Abstract
This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion.
Notes
I am grateful to Joe Saunders and to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on a previous draft.
References
Bennett C (2016) Expressive Actions. In: Abell C, Smith J (eds) The Expression of Emotion. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 73–94
Korsgaard C (1986) Skepticism About Practical Reason. J Philos 83:5–25
Russell P (2017) The Limits of Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Strawson PF (1982) Freedom and Resentment. In: Watson G (ed) Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 59–80
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Bennett, C. Russell on Naturalism and Practical Reason. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 24, 347–356 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10031-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10031-9