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Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

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Abstract

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

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Notes

  1. For examples, see Williams (1981, 1995a,b); Smith (1994, 2004); Korsgaard (1996, 1997); Pettit and Smith (2006).

  2. For examples, see Broome (1999, 2004); Wallace (2001); Kolodny (2005); Raz (2005).

  3. See Smith (1994, Ch. 4) for a full discussion of the view.

  4. Korsgaard (1997, pp. 220–34) makes the similar claim that Humeans cannot distinguish one’s ends from what one actually pursues, and so cannot violate the instrumental principle to take the means to your ends. She then argues that a principle that cannot be violated cannot be normative, which I address is Section 3-B below.

  5. Insofar as some theories speak in generalities, as Humeans might use the blanket term ‘desire’ and Kantians might use the term ‘inclination,’ they are not yet sensitive to the nuances of what I have been calling desire-type mental states, and so they overlook the possibility of isolating some subset of these states as the ones directly relevant to one’s ends.

  6. Scanlon (2007).

  7. To be precise, when I say that one sees reason R to Φ, or judges that she has reason R to Φ, R is best understood as a consideration that favors Φing. We could limit our use of the term ‘reason’ to refer to the whole relation between the favoring thing and the thing favored for the agent in particular circumstances, in which case I should say that one sees a consideration F as favoring Φ. But it is common usage to call the favoring consideration a reason so I will tend to use ‘is a reason for,’ ‘favors,’ and ‘provides a reason for’ interchangeably.

  8. At this point not much follows from this. In the case of our anorexic I still leave open the possibility of criticizing her end-setting attitudes. Perhaps our anorexic is irrational, or, what I think more likely, fails to judge reasons aright. But there is no reason to argue that she can’t have bad ends.

  9. When discussing what he calls the “High Brow” view, according to which action and choice constitutively aim at the good, Railton (1997, p. 64) considers whether the following claims are paradoxical:

    I believe I have reason to choose act A, but I can’t see anything good about it.

    Act A would be good, but that’s no reason for me to choose it.

    These claims link evaluations of goodness and acknowledgments of reasons to act, so they are related to our endeavor by bringing evaluations into the fold. Whether these sentences have the flavor of a paradox depends on how one interprets the word ‘good.’ If the speaker uses the term to pick out acts conventionally considered to be good, then there is no paradox, but if the speaker is being sincerely evaluative of the goodness of the acts, then these statements strike me as more paradoxical.

  10. Just to cover bases, let me acknowledge that there are attitudes through which we see certain considerations as disfavoring action, or reasons not to engage in action. Most of us consider the fact that an action would cause pain as a reason not to do it, and these attitudes would also get to count as end-setting attitudes.

  11. Velleman (1992, p. 18).

  12. This is similar to the issue raise in footnote 9 with respect to reasons and value. To the extent it seems possible to see reason to do something that is in no way valuable, the notion of value one has in mind is conventional value (whereby one uses terms like ‘valuable’ and ‘good’ in their so-called inverted commas sense). This seems to be what Satan does. He sees what others regard as valuable as failing to provide him with reasons for action. It would be entirely different if he actually values something and yet sees no reasons to adopt certain attitudes and actions toward it.

  13. Kolodny (2005, p. 557). For similar claims about rational responses to beliefs about reasons see Scanlon (1998, p. 29–31); Parfit (unpublished manuscript, Ch. 4).

  14. In addition, I doubt that mere beliefs about one’s reasons rationally requires anything. If you believe that you have reason to Φ, but do not see any particular consideration favoring your Φing, you are normally not rationally required to Φ; instead, it seems most rationally appropriate to search for the reason-providing considerations that would justify your belief that you have reason to Φ and act on those.

  15. Cf. Scanlon (2003, 2007).

  16. Speaking of moral phenomenology, Horgan and Timmons (2007) comment that we often see situations as “calling for” particular actions, and this also seems to get the direction of flow right: the situation favors some attitude or action of ours. I think we have attitudes like this outside of moral cases, and indeed these are the attitudes that characterize ends more generally.

  17. It is now customary to distinguish two different kinds of reasons: motivating reasons and normative reasons. See, e.g., Smith (1994, pp. 94–97). I prefer the tripartite distinction to preserve an in-between kind of reason, where agents act on what they think are normative reasons. These can be thought of as a special kind of motivating reason.

  18. Dreier (1997, p. 93).

  19. Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this helpful example.

  20. Scanlon (2007).

  21. Parfit (unpublished manuscript, Ch. 1, p. 25). All page citations are to a manuscript draft dated Feb 9, 2007. Permission to cite and discuss his developing views were given in personal communication.

  22. Parfit (unpublished manuscript, Ch. 2, p. 51).

  23. Parfit (unpublished manuscript, Ch. 4, p. 85).

  24. Parfit would also claim that some cares and concerns are rationally required. He claims that if someone does not give his future well being appropriate weight he is to that extent irrational. Parfit (unpublished manuscript, Chs. 2 & 4). Such claims are best interpreted as claims about substantive rationality, or what agents have reason to do (perhaps assuming the accuracy of their beliefs). I take it that no ultimate ends are rationally required, unless adopting an ultimate end is necessary to achieve some other ultimate end, but even here the adoption of an ultimate end must be indirect, for we cannot merely choose to see a consideration as an ultimate reason for action. On Humean means for adopting ultimate ends see Schmidtz (1996, Ch. 3).

  25. [II.iii.3/416].

