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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
It is by no means unusual in works of philosophy for writers to make use of examples from literature or (like e.g. Peter Winch and Eugene Kamenka) to bemoan the lack of literary examples in the work of other philosophers. Nor is it unusual for philosophers to write substantial tomes without ever mentioning any work of literature or (like R. M. Hare and C. W. K. Mundle) to condemn the use of literary examples as a threat to clarity of thought. This contradiction in practice and principle might lead us to suspect that what we are here dealing with is at least to some extent a philosophical disagreement, and I believe this to be the case. Unfortunately, what is extremely unusual is any direct discussion of the philosophical issues involved, that is to say any discussion of what philosophers are doing when they appeal in their writings to works of literature, and of what if anything is lost by those who fail to do so.
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13 Ibid., 28.
14 Ibid., 17.
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17 It may be said that Mill breaks decisively with this aspect of his introduction of qualitative considerations. But it is worth noting that in the last resort Mill is forced to explain even this aspect as a matter of what most qualified judges would choose, i.e. as a matter of numbers.
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