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Bodily Protentionality

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Abstract

This investigation explores the methodological implications of choosing an unusual example for phenomenological description (here, a bodily awareness practice allowing spontaneous bodily shifts to occur at the leading edge of the living present); for example, the matters themselves are not pregiven, but must first be brought into view. Only after preliminary clarifications not only of the practice concerned, but also of the very notions of the “body” and of “protentionality” is it possible to provide both static and genetic descriptions of the phenomena in question, leading to concluding meditations on the differences between an “integrating” consciousness engaged in a project of knowing and an “improvisational” consciousness open to radical transformation. In the end, however, the Urzeitigung in which what is protended is simply “more time” holds good as the invariant governing the deep structure of both of these styles of consciousness.

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Notes

  1. As Ströker (1997, p. 11) points out, it is not enough to know “about” such distinctive phenomenological methods as transcendental and eidetic reduction: “Rather, doing phenomenology is itself the phenomenological project proper” (see also, e.g., Van de Pitte 1988, pp. 31ff.), and this is the aim of the present essay as well as of my other “experiments in phenomenological practice” (see, e.g., Behnke 2007). An earlier form of this essay was presented at the 2005 meeting of the Husserl Circle in Dublin, and I thank participants for their comments and questions.

  2. For a critical appreciation of the general program of a turn to the “things” or “matters” themselves, cf. Zirión (2006).

  3. See, e.g., Husserl’s diary entry for 25 September 1906, which situates various specific projects within the context of a thoroughgoing critique of reason (Hua XXIV, pp. 445ff.); cf. Ströker (1997, p. 11), on Husserlian phenomenology as foundational theory of science.

  4. To make sense of this claim in light of the diversity of “phenomenologies” within the phenomenological tradition in a broad sense, it is helpful to recall the distinction that Husserl repeatedly makes between “phenomenology” and “phenomenological philosophy”—see, e.g., not only the title of the Ideen, but the distinction between “phenomenology” and “phenomenologically founded philosophy” (and the claim that phenomenology is a field of rigorous scientific research whose results are fruitful both for philosophy and for other sciences—cf. also Hua XIX/1, pp. 6f.) in the foreword to the inaugural issue of the Jahrbuch (Hua XXV, pp. 63f.), as well as the distinction in the title of the London lectures between “phenomenological method” and “phenomenological philosophy” (Hua XXXV, p. 311); see also Aguirre (1970, pp. 23ff.). The present project is concerned with what happens when we put Husserlian phenomenological methods into practice for ourselves, using them to investigate particular themes, rather than with specifically philosophical interpretations (including Husserl’s own self-interpretations) of either the methods or the findings produced by these methods.

  5. Husserl not only frequently uses the metaphor of a path or way (Weg), as in the issue of various “ways” to the reduction, but emphasizes that we must actually take these paths for them to be fruitful (see, e.g., Hua XXIV, p. 445; Hua XXXIV, p. 291; Hua IV, p. 123).

  6. “Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung, die ernstlichen Anspruch auf Wissenschaftlichkeit erhebt, muß, wie man schon oft betont hat, dem Prinzip der Voraussetzungslosigkeit genügen. Das Prinzip kann aber unseres Erachtens nicht mehr besagen wollen als den strengen Ausschluß aller Aussagen [Annahmen], die nicht phänomenologisch voll und ganz realisiert werden können”—Hua XIX/1, p. 24 (cf. 28f.). For a 1930 echo of this key passage from the Logische Untersuchungen, cf. Hua XXXIV, p. 176: “Ich will absolut ‘vorurteilslos’ vorgehen, d. h. jedwede Vormeinung, jedwede Mitmeinung, die erst durch eine künftige Schau bewährt werden müsste, ausschließen” (and see also Hua XXXIV, p. 66; Behnke, in press, a).

  7. This is emphasized in, e.g., Waldenfels (1992, p. 17). Cf. Hua III/1, p. 135: “Nicht liegt das neue Feld so ausgebreitet vor unserem Blicke mit Füllen abgehobener Gegebenheiten, daß wir einfach zugreifen und der Möglichkeit sicher sein könnten, sie zu Objekten einer Wissenschaft zu machen, geschweige denn sicher der Methode, nach der hierbei vorzugehen wäre.” For Husserl (Hua Mat IV, pp. 73f.), this gives the method of phenomenological reduction an entirely different status from the methods used in existing sciences of whatever sort: “In allen solchen Wissenschaften sind die Gebiete durch Erfahrung oder durch eidetische Intuition vorgegeben, und ‘Methode’ ist der Titel für technische Veranstaltungen, die sich für eine theoretische Bearbeitung des jeweiligen Gebietes als nützliche Mittel erweisen lassen. In unserem Fall aber, in dem der Phänomenologie, ist gerade das Gebiet nicht vorgegeben, und es bedarf allererst der Methode, um dasselbe, um das reine Bewusstsein und seine reinen Phänomene in den theoretischen Blick zu bringen …” (Hua Mat IV, p. 74).

