

# The Gravity of Steering, the Grace of Gliding and the Primordially of Presencing Place: Reflections on Truthfulness, Worlding, Seeing, Saying and Showing in Practical Reasoning and Law

Oren Ben-Dor

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**Abstract** This article reflects on the received view of the rupture which constitutes the beginning of a critical, ethical, political and legal opening, the understanding of which inhabits the cry of, and response to, injustice. It takes the very critique that feeds into, and is distorted by, practical reasoning, as its point of departure. Grasping this rupture as the complementary relation between deconstruction and radical alterity, would entail unreflectively accepting a certain kind of truthfulness—truthfulness as [in]correctness, manifesting in a relationship that involves rootless and controlling movement of making and unmaking of world. In closely reading Wittgenstein and Heidegger on the level of seeing, showing and saying, truthfulness is shown to contain an essential tension between, on the one hand, the Socratic, metaphysically-bound notion of beingness, correctness and meaning-steering and, on the other hand, the pre-Socratic notion of unconcealment (*a-lethia*), which, pointing even earlier than pre-Socratics into aboriginality, involves attentive letting of gliding in the inexpressible saying of language. While steering is about generating new possibilities of expressibility, gliding is about poetic dwelling, or enduring inexpressibility as a constitutive part of saying. Although *aletheia* is taken to be the key influence on rootless post-foundational thinking, it is argued that unconcealment involves letting and enduring the presencing inexpressibility of place and home-coming, that is, worlding-rootedness; thus showing Heidegger's originary politics as the district of the uncanny to be about worlding that attentively *lets* the presencing inexpressibility of earth be as place. In reading Heidegger's views on humanism, beginning and language, the argument links inexpressibility—essentially and historically—to the grasping of the belongingness together of world, earth and place, viewing this belongingness as key to both the saying of art and of mortals dwelling together temporally, spatially, materially in a manner always strange to, and nearer than, the steering/controlling of beingness, time, space and

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O. Ben-Dor (✉)  
Law School, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK  
e-mail: obd@soton.ac.uk

place that the very gesture and emergence of critique is captive of and is not capable of attuning to and capturing. Art always estranges the metaphysical cycle of correctness which preserves pain and suffering—a cycle that inhabits a double bind of responding to violence and injustice generated by the violence of metaphysics with metaphysical violence and justice. In showing essential strife within truthfulness itself, Heidegger points to even greater and earlier problematic than the pre-Socratics—to the painful core of inexpressibility between the ontology of steering time, spaces and material—steering places—and the gliding temporality, spatiality and materiality of ontology of place.

**Keywords** Law · Practical reason · Wittgenstein · Heidegger · Beginning · Belonging · Language · Time · Place · Earth · Worlding · Truthfulness · Correctness · Unconcealment · Origin of inexpressibility · Presencing

*In the encounter with the mystery of nature the ‘Glider’ more than the steering ‘Pilot’ lets himself be lead by wonder through the tides and flows of breeze and airstreams. Thinking likewise, gliding seeks by its very nature, asks for, and even insists on dwelling in Being whilst breathing (grasping) its enigmatic and inscrutable essence. There is no salvation to the human spirit in calculative thought, as long as it avoids being absorbed by an inner urge inebriated by the wonder of gliding. There is no promise of salvation in scientific thought as long it lacks the gift of poetic inspiration.*

Ariella Atzmon, ‘Teaching as a Work of Art’ ([4], p. 110)

## I

1. The stake for understanding, indeed the origin of *care, reason, goodness and justice*, concerns making sense and being actually and potentially truthful. This stake shows itself as *mattering*. Mortals stand before mattering, in old German, to stand-before—*vor-stehen*—mutated later into *verstehen*—to understand. Standing before mattering, letting mattering encounter innermost ownness, shows as the essence of truthfulness and the truthfulness of essence.

2. *How* does understanding relate to truthfulness? Does understanding near as an actual or potential ‘what’ for the sake of which it is yearned for and being sought?

3. Further, how does the stake that calls for understanding and truthfulness—mattering—relate to the manner the beginning of worlding is grasped and brought into language?

4. *How* is it to dwell in the midst of mattering? Does not standing-*before* mattering happen essentially, indeed strangely, in a *place* that is always too near, inexpressible and inaccessible? Does not mattering always call ahead of our thoughts and reflections? *How then is the origin of inexpressibility emplaced?*

5. Is responding to mattering by being ‘critical’ about ‘this or that matter’, the same as encountering and letting the strangeness that renders mattering essentially inaccessible be, that is, enduring the presencing trace of that lightening of mattering as such?

6. The essence of ownership, responsibility and authority is to let-own by, be able to respond to, and be in awe before, the strange, inaccessible and inexpressible origin of the presencing of mattering.

7. How is the temporal, spatial and material place mattering comes from? How to write *about* this place, from the lingering whilst of this place, enduring its nearness, without distancing? Indeed, the origin and stake that prompts writing *about* this place, rather than simply be there, is thought-provoking and troubling.

8. *Why* does it matter to make the very happening of mattering question-worthy? It matters because the very attempt to bring the inexpressible into speech involves suffering. We need to grasp the kind of relationship to language and truthfulness that characterises both our traversing inexpressibility but also enduring it in suffering. The realisation that suffering is tragically recycled by our ethical, political and legal responses to it [67], though, may not yet ask how it is to let inexpressibility of mattering be-gin and endure it in a manner that responds to the suffering such endurance brings. How, then, to properly attend to Weil's cry of 'Why am I being hurt'? [58].

