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DECLARATIVES ARE NOT ENOUGH

1. THE DECLARATIVE FALLACY

My thesis is simple: systematic theorists should not only stop neglecting interrogatives and imperatives, but should begin to give them equal weight with declaratives. A study of the grammar, semantics, and pragmatics of all three types of sentence is needed for every single serious program in philosophy that involves giving important attention to language.[1]

Part of the background of my thesis is that in our culture when a logician, or nearly any trained philosopher, says 'sentence,' what is meant is a declarative sentence,[2] a sentence capable of having, as they say, a truth-value, or maybe truth-conditions, a sentence that can be used to 'say' something, a sentence expressing a proposition, a sentence that can play a role in inference as either premiss or conclusion, a sentence that might occur in someone's (say Quine's) 'canonical language.' This is what is to be rejected. This is the Declarative Fallacy. Instead, one should recognize that from the beginning there are not only declarative sentences, but, at least, both interrogatives and imperatives. The grammarians are right and those teachers of elementary logic that seem to have miseducated most of us are wrong: give all sentences equal time, and do not take declaratives as a paradigm of what can happen between full stops.

I wish eagerly (but parenthetically) to grant that there are or may be other sorts of sentences besides the declaratives, interrogatives, and imperatives, say the optatives, or the performatives, and indeed further on I will ask you to think a moment about the precatives, but it is no part of my thesis that I've got the goods on what sorts of sentence *are* enough; so if you just promise to take my remarks as nonexclusive, we can make some honest headway and all will be well.

1.1. *Declaratives Are Not Enough*

Here is an example of the Declarative Fallacy. Frege says, rightly or wrongly, that only in the context of a sentence words have meaning — the famous context principle.[3] There is, I think, small doubt that Frege himself, and *no* doubt that the tradition that followed him, has in mind only declarative sentences,[4] leaving out the interrogatives and imperatives altogether, and if so, then the context principle is bad philosophy. For one thing, to the extent that it is true it is seriously misleading, for the role that words play in interrogatives and imperatives is at least as important as the role they play in declaratives. Thus, the word *six* can obviously be just as meaningful in an interrogative or in an imperative as it is in a declarative. And conversely, if you want a contextual explanation of the meaning of *six*, the declarative contexts are not enough: you had better know as well how it functions in interrogatives and imperatives. Declarative context has no pride of place.

You may respond that once you know all about *six* as it functions in declaratives, then what it comes to in the context of interrogatives and imperatives is determined and therefore secondary. The point is doubly wrong. In the first place, it is a cheap philosophical shot, for symmetrically, if I know all there is to know about *six* as it functions in imperatives, or in interrogatives, then it is to an equal extent determined what *six* comes to in declaratives. If for instance I know everything that anyone can *ask* using *six*, then I know everything that anyone can *say* using *six*. And in the second place, some words, and *six* is one of them, play distinctive roles in interrogatives, as in

> *Which six speech acts are most important?*

Here the *six* is arguably part of the interrogative form rather than part of a declarative matrix suggesting possible answers, as it might be in

> *Which speech acts require the presence of six persons?*

For a second thing, there are certain words or modes of combination whose significance is principally to be gathered from their roles in interrogatives, say the question words themselves. Take *what* as in

> *What is an illocutionary force?*

Frege's context principle suggests that *what* has no meaning except as it occurs in a sentence, but the primary sort of sentence in which *what* occurs is not a declarative at all. If you want to know what *what* means, look at it in the context of interrogatives — that is the best of advice. Another example is offered by the way or ways *or* functions in interrogatives; how *or* works in, for example,

> *Is it declaratives or interrogatives that have inverted word order?*

does not have much to do with truth tables or assent tables or anything like those devices for understanding declaratives, because it has to do with the interrogative form itself. I am supposing that it is obvious to you that we are not given a yes-no question involving the declarative,

> *Declaratives or interrogatives have inverted word order.*

Instead the *or* in the interrogative is working *interrogatively* to determine what is to count as a possible answer.

Let me summarize: *declaratives are not enough.* They are too insubstantial to count as a paradigm for interesting theses in the philosophy of language.

1.2. *Propositions Are Not Enough*

Here is an easy corollary of or addition to my thesis: assertions, that is, the speech acts so called, are not enough. And it needs bearing in mind that not only are they not enough, but they are not in any philosophical sense 'primary,' even though the canonical languages of the dominant, more formal logicians allow for nothing else. To suppose that assertion is the primary speech act is to commit at least a misdemeanor with respect to the Declarative Fallacy.

Well, you may say, avoidance of the Declarative Fallacy is tired advice that you have taken all your life, because you are a fan of speech acts, and all speech activists have always known that there are numerous kinds of speech acts, with non-assertions such as questions and commands being prominent among them. I, too, am awed by our magical powers to do things with words, but alas, many of the central

theorists in this tradition are just as guilty of the Declarative Fallacy as
those philosophers, say, who exclude interrogatives and imperatives
from their invented 'canonical languages.'

For example, permit me to quote from page 1 of a recent book.[5]

> The minimal units of human communication are speech acts of a type called *illocu-*
> *tionary acts.* Some examples of these are statements, questions, commands, promises,
> and apologies. Whenever a speaker utters a sentence in an appropriate context with
> certain intentions, he performs one or more illocutionary acts. In general an illocu-
> tionary act consists of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content P.

On the surface this looks to be a paradigm *rejection* of the Declarative
Fallacy, but it is not. The fallacy is, at the very beginning of the theory,
to endow every kind of speech act with the same kind of content, here
called 'propositional content.' Let us say that each assertion, or what we
might call 'declarative act' (this would not be Searle-Vanderveken
terminology, but it is just as good) consists of an illocutionary force F
and a propositional content P. Then you are guilty of the Declarative
Fallacy if you suppose that interrogative acts, or imperative acts (as we
might call them), can have the same propositional content, P, as a
declarative act. Of course the whole driving idea of speech activists is
that a single content can be clothed in a variety of different forces, and
it is *not* this crucial idea about which I am now complaining. I am
objecting only to the Declarative Fallacy, which here emerges as the
special case of supposing that interrogative acts and imperative acts
have the same content as declarative acts. I understand that there are
many speech acts that share a propositional content but differ in
illocutionary force; good. And there are many other speech acts that
share an interrogative content but differ in illocutionary force, and
others that share an imperative content but differ in illocutionary force.
So the program is a healthy one; the only — but serious — mistake is to
suppose that you can identify the content of all speech acts with
propositional content, that is, with the content of declarative speech
acts or assertions.