  8. Cf., e.g., Ströker (1997, pp. 25ff., 111ff., 265).

  9. The present essay can only offer a modest and local contribution to the lofty goal of methodological self-responsibility that Husserl expects of us (cf., e.g., Hua III/1, p. 136; Hua VIII, pp. 3, 10ff., 195ff.); cf. also Behnke (in press, c). On broader issues pertaining to the phenomenology of phenomenology, see, e.g., Luft (2002).

  10. From this it can be seen that I am not carrying out the type of investigation that simply reflects on natural attitude experience in its own terms so as to make the tacit structures of the Lebenswelt patent. Instead, I am proceeding within a transcendental attitude: the transcendental reduction not only enables me to inquire into the subjective activities through which everything receives the validity and sense, the being and being-thus, that it has for me (Hua XXXIV, pp. 279ff., especially 280, 285), and thereby to pursue radical freedom from prejudices (Hua Mat VIII, p. 41), but also opens up transcendental experience as a radically new style of experience (see, e.g., Hua XXXIV, pp. 291f. et passim), a new transcendental “dimension” (Hua II, pp. 24f.; Hua XXXIV, p. 121; Hua VI, pp. 114, 120ff., 209) that is to be investigated by “phenomenological-transcendental science” (Hua XXXIV, p. 291).

  11. For Husserl, it is both obvious that a basic form of experience—somatological sensitivity—deserves a science that investigates it in its own right, and comprehensible that this science never actually historically emerged, since it presupposes “ungewohnte phänomenologische Analysen, und eine Abwendung des Blickes von dem in den vollen Auffassungen Gegebenen und unsere natürlichen Blickrichtungen Bestimmenden” (Hua V, p. 10). However, the contemporary field of somatics (see, e.g., Behnke 2007; in press, b) does indeed thematize somaesthetic experience. Husserl indicates (Hua XXXIV, p. 297) that moments of self-awareness within waking life in the natural attitude—including being practically occupied with self-education—can be transformed into transcendental parallels once the transcendental epochē is in play, and I do indeed find that the rich repertoire of body and movement awareness practices within the field of somatics can serve as fine resources for work in phenomenology of the body (with, of course, any accompanying naturalistic explanations or other mundane positings placed in brackets).

  12. Husserl frequently builds on these analyses in other works—cf., e.g., Hua XXXV, §2, especially pp. 15ff.

  13. Ströker (1997, pp. 14f.).

  14. Cf., e.g., Hua V, pp. 14ff.; Hua Mat IV, p. 145.

  15. Hence the ontological region of Leiblichkeit has an ontological a priori of its own (see, e.g., Hua Mat IV, p. 212; Hua VIII, p. 227; Hua XXXII, p. 225) and can be studied in its own right (cf., e.g., Hua VIII, p. 491, for a concise list, recapitulating many points from Ideen II, of its distinctive properties), even if the somatology that studies it falls under the category of objective anthropological science, with all of this standing in contrast to pure transcendental investigation (see Hua VIII, p. 226).

  16. Since this mundanization is itself an accomplishment of transcendental subjectivity, Husserl refers to “den Geltungssinn ‘Mensch’” as “nicht sozusagen das vermenschlichende, sondern vermenschlichte Ich” (Hua XXXIV, p. 286). Note that the theme of Vermenschlichung must be distinguished from the “humanizing” (“Humanisierung,” “sich humanisierende”) through which the social world is constituted as a field of communal goals, etc.—see, e.g., Hua XV, pp. 205, 317; Hua Mat VIII, pp. 112 n. 1, 349 n. 1, 389; Hua XXXIV, pp. 313, 334, 364f.; Hua XXXIX, pp. 311, 529.

  17. See, e.g., Hua XXXIV, p. 290, where Husserl uses his usual term, “verleiblicht”; “verkörpert” (Hua XV, p. 323) and “inkorporiert” (Hua VIII, p. 72) also occur, as well as “einverleiben” (Hua VIII, p. 72) and even “einlegen” (Hua VIII, p. 74). The other side of such “incarnation” is the “animation” of the body by the psyche (see, e.g., Hua VIII, p. 74; Hua XXXIV, pp. 49, 112, 145).

