessary conditions for an account of the teleology of organisms. These include that simple artifacts and other self-sustaining systems such as tidal systems or flames be excluded from the domain of the teleologically organized. For a discussion of these conditions see (Basl and Sandler 2013a, b; Holm 2012).

  14. For contemporary discussions of the issue see, for example, (Sober and Wilson 1998; Okasha 2006; Lloyd 2007).

  15. Some of this discussion is adapted from and further developed from previously unpublished work (Basl 2011). I include the citation here only because others have cited this work in discussions of this topic (Wilson and Barker 2013; McLoone 2015).

  16. I’m glossing over important differences between various versions of Conventionalism. Kitcher and Sterelny (1988), for example, occupy a strange middle-ground between Conventionalism and Reductionism; they argue that the level of selection relevant to the evolution of a trait is a matter of convention, but give special place to the gene because an explanation in terms of genes can always be given, whereas, for example in populations without groups, a group-level explanation is not always available. Dawkins, while originally adopting a form of Reductionism which was realist in nature (Dawkins 1989), later (Dawkins 1999) espoused a form of Conventionalism similar to the version endorsed by Kitcher and Sterelny. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing me to this feature of the later work of Dawkins.). For a discussion and challenge to views of this form, see, for example, (Lloyd 2007).

  17. Kin Selection Theory (Smith 1964), Inclusive Fitness Theory (Hamilton 1964a, b), and Game Theoretic Approaches (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) have been used as tools to understand selection processes that seem to be at the group level in terms of selection at a lower level. Inclusive Fitness Theory, for example, assigns traits an inclusive fitness on the basis of the average fitness of individuals with that trait across a population. So for example, the inclusive fitness of an altruistic individual is a function of how fit altruists are across all groups in a population. Altruism can only evolve by selection if altruists have a higher inclusive fitness than non-altruism. For criticisms of the attempt to undermine multi-level selection by appeal to these tools see (Sober and Wilson 1998; Sarkar 2007; Sober 2010, chap. 2).

  18. This happens to be a case where there is a failure to satisfy both Non-Arbitrariness and Non-Derivativeness for the same reason, but these conditions can come apart. For example, consider that we might attribute to the host of a parasite the end of nourishing the parasite. This end might be objectively specifiable in terms of the teleology of the parasite, but it will not satisfy Non-Derivativeness; this end really reduces to the parasite’s ends. Similarly, a child, as children are wont to do, might attribute ends to an inanimate object. Those might be taken to be ends of the object itself, i.e., they are non-derivative, but they are arbitrary.

  19. In “Ecosystem Health”, McShane (2004) raises doubts about whether our choices about what constitutes an ecosystem undermine claims about ecosystems having a health. She argues that just because our choices determine which things make up an ecosystem, this doesn’t undermine the claim that whatever ends up being an ecosystem relative to our choices might have a health. Perhaps the Biocentrist can similarly embrace Conventionalism to avoid the criticisms just raised.

    Even if McShane is right that Conventionalism doesn’t undermine attributions of health or welfare, this is of no help to the Individualists. This is because as a matter of convention, in at least some contexts, there is no problem describing selection as operating at the level of non-individuals such as groups. Even if Conventionalism doesn’t undermine genuine teleological organization, it is too permissive to ground Individualism.

  20. It is perhaps not possible to model the selection of every trait as resulting from group or community level selection.

  21. I’ve chosen the Trait-Group Framework for the purposes of illustration, but the conclusions drawn generalize to any form of multi-level realism. For a comprehensive discussion of the problem of the units of selection see (Okasha 2006). See also (Wilson 2004b). For a criticism of the Trait-Group Framework see (Basl 2011; McLoone 2015).

  22. If a population does not contain any groups, individual selection need not occur within groups; instead, it is defined in terms of difference in fitness between individuals in the population.

  23. The example I’ve used to explain the Trait-Group Framework appeals to individuals vs. group, but the definitions generalize. “Individuals” and “groups” can be understood to represent particles and collections at any level of organization. For example, the individuals might be genes and the groups might be organisms, or the individuals might be organisms and the groups ecosystems. The Trait-Group Framework is a framework for understanding selection at any level of biological organization (Okasha 2006; Sober and Wilson 1998, p. 96).

  24. For some criticisms of the Trait-Group Framework see (Basl 2011; McLoone 2015).

  25. How often the conditions for group selection will be met may vary considerably depending on what those conditions turn out to be. For example, Godfrey-Smith (2009) develops an account of selection on which collections of entities, “Darwinian Individuals”, evolve by natural selection or are likely to do so to the extent that they form a “Darwinian population” which is a function of how well they satisfy various conditions drawn from the Lewontin Conditions. Godfrey-Smith thinks that what might be seen as paradigm groups on other models of group selection do not constitute Darwinian populations. But, again, this will ultimately be an empirical issue to be resolved once we’ve opted to understand group selection according to the Darwinian population model.