One way to avoid this mistake is to take the content of a speech act
to consist not of a proposition all by itself, but instead to consist of a
proposition *together with* a marker of mood or perhaps force — to
count the force, so to speak, as part of the content.[6] But after all this
strategy re-commits the Declarative Fallacy, for even with its mood

marker, at bottom each speech act is construed as based on a proposition, situated, so to speak, at the core of its core. Strict avoidance of the Declarative Fallacy, however, requires the recognition that interrogatives and imperatives are not just marked differently from declaratives, but possess fundamentally different underlying content structures.

In a word, propositions are not enough.

I have to make good on an implied promise to distinguish the content of interrogative acts and imperative acts from that of declarative acts, but not now.[7]

Again, summarizing so far: *declaratives, assertions, and propositions are not enough.* They do not provide enough variety of content to support the content/force distinction of speech act theory.

1.3. *Truth Conditions Are Not Enough*

There are yet more who thrive by committing the Declarative Fallacy. There is an enormous school with an even more enormous group of hangers-on that says that what we ought to pay attention to are truth conditions, and that to have a theory of truth conditions is to have it all — well, most of them say, grudgingly, that perhaps we also need a small auxiliary theory of reference, just in case the language is non-canonical enough to contain a few singular terms. The reason this school is so large is not entirely a matter of charisma; in fact there is tremendous enlightenment to be had by thinking of various pieces of language as resulting by grammatical combination, and seeing how the meaning of the grammatical wholes arise out of the meanings of their parts. Tarski was a genius. Nevertheless, the slogan that meaning is truth conditions is flawed in more than one way, not least because it seems to force us to take the concept of truth much more seriously than we should, nor least because it appears to suggest that our understanding of language results from internalizing the recipes that Tarski invented for the first-order functional calculus.

But I am putting these flaws aside in order to call to your attention that the only items that can possibly have truth conditions are declarative sentences, or at least items with a propositional content. Davidson's famous and deceptively short transition from meaning to truth[8] is remotely plausible *only* for the meaning of declaratives or their ilk. If,

however, we want to understand the meaning of *interrogatives* as arising
by composition from the meanings of their grammatical constituents, as
we should, then *truth conditions are not enough.* What we want when
we want to become clear on an interrogative is what question it asks,
and what counts as a possible answer to it; and in the framework that
approaches this problem in the spirit of Tarski, we want an account that
sees this dimension of meaning as arising by grammatical combination.
Furthermore, and with equal importance, just as with Tarski we inves-
tigate the ways that declarative sentences are grammatical *parts* as well
as wholes, so that they contribute their meaning to larger contexts, just
so we should expect the same of interrogatives; we should expect them,
in an adequate language, to contribute their meaning to other interroga-
tives, or to declaratives, or to imperatives, or whatever. We should ask
for a Tarski account of the declarative,

> *How important truth conditional semantics is said to be
> depends on whom you ask*

that makes it clear that in that *declarative* there are embedded two
ingredient *interrogative* sentences, each of which should contribute its
distinctive meaning. Let me emphasize the point: interrogatives occur as
compositional elements in declaratives just as truly as declaratives
occur as compositional elements in interrogatives. Therefore, whether
you believe that understanding climbs the grammatical tree composi-
tionally, or descends the grammatical tree contextually, you should
agree that interrogatives and declaratives cannot have independent
theories.

There is of course more to interrogatives, indeed a great deal more.
Here is a tiny sample that arose in the work that some of us, including
Bennett[9] and Thomason, did together a number of years ago: in
thinking about

> *Michael wondered where each adequate theory of impera-
> tives is published,*

we should see the embedded and therefore contributory interrogative,

> *where each adequate theory of imperatives is published,*

as itself arising by a universal

each adequate theory of imperatives

quantification into the open interrogative,

where x *is published.*

That is, we have here a quantifier expression transforming not a declarative into a declarative, but an interrogative into an interrogative. For understanding these transformations, truth conditions are not apt.

It is also obvious that the nature of the complaints I am making counts against the sufficiency of 'verification conditions,' such as those urged by Dummett,[10] just as much as they do against the sufficiency of truth conditions. It is the very *type* of the conditions that is wrong.

The same holds for imperatives, though to a lesser extent, for the content of an imperative act is certainly more closely allied to a proposition than is the content of an interrogative, and thereby more easily fits the truth-conditional or verification-conditional mold. Also much less is known about the compositional semantics of imperatives. In the first place, not much is known of how the meaning of an imperative arises out of the meaning of its constituents, although various essays in action theory can perhaps be taken to be contributions to this theory. In the second place, philosophers have almost universally ignored the obvious fact that imperatives embed in larger contexts as readily as do declaratives, so that no one at all has studied how the meaning of an imperative contributes to those larger combinations. What is it exactly that you have to know about an imperative such as

John, give us a lecture on truth conditions

in order to say something interesting about its contribution when embedded, as in the following:

Mary, request John to give us a lecture on truth conditions?

A signal weakness of the speech act program — not in its essence but in its present state — is its failure, in spite of its attention to imperatives and interrogatives, to focus on the problems of compositionality.

Summary so far of *what is not enough: declaratives; assertions; propositions; truth conditions; verification conditions.* None of them are enough for a compositional theory of meaning. In part the thesis is that understanding how such a theory works — or doesn't work — for

declaratives is *not* sufficient for understanding the deepest features of compositionality. It is past time for the dialectic about compositional theories to move to a new and more philosophically adequate plane.

1.4. *Inference Is Not Enough*

And there are the inferentialists. Instead of attempting analytically to see meaning as arising by composition, an inferentialist gives an explanation of the meaning of a declarative form in terms of its role in a larger context. Nor for the inferentialist will satisfaction be found by confining attention to just the context of a single illocutionary act, defined by Searle and Vanderveken, as you recall, as a '*minimal* unit of human communication' (emphasis supplied). Instead the appeal is to the larger context of inference, where the declarative can figure either as conclusion or as premiss. Instead of seeing a declarative as inheriting its meaning analytically from its parts, one sees a declarative as deriving its meaning contextually by the role it plays in inference. I have to tell you that this now-popular approach, to the extent that it claims to tell us philosophically that we know our way around language, is also miserably guilty of the Declarative Fallacy, for, to a first approximation, it is *only* declaratives that can figure in inference, and we are thereby given no purchase on interrogatives or imperatives.