  26. Korsgaard (1997, esp. p. 228–34).

  27. Korsgaard (1997, p. 250).

  28. Schmidtz (1996, p. 8). I set aside here the issue of whether the biologically given goal is a non-psychological end, for I am interested in psychologically determined ends.

  29. Cf. Williams (1995b, p. 186).

  30. Williams (1981, pp. 104–5); (1995a, p. 36).

  31. Thus, Pettit and Smith (2006) are incorrect to suppose that the following principle could make it into the internalist notion of rationality: “Reason requires that if A believes that B is another person, equally real, and believes that B is in pain, and A believes that she can relieve B’s pain by Φ-ing, then a desires to Φ.” Pettit and Smith (2006, p. 151). This would be a principle of substantive rationality, a principle by which agents can be sensitive to the good normative reasons there are to relieve another’s pain. This procedural constraint also calls into question Korsgaard’s (1996, 1997) and Hooker’s (1987) standing as good internalists, for it looks like they want to count some principles as rational simply because they enable agents to respond to reason-providing considerations. When such principles look so obviously informed by what we take to be good reasons for action, the internalist bears the burden of defending these principles on procedural grounds without appeal to normative reasons.

  32. I am indebted to Michael Smith for thinking of those motivations reachable through sound deliberation in terms of the motivational states of an idealized agent. See Smith (1994, 2004).

  33. Michael Smith notes a difficulty with this formulation. There can be circumstances where the rationalization transformation changes one’s circumstances such that A+ is in different psychological circumstances than is A, and these different psychological circumstances provide A and A+ with different reasons. As a result, Smith would prefer the following statement: A has reason to Φ only if A+ would desire that A Φ (though Smith seems to think this is a sufficient condition as well). Smith (1994, Ch. 5). This way A+’s desires are sensitive to A’s particular circumstances, including A’s less than ideal psychological makeup, and so they are more likely to capture A’s reasons, rather than A+’s reasons. See also (Smith 2004, p. 19). We should keep this modification in mind, though nothing that follows turns on it.

  34. Williams (1981, p. 102).

  35. Korsgaard (1996, p. 317). See also Shafer-Landau (2003, Ch. 7).

  36. Korsgaard (1997, p. 215). Another quote from Korsgaard helps to reveal what is at issue here: “[W]e must still explain why the person find it necessary to act on those normative facts, or what it is about her that makes them normative for her. We must explain how these reasons get a grip on her.” Korsgaard (1997, 240). It is not clear how to understand the grippage reasons are supposed to have. In one sense normative reasons have a normative grip on individuals: a given agent’s normative reasons really do pick out considerations that should guide his attitudes and actions. But Korsgaard seems to be referring to something else: a motivational grip. Perhaps the thought is that reasons get a grip on people by being the kinds of things that motivate rational individuals. Here again, this is the right thing to say for perceived reasons, but it is not true that normative reasons must have a motivational grip on individuals. Individuals – even ideally rational ones – can fail to see the reasons they have because their values are askew and they see ultimate reason to do things that are imprudent and immoral.

  37. Here I agree with Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 171), who says “The sticking point about reasons internalism is understanding the relevant modality expressed in the locution ‘can be motivated’.”

  38. For example, see Parfit (1997, p. 107).

  39. Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 187).

  40. A nice though admittedly imperfect test for whether something is playing a causal explanatory role in any given situation is to formulate a subjunctive conditional. In our case we want to know whether a normative reason R explains A’s Φing, so we ask whether A would have Φed in the nearest possible world where R is false. Let’s consider the anorexic case. Is it the case that she would not starve herself if it were the case that she had no good normative reason to starve herself? No. The nearest possible world where she has no good reason to starve herself is probably this world, and in this world she starves herself anyway. She does so because she perceives a reason to do so, and because there is some belief–desire complex that gets her to do so. Motivating and perceived reasons alone explain her behavior.

  41. McDowell (1995) discusses non-rational routes of conversion.

  42. Smith (2004, p. 27).

  43. Parfit (1997, esp. pp. 119–120) suggests another line of argument that might debunk internalism’s appeal. He thinks that reasons internalism is attractive for those who would eliminate or ignore the concept of normative reasons altogether. If the internalist maintains that A has reason to Φ iff A+ would be motivated to Φ, for instance, then the internalist gets an eliminative reduction either by maintaining that the two sides of the biconditional mean the same thing, or they mean something different but nonetheless state the same fact. Those views lose sight of normative reasons by denying that there are any favoring relations – the left side of the biconditional says nothing about any considerations favoring any attitudes or actions. So let me assume that internalist want to talk about normative reasons and explore whether there are good reasons to prefer a non-reductive analysis in terms of procedural rationality alone.

  44. Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 181, p. 192).

  45. Parfit (1997) raises a similar point. However, I prefer to use the term ‘wisdom’ instead of substantive rationality to clearly mark the difference. Also, on my view, wisdom just is sensitivity to good, normative reasons.

  46. Williams (1995b, p. 194).

  47. There might also be a category of motivations and actions that are mindless and possibly a-rational in the sense that we neither have reason to do them, nor reason not to do them unless the get in the way of something else we have reason to do. Twirling one’s hair comes to mind.

  48. Parfit (1997, pp. 120–30); McNaughton and Rawling (2003).

  49. Regarding kindness McDowell (1997, p. 142) states:

    A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations impose on behavior. The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; and there are idioms according to which the sensitivity itself can appropriately be described as knowledge: a kind person knows what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Tim Scanlon, Derek Parfit, and David Schmidtz for great discussions on this material. And I thank participants of the Arizona Research Seminar 2006 for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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Bedke, M.S. Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 11, 85–111 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-007-9064-8

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