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Property theory: The type-free approachv. the church approach

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  1. Department of Philosophy, 169 Hellens, Campus box 232, 80309-0232, Boulder, CO, USA

    George Bealer

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Bealer, G. Property theory: The type-free approachv. the church approach. J Philos Logic 23, 139–171 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01050341

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