My case is strongest for premisses: for decades logicians led astray by the Declarative Fallacy have tried out little, tiny examples of inferences involving interrogatives, such as

> *Who has a good theory of interrogatives and who wants one?, therefore, Who has a good theory of interrogatives?*

But never, ever has anyone even suggested a long or interesting inferential chain of interrogatives, either in an idealized language or in plain English. Nor has anyone ever suggested that we could learn something about the meaning of an interrogative by its use in such a (I shudder with quotes) 'inference.' Nor is it surprising; since the meaning of an interrogative is not essentially propositional or truth-conditional, it is hardly likely to be inferential.

Analogously, using imperatives as premisses can hardly be con-

sidered idiomatic. Maybe we sometimes say with the deontic logicians from A. Ross[11] to B. Chellas,[12]

> *Mail the manuscript; so mail it or burn it.*

But I hope not very often. Certainly not often enough to enable us to work out what an imperative means by examining its role as a premiss, or, for those of us who think that Gentzen was on to something, to find a cut-elimination theorem for imperatives.

As a possible objection, according to a long-standing tradition in the theory of action, agents plan what they do by resorting to practical syllogisms or enthymemes like

> *I shall burn the manuscript; therefore, I shall set it on fire.*

While much of the talk about practical reasoning tends to confuse me, this episode of practical reasoning surely involves stand-alone declarative expressions of intentions rather than stand-alone first-person imperatives, which is not to say that declaratives that carry expressions of intentions do not contain embedded imperatives.

With respect to conclusions, the situation is not obviously symmetric between interrogatives and imperatives. On the one hand, it is perfectly straightforward to place an imperative as the conclusion of an inference, say in giving advice. The consecution

> *Truth conditions cause cancer; therefore, avoid them*

is just fine. Interrogatives, on the other hand, when they appear as conclusions, seem never to contribute only their content but also in addition their stand-alone force.

Consider the perfectly idiomatic

> *Quine does not avoid the declarative fallacy; therefore, who does?*

and contrast it with the preceding example, in which the premiss gives a reason for the *content* of the conclusion, a reason *to avoid truth conditions*. But the premiss in the quine example does not give a reason for the content of the conclusion, *who avoids the declarative fallacy*, but only a reason for *asking* that question.[13] To see this point more clearly,

notice that the ostensible interrogative conclusion can be paraphrased by the following imperative:

> *Quine does not avoid the declarative fallacy, so tell me who does.*

Furthermore, even though imperatives can occur as conclusions in inferential trains of justification, it is not a good strategy to pin all their meaning to such a role. The reason for this derives from a crucial observation of Hamblin:[14] *some* among all imperative acts are acts of advice or warning, say the advice or warning not to ignore interrogatives carried by

> *Don't ignore interrogatives.*

Such imperatives call for justification. But *other* imperative acts are what Hamblin calls 'willful,' being either for example the issuing of a rule against ignoring interrogatives, or perhaps a plea or a request not to ignore them, also issued with exactly the same imperative sentence, *Don't ignore interrogatives.* Here, though there may be a call for reasons for the *act* of issuing the imperative, there is no call for reasons for the *content* of the imperative itself. And yet the content of the different imperative acts of advising or warning or pleading or requesting is quite the same, whether willful or not, a sameness that our theory of imperatives should recognize by *not* looking to inference to confer all their meaning. It is easy to become confused about this if we are too swift to label imperatives 'exit moves' in the language game; my advice is: don't become confused in this way.

Summary of *what is not enough: declaratives, assertions, propositions, truth or verification conditions,* and *inference.* No philosopher should be deluded into thinking that he or she knows the way around the declaratives of our language without understanding their dependence on interrogatives and imperatives. And no philosopher should delude others into supposing that a method such as that of compositional semantics, or that of conceptual or interpersonal contextual role-descriptions, can arguably be defended as philosophically adequate — or attacked as inadequate — even as a program, unless it is shown how it works — or doesn't work — for interrogatives and imperatives.

So, you might ask, what *is* enough? In my opening remarks I asked

you not to ask me that. Instead, permit me to use this list of what is not enough as an indication of what more is needed. Needed for what? Needed to make us see that nowhere in that part of philosophy that relies on theories about language can what we know so far about declaratives reasonably be taken as a comforting paradigm giving us to believe that 'the rest is something like that'; so that if only we understand declaratives, we can be sure we know our way around our mode of being as it is exhibited in language. Interrogatives and imperatives are not 'something like declaratives.' What they share with declaratives is this: that unless we bring them to the light, or the light to them, there is much else of philosophical importance that will also remain in the dark.

My plan for the following sections is to say a few things about grammar, semantics and pragmatics of interrogatives and imperatives, hoping by their inadequacy to push you to include these neglected forms in all your orisons, and never again carelessly to say 'sentence' when more narrowly you mean 'declarative,' or 'proposition' when more widely you mean 'content of a speech act.' And so to move down closer to the tacks that are brass.

2. INTERROGATIVES MAY NOT BE ENOUGH, BUT THEY HELP

I have had my say about interrogatives in various places, and here wish only to fill out the current perspective with some brief remarks.[15]

2.1. Grammar for Interrogatives

Independently of whatever kind of grammar we endorse for declaratives, we should articulate different *grammatical* structures for interrogatives. A few logicians in the last thirty years or so have worked a little at laying out *normatively* what a *good* grammar of interrogatives should be, and a few good linguists have worked at the *descriptive* grammatical theory of interrogatives, whereby it is crucial that by 'interrogatives' I signify not only stand-alone interrogatives capable of carrying speech acts, but also constituent interrogatives,[16] sometimes called 'indirect questions,' capable of being embedded in larger contexts. The chief point to stress is that the grammar of interrogatives

ought to resist oversimplification by tired philosophers out to make a quick reduction, or a career. Let a single brief example suffice:

> *Who was the author of* How to do things with words *?*

is, for all its apparent simplicity, *grammatically* ambiguous, and that in at least two ways. In the first place, the scope of the definite description operator, *the*, could be either wide or narrow, just as Russell would have said; but this sort of thing is familiar and I wish to leave it. The other grammatical ambiguity is this: *Who was the author of* How to do things with words *?* can derive by the introduction of the question word *who* into either of two quite different declarative matrices. Consider the following,

> x *was the author of* How to do things with words,

and

> *the author of* How to do things with words *was F,*

in which I intend that *x* occupy the place of a nominal singular term, and that *F* occupy the place of a predicate adjective or a predicate nominal. That is, *who* may be thought to be proper-name-like, or term-like, or adjective-like, since all of these may be sensibly combined with *is*. We should not assume that these different derivations give rise to exactly the same question. On the first grammatical derivation, the interrogative invites as an answer,

> *Russell was the author of* How to do things with words,

while on the second grammatical derivation, what is invited is some-thing like

> *The author of* How to do things with words *was a fat, early fourteenth century French author from Provence.*

On the first derivation the question asked amounts (for a logician) to something like

> *Which person — and please confine yourself to canonical and very rigid designators — is identical to the author of* How to do things with words *?*

On the second derivation, the question comes to

> *What are a few interesting properties of the author of* How to
> do things with words *?*

It is the fact that interrogatives invert word-order that causes this
particular grammatical — I stress that it is a matter of grammar —
ambiguity. Whether or not you agree that I have correctly represented
the difference between the two interrogatives, you will certainly agree
that what I say is based on grammar.

   This point is both contentious and tiny, and it was meant to be both,
so that it could become more palpable without the need of a substantial
apparatus with which firmly to grasp it; but I hope the point is at least
large and bright enough to suggest the error of thinking that we clearly
understand what is meant by an arbitrary who-question (much less a
what-question or a why-question), and the error of supposing that we
have no need for a grammatical theory of a philosophically suggestive
declarative that contains an embedded interrogative such as

> *George IV did not know who the author of* How to do
> things with words *was.*

We should all be saddened, incidentally, by how many of us have been
trained to think about the meaning of that declarative or one of its
cousins without being brought to notice that it contains a constituent
interrogative.

   So much for the claim that philosophy needs a grammar of inter-
rogatives as much as it needs its endlessly elaborated grammar of
declaratives.[17]

2.2. *Semantics for Interrogatives*

Interrogatives deserve a compositional semantics that is not piggy-
backed on the semantical correlates of declaratives. But if truth condi-
tions won't do, what else should a semantic theory for interrogatives
draw on? The answer goes back at least to Hamblin,[18] and more than
once I myself have helped to spread his word: instead of truth condi-
tions, interrogatives need *answerhood conditions*. If you are persuaded
that there is enlightenment to be had about a declarative by learning

how its truth conditions arise out of the meanings of its constituents and its structure, and if you are persuaded that it is the truth conditions of declaratives that are needed when it comes to embedding them in yet larger structures, then with perfect analogy, you should expect to find corresponding enlightenment in seeing how *what counts as an answer* to an interrogative arises out of the meanings of its constituents and its structure, and you should correspondingly expect that it is the *answerhood conditions* of an interrogative that are needed when it comes to embedding them in yet larger structures.

Let me illustrate with a small problematic. What if anything is the difference between the meaning of the following two interrogatives, whether stand-alone or embedded?

> *Which logician uses declaratives for training her dog?*
> *Which person who uses declaratives for training her dog is a logician?*

I tell you by the method of authority that people disagree as to whether or not these two interrogatives differ in meaning, and I am not going to try to convince you one way or another. Rather, I simply submit that if we are to find a difference in meaning between these two, we should forget about truth conditions or verification conditions. The best strategy is to look to see if they have different answerhood conditions; that is all I wish to urge.

If we like to reify the results of semantic inquiry, as indeed I think is always helpful in keeping us clear and even honest, then we need a content for interrogatives, a content that is distinct from their force. As a word I like 'question' for the content of an interrogative, but for those disinclined towards any new words, I am happy for now with just 'interrogative content' for the content of an interrogative. I see it possible to have as many theories about interrogative content as there are theories about content of answers, including just as many nominalistic theories or non-theories. Certainly many and many, including many false or unhelpful ones, have been tried out over the decades; but, and this is the reason for the being of my present remarks, the vast philosophic majority just ignores the matter altogether, and that is what is *really* bad philosophy. My own view is that we should take the content of an interrogative to be — put circularly — the property of

being an answer to the interrogative. What will count as an answer varies from context to context, so that, for instance, what counts as an answer to the question of which logician uses imperatives for training her dog depends on who, in a given context, qualifies as a logician, but does not depend on who in that context uses declaratives for training her dog. Only the *true* answer depends on *that*.

2.3. *Pragmatics of Interrogatives*

Inference, as I pointed out above, does not suffice to characterize the meaning of interrogatives. But what can possibly *be* enough for interrogatives if inference is not? We have to stop to introduce at this point a subtlety depending on force versus content, a subtlety that already arises for declaratives. We know through trial by Gentzen that if all that we are interested in is *content* as it is passed through embedding, then a rather abstract notion of inference will do; we need little more than the division into premisses and conclusion, and that it is meaningful to separate good inferences from bad. But if we want enlightenment about force, say assertive force, and especially if our philosophical inclination is pragmatically to derive content from force, then we shall need to follow Brandom's Sellars-inspired lead in seeing inference as more than a mere abstract semantic relation, and as rather a part of a *normative* structure involving at least the undertaking and attribution of commitments.[19] The analogy is that for a purely semantic theory of interrogatives, hardly more is needed than the abstract concept of the answerhood relation in place of the inference relation; but that for a decent understanding of the force of interrogatives, whether or not we can thereby derive an account of their content, we shall need an appropriate normative structure.

I am describing seldom trod territory, and certainly territory in which I am myself not at home, but territory worth exploring. Of course, when we put a question with an interrogative we commit ourselves to its presupposition, if any; that's easy. And surely we put on the conversational table, whatever that means, the possible answers to the question we ask. What else we do seems to be various in the extreme; let me observe just for example that an interrogative act can be either an injunction — occasionally even a 'command' if you like, as when the

District Attorney quizzes a sworn witness — or a request, as when you ask the time of a passer-by; and in fact it may be that the varieties of interrogative act are not fewer than the varieties of imperative, which are legion. Nevertheless, I cannot leave this topic without one last piece of the manifesto: it seems to me extremely unlikely that one can develop a philosophically adequate interpersonal normative structure for assertions without simultaneously treating of questions in the sense of interrogative acts.

The inferentialist, and Hamblin explicitly in his theory of dialogs,[20] pictures each person as carrying a slate on which is inscribed a list of declaratives representing those propositions to which the person is committed. But propositional commitment, either undertaken or attributed, is not enough exhaustively to characterize the content of the slate. For one thing, there is just too much non-trivial truth in R. G. Collingwood's slogan that every proposition is an answer to a question.[21] At some point in describing the game of conceptual thought you are going to have to make room on the slate for a different kind of statement representing a different kind of content, not declaratives representing propositions at all, but *interrogatives* representing the questions in which that person is privately interested, or the questions that person is asking, or has been asked. There seems no conceivable possibility of a conversation or even a private train of thought unless there is an expression of the limits of what can be said next, not inferentially but with regard to the category of importance. What is Annie interested in? Well, in who will lecture on truth conditions. That question is what she cares about, the answers to that question is what she wishes to gather evidence about, and that question is indeed what she is thinking about. She will not assert anything ever, nor profit from the assertions of others, without at least the traces of such interests as can be expressed by interrogatives (the point is due to Harrah).[22] Interest in questions, like commitment to propositions, will need to be declared for oneself and attributed to others and investigated interpersonally. One cannot make sense of a paradigm of canonical linguistic transaction without, I am saying, keeping track of which questions are at issue for whom. It may even be true that what counts as evidence for an assertion, or what counts as a 'rigid designator,' or whether a term is being used attributively or referentially (as they say) should canonically depend on what

questions are there to be addressed. If so, then *inference is not enough* even for assertions! I hope it is but a harmless exaggeration to assert that there can be no mental motion, not even inference, without the existence of some question — not a proposition but a question — as its final cause.

3. IMPERATIVES MAY NOT BE ENOUGH, BUT THEY HELP

There is so incredibly much to say about imperatives, and I have learned what little I know so recently, that it is hard to know where to make a beginning.[23] It is certainly my view that our philosophical community is scandalously naive about imperatives, that our community wallows in *non*-Socratic ignorance of imperatives, thinking that it knows when it does not know, and that it *matters* for its own best purposes whether it knows or not. It is, that is, all unknowingly enmeshed in the Declarative Fallacy.

What I have to say about imperatives comes again under the familiar heads, grammar, semantics, and pragmatics; with regard to the latter I will keep in mind both the speech activists and the linguistic gamesmen, those that before I called 'inferentialists' because, indulging in the Declarative Fallacy, they proceeded as if inference were the only game in town that is presupposed by every game.

3.1. *Grammar of Imperatives*

The grammar of imperatives, especially the logical grammar of imperatives, is in its infancy, and whatever I say today will be gone tomorrow; but of course that is not going to stop me for a moment. Let me proceed by enumerating.

1.   Imperatives can be either stand-alone or embedded. In English, just as for declaratives or interrogatives, this is a complicated grammatical matter. The deepest comment is this: embedded imperatives *are* in truth embedded imperatives, that is, constituent or embeddable forms of the very same imperative sentences. In a logically perspicuous language, they would *be* the very same sign designs. Consider the following examples of the

stand-alone imperatives 'Jack, explain sincerity conditions to Alfred':

> *Mary, ask Jack to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred.*
> *Mary ordered Jack to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred.*
> *Jack carried out Mary's order to explain sincerity conditions; or at least Jack explained sincerity conditions to Alfred.*
> *Did Mary advise Jack to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred?*
> *Mary demanded that Jack explain sincerity conditions to Alfred.*
> *Mary demanded that sincerity conditions be explained by Jack to Alfred.*
> *Jack refused to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred.*
> *Jack refused Mary's request (order, advice) to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred.*
> *Jack is obligated (permitted, forbidden) to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred.*

2. The grammatically crucial thing about imperatives, aside from their embeddability, is that they display an agent. As Castañeda[24] and others have urged, they have the deep grammatical form,

    > α *to verb.*

    In this respect an imperative is unlike a declarative in general, which may or may not express an agentive proposition, and even when it does, may not wear its agent on its surface, as the linguists say. But imperatives must show forth an agent, at least in the sense that to be understood, and (the point is crucial) to be used in larger contexts, the agent must be uniquely recoverable from the surface (for example, as the addressee of a stand-alone imperative).[25]

3. There are various grammatical tests for agentive *declarative* sentences, but none that I know distinguish between

    > *The fire destroyed the manuscript*

    and

    > *Jack destroyed the manuscript.*

I propose the following, which although it is 'my' proposal, derives directly from Perloff, and of course depends on the work of others, not least on that of Anderson.[26]

Thesis 1. No matter the declarative Q,[27] the sentence

   α *sees to it that* Q

is 'agentive in α.' It may be false, true, or nonsense, but it is always agentive in α.

Thesis 2. A declarative sentence, Q, expresses a proposition 'agentive in α' iff Q is accurately paraphrasable as: α sees to it that Q.[28] That is, Q is agentive in α if

   Q ↔ [α *sees to it that* Q].

Therefore, for the purposes of 'logical grammar,' it suffices to picture all agentive declaratives, and also all imperatives, as carried by some such notation as

   [α stit: Q],

4. where we read this piece of notation — '*stit-sentence*,' as I shall say — differently in English depending on how it is used.[29] Here are some examples.

Readings into English of [α stit: Q].
   As a stand-alone imperative:

   α, *see to it that* Q!

   As a stand-alone declarative:

   α *sees to it that* Q
   α *is seeing to it that* Q
   α *saw to it that* Q.

   As an embedded imperative:

   α *to see to it that* Q
   for α *to see to it that* Q
   that α *see to it that* Q[30]
   α *'s seeing to it that* Q.

   As an embedded declarative:

> α *sees to it that* Q
>
> *that* α *sees to it that* Q.

Thus the outstandingly important grammatical stit-facts are these, where $[\alpha \text{ stit: } Q]$ is any stit-sentence.

1. The first blank in a stit-sentence must receive a term for an agent.
2. The second blank in a stit-sentence can receive an arbitrary declarative.
3. A stit-sentence itself is both a declarative and an imperative:[31] it can be embedded wherever a declarative or an imperative can be embedded. For example, with regard to the former, a stit-sentence can be embedded under a negation.

    a. The result of such an embedding is on the face of it not itself a stit-sentence; for the special (and, to a logician, prominent) case of negation the result of embedding looks at least on the surface like

        $\sim [\alpha \text{ stit: } Q]$,

        not like

        $[\alpha \text{ stit: } Q]$.

    b. But more deeply, for the special case of negation, the result of embedding is not even any kind of agentive; that is, by our test, to which I hope you have agreed, the declarative

        it is false that α *sees to it that* Q

        is not invariably paraphrasable (or indeed equivalent in truth value with)

        α *sees to it that it is false that* α *sees to it that* Q.

    c. Negation was just an example; there is no implied warrant to generalize to other embedding contexts.
4. Because stit-sentences are imperatives as well as declaratives, they can be embedded in those special contexts fit to receive *only* imperatives.

