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**The Christian Philosophical Worldview of St. Thomas Aquinas**

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**Introduction[[1]](#footnote-1)**

My task for this paper is threefold. First, I’ll discuss the notion of a Christian worldview which has been aptly articulated and defended by David Naugle. In particular, I’ll focus on the way in which a worldview in general is a systematic way of thinking, and how a Christian worldview in particular, is structured in terms of the creation, fall, redemption, and consummation of all things. Second, I’ll discuss Alvin Plantinga’s advice to Christian philosophers in light of what has been said about developing a Christian worldview in which I’ll focus on how developing a Christian worldview and the particular tasks of a Christian philosopher are uniquely and intricately linked. Third, I’ll discuss the life and work of St. Thomas Aquinas who I’ll argue provides a model for developing a Christian worldview and accomplishing the tasks of the Christian philosopher.

**1 On the nature of a Christian worldview**

In this section, I’d like to articulate the notion of a worldview, in particular, a *Christian* worldview. I’ll draw from what David Naugle has said concerning the nature of a worldview in general as well as what he thinks the nature of a distinctively Christian worldview is in particular.

*1.1 On worldviews in general*

In his book, *Worldview: The history of a concept*, David Naugle (2002), understands a worldview in the following way:

A worldview, then, is a semiotic system of narrative signs that creates the definitive symbolic universe which is responsible in the main for the shape of a variety of life-determining, human practices. It creates the channels in which the waters of reason flow. It establishes the horizons of an interpreters point of view by which texts of all types are understood. It is that mental medium by which they world is known. The human heart is it’s home, and it provides a home for the human heart.**[[2]](#footnote-2)**

Let’s unpack Naugle’s definition of a worldview by explicating each of the main concepts within the definition. First, consider the concept of a semiotic system. According to Naugle, a *semiotic* *system* is a set of signs made by humans. A semiotic system is an activity that humans engage in so that they can signify their “thoughts, feelings, and ideas as well as people, places, and things in the world. …By these primary semiotic activities, people have been able to parse the cosmos and create maps of reality.”[[3]](#footnote-3) So, according to Naugle, a worldview is a semiotic system insofar as humans are the kinds of creatures that make and manage signs, primarily in the form of words, either spoken or written, and humans use these signs to map the structure of reality.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Second, consider the concept of a narrative signs. What exactly is a narrative sign? Naugle thinks that a *narrative sign* is a semiotic sign that is structured in the form of a story. Humans as semiotic creatures, are specifically storytellers.[[5]](#footnote-5) The way in which a worldview is structured is in terms of a network of stories that function as signs in order for humans to interpret and map the structure of reality.

Third, Naugle says that a semiotic system of narrative signs is the primary way in which a variety of life-determining human practices are decided. What exactly does this mean? The kind of life-determining human practices that Naugle takes a worldview to provide are the practices of human thinking, interpreting, and knowing.[[6]](#footnote-6) A worldview, or a semiotic system of narrative signs, provides the foundation and groundwork for determining an individual’s theory of rationality, hermeneutics, and epistemology. From these rational, hermeneutical, and epistemological human activities flows the praxis of daily human choices. Hence, a worldview, as this semiotic system of narrative signs which ground the rational, hermeneutic, and epistemological framework for mapping reality, provides a home for the heart of man. This is what Naugle refers to as the ‘kardioptical’, or vision of the heart, nature of a worldview.[[7]](#footnote-7)

*1.2 On Christian worldview in particular*

In developing an account of a Christian worldview, Naugle draws from the work of Brian Walsh and J. Richard Middleton.[[8]](#footnote-8) Walsh and Middleton understand the unique structure of the Christian narrative as composed of three major events: creation, fall, and redemption.[[9]](#footnote-9) Naugle citing Walsh and Middleton’s position writes the following:

These three biblical motifs [creation, fall, redemption] answer the four fundamental worldview questions that are at the heart of every worldview: “(1) Who am I? Or, what is the nature, task, and purpose of human beings? (2) *Where am I?* Or, what is the nature of the world and universe I live in? (3) *What’s wrong?* Or, what is the basic problem or obstacle that keeps me from obtaining fulfillment? In other words, how do I understand evil? And (4) *What is the remedy?* Or, how is it possible to overcome this hindrance to my fulfillment? In other words, how do I find salvation?”[[10]](#footnote-10)

