Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Normativity without artifice

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

To ascribe a telos is to ascribe a norm or standard of performance. That fact underwrites the plausibility of, say, teleological theories of mind. Teleosemantics, for example, relies on the normative character of teleology to solve the problem of “intentional inexistence”: a misrepresentation is just a malfunction. If the teleological ascriptions of such theories to natural systems, e.g., the neurological structures of the brain, are to be literally true, then it must be literally true that norms can exist independent of intentional and psychological agency. Davies, for one, has argued that such norms are impossible within a naturalistic worldview. Consequently, teleological theories of mind, for example, cannot be literally true. I will show, however, that the truth conditions on normative statements do not presuppose intentional and psychological agency and, further, that a selectional regime is one naturalistic mechanism that satisfies those truth conditions. Norms, then, exist in the world independent of intentional and psychological agency.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For its application to philosophy of biology, see Brandon (1990). For its application to the “mind-body” problem, see, for example, Dennett (1978) and Lycan (1981). For its application to the problem of “intentional inexistence”, see, for example, Millikan (1984, 1993), Papineau (1987, 1993), McGinn (1989), Neander (1995), Godfrey-Smith (1996), Rowlands (1997), and Price (2001).

  2. The view is initially suggested by Rosenblueth et al. (1943) and is further developed by Sommerhoff (1950, 1959), Braithwaite (1953), Beckner (1959), Nagel (1961, 1977), and Boorse (1976, 2002).

  3. See, for example, Wright (1973), Millikan (1984, 1993, 1999, 2002), Neander (1991a, b), Griffiths (1993), and Godfrey-Smith (1994).

  4. See, for example, Canfield (1964, 1965), Wimsatt (1972, 2002), Bigelow and Pargetter (1987), and Walsh (1996).

  5. See Schlosser (1998) for an attempt to integrate the virtues of the homeostatic/regulative and etiological/selectional historical accounts into a single theory.

  6. For a recent comprehensive review of the numerous functional theories, see Wouters (2005).

  7. This is a view that Fodor (1987, 1990) has advocated, namely that a naturalizing account of mind cannot be successful unless that account is a non-normative and non-teleological (as well as a non-semantic and nonintentional) account.

  8. See, for example, Sellars (1968, chap. 7, 1969).

  9. Sellars would not have agreed to the ‘might’. He thought that “ought-to-be”s do imply “ought-to-do”s. Sellars writes,

    … though ought-to-be’s are carefully to be distinguished from ought-to-do’s they have an essential connection with them. The connection is, roughly, that ought-to-be’s imply ought-to-do’s. Thus the ought-to-be about a clock chimes [“Clock chimes ought to strike on the quarter hour.”] implies, roughly,

    (Other things being equal and where possible) one ought to bring it about that clock chimes strike on the quarter.

    This rule belongs in our previous category [ought-to-do], and is a rule of action. As such it requires that the item to which it applies (persons rather than chimes) have the appropriate concepts or recognitional capacities. (1969, 508)

    Sellars’ claim here (standards imply rules of action) rests on the assumption that the existence of a standard presupposes an intentional and psychological agent ensuring conformity to that standard. Part of the purpose here is to undermine the plausibility of that assumption.

  10. Wertheimer (1972, 130–132) also stresses, based on etymological considerations, the similarity in linguistic function of ‘ought’ to ‘owe’. Additionally, see Anscombe (1958a, b).

  11. See White (1975, chap. 10), Wertheimer (1972, chap. 3), and Lycan (1994, chap. 8) for detailed considerations for claim that modal auxiliaries serve singular linguistic functions across varied contexts.

  12. Wertheimer notes that in ordinary conversation ‘can’, ‘must’, and ‘have (got) to’ are used with as much frequency as ‘ought’ in normative contexts as well as that in legal codes ‘must’ and ‘can’ are regularly used and ‘ought’ rarely so. The philosopher’s fixation with ‘ought’ reflects the fact, he suggests, that the philosopher’s project is usually that of abstract generalized moralizing. When the concrete circumstances that would or would not excuse an action are unknown, undetailed, and so on, ‘ought’ is the more appropriate term. But, in ordinary conversation or in a legal code, when the concrete circumstances are known or specified, ‘must’ and ‘can’ are the more appropriate terms. (See Wertheimer 1972, 116–121)

  13. We often make general factual claims, especially in the biological case, for which we reasonably expect exceptions and for which the observed exception is no reason to revise the general claim. For example, “Angelfish [Pterophyllum scalare] breed only when water quality is high” is generally true and for which there are observable exceptions. The odd breeding in poorer water quality is not a reason to revise the general claim, because that general claim is intended to be generally true, not universally so. So, it is not surprising that the presence of an exception fails to put us under an obligation to revise the claim. There remains, nonetheless, a threshold of non-correspondence, no matter how vague, at which point mounting exceptions do present an obligation to retract or revise the general claim.

  14. Clearly, the “direction of fit” of the normative is not the sole province of the normative. Propositional attitudes, such as desires, with satisfaction conditions rather than truth conditions will share the same “direction of fit” as the normative. “When soccer is being played, a ball in play is not touched …” can equally well be the expression of a desire or the statement of a rule of soccer. The logical grammar of normative statements and ascriptions of propositional attitudes is sufficiently distinct, however, that we need not be concerned with running the two together. A properly made ascription of a propositional attitude requires an agent to which to predicate the propositional attitude, while a properly made normative statement does not.