9. In contemplating the origin of enduring inexpressibility, this article attempts to articulate a non-metaphysical seizing of mattering as the happening of truthfulness that speaks as language. The suffering incurred in this seizing is argued to come to presence as a *place* which is nearer to the innermost of mortals than the mattering that grasps and responds to the tragic cycle of suffering and violence that arises out of giving an account of 'the matter' to oneself and on behalf of 'others', one that involves creative moments of *making and remaking* of worlds, however radically pursued ([51], pp. 1–19). I attempt to get a sense of attending to the presencing of mattering—attunement to mattering—as the origin of the due of justice, a kind of truthfulness the dis-closure of which relates to feeling of be-longing, which is otherwise than the truthfulness which characterises the very cry for justice, the potentiality of which is already predisposed to render a visible and audible due for critical reflection in ethics politics and law. Finally, the contemplation offered here links the origin and endurance of inexpressibility to different ways of grasping the *belongingness* together of world, earth and place, viewing uncanny notion of place as key to both the saying of art and to dwelling together temporally, spatially, materially and last but not least, politically in originary way. I approach this link as both *historical*, but in a very different sense to the 'history' of the Western philosophical tradition, and as *essential* presencing that is always there, as an inexpressible founding moment of beginning and belonging. This essential sense of place re-creates the prophetic nowness the uncanny belonging to which lingers temporally, spatially and materially in a manner that is understood otherwise than controlling 'historical' time and space of political geography/territory—what I refer to as metaphysical 'place' which is merely contestable beingness of what-world on the surface of the earth.

10. In pursuing the origin of inexpressibility, the article offers readings of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Both sought, in very different ways, to bring about unmediated speaking in the midst of mattering. Both were sensitive to the violence of both authority and of metaphysics and the due that metaphysical authority generates in the name of 'justice'. Both aimed to emancipate thinking from the metaphysical shackles and cravings of the Western philosophical tradition.

11. The argument magnifies into the kind of *seeing* that pertains to truthfulness as correctness—and to the most radical potentiality that this truthfulness generates—

that makes the reflections by the late and early Wittgenstein immediately appealing to critical political theorists and lawyers. Captivity in this kind of truthfulness and remaking and to the controlling of time and space, I argue, resonates well with contemporary post-foundational attempts to destabilise any foundational truth through radical critique. These attempts nourish the antagonistic view fuelled by constant radical otherness that governs the re-writing of the *polis*, otherness that sustains the political rupturous negativity, in which the origin of authority seems to reside, thus ensuring the political condition of ongoing conflict, creative judgement, invention and action. Spatially, the *polis* is conceived as a territorial place that juridifies the earth, the belonging to which constitutes a world that is constantly being contested, re-invented and indeed re-written and overcome from a place of infinite potentiality of rootless void. Although Heidegger's notion of truthfulness as unconcealment—*aletheia*—is taken to be the key influence on this rootless post-foundational thinking ([44], pp. 11–33) it is argued here that he was at pains to convey a very different notion of unconcealment. Rather than being subsumed into either the antagonistic thinking of the radical left that rootlessly resists globalisation, bio-power and the power of sovereignty, or the rooted thinking that this left has reacted to—both of which are in the realm of meaning-making and overcoming—it is argued that Heidegger's *aletheia* involves letting and enduring the presencing inexpressibility of place and home-coming, what I have called worlding-rootedness [8] and which shows his politics to be first and foremost about attentively letting the earth be.

12. As a continuation of my own previous attempts to make critical [legal] thinking, indeed the very epistemological and normative gesture of critique, question-worthy ([6, 7], esp. pp. 118–119), and in reading Heidegger and Wittgenstein, this article maintains that what is accepted as a critical and antagonistic post-foundational opening in ethics, justice, politics and law is still involves belonging to world making and unmaking and as such is emplaced metaphysically within truthfulness as correctness, a captivity the hold of which shows well in an attentive reading of both Wittgenstein's late and early writings. In reading Heidegger's views on humanism, beginning and language, I argue that this post-foundational gesture is itself a characteristic of a mature epoch of metaphysical historicity of the Western philosophical tradition, a tradition which forgot, but is always-already haunted by, a more ancient, and in a sense simpler, self-concealing truthfulness that uncannily refuses any belonging to a controlling metaphysical time, space and place and which involves, as art, letting worlding-autochthonous presencing of place be. The presencing of this metaphysics-refusing place, I argue, can not be appropriated by either radical left-leaning or right-leaning political thinking. Both ways of thinking, I argue, belong to a philosophical tradition that tragically and fatefully move from epoch to epoch by first generating a cycle of metaphysical violence towards people, controlling time, things and spaces, that itself already dictates a metaphysical grasping of insecurity and injustice, that in turn is already predisposed to metaphysical violence that 'authoritatively' address (as *Gewalt*) this injustice but in fact moves us to the next metaphysical epoch. In this cycle, responsibility, ownership and authority become the means of cloaking the continuation of violent metaphysical thinking. This cloaking is most intense with

the post-foundational thinking and rootless meaning-making that Wittgenstein attempts to advocate—not without evident uneasiness. Heidegger, who points to a time earlier than the late-Greek thinking that he claims inaugurated the Western philosophical tradition (perhaps also his own unsaid, points to an even earlier time as we will see) helps us to a sense of non-metaphysical autochthonous and terrestrial beginning of worlding as art, the sensibilities of which have been totally muted by post-foundational thinking and its claim to have the ability to respond to suffering.