5. Many contexts of serious interest to philosophers can take only imperatives. By our test it follows that in logical grammar we can without loss require that these contexts be filled only by stit-sentences. Among such contexts, the stand-alone imperative form itself is perhaps primary. I am claiming, therefore, that if you understand

> *Be at the lecture on truth conditions at nine*

as uttered with the force of, say, advice — with, that is, one of those forces we might want to call 'imperative' — then you are understanding *Be at the lecture on truth conditions at nine* as an agentive, and hence as paraphrasable as

> *See to it that you are at the lecture on truth conditions at nine.*

6. Furthermore, if you understand either

> *Don't explain sincerity conditions to Alfred,*

or

> *Refrain from explaining sincerity conditions to Alfred*

as an imperative (as of course it is ordinarily and even para-digmatically so taken), then you must understand it as equivalent to

> *See to it that you do not explain sincerity conditions to Alfred;*

or even better, since

> *you explain sincerity conditions to Alfred*

is doubtless an agentive and hence paraphrasable as a stit-sentence, you must understand *Refrain from explaining sincerity conditions to Alfred* as

> *See to it that it is false that you see to it that you explain sincerity conditions to Alfred.*

7. Thus, by being careful to avoid the Declarative Fallacy, we

become convinced of the accuracy of the paraphrase of refraining from acting in terms of a negated stit-sentence embedded within a stit-sentence:

Refrain$[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$ ↔ $[\alpha$ stit: ~ $[\alpha$ stit: Q$]]$

8. The grammatical fact, and one that should guide us philosophically, is that obligation and permission and prohibition always take imperatives. An immediate consequence of this train of grammatical thought is some modest light on deontic logic. Hence, in logical grammar we should never write

Obligated Q

for arbitrary Q, but only

Obligated$[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$,
Permitted$[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$,
Forbidden$[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$,

etc. It makes all the difference, and leads us to numerous small insights driven by our desire to avoid the Declarative Fallacy. Standard deontic equivalences, for example, which wholly depend on the declarative fallacy, must be refined. Take

Forbidden$[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$ ↔ *Obligated* ~ $[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$.

This is surely Bad Grammar since it embeds an arbitrary and probably non-agentive declarative into the obligation context, where it *cannot* go. And a possible alternative,

Forbidden$[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$ ↔ *Obligated*$[\alpha$ stit: ~ Q$]$,

is just false when Q is not an agentive.[32] What is wanted is precisely (if you think about it in your new-found commitment to avoid the Declarative Fallacy)

Forbidden$[\alpha$ stit: Q$]$ ↔ *Obligated*$[\alpha$ stit: ~ $[\alpha$ stit: Q$]]$.

For example, the following are precisely equivalent:

You are forbidden to see to it that our room is filled with smoke;
You are obligated to see to it that you do not see to it that our room is filled with smoke.

9. I want you to see that the guideline for deontic logic that I am proposing is a powerful alternative to two different programs. The first and dominant program just wallows in the Declarative Fallacy and logicizes about

> *it is obligatory that* Q

for arbitrary declarative Q. The second, for example in Castañeda's[33] and some of von Wright's work,[34] sees that what has to come after obligation is a verb,

> *Obligated to verb.*

This second program does not commit the Declarative Fallacy, but it also does not offer us a logical point of view from which it is easy and natural to see that obligation, etc., can in fact make at least *subordinate* reference to declaratives. The beauty of relying on the schema

> *Obligated*[α stit: Q]

is that we simultaneously make it easy to see that obligation must take an imperative, and also easy to see the important truth that any declarative whatsoever can give rise to an imperative, and thus indirectly give rise to the content of an obligation, by means of the concept of *stit*.

10. There are at least dozens of other ways to embed imperatives, including dozens of different forces with which to utter a stand-alone imperative in a standard way. There is no such thing as 'the imperative force.' Chapter I of Hamblin's rich book,[35] which is a marvelous antidote to the Declaratives-are-enough Disease, gives a wonderfully helpful discussion and table. For brief remark below I mention only the following:

> *Order*[α stit: Q]
> *Advise*[α stit: Q]
> *Invite*[α stit: Q]
> *Request*[α stit: Q].

An important thing to observe is that these are themselves, when spelled out, agentives, and hence each can be paraphrased as stit-sentences. But we stop here because although certainly

declaratives are not enough, on the other hand, enough grammar is, for now, enough.

3.2. *Semantics of Imperatives*

Imperatives deserve a rich compositional semantics. Such a semantics undoubtedly will need to go beyond what is provided by anyone for declaratives. When working on the semantics of imperatives, the following questions are to be kept on your list:

1. How does such meaning as they have depend on the meaning of their grammatical parts? For stit-sentences, this is a rather definite question, and a good strategy will be to try to answer this question first; but one cannot in advance be sure that the stit-sentence paraphrase is sufficient to reveal all of the complexities of imperatives with which semantics will need to deal. For example, what about all of the data and some of the theories about *by*, or about *the time of a killing*, or about the Davidsonian strategy of emphasizing our ontology of events and actions?

2. Here is as important a question as any that semantic theorists should keep before their group mind: what sort of meaning must we attribute to imperatives in order to make sense out of the compositional role they play in philosophically important contexts? Among such contexts, especially salient are the forces that pertain to stand-alone imperatives, such as advice, order, invitation, and request, but there are other embedding contexts of importance such as obedience and refusal. Again I recommend the strategy of dealing first with stit-sentences, in slim hopes that that will be enough.

    One thing I am sure of: the semantic representation of an imperative must keep the agent as a separate part of its structure, not to be lost, for example, amid some collection of possible worlds or truth conditions or conditions of correctness. The reason is based on reflecting what meaning an imperative must feed to the contexts into which it is embedded. For example, an obligation that Jack explain sincerity conditions is

not a simple valuing of the proposition that sincerity conditions be explained by Jack; it is an obligation on *him*. In this sense, even if we give them truth conditions, imperatives do not have the same kind of meaning as declaratives.

3. Lastly, what is the grammar and the meaning (or philosophically interesting range of grammars and meanings) of the various locutions that embed imperatives, such as advice, order, invitation, request, obedience, and refusal?

There is a fantastic amount of data about these matters, but beyond just data, some helpful *theories* about some of these matters are possible; and we can all agree that numerous people have made contributions to the enterprise, for example the speech activists, the deontic logicians, and Hamblin in his book on imperatives. To begin with, one may hope for a theory of the *truth conditions* of stit-sentences, since after all they are advertised as able to play a declarative role. One may entertain such a hope while being appalled by the view that truth conditions of stit-sentences constitute *enough* semantic information about them in order to explain how they embed. I would be disingenuous if I did not note that I have some ideas on how at least one theory of their truth conditions should go, ideas that take seriously the *agency* of the agent. These ideas are not all that rich, but they at least suffice to suggest a possible explanation as to why there are just four modes of action (and of course four correlative modes of inaction, by negation).