According to Naugle, Walsh, and Middleton, the biblical worldview of creation, fall, and redemption provides the most coherent, comprehensive, and livable account of answers to the four fundamental worldview questions[[11]](#footnote-11)

Briefly, the biblical themes of creation, fall, and redemption answer the four fundamental worldview questions as follows: First, humans are created in the image and likeness of God and find their true fulfillment in adoring and worshiping their creator by being in an intimate relationship or communion. Second, The world was created by God who is the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creator and sustainer of all things.[[12]](#footnote-12) Third, humans fell from being in right relationship with God through sin, in particular, by disobeying God. The result of this fall was a severing of the relationship between God and man, man and his neighbor, and man and himself. Last, God provided a remedy for the restoration of all things. By becoming man, as the incarnate God-man, Jesus Christ, God made a way for man to become god, or to partake in the divine life.[[13]](#footnote-13) God accomplished this primarily through the mysteries of His incarnation and life, death, resurrection, and ascension. Hence, the remedy to the problem of human sin, suffering, and evil is provided for by God through the works of his Son, Jesus Christ. Man is restored to right relationship with God and elevated to participating in God’s very life.

Now that we have a grasp of what a worldview is in general and what a Christian worldview is in particular, let’s look at what Alvin Plantinga has to say concerning the task of the Christian philosopher. We shall see that there is deep congruence with what Plantinga has to say and what we have seen from Naugle concerning the nature of a Christian worldview.

**2 Plantinga’s advice to Christian philosophers**

In his paper, “Advice to Christian Philosophers”, Alvin Plantinga (1984) offers reflections on how Christians who are philosophers should engage in *doing* philosophy.[[14]](#footnote-14) Plantinga offers the following general ideas of how Christians ought to practice philosophy. Plantinga writes:

First, Christian philosophers and Christian intellectuals generally must display more autonomy—more independence of the rest of the philosophical world. Second, Christian philosophers must display more integrity—integrity in the sense of integral wholeness, or oneness, or unity, being all of one piece. Perhaps 'integrality' would be the better word here. And necessary to these two is a third: Christian courage, or boldness, or strength, or  
perhaps Christian self-confidence.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Plantinga thinks that Christian philosophers ought to display more autonomy, integrality, and courage. Let’s turn to what he says about each of these three traits in more detail.

*2.1 Christian philosophers ought to display more autonomy*

Christian philosophers ought to display more autonomy. What does Plantinga mean by this? He gives the example of an undergraduate student who decides that studying philosophy is what they want to do. Next, the student goes to graduate school at a top program in philosophy. The student learns how philosophy is done at the top level. Unfortunately, the questions asked by philosophers at the top universities are not always the same questions that are salient to the Christian community from which the student comes. Plantinga thinks that Christian philosophers ought use their skills and gifts to serve the Christian communities and address from a philosophical standpoint questions that matter to the *Christian* community. For example, Plantinga writes:

Christian philosophers, however, are the philosophers of the Christian community;

and it is part of their task as Christian philosophers to serve the Christian community. But the Christian community has its own questions, its own concerns, its own topics for investigation, its own agenda and its own research program.[[16]](#footnote-16)

When the Christian philosopher only engages in the questions that are of interest to the philosophical community, they are not exhibiting the kind of autonomy that they ought. For example, questions about different theories of reference in the philosophy of language, or the realism/anti-realism debate in the philosophy of science, or different analyses of the concept of knowledge in epistemology are all good things, but, says Plantinga, if the Christian philosopher only focuses on those question, and doesn’t focus on questions the Christian community is concerning with, then they are not exhibiting the kind of independence or autonomy from the philosophical community that they ought. Plantinga thinks that Christian philosophers are called to do the philosophical work for their Christian community. When they don’t do this, they are not fully living up to their vocation. For example, Plantinga says the following:

Christian philosophers are the ones who must do the philosophical work involved. If they devote their best efforts to the topics fashionable in the non-Christian philosophical world, they will neglect a crucial and central part of their task as Christian philosophers. What is needed here is more independence, more autonomy with respect to the projects and concerns of the non-theistic philosophical world.[[17]](#footnote-17)

Christian philosophers have a task. A task to serve their Christian community with their gifts and skillset. The Christian philosopher who doesn’t exhibit autonomy from the philosophical community (which is largely non-theistic) and only concerns themselves with questions from the non-theistic philosophical community does a disservice to their Christian community by not engaging in philosophical questions and research programs that are more salient to the *Christian* community.

*2.2 Christian philosophers ought to display more integrality*

In addition to arguing that Christian philosophers ought to display more autonomy in their work qua Christian philosopher, Plantinga also argues that Christian philosophers ought to display more *integrality*. With respect to integrality, Plantinga has in mind the idea of wholeness or of being of one mind. He discusses the philosophy student who goes to graduate school and studies with a top notch philosopher. The philosopher holds to a broadly naturalistic worldview that is fundamentally at odds with the student’s Christian worldview. Plantinga thinks that the student, who is experiencing cognitive dissonance, should not resolve the cognitive dissonance by attempting to make his Christianity compatible with a philosophical worldview that is deeply incompatible with Christianity. Concerning this notion of integrality and the student’s relationship to her non-theistic professor, Plantinga writes:

But his [the philosophy professor’s] fundamental commitments, his fundamental projects and concerns, are wholly different from those of the Christian community-wholly different and, indeed, antithetical to them. And the result of attempting to graft Christian thought onto his basic view of the world will be at best an unintegral *pastiche*; at worst it will seriously compromise, or distort, or trivialize the claims of Christian theism. What is needed here is more wholeness, more integrality.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Here, Plantinga cautions against a Christian philosophy that either tries to be a cheap imitation of either of the incompatible worldviews, or, even worse, the unintegral attempt could lead to a serious, even perverse distortion of the claims of Christianity. The Christian philosopher ought to be of one mind, not being tossed to and fro by the waves of what is philosophically in vogue.[[19]](#footnote-19)

*2.3 Christian philosophers ought to display more courage*

Last, Plantinga advises that Christian philosophers ought to display more courage. What Plantinga has in mind here is something like intellectual self-confidence. Plantinga thinks that Christian philosophers are just as entitled to their pre-philosophical assumptions as their non-theistic colleagues and that Christian philosophers should not be intimidated by what others think about the plausibility or implausibility of their views.[[20]](#footnote-20) An example that Plantinga refers to as an example of what not to do is his discussion of the relationship between verificationism and theism. Verificationism was a product of logical positivism that was prominent in early and mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy. Part of verificationism was the thesis, known as the verifiability criteria of meaning, that a statement was meaningful only if it was either analytic or it’s truth or falsity could be verified by empirical methods.[[21]](#footnote-21) Claims central to Christianity such as “God loves you” were meaningless because the statement was neither analytic (e.g. All bachelors are unmarried males) nor was it verifiable via empirical methods. Hence, according to this verificationism analysis, the statement, “God loves you” has no meaning.

Plantinga discusses the response from theistic philosophers or those sympathetic to this view when verificationism was in vogue in the mid-twentieth century. He writes:

Many philosophically inclined Christians were disturbed and perplexed and felt deeply threatened; could it really be true that linguistic philosophers had somehow discovered that the Christian's most cherished convictions were, in fact, just meaningless? There was a great deal of anxious hand wringing among philosophers, either themselves theists or sympathetic to theism. Some suggested, in the face of positivistic onslaught, that the thing for the Christian community to do was to fold up its tents and silently slink away, admitting that the verifiability criterion was probably true. Others conceded that strictly speaking, theism really *is* nonsense, but is *important* nonsense. Still others suggested that the sentences in question should be reinterpreted in such a way as not to give offense to the positivists; someone seriously suggested, for example, that Christians resolve, henceforth, to use the sentence "God exists" to mean "some men and women have had, and all may have, experiences called 'meeting God'"[[22]](#footnote-22)