## II

13. As a point of departure for my inquiry I would like to give a short characterisation of the received post-foundational view of the manner in which critical ethical, political and legal thinking happens over time as normative and judgment-based practical reasoning. My argument below will be that the very gesture of critique advocated so effectively by Wittgenstein, despite his abhorrence at abstractions and metaphysics, unlike Heidegger, for all its radicality, is still captive to the Aristotelian framework of thought, which still pervades contemporary post-foundational thought (for an attempt to contain Heidegger's reflection within an Aristotelian framework, see [56]). Aristotle conceives of man as political animal ([3], book I, ch. 1, 1225a, 1–5; ch. 2, 1253a, 3–6) whose togetherness with others manifests as ongoing reflection and action about things that, unlike theoretical knowledge, can be known 'otherwise'. The *phronimos* exercises judgement and action (*praxis*) after traversing ongoing calculations, deliberations ([3], book VI, ch. 1, 1139a 1–17, ch. 2, 1139a 26–31, 1139b 1–5, ch. 5, 1140b 1–8, 20–30, ch. 6 1140b35, 1141a 1, book VI, ch. 9) and contestation that involve considerations of appropriateness and proportionality, finding what Aristotle calls the *intermediary* amidst irreducible circumstances of conflict and extremes ([3], book VI, ch. 1, 1139a 1–17, ch. 2, 1139a 26–31, 1139b 1–5, ch. 5, 1140b 1–8, 20–30, ch. 6 1140b35, 1141a 1). Furthermore, in his famous notion of bending rules and legal justice—equity—Aristotle alludes to the need to engage in endless reformulation of rules so that legal justice can be made to respond to the cry of the particular case in a way that does not turn that event of particularity—the *situation*—into 'particularity', that is subsumed under existing articulated reproducing generality ([3], book V, ch. 10, esp. 1137b, 12–32. See also book 6, ch. 7 1141b 8–20). Continuing Aristotle's thinking here, the language of sameness and otherness, generality and particularity, inclusion and exclusion, does involve practical reasoning with a moment of rupture which pertains to the very link between the pursuit of justice and genuine plurality that stems from radical particularity.

14. It is important to note that all matters of practical reasoning, as well as judgements in matters of justice, involve some aspects of correctness and correction. Even by bending rules, the genuinely particular would always constitute a call for *correction* of legal justice, a call for bending something straight towards the messiness of particularity and plurality of life so as to correctly respond to the challenge.

15. The beginning, the founding *situation* of critical ethical, political and legal reflection that challenges received justification and limits to political authority, is characterized as a critical moment, which is a situation, the infinite potential of which involves essential negativity—a radical rupture in the ‘we’ of the community, a moment that encounters and traverses that which is *not* said in uncritically accepted and, thus dominating and oppressive, thought and speech. The origin of authority resides in traversing this negativity and distinguishes it from mere legitimate exercises of power. The core exploration of this article magnifies into, and contemplates, this negativity in a manner that exposes and then challenges the kind truthfulness that makes its authoritative potentiality possible.

16. A radicalised Aristotelian thinking about practical reasoning along generality and particularity, inclusion and exclusion, constitutes a founding rupturous moment of genuine otherness (alterity). Such a rupture can happen as the Levinasian ethical moment (the *face-to-face* gaze of asymmetric relationship of genuine alterity between two parties, the ethical proximity between whom sustains their irreducible Otherness ([38, 5], chs. 1–4)); the political (the relationship of such radical alterity between multiple parties and the constant emergence of an antagonistic situation which constitutes a rupture of the stifling totality imposed by ‘politics’ and the disturbance by the plural alterity of the ‘political’ (see e.g. [2], pp. 7–12; [44], pp. 35–60; [6], ch. 7); constitutionalism as the paradox between the raw rupturous founding moment of constituent power and the conditioning of such power when it becomes ‘constituent of *something*’ and thus oriented to, and captive of, already constituted power even minimally by, for example, the calling for ‘representation’ ([40], ‘introduction’) and in turn, in law as the emergence of a-legality as the moment that is other, yet visible, to the institutional legal-illegal distinctions [39]. The common denominator of all of the above is that actuality is a moment of radical potentiality for the sake of radical practical reasoning that is indeed based on an influential interpretation of Aristotle’s own account of potentiality [1].

17. How does such rupture begin and what gives purchase to its constant return? Let us imagine a genuine alterity, a moment of originary rupture. This beginning of rupture is always antecedent to, essentially negative with impossible content to articulate. This seems already to be the moment of the ‘not’ in which mattering begins in ethics, politics and law, a moment of a genuine cry of genuine difference. However, re-exclusion of the most particular other already starts, and the cry for justice gets its purchase, at the very initial ‘inclusive’ directional articulation/expression/re-presentation, when the originary rupture is already being characterized *as* a ‘possibility’ and in turn, orients itself towards a ‘dispute’ between ‘possibilities’. As it is so often the case, structures of power also unofficially police the permitted range of possibilities for resistance. Thus, the very emergence of seeing the rupture *as* a situation that already articulates an excluded ‘possibility’ that demands the bending or reformulation of rules towards some re-inclusion is already, and paradoxically, a taming moment of exclusion. From this point there is already a movement of the issue that is fuelled by the need to reach a further exclusionary decision between argumentative possibilities. Institutionally in law, as the decision must get the legal status of validity and ‘authority’, subsequent attempted rationalisations of the decision and hence of the exclusion it bears in the

form of ‘reasoning’, is inevitable. The decision and the subsequent rationalizing reasoning are the culmination of exclusion. This exclusionary apex though is precisely what always already anticipates the continuation of originary rupture—justice-to-come.

18. Sensing and responding to such rupture would constitute the traversing of a boundary between law and justice. As Derrida puts it, this boundary persists as a chase of and waiting for, justice: between the unlimited justice that can not be deconstructed because infinitely inclusive, and undecidable and essentially deconstructable law. Traversing this aporetic boundary constitutes the *mystical* foundation of law’s authority—*mystical* being a term that we will be coming back to with the early Wittgenstein [11]. The rupture of justice is a moment with no guiding power, a moment of vulnerability and infinite ethical authority, where absolute hospitality occurs as the host and the guest genuinely risking role-reversal, what Levinas has called ‘substitution’ [12].

19. The movement between law and justice means that the dawning of the critical opening in ethics, politics and law is always a becoming-justice. Justice is being chased and waited for as the origin of the very practical reason that excludes justice as its beginning. Because the demands of justice are infinite, the authority of law must always be defective and violent (*Gewalt*), that is at the same time legitimate as long as it sustains its powerlessness from availing itself of the chase and re-turn of justice.

20. It is to be noted that the unfolding ongoing economy of ‘general’ and ‘particular’/‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’/‘explanation’ and ‘justification’/‘facts’ and ‘norms’, encompasses normative critical reflection and judgement that connects the kind of ‘seeing’ that seeks potentiality within the rupture of alterity and justice-to-come to the exclusionary ‘seeing as’ of the taming articulated possibility. The originary essential negativity and externality of radical alterity, the *pure* potentiality and the undecidability of it, *does* somehow manage to generate some usefulness and visibility in that it is *capable* of *changing* the uncritically accepted patterns of possibilities of meaning, speaking, articulating conflicts and passing judgements. The very hide and seek by ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing-as’ always continues to emerge. From the event of rupture to decision and back to rupture there is some common economy that embodies a *kind* of truthfulness that enables the cycle to generate its potentiality.

21. The configuration of the rupturous primordial negativity in which legal justice faces the justice-to-come and in turn community-to-come, no-place (*u-topia*)-to come, reveals a common trend in thinking of the ontology of temporal world-creation and overcoming (e.g. Nancy), the radicality of other-than-historical exception that is more primordial than the exceptional exercise of sovereignty (Agamben); and genuine alterity (Levinas). Such a trend unites the kind of thinking and understanding behind post-foundational political thinking about the founding place of justice and community.

22. We could imagine critical practical reasoning and its concerns with justice and the most radical configuration of it as this rupturous cycle, to be the basis of a tetrahedron of which politics, ethics and law constitute irreducibly distinct sides. The shape of such tetrahedron changes, indeed, there could be a plurality of



tetrahedrons (different worlds, ways of life) the dynamic boundaries within and between which constitute the very challenges of *justice and community*, *phronesis*, *action and speech*. However the configuration of mattering for practical reasoning is itself conditioned by a kind of truthfulness that, in turn, makes it possible to allow common visibility, knowledge, understanding, theory, to persist between ethics, politics and law.

23. *But what is the kind of truthfulness that conditions the possibility of belonging to the ‘now’ of this tetrahedron, namely the beginning of communal critical reflection in ethics, politics and law and, more specifically, the between the beingness of ethics, politics and law and their constant becoming? Whether being or becoming gets the priority—whether we see the cycle as substantive or process-based—may be not yet respond to such a question. Should we not make this kind of truthfulness question-worthy? Is there no nowness of another kind of truthfulness that is other to it, and in a sense simpler and which is situated in a place which is nearer to the inexpressibility of mattering, community and justice, truthfulness that always presences but which is silenced by the very dominance of the manner the very rupture is so readily configured so as to be conducive to the normativity of practical reasoning? How would such simple truthfulness show itself amidst the other one and how is the place of such showing? Is there no primordial suffering inflicted on beings who essentially care about such simple truthfulness of mattering by being silenced by the dominant one? Finally, how do both kinds of truthfulness manifest temporally, spatially and materially as belongingness to place from which justice call for people to dwell together? Is there no more primordial ethos here?*

### III

#### Two Notions of Truthfulness

24. Let me introduce two notions of truthfulness that Heidegger elucidated in his writings. (This summary is based on a wide range of Heidegger’s sources: [22], pp. 256–273, Sects. 27, 34, 35; [30], pp. 93–110; [31], pp. 115–138; [23], pp. 49–60. See also [6], pp. 123–133. The references to Heidegger’s lecture series *Parmenides* and *Contributions to Philosophy* are made separately. See also [7]).

25. Instead of the human ‘subject’, Heidegger wrote about *Da-sein*—being-[t] here-in-the-world. Heidegger (at a gesture-level like Wittgenstein) approached *Dasein* in its everydayness, its everyday encounters with extant things, with beings. For the most part *Dasein* lingers in commercing with the beingness of beings (including that of other human subjects). To this subject-object relationship with beings, Heidegger called *ontic*, namely epistemological, theoretical, normative, logical, and derivative ontological reflections that involve representations of the beingness of beings and their relations, crucially for our purposes, representations by and of relations between human-beings. This he contrasted with the fundamental ontological question of Being itself (hence the capitalisation), which is *the withdrawing movement of presencing* that persists alongside the beingness of beings (‘ontology’), in complementarity to it, but at the same time other and nearer than it.



The distinction between the ontic and the ontological, Heidegger called the ‘ontological difference’. The nearness of presencing is something ready-to-hand in the everyday encounter with things rather than the present-at-hand representable thing by a subject who represents. Indeed, the manner in which presencing is brought into language in contrast to the representational language of theory and epistemology, will be our concern ([6], pp. 75–78).

26. *Dasein* is that being whose Being is an issue for it. Haunted by sensibilities to ontological difference, *Dasein* essentially ek-sists, that is, always ahead of itself as a ‘human subject’. That which is nearest to it as its innermost own is essentially inaccessible and concealed as part of the very worlding *Dasein* is always thrown into. This is not an existentialist thesis whereby *Dasein* is an ‘I’ who through existence participates in new ways of being. It is rather that *Dasein* is in truth as a lack which is always different to the ontic condition in which subjectivity dawns. As ek-sistent, *Dasein* unfolds as care (*Sorge*), but not care of a subject about an object—a relationship that merely ‘exists in the ontic time’ of ‘before’ and ‘after’ and sequences of ‘now’s. Rather, ek-sistence unfolds as care, which presences as temporality where past, present and future are ek-statically still one in a manner which is not conditioned by time-making. The oneness of this temporality *presences* as ‘earlier-always-already-will-have-come. Such ek-sistence in ek-static temporality always precedes subjectivity which merely ‘exists in time’. This ek-static lingering nowness, conveys unconditioned presencing [t]hereness. Worlding always comports to the manner this nowness is ahead of, and other to, metaphysical historical time but always with inexpressible self-concealing presencing.

27. Let us contemplate *Dasein* and its being-in-the-world as a wave that originates in an unbounded ocean and try to *place* the wave’s beginning. In just a similar manner a wave is never ‘a thing-wave’ because having its beginning and end as a mere movement of water that has always been its place of origin—its thingness—*Dasein*’s thinking as subject (‘a wave’) *cares* in that it is anxiously and mindfully haunted by its origin, beginning which remains inexpressible to it as a mere ‘subject’ that encounters ‘beings’ and other ‘subjects’. Countless historical accounts of waves can be given by those who observe their movements but none would, as yet, ask the question of that origin of the moving-rising of the ‘wave-thing’. Such accounts, or phenomenology, of waves would acknowledge the mere relational complexity of waves, but would not let the beginning of the wave, as just the presencing of the housing ocean, be. The ocean has always been there, an always nearest presencing nowness that is uncanny because, while it encompasses a movement of water, all of this happen *as it*; it also gives the feeling of stillness, that uncanny feeling that no-thing actually *happens*—that the presence of the wave is simultaneous with the in-sight that there has never been one. The waveness of the wave as its rootedness in the housing ocean persists regardless of wave-cycles and relations. It persists as ancient, present, uncanny and inaccessible, a non-question to the anxious phenomenological mind, yet strangely precencing nearer to it and alongside it.

28. Thinking as an ‘I’-subject who encounters ‘beings’ constitutes an essential obliviousness to origin, thus falling into the distantiality in which *Dasein* always finds itself for the most part. *Dasein* constantly and anxiously wrestles with the

impossibility to articulate the *be-longing* to the presencing no-thing-ness, and yet all too present worldly origin of its innermost thingness that shows when encounters the worldly thingness of things. Just like a wave, Dasein being mindful of its finitude as part of this unboundedness creates the innermost compartment towards a place, to be-housed, for home, to be-long, to longing to be at a place of origin. *Dasein* continues to be haunted by origin, nearer and despite any phenomenological, epistemological and self-interpretating ‘historical beginning’, ‘life’ and ‘experiences’ which feign freedom to connect to representational origin. There is a sense that there remains lingering nowness that always continues to call as unconditional beginning—oneness of belonging that itself lets-be as the expansion into ontic insignificance, but which haunts in anxiety despite any ontic metaphysical haven of actual or potential correctness. *Dasein* is always already being essentially en-owned hovering in a temporal boundary that calls as the nearing inaccessibility of unbounded origin. In encountering the unboundedness of origin through *Dasein*’s mindful finitude of his ontic dealings, ‘truths’ and ‘worlds’, a happening is inaugurated as an originary movement of worlding *withdrawal* into a veiled clearing which is always too near to *Dasein*, yet matters most to it, one that remains estranged from its ‘experiences’ as a ‘subject’. *Dasein dwells with others in this mystery of unbounded origin rather than merely relating to them through the phenomenology of representation and expression*. The moment *Dasein* as wave can not bear its immanent beginning *as* the ocean and *as* at one with it, it turns transcendent and metaphysical, and sees itself and describes itself as a ‘human’ with certain correct aspirational characteristics as part of a rational and logical order. To such forgetfulness of immanence, Heidegger called ‘humanism’—humans steering representational meanings about both their own beingness and beingness of things. I will dwell on this below, but for now let us just note that humanism changed the relationship of man to language, turning it metaphysical and in modernity, turning it technological (technical relation of enframing and standing-reserve) [21], representational and calculative. The wave as its own innermost own happens only when it *lets* itself be claimed as always already being housed by the ocean. The deep ocean is the house *as* which it dwells *as* rooted wave. Root is not merely a foundation of wave into the ocean but rather the oneness of its own thingness with, and indeed uncannily *as*, the ocean.

29. Crucially, as *Dasein*, such rooted attunement that lets it belong to unbounded housing presencing would entail a different kind of thinking, knowing, understanding and speaking, one that requires different kind of seeing to theory, epistemology, explanation and justification—indeed an altogether different relationship to language.

