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REASONS TO LIVE VERSUS REASONS NOT TO DIE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2011

Kathy Behrendt
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Extract

Some claims seem so clearly right that we don't think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy's remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim – either directly or by implication. I will look at some of the things people say that stand in opposition to Luper-Foy's claim. I will also consider what is needed in order to agree with it. The views canvassed cover broad issues concerning life and death, and what matters to us with respect to both.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 10 , Issue 28 , Summer 2011 , pp. 67 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2011

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References

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