Abstract
In a recent volume of this journal John Carroll argued that there exist only uncooperative equilibria in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. We show that this claim depends on modeling such games as finitely but indefinitely repeated games, which reduce simply to finitely repeated games. We propose an alternative general model of probabilistically indefinitely repeated games, and discuss the appropriateness of each of these models of indefinitely repeated games.
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References
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Becker, N.C., Cudd, A.E. Indefinitely repeated games: A response to Carroll. Theor Decis 28, 189–195 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00160935
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00160935