  18. An especially clear statement can be found in Hua Mat IV, pp. 64ff.; cf. also, e.g., Hua III/1, pp. 116ff.; Hua XXXV, p. 68; Hua VIII, pp. 56f., 74, 81, 128, 173. For more implications of the psychophysical apperception, see Behnke (in press, b); cf. Behnke (2008a, §5).

  19. See, e.g., Mohanty (1985, pp. 128, 133, 163, 211, 220, 242).

  20. What is at stake here is basically the theme of the paradox of subjectivity (see, e.g., Hua VI, §§53f.; Seebohm 1992, and cf. Ströker 1965, pp. 170f.) as played out in a bodily register. Examples of passages in which Husserl explicitly tries to separate constituting kinaesthetic capability from the object, “lived body,” include Hua XIV, pp. 540 n. 2, 547, and Hua XXXVI, pp. 165f.; there are also a number of texts in Hua XV where Husserl is grappling with this issue (see, e.g., Text Nr. 17, Beilage LI, Text Nr. 37, among others). However, it is beyond the scope of this essay to address such issues as the mundanization of kinaesthetic capability.

  21. This is not to dispute the circumstance that the body is in fact routinely constituted as an externally perceivable thing; indeed, as Mohanty (1985, p. 107) points out, the world of the natural standpoint “is the world of sense-perception whose central category is the concept of the thing” (cf., e.g., Hua XXII, p. 275; Hua III/1, p. 25; Hua IV, pp. 53f.), and as Husserl emphasizes (Hua XXXIV, pp. 64f.), the habitual thematic direction within the natural attitude is toward objects of external apperception, to such an extent that even subjective activities are apperceived objectively and thereby mundanized. My task here is nevertheless to suspend this reigning apperceptive style so as to allow alternative styles of experience to emerge. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the implications of such a move for Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity, which relies heavily on the external (and primarily visual) givenness of lived bodies; cf. Behnke (2008a).

  22. See Behnke (2001). Note that I am using the term “somaesthetic” to refer not just to surface sensitivity to contact, but to any sensations that can be felt bodily with the “mineness” peculiar to the Eigenleib.

  23. Zaner (1964, p. 249); as he goes on to say, “It is not the case that embodiment is something which is ‘once done, forever done.’” Thus the dynamic activity of embodiment differs from an “action” that comes to an end when it has reached its goal (see, e.g., Hua XXXIV, pp. 355f.). Instead, on my reading, what is at stake in the ongoing act of embodiment is the subjectivity of acts in contrast to that of sensations: both are “mine,” but in a qualitatively different way, such that sensations are something that the I “has” as “possessions,” in contrast to the “I do” (Hua IV, p. 317; cf. 214f., and see also 284).

  24. Zaner (1964, p. 249; for the various ways, see 249ff., 257ff.).

  25. See, e.g., Hua VIII, pp. 60f., where what is “embodied” in the “externality” of the lived body is “psychic life” as an “inwardness” that is thereby “expressed.” For the purposes of this paper, however, I am setting aside the issue of the expressive, communicative body.

  26. The classic introduction to kinaesthetic consciousness remains Claesges (1964), at least until more of Husserl’s D manuscripts are published; cf., e.g., Husserl’s 1934 “Notizen zur Raumkonstitution,” published in 1940–1941 (henceforth abbreviated NR). See also Rohr-Dietschi (1974, pp. 72–88). Descriptions of the constitutive efficacy of kinaesthetic consciousness require retrieving it from its anonymity and thematizing its performances without freezing it into an “object” over against “me.” For one approach to a style of lucid awareness in which this is possible, see Behnke (1984), and cf. Mohanty (1985, pp. 129, 149; 2008, p. 231). Note that the term “kinaesthetic” takes on a particular technical sense in Husserl, one that emphasizes kinaesthesis as “act” rather than “sensation” (cf. n. 23 above): Cairns (1976, p. 64) reports that “what Husserl means by kinaesthesia is not the bodily sensations accompanying movement or muscular tension, or the inner sensations, but rather something volitional or quasi-volitional that remains when one abstracts from such sensations,” although “there are in certain cases hyletic concomitants which necessarily accompany the kinaesthesia” (Cairns 1976, p. 73; see also, e.g., Hua Mat VIII, pp. 320, 326, 341). Here I will simply emphasize the moment of kinēsis (and especially the sheer “I could” of capability-consciousness) rather than entering into the complex problems linked with the aisthēsis moment that is linguistically sedimented in the term “kinaesthetic,” and I will thus be setting aside not only the localization of kinaesthetic capability in somaesthetic sensibility on the one hand and the role of kinaesthetic receptivity in undergoing our own somaesthetic sensations on the other, but also the significance of these issues for what I have termed (see n. 20 above) the bodily version of the paradox of subjectivity (see, e.g., Claesges 1964, §§20c, 22, and cf. Hua IV, p. 284).

  27. The notion of kinaesthetic “constellations” comes from Husserl (see, e.g., Hua XIV, p. 552; Hua XV, pp. 304f.). He also speaks of the kinaesthetic “situation” that is currently actual at any given moment (see, e.g., Hua XV, pp. 275, 304), as well as using the metaphor of being “brought on stage” (Inszenierung) to refer to certain kinaesthetic possibilities being put into play (see, e.g., Hua XV, pp. 270, 275; Hua Mat VIII, p. 235). In addition, however, he emphasizes that kinaesthetic consciousness is simultaneously a capability-consciousness (cf., e.g., Hua XIII, p. 422; Hua XIV, pp. 291, 378; Hua XV, p. 621; Claesges 1964, pp. 75ff.; Bergmann and Hoffmann 1984, p. 300) that embraces the kinaesthetic system as a whole—“Denn auch das kinästhetische System in irgendeinem Stande momentan aktueller kinästhetischer Situation ist originaliter bewusst” (Hua XV, p. 304)—as an ideal system of possibilities that is irreducible to any momentary actualization (see, e.g., Hua XIII, p. 355; Ms. D 13 I, 18, cited in Claesges 1964, p. 78).

  28. Note that the subjective activity of actualizing a possibility is of a completely different order than the givenness of something objective through adumbrations or appearances; the “I can” of kinaesthetic consciousness stands on the same footing as the “I can” pertaining to other capabilities of consciousness (see, e.g., Hua XXXV, pp. 159ff., and cf. Mohanty 1984, especially pp. 26ff.; 1985, pp. 43f.).

  29. A move functioning as an entailment on one occasion may well be explicitly enacted on another, so that we cannot necessarily establish a clear demarcation between a set of “voluntary” enactments on the one hand and a set of “involuntary” kinaesthetic performances entailed by these enactments on the other. Moreover, for Husserl, even the latter belong to the realm of the I in the broader sense—see, e.g., Hua IV, p. 317; Hua XIV, pp. 447ff. (and cf. 89); Hua Mat VIII, p. 336.

  30. As Husserl points out, “die Kinästhese ist niemals total starr” (Hua XV, p. 652); not only is “holding still” an ongoing kinaesthetic activity (Hua VI, pp. 108, 164), but it may also happen that I lie down to relax and find myself continuing to enact a body of worry and tension, or a readiness to leap back into action at any moment, etc.

  31. Embodiment in the sense meant here must therefore be sharply distinguished from the Verleiblichung and Verweltlichung discussed above; instead, it has to do with the ongoing streaming life of the I, which is not some sort of “disembodied mind,” but “Ich, das transzendentale Ich, mit meinen transzendentalen kinästhetisch-erscheinungsregierenden Aktivitäten” (Hua XV, p. 286).

  32. See Hua XXXIV, p. 293, on the need to exercise a reduction on the language we use (here, the term “body”) so as to preclude its mundane connotations; cf. Ströker (1997, p. 42).

  33. Cf. Behnke (1997, pp. 186f.).

  34. Cf. Behnke (2007). Note that the notion of “embodiment as an ongoing act” at stake here is a broader category that does indeed include the full spectrum of relational kinaesthetic comportment; however, in light of the style of experience serving as the leading clue for the present investigation, my discussion emphasizes the more specific phenomenon of making a body.

  35. Cf. Behnke (1990; in press, e).

  36. I do not want to downplay the importance of the habitual body and its rich repertoire of skills, which is an important topic for both static-structural and genetic-developmental descriptions (cf., e.g., Bergmann and Hoffmann 1984, especially pp. 300ff.); nevertheless, what is at stake here is that the habitual body may not always be optimal (cf., e.g., Behnke, in press, d, especially §3).

  37. I first presented the protentional body practice at conferences and workshops in 1990. See also, e.g., Behnke (2001, p. 99; 2004, pp. 35ff.).

  38. Other dimensions in which the type of awareness and comportment to be discussed here may fruitfully be explored include musical improvisation (cf. Behnke 1986), embodied peacemaking (cf. Behnke 1999), and further types of bodily relationality (cf. Behnke 2007).

  39. The emphasis here on primal motility as sheer kinaesthetic capability can be complemented with investigations of the “fühlendes Dabei-Sein” (Hua Mat VIII, pp. 351f.) that is at stake in the directly lived experience of somaesthetic affection; cf. Behnke (2008b). Even in the latter case, however, I can often choose to focus on “how” I am receiving these somaesthetic givens rather than on “what” I am feeling (although this may not be possible if I am suffused, for instance, with unbearable pain). It is nevertheless important to distinguish the kinaesthetics of undergoing from the kinaesthetics of making a body, even though these are also intimately related.

  40. Theoretically, this practice can be explored in a wide variety of settings and circumstances. However, it is usually easier to begin by tapping into the kinaesthetic enactments sustaining the body at rest rather than starting with examples involving more complex kinaesthetic performances. Lying quietly, for example, effects a practical suspension of the sedimented manner of maintaining upright posture that is presuppositionally swung into play as I go about my daily tasks, holding it in abeyance, as it were, yet without utterly effacing its deep structure, which remains available for investigation and transformation.

  41. “Wir folgen dem Ereignisverlauf, wir schwimmen im Fluss der Zeit mit” (Hua XXXIII, p. 270). See also Hua III/1, p. 94; Hua XI, p. 368; Hua XXXV, pp. 117, 118f., 129f., and cf. Mouillie (1994, p. 196): “réfléchir ‘sur le coup’ (et non plus ‘après coup’ comme nous le faisons à l’ordinaire).” I borrow the term “proflection” from Hoffmann (1997, p. 116), but use it with a somewhat different nuance. The term is also used by Waldenfels (1971, p. 102), who refers to pro-flection as “ein Sich-nach-vorn-beugen, das nicht nur rekapituliert, was bereits ist, sondern interessiert bleibt an dem, was noch nicht ist”; as he later points out, however, such pro-flection does not yet reach the goal of a true and complete rationality “in der die stumme Erfahrung zur vollständigen Aussprache ihres eigenen Sinnes gebracht würde” (1993, p. 272 [cf. Hua I, p. 77]). Thus the proflective, protentionally accented awareness serves other goals than the project of knowing (cf. Sect. 6 below). In any case, what is at stake here is the possibility of living in the upwelling “Heranströmen” rather than the “Verströmen” within the “urtümlich stehende Strömen” (Hua XXXIV, p. 384), in the “Aufquellen” rather than the “Verquellen” within the “‘urquellende’ Phase” (Hua Mat VIII, p. 79; cf. 113).

  42. Hua X, pp. 30, 35, 377f.; Hua XXIV, pp. 263f.; Hua XXXV, pp. 127f., 415; Hua Mat VIII, p. 267 (cf. 58).

  43. The term “spontaneous” is ambiguous here. On the one hand, the shift happens “of its own accord” rather than being deliberately initiated by the primary active, awake I; on the other hand, it is not a mere mechanical response to some external “stimulus,” but stems from a bodily agency working at very deep levels, yet still belonging to the broader realm of the “I” (see n. 29 above). Bodily spontaneity in the sense meant here thus presupposes the absolute passivity of primal temporalization while also displaying further structures of its own that will be investigated in Sect. 5 below.

  44. Cf. Depraz (1998, p. 93).

  45. Some of the strongest statements of this principle occur in Husserl’s 1913 draft of a new preface for the Logische Untersuchungen—see, e.g., Hua XX/1, pp. 319–326.

  46. Husserl recognizes that one must first naively make use of a method before proceeding to its transcendental justification (see Hua Mat VIII, p. 7; cf. also Hua XXXIV, pp. 295f.). Thus actually putting phenomenological methods into play in specific concrete investigations is a condition of possibility for the methodological self-responsibility that Husserl also demands (cf. n. 9 above).

  47. See, e.g., Kortooms (2002), Schnell (2002), Brough (2002), Zahavi (2004), and Dodd (2005), in contrast to, e.g., Shin (1978), which nevertheless includes (pp. 19ff.) interesting material on the prehistory of the term “protention.”

  48. See Lohmar (2002). Lohmar’s approach in this essay should be situated in the broader context of his work on pre-predicative experience in general, and on the themes of apprehension, apperception, and anticipation in particular—see, e.g., Lohmar (1993–1994; 1998, especially III.5; and 2006, as well as the works cited in 2002, p. 167 n. 38).

  49. Parenthetical page references in this subsection refer to Lohmar (2002); Erfahrung und Urteil (= Husserl 1999) is cited using the abbreviation EU.

  50. I will set aside considerations of the genetic origin of time (cf., e.g., Depraz 2000).

  51. See Hua XXXIII, Part III. Although the metaphor of “higher” and “lower” levels may work for static analyses of hierarchical, one-sided founding relations, and although Husserl himself continues to use the metaphor of vertically arrayed “strata” even in the context of genetic analysis (see, e.g., the reference to phenomenological archaeology in Hua Mat VIII, pp. 356f.), such a model is not entirely satisfactory; cf. Behnke (in press, a). I will nevertheless continue to use the language of “levels” as shorthand for degrees of complexity.

  52. See Besnier (1993, pp. 338f.) for some parallel suggestions with regard to retention; cf. Husserl’s use of the dynamic terms “protentionalisierend” and “retentionalisierend” (see, e.g., Hua Mat VIII, pp. 115 n. 1, 265f., 270).

  53. In other words, even fundamental concepts are to be brought to original itself-givenness—cf., e.g., Hua Mat IV, p. 112.

  54. Cf., e.g., Hua XXXIII, pp. 116f., 121ff., 184 n. 2, 222; Hua Mat VIII, pp. 196ff.; EU, pp. 122f., 304 (= Hua XXXIII, p. 318); Cairns (1976, pp. 36f.).

  55. Note in this connection that Husserl uses the term “style” at many levels of analysis; cf. Behnke (2004, pp. 25ff.).

  56. It is interesting to note in this connection that in 1934, when Fink was applying for financial support for his work on Husserl’s time manuscripts, he emphasized that the Bernau manuscripts in particular had to be supplemented with “‘comprehensive analyses of protentionality, of the temporality of acts, and of the temporality of kinesthesis’” (cited in Bruzina 2004, p. 292). See also Kern (1975, pp. 92f.) on the activity of sensing in its openness to the immediate future.

  57. See, e.g., EU, §§19, 22. Note that the kinaesthetic enactments in question can be either voluntary or involuntary (cf. Hua Mat IV, p. 184), although since they do often run off “automatically”—penetrating into familiar directions (Hua XXXII, p. 114) along accustomed paths (Hua XV, pp. 203, 330) without my actively directing them—they are usually labeled “involuntary,” even though they do have “the character of an active, subjective process” (EU, p. 89; cf. Hua XIV, pp. 447 n. 1, 452 n. 1, and see also Cairns 1976, p. 92). Moreover, as I have indicated, every “voluntary” kinaesthetic enactment will be accompanied by “involuntary” kinaesthetic entailments, so that the voluntary and the involuntary always work together. Finally, note that in the case of kinaesthetic capability, the relation between the “passive” and the “active” cannot be captured by a contrast between, say, the “passively pregiven” and “higher,” “mental” activity built on it.

  58. Husserl uses the lovely image of a grasping (Erfassen) that receives the new now “with open arms” (Hua XI, p. 368; cf. 74, 323, and see also, e.g., Hua XXXV, p. 130; Hua XXXIII, p. 4; Hua XV, p. 349). We must nevertheless recognize that in normal experience, these open arms are already adjusted in advance, as it were, to embrace something in particular: “Ein unerwarteter Anfang kann nicht mit offenen Armen empfangen werden” (Hua XXXIII, p. 37 n. 1). Thus “not-knowing” is not merely a cognitive affair, but also entails a specific sort of “not-doing” that is not a mere stasis or inaction, but a form of bodily epochē that involves suspending or refraining from automatically deploying the modes of “readiness” we have already developed (cf. Hua XI, p. 217), e.g., specific styles of kinaesthetic Vorgreifen.

  59. Brough (2002, pp. 144f.).

  60. Cf., e.g., Hua Mat VIII, p. 94, on the distinction between a protentional streaming understood in terms of (contentual) fulfillment, and the constant protentional predelineation of the protentional horizon per se (see also 95 n. 2, 96f., 97 n. 1).

  61. Cf. Brough (2002, pp. 149ff.) for a summary of the issue of levels of time-constitution. Note that the non-objectivating awareness in which the absolute “flow” is consciousness of its own process is essentially non-objectivating insofar as the “objectivation” of a temporally distributed object is only fully completed when the process of objectivating comes to the end of its duration and can sink, as a whole, into the past—Brough (2002, p. 149); Hua XXXIII, p. 137. But as long as I am alive, my living present has a living protentional horizon, and once this ceases, I am no longer there, as a living, constituting subject, to experience myself as a fully constituted, dead object: the transcendental I cannot experience itself, firsthand, as dead—cf. Hua XXXIII, pp. 368f.; Hua XXXV, pp. 141f., 419; Hua XI, pp. 377ff.; Hua XV, p. 452; Hua Mat VIII, pp. 96ff. (cf. 102f.).

  62. Lohmar (2002, pp. 155f.) points out that in languages where the verb comes at the end of the sentence, “the limit of retentional givenness may be extended” (cf. Hua Mat VIII, p. 72); a parallel case for protention might be what musicians call “phrasing”: not only is each current note already aiming toward the next one, but from the very beginning of the phrase, the living protentional horizon is stretched to encompass the arc of the phrase as a whole (note that from the active standpoint of the player, it is the protentional horizon that is stretched, whereas from the listener’s standpoint, it is the retentional horizon—cf. Hua XXXV, p. 128).

  63. The notion of “more kinaesthetic functioning” per se not only includes both moving and holding still (cf. e.g., Hua XV, pp. 319ff.; NR, pp. 24ff., 29), but also includes cases of weakness or restriction as factual disappointments that nevertheless—qua “disappointments”—confirm the original protention of being-able-to-move that is the essential feature of kinaesthetic capability, since this is precisely what has been disappointed.

  64. Here it is not possible to enter into the question of movement that is checked by the resistance of things (cf., e.g., NR, pp. 225f.); of the experience of my own body as offering resistance I must overcome; or of the role of visual experience—with its freedom to survey vast stretches without the panorama resisting the gaze that sweeps over it—in the constitution of open-empty space.

  65. Cf. the discussions of attuned space, the space of action, and the space of intuition in Part One of Ströker (1965).

  66. The intricate issue of “inner spatiality” as a parallel to (transcendental) “inner temporality” (cf. Seebohm 1992, pp. 162f.) cannot be addressed here, but deserves a separate investigation.

  67. Hua Mat IV, p. 178 (and cf., e.g., Hua XXXIII, p. 143; Hua XXV, pp. 223ff.).

  68. Thus whether I am remembering in such a way as to transplant myself into my own past and relive its sequence of nows, or maintaining a recollective focus on one particular moment, the temporal standpoint of these activities themselves is always the current now, and I cannot hold it back in the same way in which I can check a movement.

  69. For the sake of simplicity, I am setting aside the kinaesthetics of undergoing these somaesthetic sensations, but this too has its leading edge that can be thematized in the manner described.

  70. That the protentionality proper to any kinaesthetic functioning whatsoever presupposes the fundamental passive Urzeitigung of “more time” can also be seen when we consider that the spontaneous bodily shifts occurring in the practice in question can be sudden or gradual, and indeed, all actualizations of kinaesthetic capability display an organic rhythm and tempo—but the very notion of “tempo” is senseless for the seamless prolongation of the now. Even when Husserl produces his various visual diagrams and displays the series of nows as spatially equidistant in order to indicate the steady sinking-away of the continuum of retentions, he does not mean to convey that time itself proceeds at a certain tempo in the same way as melodies or kinaesthetic sequences do (cf. Hua X, p. 370).

  71. Husserl’s references to the kinaesthetic sequences that can be actualized “from here”—from the “currently actualized kinaestheses” (Hua XXXIV, p. 372; cf. Hua Mat VIII, p. 52)—typically address these kinaesthetic possibilities in terms of the appearances they correlatively make available from the horizon of possible appearances of the perceptual object (including the further possibility of actualizing kinaesthetic systems pertaining to other sensory fields). But the structure, “immediately actualizable from here,” also pertains to experiences whose aim is not to explore horizons of appearances in the context of constituting a coherent objective world (cf. Sect. 6 below).

  72. See Zaner (1981, pp. 175ff.).

  73. See, e.g., Hua IV, p. 260; Hua XIV, p. 450. Note that the research question is still directed toward the ongoing act of making a body and not, e.g., toward the affective motivations pertaining to the kinaesthetics of perceiving transcendent things and bringing them to optimal givenness, etc.

  74. Here I am presupposing a system of already developed kinaesthetic capabilities (cf. NR, p. 24) without describing the origin and development of my mastery of this system per se (cf. Hua Mat VIII, pp. 326ff.); I am also setting aside the task of describing both the genesis of “habitualities” as sedimented styles of action and the associative awakening of these habitual patterns “under certain circumstances,” in order to focus on the genetic motivations functioning within the protentional body practice as I have presented it. Methodologically, it should be pointed out that much of the difficulty of actually carrying out concrete phenomenological investigation involves maintaining a clear focus on that which is to be described while distinguishing it from related descriptive tasks: no matter how much work one does, at each stage it is clear that there is more work yet to be done, and this, I think, is the directly lived experience motivating the characterization of phenomenological science as an infinite task requiring “resolute cooperation” among generations of researchers (Hua XIX/1, pp. 16f.). Cf. also Hua XXXIV, p. 296, on the necessity of proceeding “abstractively,” working step by step and stratum by stratum while keeping the concretion in mind as a whole, even if at this stage, it is only a mute horizon that is yet to be explicated.