  15. For a similar treatment of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, see Wertheimer’s (1972, chap. 5) detailed discussion.

  16. To what degree must a norm be efficacious? I suspect that that cannot be answered in the abstract, just as it cannot be answered in the abstract at what point do mounting exceptions prompt retraction or revision of a statement of fact.

  17. Thanks to Marc Lange for this point.

  18. “Subject to elimination”, e.g., subject to capital punishment or to banishment, is the normative analogue of “subject to retraction” in the factual case.

  19. Walsh’s (1996) non-etiological account is one explicitly formulated in terms of selectional regimes and not selectional histories. While I do not draw the concept of a “selectional regime” from Walsh, my suggestion that selectional regimes can ground normativity is clearly friendly to non-historical selectional accounts such as Walsh’s. That a selectional regime might ground normativity is interesting, because it serves to undermine the special advantage often claimed by the etiological theorist to account for malfunction and the like.

References

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958a). Brute facts. Analysis, 18, 69–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958b). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33, 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beckner, M. (1959). The biological way of thought. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1987). Functions. The Journal of Philosophy, 84, 181–196.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boorse, C. (1976). Wright on functions. Philosophical Review, 85, 70–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boorse, C. (2002). A rebuttal on functions. In A. Ariew, R. Cummins, & M. Perlman (Eds.), Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology (pp. 63–112). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braithwaite, R. (1953). Scientific explanation. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandon, R. (1990). Adaptation and environment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Canfield, J. (1964). Teleological explanation in biology. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14, 285–295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Canfield, J. (1965). Teleological explanation in biology: A reply. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 15, 327–331.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chaitin, G. (1975). Randomness and mathematical proof. Scientific American, 232, 47–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cummins, R. (1975). Functional analysis. The Journal of Philosophy, 72, 741–760.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davies, P. S. (2001). Norms of nature: Naturalism and the nature of functions. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. (1978). Brainstorms. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. (1991). Real patterns. The Journal of Philosophy, 88, 27–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankena, W. (1950). Obligation and ability. In M. Black (Ed.), Philosophical analysis (pp. 157–175). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. (1990). A theory of content II: The theory. In Theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Lycan W. (1999). Mind and cognition: An anthology (pp. 230–249, 2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.

  • Gauthier, D. (1963). Practical reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith, P. (1994). A modern history theory of functions. Noûs, 28, 344–362.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996). Complexity and the function of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould, S. (1997). The exaptive excellence of spandrels as a term and prototype. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 94, 10750–10755.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gould, S., & Lewontin, R. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, B205, 581–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gould, S., & Vrba, E. (1982). Exaptation: A missing term in the science of form. Paleobiology, 8, 4–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffiths, P. (1993). Functional analysis and proper functions. British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 44, 409–422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1890/1950). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Dover Publications.

  • Kant, I. (1790/2000). Critique of the power of judgment (P. Guyer & E. Matthews, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Lycan, W. (1981). Form, function, and feel. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (1994). Modality and meaning. Boston: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. (1989). Mental content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (1984). Language, truth and other biological categories. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (1993). White queen psychology and other essays for alice. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (1999). Wings, spoons, pills, and quills: A pluralist theory of function. The Journal of Philosophy, 96.4, 191–206.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (2002). Biofunctions: Two paradigms. In A. Ariew, R. Cummins, & M. Perlman (Eds.), Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology (pp. 113–143). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, E. (1977). Teleology revisited. The Journal of Philosophy, 74, 261–301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neander K. (1991a). Functions as selected effects. Philosophy of Science, 58, 168–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neander K. (1991b). The teleological notion of function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69, 454–468.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neander, K. (1995). Misrepresenting and misrepresentation. Philosophical Studies, 79, 109–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, D. (1987). Reality and representation. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, D. (1993). Philosophical naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Price, C. (2001). Functions in mind: A theory of intentional content. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N., & Bigelow, J. (1943). Behavior, purpose, and teleology. Philosophy of Science, 10, 18–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands, M. (1997). Teleological semantics. Mind, 106, 279–303.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schlosser, G. (1998). Self-re-production and functionality: A systems-theoretical approach to teleological explanation. Synthese, 166, 303–354.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1968). Science and metaphysics: Variations on Kantian themes. New York: Humanities Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1969). Language as thought and as communication. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29, 506–527.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sommerhoff, G. (1950). Analytical biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sommerhoff, G. (1959). The abstract characteristics of living organisms. In F. Emery (Ed.), Systems thinking. London: Harmondsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walsh, D. (1996). Fitness and function. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 553–574.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wertheimer, R. (1972). The significance of sense. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • White, A. (1975). Modal thinking. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wimsatt, W. (1972). Teleology and the logical structure of function statements. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 3, 1–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wimsatt, W. (2002). Functional organization, analogy, and inference. In A. Ariew, R. Cummins, & M. Perlman (Eds.), Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology (pp. 173–221). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wouters, A. (2005). The function debate in philosophy. Acta Biotheoretica, 53, 123–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139–168.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Grant Dowell, David Landy, Marc Lange, William Lycan, Ruth Millikan, John Roberts, Matthew Smith, and Daniel Steel for their extensive and insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer who helped correct an oversight in an earlier version of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science, Lyman Briggs College, Michigan State University, 35 East Holmes Hall, East Lansing, MI, 48825, USA

    Mark Bauer

Authors
  1. Mark Bauer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mark Bauer.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bauer, M. Normativity without artifice. Philos Stud 144, 239–259 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9208-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9208-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation