Abstract
In the present paper I attempt an interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s analysis of animality, developed in winter semester 1929/1930. My general purpose is to examine Heidegger’s analysis in the wider context of formal-indicative phenomenology as such. Thus I show that in order to develop a phenomenology of animality, Heidegger must tacitly renounce the re-enactment of animal experience in which the formal-indicative concepts of his analysis could gain concreteness, and he resorts instead to scientific concepts and concrete experiments in biology or zoology. This is due to the fact that what I call the a-logical bursts into the field of the phenomenological regard when it is oriented toward animality. I therefore argue that the phenomenology of animality presents us with a paradigmatic case of a tension that is at work in any phenomenon, one between logos and a-logos, between hiddenness and unhiddenness—constituting a basic problem of future research in phenomenology and its approach to intersubjectivity and alterity.
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Notes
A recent account of the main trends and philosophical themes in critical animal studies can be found in Calarco (2015).
This has been published in volume 29/30 of the Gesamtausgabe, henceforth cited as FCM.
Cf. GA 56/57 (henceforth TDP), GA 58 (henceforth BP), GA 60 (henceforth PRL), GA 61 (henceforth PIA).
Cf. §70, 291–300.
“Terms” is to be preferred because con-cept—or in German, Be-griff—refers to the action of understanding by seizing hold of something (be-greifen) and holding it (Griff), which is characteristic for the traditional, metaphysical way of thinking. For a discussion concerning the difference between concepts and formal-indicative terms, as well as a thorough account of the Husserlian legacy (especially the notion of emptily intended meaning) present in Heidegger’s formal indicative method, see Klaskow (2018).
Klaskow (2018) emphasizes that this warning sense of formal indication is at work in the context of phenomenological communication, and not for the individual researcher as such. However, in our understanding, the warning function can also be present in the case of the individual phenomenologist because it guards against the inherent, silent tendencies of our Dasein, which cannot be rejected once and for all, but only through constant vigilance.
Dahlstrom (1994: 782ff.) identifies two similar functions of formal indication: the ‘referring-prohibitive’ (hinweisend-prohibitive) function (which Heidegger explicitly names; cf. PIA: 141f.) and the ‘reversing-transforming’ function. Both functions work together and amplify each other: while the first “[…] points to a phenomenon in such a way that it enjoins against any preemptive or external characterization of it […],” the second reverses “[…] the customary way of objectifying whatever is entertained, a reversal that transforms the individual who philosophizes” (Dahlstrom 1994: 782f.).
For Heidegger’s discussion about concretion and formal indication see PIA: 22–30. “The definition of principle (in the formally established sense) of the object called ‘philosophy,’ and thereby the definition of principle of all ‘philosophical objects,’ must be such that the determination of the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of the object (maturation, approach, access, appropriation, retention, renewal) decisively emphasizes the ontological function of the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ at the level of principle, indeed, so that the definitory content ‘indicates’ the genuine concretion, the one it is necessary to appropriate” (PIA: 25).
Cf. TDP: 71–72.
See “Crossing out Animal Experience” section of the present paper.
For a discussion of the way in which Heidegger advances from a comparative analysis to an intrinsic one in order to escape from the danger of anthropocentrism, see Tanzer (2016): “Insofar as he attempts to conceive the animal’s world-poverty as a deficiency of [the] intrinsic type, Heidegger views a non-comparative conception of animality as the remedy to his view’s anthropocentric tendency. So, to avoid anthropocentrism, Heidegger sets himself the task of conceiving world-poverty as an intrinsic deficiency” (Tanzer 2016: 22).
See the methodological paragraph §43. The fundamental difficulty with respect to content and method in determining the essence and accessibility of life (FCM: 178–180).
One such complication concerns the fact that “poverty” can be understood as a simple quantitative lack or as a structural deprivation concerning the ontological characteristic of a being (a sense that without the appropriate consideration of animality itself remains obscure; cf. FCM: 195). For an instructive discussion of this aspect, see Tanzer (2016).
Klaskow (2018) speaks about the persuasive function of formal indications that, as empty intentions, refer back to a Evidenzsituation. They “[…] can function persuasively because by alerting the listener to a particular intention they can put her in a position to have an evidentiary experience. Importantly, this alerting occurs in genuinely functioning discourse” (Klaskow 2018: 95).
Derrida (1991: Chapter VI) also discusses the qualitative and quantitative difference between human and animal, referring to Heidegger’s undertaking as clearly focusing on the qualitative difference: “This analysis, certainly, has the interest of breaking with difference of degree. It respects a difference of structure while avoiding anthropocentrism” (Derrida 1991: 49). See also Romano (2009) for Scheler’s view on spirit and his critique of contemporary scientific views concerning the continuity or discontinuity between human and animal.
In Lindberg’s (2004) interpretation of Heidegger’s account, the animal even appears to be able to meet the human to a certain extent. This insight allows Lindberg to go even further and identify two points of indecision in Heidegger’s account of the animal: the animal’s connection with truth, thus its peculiar relation with being-open-for, and the animal’s role in a political or ethical group. In what follows, we too will address the first problem concerning the animal’s relation with the open. However, although of great interest, the latter topic will require a future undertaking of its own.
Beinsteiner (2017) interprets the ‘as’ in terms of the freedom of conceptualization; accordingly, “What Heidegger calls ‘poverty in world’ could thus be rendered more precisely as the invariance of the domain of possible ways of relating to entities with regard to the extent and the mode of accessibility” (Beinsteiner 2017: 53). However, in our interpretation, Heidegger seems to make an even stronger claim, namely, that the animal is not confined to experiencing an invariant form of the ‘as’ in relating to beings in a way determined by its instincts and impulses. Its poor world is not an invariant world, but rather a ‘world’ determined by the ontological impossibility of the ‘as’.
“[It] always has a relation of utility, of putting-in-perspective; it doesn’t let the thing be what it is, appear as such without a project guided by a narrow ‘sphere’ of drives, of desires” (Derrida 2008: 159). Thus as Beinsteiner (2017) justly states, Derrida understands the “as such” in a “realist” way.
For a recent detailed account about comportment and behavior, as well as such related concepts as captivation and encircling, see Kessel (2011: 181–193).
These include, to name just a few, Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand; Of Spirit; and Geschlecht IV: Heidegger’s Ear. For an elaborated account of Derrida’s engagement in his lectures with Heidegger’s 1929/30 course, but also for a discussion concerning the role of the latter in Derrida’s own final seminar, see Naas (2014).
An insightful discussion concerning animal and human perspectives in phenomenological description can also be found in Sternad (2017: 103–108).
Tanzer (2016) sees here a structural similarity between human being (Dasein) and animal, a similarity that could close the abyss between them. He shows that both this paradoxical determination of animality and the determination of Dasein’s ontological guilt in Being and Time are instances of the same “[…] ‘ought’ without a ‘can’ […] a potentiality that can never be actualized, an unactualizable potentiality’’ (Tanzer 2016: 29f.), i.e., the negativity of an intrinsic deficiency that requires a remediation that is ontologically impossible.
Beinsteiner suggests a positive interpretation of the crossing out, which “[…] reveals a different meaning of Heidegger’s privative strategy of accessing the living being: this strategy is not exhausted in the ontological supposition of a deprivation that characterises the animal. Rather it obtains the purely methodological sense to reflect the danger of anthropomorphizing […]” (Beinsteiner 2017: 49). In our interpretation, this methodological sense of warning against anthropomorphism could be considered one of the features of Heidegger’s formal-indicative endeavor.
More recently, Andersson (2017) showed that what is originally given in the case of the animal is its inaccessibility; “[…] the animal primarily appears as something that presents the withdrawal of itself” (Andersson 2017: 65). Thus according to our interpretation, it could be said that the crossing out of words could indicate one and the same thing every time: the absence, the withdrawal implicit in animal experience.
Another feature of formal-indicative discourse is that of letting the phenomena express themselves in and on their own terms. This means that we should refrain from and always guard against importing concepts that do not belong to the ‘thing itself’, which is the same as saying that formal indication helps make us aware of the prejudices implied by our conceptual tools. In agreement with our interpretation, Andersson writes that even though Heidegger does not always respect this methodological claim, and it is no longer clear today what the thing itself should be, his “[…] ambition is important insofar as he attempts to think the thing itself with concepts that have been earned by the very same being […]” (Andersson 2017: 63f.).
For further discussion of a so-called participatory reading of philosophical texts (mitphilosophierende Lektüre), see Cimino (2013: 47–62).
See, for example, Heidegger’s formal-indicative interpretation of religious life in PRL, where he develops a hermeneutics of the original lived experience (or situation) of the primal Christian communities in order to understand the authentic ontological structures of Dasein.
See also Lindberg (2004: 78f.) for an interpretation of transposing and accompanying.
Considering later works of Heidegger (Parmenides, Unterwegs zur Sprache), we can find a detailed criticism of the animal’s face (Antlitz) in the poetic discourse of Rilke and Trakl. For the poets, the animal looks, gazes upon the clearing of truth, and what the animal sees remains secret from the human. In these regards, see Lindberg (2004). In The Animal that therefore I am, Derrida sets out from a particular situation that involves the look of the animal: coming out of the shower, Derrida meets the eyes of his cat staring at him. For discussions on the theme of the animal’s face, see Derrida (2008), Bruns (2008), and in connection to Levinas, see Calarco (2010). Also, concerning the animal’s (impossible) death and our proximity or being-with the animal, see Sternad (2017: 108–116). On animal deceiving and on their capacity for keeping secrets, see Lohmar (2016), Derrida (2008). In addition, for an excellent review of some recent scientific advancements that can shed new light on the temporality, self, disclosing capabilities (in terms of the as-structure), and language in the case of animals, see Andersson (2017: 66–76).
“Die vernünftigen Lebewesen müssen erst zu Sterblichen werden”; see Derrida (2010: 124).
An extensive account of Heidegger’s readings of von Uexküll as well as of Max Scheler, with a focus on their methodological relevance for Heidegger’s undertaking in FCM, is to be found in Romano (2009).
FCM: 189, quoted in Andersson (2017: 59).
Work cited
FCM (GA 29/30) = Heidegger, M. (1995). The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: World, finitude, solitude (W. McNeill & N. Walker, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1983). Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit. In F.-W. von Herrmann (Ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
BPP (GA 24) = Heidegger, M. (1988). The basic problems of phenomenology (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1975). Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. In F.-W. von Herrmann (Ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
TDP (GA 56/57) = Heidegger, M. (2000). Towards the definition of philosophy (T. Sadler, Trans.). London: Athlone Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1999). Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. In B. Heimbüchel (Ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
BP (GA 58) = Heidegger, M. (2013). The basic problems of phenomenology (S. M. Campbell, Trans.). London: Bloomsbury Academic. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1993). Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/1920). In H.-H. Gander (Ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
PRL (GA 60) = Heidegger, M. (1995). The phenomenology of religious life (M. Fritsch & J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1995). Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens. In M. Jung, Th. Regehly, C. Strube (Eds.). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
PIA (GA 61) = Heidegger, M. (2001). Phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle: Initiation into phenomenological research (R. Rojcewicz, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1985). Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. In W. Bröcker & R. Bröcker-Oltmanns (Eds.). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Elizabeth A. Behnke, Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Cristian Ciocan, Remus Breazu, and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful and valuable comments on earlier drafts of my account. This paper was developed within the project Phenomenological Approaches to the Anthropological Difference, funded by the Executive Agency for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding (UEFISCDI) (Grant No. PN-II-RU-TE- 2014-4-0630).
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Bejinariu, A. Animal Experience: A Formal-Indicative Approach to Martin Heidegger’s Account of Animality. Hum Stud 41, 233–254 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-9468-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-9468-6