  75. Note that the protention of “more kinaesthetic capability” per se identified in the static inquiry is a protention of possibility, whereas what is at stake here is the actualization of a (motivated) possibility.

  76. This is a key notion in the work of Eugene T. Gendlin (see, e.g., Levin 1997, p. 28), and the same principle is at work in various transformative somatic practices as well (cf., e.g., Behnke 2007, pp. 79ff.; in press, b, Two.A.7).

  77. The notion of sense in-the-making has been addressed in, e.g., Waldenfels (1995), where what is at stake is Merleau-Ponty’s notion of truth in-the-making. Waldenfels’ concern with such matters as open situations and productive (rather than reproductive) action is echoed in other authors’ concern with a phenomenology of the “event” (see, e.g., Dastur 1997). The present essay—which uses Husserlian methods to describe a mode of lived bodily comportment attuned to the new in such a way that a corporeal correlational a priori still holds good—can be seen as bearing on the question of whether, and to what extent, “classic” phenomenology can contribute to elucidating the spontaneous emergence of new and unforeseen experiential possibilities. Cf. also Behnke (2004, pp. 32ff.).

  78. Cf. Hua XXVI, §4a, especially pp. 20ff.

  79. Cf., e.g., Hua XXXIII, p. 377; Hua XXXV, p. 415; Hua XXXII, p. 255; Hua XV, pp. 349f.; Hua XXXIV, p. 170 n. 1; Hua XXXIX, p. 374; Hua Mat VIII, pp. 30, 44, 82, 90ff., 395.

  80. Cf., e.g., Hua XXXV, pp. 461ff.

  81. Cf., e.g., Hua XI, p. 9; Hua XXXV, p. 132; EU, §48; Hua XXXIV, p. 456 n. 1.

  82. Cf., e.g., Hua XXXVI, p. 130; Hua XXXV, p. 717; Hua XXXII, pp. 104, 140f.; Hua XXXIV, p. 123 (cf. 610f.); Hua Mat VIII, p. 96; Mohanty (1996, p. 20). Husserl also uses the term Vorgeltung (see, e.g., Hua XV, p. 353; Hua XXXIV, p. 444, and cf. 222), as well as Vorgewissheit (Hua XXXIV, pp. 327ff.).

  83. Cf., e.g., Hua XI, p. 86; Hua Mat IV, p. 99; Hua VIII, pp. 45, 221; Hua XXXIV, p. 423 (cf. 607); EU, p. 118.

  84. See, e.g., Hua Mat IV, pp. 99f.; Hua XVII, pp. 253, 289.

  85. Cf., e.g., Hua Mat IV, Part II; Hua XXXV, pp. 304ff., 481ff.; Hua IX, §§6ff.; Hua XXXII, passim.

  86. Cf., e.g., Hua Mat IV, p. 212.

  87. See, e.g., Hua XV, p. 214 n. 1; Hua XVII, pp. 297, 457; Hua Mat IV, pp. 21, 152, 168, 171f., 174, 177, 179f., 182, 186, 189, 193, 195, 197ff., 208, 212; Mohanty (1996, pp. 20f.).

  88. Cf., e.g., Hua Mat IV, pp. 198ff.; Hua XXXII, Ch. 4, especially p. 110, §18, pp. 120ff.; Hua XVII, pp. 447ff.

  89. Cf., e.g., Hua XXXIII, pp. 291ff. (= EU, pp. 463ff.).

  90. See Hua XXXIII, p. 122; EU, pp. 308f.; Hua XXXII, pp. 140, 156, and cf., e.g., Hua XXVI, Beilage XIII; Hua Mat IV, Beilage IV.

  91. In other words, it is not a matter of a linear “summation” of parts that only subsequently form a whole—cf. Hua XXVI, pp. 178f.; Hua XXXV, p. 463.

  92. Here it is important to remember that transcendental accounts bring out moments not normally thematized within the natural attitude, but as moments, with no claim that they are in fact self-sufficient elements. Hence the descriptive project of discerning the moment of “more time” as an invariant running through both the integrative preservation of the familiar and the improvisational openness to the radically unfamiliar does not yet provide an answer to such questions as whether time itself exerts a connective force above and beyond the specifically hyletic “fusion” of similarity (cf. Hua Mat VIII, p. 88), or whether a truly “empty” time is ever actually experienced (cf. Mohanty 2008, p. 276).

  93. Like my other “experiments in phenomenological practice,” the present essay is a preliminary study for a larger project whose current working title is This Body that is Not a Thing: A Husserlian Investigation of Embodiment.

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Behnke, E.A. Bodily Protentionality. Husserl Stud 25, 185–217 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-009-9060-z

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