Abstract
Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has emerged from this research is that—contrary to the predominant view in the history of philosophy—ordinary participants do not think of weakness of will solely in terms of akrasia but see resolution violations and moral evaluations as playing equally important roles. The present article extends this line of research by reporting the results of four experiments that investigate (i) the interplay between hastily revising one’s resolutions and the degree of reasonableness of the actions one had resolved to undertake, (ii) whether ordinary participants are willing to ascribe weakness of will to agents whose actions stem from compulsion or addiction, and (iii) the respects in which akratic action, resolution violations, and the seriousness of an addiction impact attributions of weakness of will to agents acting in accord with their addictions.
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Notes
For example, describing what he takes to be the common view of weakness of will, Plato writes, “many people who know what it is best to do are not willing to do it, though it is in their power, but do something else” (Protagoras 352d). Davidson (1970, p. 93) writes, “An agent’s will is weak if he acts, and acts intentionally, counter to his own best judgement; in such cases we sometimes say he lacks the will power to do what he knows, or at any rate believes, would, everything considered, be better.” Several philosophers have questioned whether weakness of will is really possible—since it requires acting contrary to what one believes one ought to do—while others have wondered whether weak-willed actions can be free, if the agents who perform them are overcome by their passions or desires (cf. Protagoras 358b-c, Hare 1952, 1963; Watson 1977; Audi 1979; Pugmire 1982; Mele 1986).
Holton (1999, p. 241) wrote: “I do not agree that this is the untutored view. Whenever I have asked non philosophers what they take weakness of will to consist in, they have made no mention of judgments about the better or worse course of action. Rather, they have said things like this: weak-willed people are irresolute; they do not persist in their intentions; they are too easily deflected from the path that they have chosen.” Holton (1999) credits Wiggins (1987) with defending a similar view.
Although Mele (2010, p. 394, 397) believes that akratic actions constitute the “traditional” or “orthodox” instances weakness of will, he allows that there may be some “untraditional” or “unorthodox” cases of weakness of will that do not involve akrasia.
Mele (2010) also carried two other studies that are not undermined by the present considerations.
Two-way ANOVA \(F\)-ratio for akratic action variable: (\(F\)(1, 174) \(=\) .063, \(p > .05\), partial eta squared = 0. Interaction: \(F\)(2, 174) \(=\) 2.387, \(p > .05\), partial eta squared \(=\) .027.
\(F\)(2, 174) = 11.212, \(p < .001\), partial eta squared \(=\) .114. Planned contrasts and a post-hoc Tukey’s HSD test revealed a significant difference (at the .001 level) between the bad condition and the good and neutral conditions. No gender effects were found.
CJ/not-CJ: \(F\)(1, 58) \(=\) 2.050, \(p > .05\), partial eta squared \(=\) .034. Q1/Q2: \(F\)(1, 58) \(=\) 9.259, \(p < .01\), partial eta squared \(=\) .138. If the latter effect does not appear to be large, readers should keep in mind that when two data points are taken from the same participant, the difference between them does not need to be as large as the difference between data points taken from two different participants in order to count as statistically significant or large. No gender effects were found.
Reconsiders: \(F\)(1, 232) \(=\) 49.319, \(p < .001\), partial eta squared \(=\) .175. AA: \(F\)(1, 232) \(=\) .649, \(p > .05\), partial eta squared \(=\) .003. RV: \(F\)(1, 232) \(=\) 1.604, \(p> .05\), partial eta squared \(=\) .007. No gender effects were found.
Nicomachean Ethics (trans. T. Irwin; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985; 186), 1148b30.
Compulsion: \(F\)(2, 348) = .934, \(p > .05\), partial eta squared = .005. AA: \(F\)(1, 348) \(=\) .775, \(p > .05\), partial eta squared \(=\) .002. RV: \(F\)(1, 348) \(=\) 5.818, \(p< .05\), partial eta squared = .016.
\(F\)(1, 348) \(=\) 3.813, \(p\) \(=\) .052, partial eta squared \(=\) .011. No gender effects were found.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Frank Hindriks, Al Mele, Kevin Timpe, and two anonymous reviewers from Synthese for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Mark Alfano and Mark Phillips for assistance in setting up the experiments.
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Beebe, J.R. Weakness of will, reasonability, and compulsion. Synthese 190, 4077–4093 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0250-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0250-z