30. To the truthfulness of the originary presencing withdrawal, the attunement to which is sustained as primordial song of any authentic speech, *logos*, Heidegger relates the pre-Socratic understanding of truth, *a-lethia*, or un-concealment, an originary withdrawing near/far movement of concealing and revealing that sustains emptiness that is not simply void, but rather mysteriously presences—a murmur that can not be disempowered. For the ancient Greeks, *a-lethia*, un-concealment, was contrasted with the word of a different etymological stem, *pseudos* which stood for ‘falsity’, thus strangely avoiding the simpler *lethe*—concealment. The word truth,

*a-letheia*, as un-false, then, meant *a-pseudos*, which gives us a clue as to how *a-letheia* should be originarily grasped, namely as playing to a different register than merely asserting a simple concealment-unconcealment of ontic how-whatness of the beingness of beings. This register is that of whoness-howness and it relates to temporal/spatial response to the feeling of presencing that is always already encountered as be-longing to origin. Contrary to contemporary understandings of ‘pseudo’ as ‘fake’ or ‘false’, Heidegger shows a connection between the Greek understanding of *pseudos* and *a-lethia* in that the root *lath* conveyed a sense of *forgetting*. This forgetting is not a psychological state, but rather an essential relation to the way presencing gathers as essential withdrawal in relation to a simultaneous withdrawal that characterises the ownness of a respondent to such enowning presencing—*Dasein*. Thus grasped, *pseudos* is a state of ek-sistential awing of comportment towards a self-concealing secret that never becomes an object to be *correctly made into* knowledge, namely that explains, justifies, represents or expresses. *A-letheia* presences with a sense of meaningfulness before meaning and so always as the strange that is already ‘[t]here—too near. Forgetting, *lath*, then, is linked to *pseudos* through the notion of ‘being already concealed in what is revealed’ or, ‘being always-already sheltered in its concealedness’—some veiled nearness of presencing that has always already withdrawn. *Revealing that sustains the concealed in its concealedness is the essence of truth*, essence that can be captured as *dis-closure and un-hiddenness*, just like a pseudo-name.

31. It is important to emphasise that the un-concealment of concealedness as unveiling and clearing that lets-appear, must remain distinct from merely non-concealing as a positive new, previously potential, some correct ‘said’ ([29], pp. 20–38). This movement of *aletheia* which appropriates *Dasein*, and which conceals *as it reveals*, sustains the pointing towards a trace of always already veiling sheltered withdrawal of originary presencing that nears the (t)here of *Dasein*. However, the forgetting of *lath* that nears *as pseudos* unfolds in such a way that not only does the movement of *aletheia* conceal as it reveals, but it also conceals that it conceals, thus always remaining an irreducible mystery by this double concealment to any response to the traceless trace of the call ([29], p. 24 and [23], pp. 52–54). Rather than any actual or potential *relationality* between subjects, inter-subjectivity and alterity of dwelling with other individual ‘*Daseins*’, *aletheia*, to return to the ocean, always already presences as the own-veiled waveness of the wave—the empty place of the mystery of rootedness in the ocean. *Dasein*’s innermost ownness involves sustaining truthfulness of the belongingness to the mystery as such, thus sustaining the uncanny sense of belatedness and impossibility to overcome that essential and inaccessible nearness—which is captured by the word ‘forgetting’. Further, waves dwell together *as* the ocean rather than relationally. Truthfulness resides in that presencing oneness which has always already essentially withdrawn—what Heidegger called ‘untruth-proper’. Untruth-proper involves an antecedent appropriating near/far movement of call and response, the attunement to which is not one of correctness and falsity. The withdrawing movement of *aletheia* is the presencing of the traceless trace of self-concealing presencing into which *Dasein* is always thrown, and which it guards by grounding its innermost worlding in a manner that is unconditioned by phenomenological judgements of subjectivity. Such thrownness

includes also the call to thinking which manifests as strangeness shown to its for-the-most part correctness-based involvements with the beingness of beings. To *Dasein*'s ability to respond (responsibility) to the calling of the essence of truth as untruth-proper—the comportment and attunement towards the essential withdrawal of presencing beginning—I refer to as attentive *letting*-appear of the sheltered in its concealedness (*Gelassenheit*). I call this movement *gliding*, a *call-response* of being in the midst of the withdrawing happening of the *presencing* of the actuality of the actual.

32. The essence of truth as un-truth proper (enduring concealedness) is a kind of understanding which is a gift (*es gibt*) that relates to the ek-static manner presencing is temporally, spatially and materially *emplaced*, a place of difference from untruth as falsity that relates to logic, theory, epistemology, and any representational idea that includes values, norms, standards, in short, meaning. For example, a *theory* of law, of practical reason, of community is already correctness based ([6], pp. 75–78).

33. Un-truth proper always manifests as uncanny from within a 'yes' that constitutes a 'falling' into commerce with beings and their beingness. That falling, Heidegger called *errancy* or 'counter-essence' and it is in a fallen state that humans steer meanings of 'truth' and 'false' according to a propositional theory of declarative assertions—logic ([29], p. 21). Errancy is not a part of the essencing disclosing movement of un-truth proper, but gathers as the farness by which that essencing movement gets its uncanny purchase. Being-in-errancy, Heidegger called correctness (*Richtigkeit*)—a movement that, however critical and indeterminate, retains a correspondence between representational ideas to the extant beingness of beings—that gets its reflective correct 'rightness' from metaphysical principles. The truthfulness of *Dasein*'s being in errancy with others, namely in metaphysical, representational, calculative and technological manner, Heidegger called the 'they' or the 'One'—namely being-with-other-*Daseins* within the horizon of actual and potential correctness.