In response to the verificationist attack on theism, many theists cowered and accommodated the pre-philosophical assumptions of the verificationist. Plantinga thinks that the theists should not have cowered so easily. They should have rolled-up their intellectual sleeves and argued against the verificationists. They should have exhibited the intellectual virtue of courage and self-confidence in challenging the verificationists assumed, rather than argued for, presuppositions about the meaning of terms. Christian philosophers should not be so deferential and accommodating to what is currently philosophically in vogue, they should stand their ground and challenge pre-philosophical assumptions. Christians should have had the courage to insist that their convictions were meaningful even if a fashionable theory in philosophy of language said otherwise.[[23]](#footnote-23) Christian philosophers should be bold and courageous.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Now that we have discussed Plantinga’s advice to Christian philosophers, let’s turn to some who I think is a Christian philosopher *par excellence*: St. Thomas Aquinas.

**3 St. Thomas Aquinas: Exemplar *par excellence***

In this section, I’ll argue that St. Thomas Aquinas is the Christian philosopher par excellence. My reasons for thinking this claim is true is two-fold. First, Aquinas’ theological magnum opus, the *Summa Theologica*, is structured according to the essence of a biblical worldview - of creation, fall, and redemption. Man’s coming from God, falling away from God, and God returning to man. Hence, Aquinas is does philosophy from a distinctively Christian worldview.

Second, Aquinas does what Plantinga says Christian philosophers ought to do. In the second part of this section, I’ll elucidate on how Aquinas is an exemplar of what Plantinga takes to be a Christian philosopher.

*3.1 St. Thomas’ Work is Structured as a Christian Worldview*

My goal is to demonstrate, by discussing the contents of St. Thomas’ *Summa*, how Aquinas’ thought comports with the nature of a Christian worldview as articulated by Naugle, Walsh, and Middleton. Let’s begin this task with looking at the details of Aquinas’ *Summa*.

In his theological magnum opus, the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas Aquinas provides a systematic theology for the Christian religion.[[25]](#footnote-25) Concerning the structure of the *Summa*, Peter Kreeft writes the following:

The structural outline of the *Summa Theologica* is a mirror of the structural order of reality. It begins in God, Who is “in the beginning”. It then proceeds to the act of creation and consideration of creatures, centering on man, who alone is created in the image of God. Then it moves to man’s return to God through his life or moral and religious choice, and culminates in the way or means to that end: Christ and His Church. Thus the overall scheme of the *Summa,* like that of the universe, is an *exitus-redditus*, an exit from and return to God, Who is both Alpha and Omega. God is the ontological heart that pumps the blood of being through the arteries of creation into the body of the universe, which wears a human face, and receives it back through the veins of man’s life of love and will. The structure of the *Summa*, and of the universe, is dynamic. It is not like information in a library, but like blood in a body.[[26]](#footnote-26)

We can see that St. Thomas’ systematic theology is structured in the same way that Naugle and Walsh and Middleton think how a Christian worldview ought to be structured. In its most general outline, Aquinas’ *Summa* is structured as follows:

First, there are three main parts. Part one, or the *prima pars*, discusses the nature of God in himself and the treatise on creation. This includes the act of creation of things in general and angels, the physical world, man, and the divine government in particular.

Second, the second part, or *secunda pars*, is divided into two sub-parts: the *prima secundae*, or the first part of the second part and the *secunda secundae*, or the second part of the second part. The *prima secundae* focuses on man’s final end, the treatise on habits, and the treatise on law.[[27]](#footnote-27) The *secunda secundae* focuses on the virtues. This includes the treatise on prudence and justice, the treatise on fortitude and temperance, and the actions of some particular men.

Third, the third and final part of the *Summa* is the *tertia pars*, or the third part. In this part of the *Summa,* Aquinas discusses the nature and purpose of Christ’s incarnation, the nature of Christ’s mother, the blessed Virgin Mary, Christ’s passion and resurrection, and the nature and purpose of the sacraments to name a few things.