> *seeing to it that* Q: $[\alpha \text{ stit: } Q]$
> *seeing to it that* $\sim$ Q: $[\alpha \text{ stit: } \sim Q]$
> *refraining from seeing to it that* Q: $[\alpha \text{ stit: } \sim [\alpha \text{ stit: } Q]]$, and
> *refraining from seeing to it that* $\sim$ Q: $[\alpha \text{ stit: } \sim [\alpha \text{ stit: } \sim Q]]$.

For example, the suggested truth-conditional semantics explain why, at least in the context of certain restrictions,

> *refraining from refraining from seeing to it that* Q, that is,
> $[\alpha \text{ stit: } \sim [\alpha \text{ stit: } \sim [\alpha \text{ stit: } Q]]]$

is not a new mode of action. And here is a further exercise: take the standard reading of the action of giving an order as seeing to it that

there is an obligation laid on the addressed agent. Then the giving of an order has the following content, expressed somewhat redundantly[36] so as to be able to call attention to some possible blanks:

$$[\underline{\quad}_1[\alpha \text{ stit:} \underline{\quad}_2[\alpha \text{ stit:} \underline{\quad}_3 Obligated[\beta \text{ stit:} \underline{\quad}_4[\beta \text{ stit:} \underline{\quad}_5 Q]]]]].$$

In each of the numbered blanks there is room for a negation. The exercise is to see how instructive it is to fill these blanks in various ways, thus pulling together into a single schema some otherwise confusing observations. For example, filling 3 and 5 is the positive granting of permission or authorization, while filling 2 and 5 is the positive act of refraining from laying on an obligation, which is sometimes thought of as a kind of permission, while filling 1 and 5 describes the non-act of not laying on an obligation, which some also think of as falling within the precincts of permission. Sans scribed stit-sentences, thyself the troubled tempted thinker temerously tumbles to thrasonical tergiversant turpitude, treacherously throppling the true track thirling through these turbid teeming twizzles; the tongue twists too trickily trippingly to termine these thorny termless twirlers tristily. So scrupulously scribe stits.

Stit-sentences aside, hoever, here is a deceptively simple-sounding question to which I, at least, have not heard a careful and helpful answer: what is the meaning of a precative, that is, of a request? If you prefer to answer in terms of performatives or in terms of illocutionary force, fine: how is the world different after you have requested your boss to give you a raise, or Jack to explain sincerity conditions? Even though I do not have a theory about the matter, I will tell you something I think might be true: requests are *de re* ties that bind us person to person in the mode of caring, and are perhaps more necessary to undergird morality and our life together than even those illocutionary acts that create commitments or obligations or rights.

3.3. *Pragmatics of Imperatives*

Allow me to convey just one unifying idea concerning the pragmatics of sentences, whether they be imperatives, interrogatives, or even declaratives. Addressing the pragmatics of interrogatives, I adumbrated the idea of picturing speakers as carrying a slate listing their commitments

(as members of a linguistic community, relative to a specific situation), and I pointed out that the slate must not be restricted to lists whose content is declarative. Now I want to stress that the slate's content must not even be restricted to declaratives or interrogatives. For example, having mentioned commitments, we need to insist that there ought to be on that slate at least a list of commitments of a wholly different kind from propositional commitments, namely, commitments to action, which we can happily represent with stit-sentences [I stit: Q]. But what we cannot do is represent these commitments to action by any conceivable propositional commitment; to suppose that we can is the last dying gasp of the Declarative Fallacy. For example,

> *Jack's commitment to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred*

is to be represented on the action-commitment portion of his slate by the stit-sentence

> [I stit: I explain sincerity conditions to Alfred].

What I am saying is that there is no proposition that you can put on the list of propositions to which he is committed that will do the representational work required. Furthermore, since every normative and interpersonal structure involves the creation of commitments to action, no contextual account of anything human is possible that does not at least secretly rely on stit-sentences. Let us together assume the philosophic task of making the secret public.

I hope to have convinced you that these three lists differ not just in what they represent as lists, but more profoundly, that they differ in the form of their content, and that they are interdependent. Along the way I hope to have emphasized that in developing our philosophical understanding of topics touching on these contents we should include theories of grammar, of compositional semantics, of speech acts, and of larger normative or interpersonal structures. And conversely and above all, I hope to have emphasized that every philosophical program touching language can profit from recognition of the separate requirements and importance of declaratives, interrogatives, and imperatives. Each of these three forms of content[37] must be conceived as being all on the same slate, all interdependent; to do philosophical justice to any will require doing justice to all.

NOTES

[1] Thanks are due to the University of Pittsburgh Center for the Philosophy of Science, under the sponsorship of which I read the antecedent of this paper in February of 1988. I am profoundly indebted to J. Seibt for knowledgeable, talented, and time-consuming substantive contributions to this paper throughout the entire period of its composition.

[2] Some speech act theorists use 'declarative' as part of their technical terminology with a different meaning, to signify the sort of act in which we make something true by declaring it so. Here, however, 'declarative' is used to help make the standard grammatical contrast with interrogatives and imperatives.

[3] See G. Frege, *Foundations of Arithmetic*, tr. by J. L. Austin, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1959, sect. 60, 62, pp. 71e, 73.

[4] This is certainly the way that contemporaries understand him. See M. Dummett, 'What is a theory of meaning? (II)', in: G. Evans/J. McDowell (eds.), *Truth and Meaning*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, ch. 19, pp. 428—472; or McDowell, 'Truth conditions, bivalence, and verificationism', G. Evans/J. McDowell, *op. cit.*, p. 44. Frege's position is that interrogatives and imperatives, unlike declaratives, lack a reference. See, for instance, Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', in: P. Geach/M. Black (eds.), *Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1960, p. 68.

[5] See J. Searle/D. Vanderveken, *Foundations of illocutionary logic*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

[6] See M. Pendlebury, 'Against the Power of Force: Reflections on the Meaning of Mood', *Mind*, vol. xcv, 1986, pp. 361—372.

[7] I also have to make good on an implied promise to distinguish and relate the three different categories for which I use the adjective 'imperative': the grammatical category of imperative sentences (stand-alone and constituent), the abstract category of imperative contents, and the pragmatic category of imperative acts. But this is beyond the scope of this paper.