34. Correctness has to be grasped broadly and encompasses '*certitudo*', '*veritas*', 'correspondence', 'coherence', 'adequacy', 'appropriateness', 'normativity', 'verification', 'explanation', 'description', 'justification', 'conformity' in a manner that affects notions like authority, practical reason, community, responsibility and ownership. To that being in the horizon of correctness I refer to as *steering*, as possible correctness(es) are steered by subjects through their ideas that *make and unmake* sense and meaning of things and places.

35. The subject that steers the movement of errancy with others is grounded in the forgetfulness of the question of Being, distanced from the capacity for non-phenomenological truth, namely as untruth-proper of presencing withdrawal. This forgetfulness of the question of Being amidst metaphysical correctness was set on course to dominate the core of the Western philosophical tradition by the late Greeks, straight into the misguided Roman translation of the word opposing *aletheia* as 'false', that is, incorrect meaning. The word false, in Latin *falsum*, comes from *fallere* which means 'to bring down' through command, that also related to the notions of law in Rome (*ius, iustum*). The mistranslation of *aletheia* into the truth/false dichotomy brought together correctness and power/powerlessness that stemmed from human wills in which the craving, and the possibility, for

normativity originates. As Heidegger shows, the untrue then became ‘that which is brought down’. Truth was related to the Roman notion of authority (*auctoritas*) that, although signified as acting from origin, still evoked ancient traditions, as steering-based beginnings with some original correct purpose ([29], pp. 39–43, see also [68]). The late-Greek turn to metaphysics became the Roman notion of authority. These sparked the Western epochs of forgetfulness of the originary authority of the unbounded origin. The wave (to be taken for both *Dasein* and its world) has begun forgetting its self-secluding-always-presencing terrestrial origin in the ocean, a forgetfulness that nevertheless never fails to haunt as a call of beginning.

36. *Crucially*, falling into the ontic *is* essential and the distance from mattering it instantiates can have many manifestations, some of which are more entrenched than others. Openness to the mystery of origin always happens as the extraordinary amidst the for-the-most-part fallen mundane horizon of correctness, that is, in complementarity with it. The rooted place of the beginning of the waves as belonging to the ocean is always emplaced as uncannily presencing vis a vis the representational relational and phenomenological steering-belonging to ‘place’ as a rootless ‘thing-waves’ on the ocean. Let us magnify into these various notions of place.

I would like to identify threefold unity of a sense of place of which: a metaphysico-historical phenomenological place that controls worldhood, beginning beingness, meaning, time and space; second, a place of ek-static boundary, or an uncanny seam that estranges the first sense and which points to another kind of understanding of presencing and thirdly, an other to metaphysical sense of place the belongingness to which is not epistemological but attuned to by letting the presencing-beginning of earth house worlding temporally and spatially.

#### Place: The Autochthonous Originary Authority of Worlding

37. The presencing of *aletheia* always already matters for *Dasein* as care, temporally remembers it in a manner which remains inexpressible and which shows as *Dasein*’s essential innermost *ek-static place amidst its ontic involvements*. How is this place of *Dasein*’s originary ek-static memory? Furthermore, how does the *place* of such ek-static memory, that re-members *Dasein* before metaphysically embedded ‘memory’, manifest temporally, spatially and materially into a sense of autochthonous/terrestrial place that presences as the hidden worldliness of the thingness of things and place-ness of sites?

38. The word *mnemosyne* evokes the mother of the muses, as the memory of the kind of knowledge that involves meaningfulness before meaning—knowledge as the resolute and unshakable ek-static memory of Being—be-longing as longing to be—longing to the be-ginning as originary presencing bee-ness—presencing that *unites be-ing* and *be-coming* rather than view them as distinct and tensional ‘being’ and ‘becoming’. The unity is the uncanny stillness of the lingering ek-static seam of the ‘be’ that always presences [t]here and calls as a place of be-longing—as a place ([25], pp. 89–91). The always-already re-turning to a place of originary memory that bears the message remains *essentially* inexpressible. To point is otherwise than to

interpret from ‘memory’ that re-covers and steers meaning (the unsaid of the ‘rootedness’ of Gadamer [13]). The emplaced beginning of the ‘now’ becomes multilayered, being always already embedded in essential withdrawal, the terrestrial presencing absence of which calls for metaphysics-refusing attunement—attunement to a ‘now’ that remembers and is always (*t*)here. Imagining *Dasein* to be a wave, let us go back to the ocean and evoke the kind of stillness the ocean shows, the always already presencing and thus remembering [t]here-ness which is concealed in its unbounded and lingering nowness. This presencing that is unconditioned by any ‘history’ and ‘memory’ of waves, the rooting quiet power of nowness that endures as a point of fateful return even amidst the most entrenched forgetfulness by subjectivity and phenomenology of ‘waves’. The now that governs the correctness-based phenomenology that expresses, explains, justifies, relates, theorises about the tension between beingness and becomingness of beings *is* always already complimentary to the persistent uncanny nowness of being—bee-ness that presences ek-statically as now-will-have-been. This nowness uncannily embodies the other-than-historical presencing of uncanny pointing, amidst errancy, to this originary song always already [t]here. The rootedness in the bee-ness of presencing in the ocean has a sense that calmly and decisively refuses the metaphysically-made tension between the ‘being’ of Parmenides (nothing happens, there *is being* and all change is illusory) and ‘becoming’ of Heraclitus (flux is primordial—any being is illusory) ([37]). Root, then—rootedness of waves *as* the ocean—is always a *seam-place* where perceivedness is that of uncanny presencing bee-ness of the oneness unbounded that evokes a fateful passage other than merely coming and going, birth and death. Anaximander’s *apeiron*, the unlimited, in which all-remembers-all-from-all-into-all—flickers as the perceivedness of withdrawing *emplaced seam* of bee-ness that worlds into the ocean as the *pathos* felt by *Dasein*’s mindful finitude that expands into ontic insignificance. The pathetic place estranges any optically-made place on the ocean.