*3.1.1 A Detailed Outline of Aquinas’ Summa*

With this brief outline of the Summa in hand, let’s look at each of the parts in greater detail, keeping an eye on how they follow the same pattern of the nature of a Christian worldview articulated by Naugle, Walsh, and Middleton.

First, Aquinas begins the *Summa* reflecting on the nature of God, the Author, Creator, and Sustainer of all that is, also understood as *ipsum esse subsistens*, or the sheer act of being itself.[[28]](#footnote-28) For example, in the *Summa Theologica*, after explaining the nature and extent of sacred doctrine, St. Thomas discusses the existence and nature of God at length.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Second, after discussing the nature of God, Aquinas proceeds by discussing the nature of creation in general, and the nature of man in particular. Within this section of the Summa, Aquinas subdivides his account of creation into five distinct treatises: the treatise on the creation, the treatise on the angels, the treatise on the work of the six days, the treatise on man, and the treatise on the divine government.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Third, after detailing his treatise on creation, Aquinas, in the first part of the second part of the Summa, moves to the end or purpose of man. Aquinas begins by outlining man’s nature and purpose. He then discusses the habits or man, or virtues and vices. Next, he moves on to discuss the nature of law and how man relates to his neighbor and the city of man and the city of God. Additionally, Aquinas discusses the nature of grace and the order of grace in terms of man’s end or destiny.

Fourth, Aquinas, in the second part of the second part of the *Summa*, continues to discuss the various actions of man which includes his natural actions (i.e. the cardinal virtues) as well as the supernatural actions such as the gift of faith.

Fifth, Aquinas, in part three of the *Summa*, discusses the nature of the incarnation, crucifixion, atonement, resurrection, and ascension. He also discusses the nature and effects of the sacraments.

To conclude, it is evident that Aquinas’ thought is thoroughly in line with what Naugle, Walsh, and Middleton take to be a Christian worldview. In the last section of this essay, we shall see that although anachronistic, Aquinas does in fact take Plantinga’s advice for Christian philosophers.

*3.2 Aquinas takes Plantinga’s Advice*

In section two of this essay, we considered what Plantinga had to say concerning his advice for Christian philosophers. In this section, I’ll argue that Aquinas takes Plantinga’s advice. Setting aside the fact that Aquinas lived around seven hundred years before Plantinga, we can see that St. Thomas fulfilled the advice given by Plantinga for Christian philosophers.

*3.2.1 Aquinas displays autonomy*

St. Thomas Aquinas displays autonomy in the following way. As a Christian philosopher during the medieval period, Christianity had not yet fully embraced the works of Aristotle. Many Christian philosophers and theologians were skeptical or dubious of Aristotelianism. Moreover, Aquinas’ works were not immediately accepted by the Catholic Church. Yet, this didn’t prevent St. Thomas from developing a systematic theology and philosophical worldview that incorporated Aristotelian notions such as act and potency, form and matter, substance and accident.

*3.2.2 Aquinas displays integrality*

St. Thomas also displayed integrality. He was of one mind. Aquinas was known as the great synthesizer. He was known as the great synthesizer because he was able to integrate a number of positions that seemed to be in fundamental tension with each other. For example, Aquinas was able to provide deeply robust accounts of the relationship between conceptual pairs that are difficult to reconcile, integrate, or synthesize. Some of these pairs include the relationships between faith and reason, grace and nature, special revelation and natural revelation, Platonism and Aristotelianism. Concerning this point, Peter Kreeft writes:

He [Aquinas] fulfilled more than anyone else the essential medieval program of a marriage of faith and reason, revelation and philosophy, the Biblical and the classical inheritances. …Not only does St Thomas represent a unity of ingredients that were later to separate, but also a unity of ingredients that existed separately before him. In reading St. Thomas you meet Thales, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Justin, Clement, Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius, Anselm, Abelard, Albert, Maimonides, and Avicenna. For one brief, Camelot-like moment it seemed that a synthesis was possible.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Moreover, a primary way in which St. Thomas displayed integrality was through his commitment to Christian orthodoxy.