[8] See D. Davidson, 'Truth and Meaning', *Synthese*, vol. 17, 1967, pp. 304—323; reprinted in: *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 17—37.

[9] See M. Bennett, *Questions in Montague-Grammar*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana Linguistics Club, 1979.

[10] See e.g. Dummett, *op. cit.*

[11] See A. Ross, 'Imperatives and Logic', *Theoria*, vol. 17, 1941, pp. 53—71; also in: *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 11, 1944, pp. 30—46.

[12] See B. Chellas, *The Logical Form of Imperatives*, Stanford, CA, Perry Lane Press, 1969.

[13] Of course you can give a reason for the true answer to a question being which one it is. Furthermore, *reason why* is a special case, obtaining because why-questions themselves ask for reasons. To give a reason why truth conditions cause cancer is just to give an answer to the question of why truth conditions cause cancer; it is *not* to give a reason for the question itself of why truth conditions cause cancer — that appears to be nonsense.

[14] See C. Hamblin, *Imperatives*, New York, B. Blackwell, 1987.

[15] The best introduction to the theory of interrogatives is D. Harrah, "The Logic of Questions," *Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. II: Extensions of Classical Logic*, Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1984, pp. 715—764.

[16] Elisabet Engdahl calls them 'constituent questions' in Engdahl, *Constituent Questions*, Dordrecht-Boston, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1986.

[17] In fact, not only some who-clauses but also some if-clauses cannot satisfyingly be treated within the grammar of declaratives. J. L. Austin in his celebrated paper 'Ifs and

Cans' (see Austin, '*Ifs and Cans*', in: *Philosophical Papers*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, pp. 153—181) pointed out that in a sentence like *I can if I choose*, the if-clause cannot be taken as expressing a conditional. But while this *negative* observation of Austin's found ample response, nobody seems to have even *reacted*, neither affirmatively nor critically, to his *positive* thesis (see *op. cit.*, p. 160) that the clause 'if I choose' expresses a question! The fact that we 'wonder' or 'ask' *if* such and such is the case supports the plausibility of Austin's conjecture and should make us wonder or ask *why* philosophers still indulge in declarative slumber. For a discussion of embedded interrogatives with if-clauses see Bolinger, 'Yes-No Questions Are Not Alternative Questions', in: H. Hiz (ed.), *Questions*, Dordrecht-Boston, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1978, pp. 87—107.

[18] See Hamblin, 'Questions', *The Australasian journal of philosophy*, vol. 36, 1958, pp. 159—168.

[19] See B. Brandom, 'Asserting', *Nous*, vol. 17, 1983, pp. 637—651.

[20] See Hamblin, *Imperatives*, New York, B. Blackwell, 1987, p. 229.

[21] See R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay in Metaphysics*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1962, p. 23, and the detailed working out in R. Manor, 'Pragmatics and the Logic of Questions and Assertions', *Philosophica*, vol. 29, 1982, pp. 45—95.

[22] See for instance D. Harrah, *Communication: a logical model*, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1963.

[23] The best introduction to the theory of imperatives is Hamblin's previously cited book, *Imperatives*. For a penetrating discussion that avoids the Declarative Fallacy and may very well be combinable with some suggestions made below, see M. Huntley, 'The Semantics of English Imperatives', *Linguistics & Philosophy*, 1984, pp. 103—133.

[24] See H. N. Castañeda, *Thinking and Doing*, Dordrecht-Boston, D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1975, p. 169.

[25] Those engaged in the descriptive grammar of English have and are entitled to different views on this matter. Perhaps the work most pertinent to our concerns is W. Badecker, *Formal Grammars and the Analysis of Infinitives*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1987. Badecker surveys some Chomsky theories, which by deriving all infinitive constructions by transformation of declaratives are deeply at variance with the spirit of the present paper, though my aims are so different from his that it is hard to call the variance a conflict. In healthy contrast, the lexicalist theory that Badecker offers in his chapter 3 awards infinitive constructions independence from declaratives, and thereby more nearly shares our direction; however, there remains the question of whether in agentive infinitive constructions such as *Jack refused to explain sincerity conditions to Alfred*, we should or should not take it that there is a "trace" of *Jack* heading the infinitive phrase. We certainly need *Jack* to get the *semantics* right, but that far from settles the *syntactical* question for English. In any event, Badecker supplies a truly helpful framework for addressing this and related questions.

[26] See A. R. Anderson, 'Logic, norms and roles', *Ratio*, vol. 4, 1962, pp. 36—49.

[27] In particular, it just doesn't matter whether or not Q is itself agentive in α.

[28] I am ignoring tense as a temporary and dangerous strategy.

[29] On my proposal, if Q is agentive, then $[\alpha \text{ stit: } Q]$ is equivalent to Q. Obviously this is not to be taken as an *analysis* of Q, especially not as an analysis of Q in terms of propositions that are non-agentive. In this way the program is very different from that of say Chisholm. See R. Chisholm, 'Evidence as Justification', *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 58, 1961, pp. 739—748, or 'The Ethics of Requirement', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 1, 1964, pp. 147—154; or A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*, London, Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1963, ch. 8; both of these programs insist on replacing Q with a sentence describing some terminal state of affairs. In contrast we clarify but do not analyze.

[30] Note: subjunctive, not indicative, as in *Mary demanded that Jack explain sincerity conditions*.

[31] I'm not sure this use of overlapping grammatical categories is the best way to go. Let me emphasize again that the aim of applying stit-notation is to clarify, not to analyse and, in particular, not to provide a syntactical criterion for when a certain surface form must be considered an imperative rather than a declarative.

[32] This equivalence is fine for agentive Q; thus, *to be forbidden to see to it that you explain sincerity conditions to Alfred* is indeed equivalent to *being obligated to see to it that you do not explain sincerity conditions to Alfred*, precisely because *you explain sincerity conditions to Alfred* is agentive. This remark is not ad hoc, but a straightforward, useful, and important consequence of the analysis. Dialectically we use it to explain how easy it is to confuse these matters and therefore how easy it has been for some (but far from all) investigators, trained in the Declarative Fallacy, to get things wrong.

[33] See Castañeda, *op. cit.*

[34] See for instance G. H. v. Wright, 'Deontic Logic', *Mind*, 1951, pp. 1—15.

[35] See Hamblin, *op. cit.*

[36] $[\alpha$ stit: $[\alpha$ stit: $Q]]$ collapses into $[\alpha$ stit: $Q]$.

[37] And as few others as possible.

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