Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy

Abstract:

In this article I connect Peirce’s early logico-semiotic investigations (1865–1867) to the doctrine of sign-inference presented by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics. In section III I argue that An. Pr. II.27 showed Peirce the possibility of a syllogistic reconstruction of non-syllogistic inferences, and taught him (i) to consider the premises of an argument as affording a σημεῖον or sign of the conclusion, and (ii) to consider the three syllogistic figures as three different signs based on three different semiotic principles. As a preliminary to my argument, in section II I discuss some of Peirce’s later remarks on semiotic terminology that collectively throw some light on the historical models of Peirce’s semiotic enterprise.