  26. For a discussion of community or ecosystem selection in artificial contexts see (Swenson et al. 2000a, b; Wilson and Swenson 2003). For a discussion of the limits of community selection see (Basl 2011).

  27. It’s worth mentioning that whole ecosystems or entire species are not likely to be units of selection; it is unlikely that they will satisfy the relevant definitions of grouphood. So, the Teleological Individualist might be right to criticize views on which these sorts of entities are seen as teleologically organized. But, that does not mean that bee hives, ant colonies, or multi-species communities, for example those that form symbiotic relationships, are not units of selection.

  28. For a discussion of the role Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness Theory have figured into debates about the levels of selection see (Sober 2010, chap. 2).

  29. It is worth noting that this view has been widely criticized and is no longer widely accepted among biologists and philosophers of biology. Still, given the prominence of this view outside of biology, it is worth recognizing the challenges for adopting an etiologically-based Teleological Individualism if one accepts such a view.

  30. See also (Hull 1980; Dennett 1995).

  31. This expression is borrowed from (Godfrey-Smith 2009).

  32. The Lewontin Conditions are not, in fact, sufficient for evolution by natural selection. Even when a population has members that satisfy the conditions, if mutation rates are too high or there is sufficient evolution due to drift, the effects of selection can be undermined. Peter Godfrey-Smith has, helpfully, defended the Lewontin Conditions as a general kind of recipe for natural selection even though the addition of other factors can undermine selection (Godfrey-Smith 2009, chap. 2).

  33. Are there grounds for adopting the Standard View over the gene’s eye view? I think so. Perhaps the most compelling is that we take it that genes are the result of selection, but if selection is defined in terms of genes, they cannot themselves be the results of selection (Godfrey-Smith 2009). However, the committed gene’s eye-er might respond that it is replicators more generally that are the units of selection and genes are the result of selection of more primitive replicators.

  34. There is an interesting question about how to understand genes as being teleologically organized. What exactly is it that is so organized? There is, as far as I know, little discussion of this since most Teleological Individualists with an interest in these issues typically talk as if it is individual organisms that are teleologically organized even if they adopt a form of Reductionism. Lewontin (1970) discusses molecules as units of selection. Perhaps we should understand the molecular structure of DNA as that which is teleologically organized. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.

  35. McShane (2014) has, independently, developed a similar criticism.

  36. See for example (Williams 1996, chap. 7).

  37. The same tools available to the Conventionalist, inclusive fitnesses, game theory, etc. are available to the Reductionist to explain selection at some higher-level in terms of individuals or members at some lower-level of biological organization.

  38. For a recent overview and discussion of parsimony reasoning in biology, see (Sober 2015). Sober argues that parsimony considerations don’t generally tell in favor of hypotheses. Instead, the heuristic value of parsimony is limited to specific contexts.

  39. Godfrey-Smith mentions bee colonies as collections of organisms that he takes to satisfy at least the reproductive conditions he puts on Darwinian Populations (2009, 119) and acknowledges that some individuals in tight symbiotic relationships, like lichens and the different types of individual bacteria that lead to the evolution of the eukaryotic cell, might also constitute Darwinian Populations (Godfrey-Smith 2009, chap. 4).

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Correspondence to John Basl.

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I am grateful to have presented this work at several conferences and workshops with audiences who were generous enough to provide feedback and help shape the views in this paper. In particular I’m grateful for being hosted at The Workshop on Teleological Organisation held at the Carlsberg Academi in Copehagen, The Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, and the Workshop on Value Theory in Environmental Ethics in Montreal sponsored by CRE and QCBS. I owe a special debt to the following individuals who have contributed to this work: Matt Barker, Jeff Behrends, Fred Bouchard, Antoine Dussault, Mylan Engels Jr., Valéry Giroux, Dan Hausman, Ben Hale, Sune Holm, Wybo Houkes, Elselijn Kingma, Matt Kopec, Greg Mikkelson, Karen Neander, John Nolt, Jay Odenbaugh, Samir Okasha, Simon Rippon, Ronald Sandler, Elliott Sober, Robert Streiffer, Mike Titelbaum, Gary Varner, and Arno Wouters. I also received excellent feedback from two anonymous reviewers at Synthese whose comments improved this paper greatly.

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Basl, J. A trilemma for teleological individualism. Synthese 194, 1057–1074 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1316-0

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