*3.2.3 Aquinas displays courage*

Aquinas demonstrated intellectual courage. Not only did he compose a massive volume of systematic philosophy and theology, the *Summa Theologica*, he also wrote an apologetic for pagans, the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, and an apologetic for Muslims, *De Rationes Fidei*.[[32]](#footnote-32) Moreover, G.K. Chesterton, in his biography of St. Thomas Aquinas, tells a story about St. Thomas while at a dinner with St. Louis of France in which St. Thomas, lost in thought, loudly exclaimed, “that shall settle the Manichees.”[[33]](#footnote-33) The Manichees were a heretical sect of Christianity that St. Dominic, the founder of the Dominican order, and his friars, which included St. Thomas, combated in the streets of France. St. Thomas was not afraid to boldly proclaim the Gospel in a rational and deliberate way. Hence, he exhibited Christian intellectual virtue.

**Conclusion**

Assuming Naugle and Plantinga are correct in what they say a Christian philosopher ought to be, then, as I’ve argued, St. Thomas Aquinas is a Christian philosopher *par excellence*.[[34]](#footnote-34) My reasons in support for this claim consisted in the fact that Aquinas’ thinking was structured in accordance with a Christian worldview and that he did what a Christian philosopher ought to do. I elaborated on the nature of worldviews in general, and a Christian worldview in particular, by drawing from the work of David Naugle. Additionally, I discussed the task of the Christian philosopher outlined by Alvin Plantinga. I tied these two ideas from both Naugle and Plantinga together by giving the example of the life and work of Aquinas. Aquinas provides an example of how to do philosophy as a Christian. We should add Naugle and Plantinga to that list of exemplars as well.

1. Many thanks to Mark Boone for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I’d also like to thank Dr. David Naugle for being a model of a Christian philosopher to me. Additionally, I’d like to thank my confirmation saint, St. Thomas Aquinas, for his help and example. Last, and most importantly, I want to thank my Lord Jesus Christ for providing an opportunity to write on this topic. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See David K. Naugle (2002), *Worldview: A history of a concept*, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 329-330. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Naugle (2002), 292. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Ibid., 291. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See J. Richard Middleton and Brian Walsh (1995), *Truth is Stranger Than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a Postmodern Age*, Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press and (1984), *The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian Worldview*, Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press. Cf. Naugle (2002), 300, 302. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See Naugle (2002), 350. Cf. Walsh and Middleton (1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid. Cf. Walsh and Middleton (1984), 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Naugle (2002), 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. I am reminded of being in Dr. Naugle’s honors developing a Christian mind course in which he had us repeat after him ‘ta panta’ which is greek for ‘all things.’ Cf. Colossians 1:16. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See St. Athanasius, *On the Incarnation*, 54, 3. http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2802.htm. Cf. 2 Peter 1:4. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See Alvin Plantinga (1984), “Advice to Christian Philosophers”, *Faith and Philosophy*, 1, (3), 253-271. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid., 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Plantinga (1984), 255. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Plantinga (1984), 256. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See Ephesians 4:14. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Plantinga (1984), 269. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. For more information on logical positivism, see Richard Creath (2017), “Logical Empiricism”, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/. The literature on this philosophical movement sometimes uses the term ‘positivism’ and sometimes uses ‘empiricism.’ For our purposes, the distinction is not important. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Plantinga (1984), 257. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Thanks to Mark Boone for making this point to me. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See Joshua 1:9. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Benziger Bros. edition, (1947), translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See Peter Kreeft (1990), *A Summa of the Summa: The Essential Philosophical Passages of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica Edited and Explained for Beginners*, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa, Iae, QQ1-114. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See Robert Barron (2011), *Catholicism: A Journey to the Heart of the Faith,* New York: Random House, 228. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Summa Theologica*, Ia, QQ1-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., Ia, QQ44-119. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Kreeft (1990), 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. All three of these works can be found at the Dominican house of Studies website dhspriory.org/thomas/. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See G.K. Chesterton (1933/2001) Saint Thomas Aquinas: “The Dumb Ox”, New York: Doubleday, 74-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Thanks to Mark Boone for pointing this out to me. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)