39. The *movement* of the water evokes not only emplaced ek-static condition, but also a dim uncanny real sense of belonging to place. On the one hand, the sea, like the sky, is placeless, defying any belonging and home. But the emerging and disappearing waves evoke a ‘could be place’ and longing-to-be at the familiarity of home—but that immediately keeps disappearing into the reminder of no-place—evoking a sense of mortality of belonging that also affirms a deeper sense of belonging to something unconditional and unbounded that merely changes. The origin of the uncanny presencing rooting nowness of the sea that houses the beginning of waves constitutes the oneness of waves and the sea as their home-beginning, that emptiness of withdrawing seam that flickers, always otherwise to the home-making individuation as ‘waves’ that is merely a thing in made time and space *on* the surface of the ocean. The unconditionality of home, then, stems precisely from the *inability* to own and to juridify the sea. The sea evokes the inability of metaphysically to fix a place ‘on’ the ocean but rather forces a place that interacts with the ocean’s many secret depths which remain just hinted/pointed at by its surface movement—all en-owning emptiness that *sings desire for home—mattering—by resolutely poetising contemplation towards letting* the ocean’s many depths silently speak before signification, before denotation, before symbolisation—



quietly rendering nameless all steerings. An attunement, *not out of the crave for correctness*, but rather to the strange belongingness is *emplaced* in this unconditioned unboundeness and rooting mysterious care-free pursuit of the great law of destiny (see [14], pp. 139–155), discussing Hölderlin and St.-John Perse's notion of thresholds). The limitlessness *is* nearer than all phenomenological, epistemological *relations* ([34], pp. 189–191) and brings about a self-concealing uncanny sense of 'the open'—worlding and strange attentive-let-belong-understandingly. The ocean evokes a letting-place that worlds into the lingering nowness of beeness, spatially into the secret depth of materiality, unconditioned by any violent history, territory and material use associated with metaphysics and phenomenology of the history and political geography of juridified extant 'places' and 'things' that can be owned.

40. The land, because seemingly not moving, lures thinking towards worldiness, that is, *place-making* of history and territory the belonging to which manifests as actual or potential correctness, one that steers-places out of the land and juridify them with violent truthfulness which owns, makes and unmakes. But in the changing boundary between moving sea and land, *Dasein* evokes the sea-wave continuing to happen in the land too. *Dasein* evokes the unbounded unconditionality that instantiate as the land's surface as merely a seam that points to the inner depths and details. The seeming simplicity of the surface calls for contemplative attunement and letting-responsive-worlding so as to near this self-shealtering, withdrawing seam—the seam of the uncanny belongingness to place. Worlding then, it to attentively let the earth's inner world be, showing the land as traceless trace of rooting appropriating movement that invites our attentiveness and waiting, belonging which our worlding lets the presencing withdrawal of the movement of a place be. Worlding lets the materiality of earth evoke the uncanniness of ab-original dreaming and singing of place—being constantly attuned to ownership by earth as the knowing of place. The threefold of sky-sea-land brings in one unity the uncanny belongingness to withdrawing presencing seam of unconditioned unboundeness. This seam is emplaced as the home, the home as a call for earthing, home that attentively lets the earth house worlding into its inner depths. Evoking the unconditionality of the sea while attuning to the land happens readily in the desert that also refuses metaphysical juridification, remaining uncannily unconditioned and thus evoking that strange primordial feeling of place. The desert is an appropriating place, quiet belongingness where worldhood and its death matters little. The desert demands letting-be because uncanniness to any possible ontic place becomes very palpable as a sense of refusal, a primordial unconditionality that can be then evoked in any ontic place on the land, even in the city. However, this strange unconditionality of the showing of withdrawing seam nears while attuning to the hidden and minutely changing look, rhythms, colours, textures of nature, so well evoked by the poetry of Antonio Machado that makes words sing and dream the originary presencing inexpressibility of worlding rootedness in place—unfolding that happens to seeing which is healed of its metaphysical arrogance. Machado points at just how attentiveness that endures the temporal mystery of nature by being (t)here brings the withdrawal of the seam by revisiting the impossible repetition of seemingly the same, not out of complexity, which is still a phenomenological/logical notion—the presence of the sea is always nearer than *complexity*—but out of



sheer withdrawing presencing, inexpressible waying of nowness that does not allow worlding to condition earth as a stalled-thing-material presence, namely as merely a ‘place on the earth’. The earth always opens up, protects worlding but remains unconditioned by it, just like the ocean.

41. This sheltered terrestrial material presencing of withdrawal, one which opens up worlding, but which is unconditioned by it, Heidegger referred to as *earth* on many occasions in his later works—*physis*—which was anything but the metaphysically extant notion of ‘nature’ or a planet. This letting the housing presencing of earth be, in which earth as a place of be-ginning-of longing to be, which remembers before memory, moves and appropriates in that it lets responding-worlding be, is conveyed as the strife between world and earth in which the opening of worlding is enhanced by the self-sheltering and self-secluding presencing of earth in *things* and *places* which is *unconditioned* by any ontic history-making of world.

42. Heidegger characterised as art (which constitutes both the thingness of the work of art and of the artist) the essential encounter of mutual letting-enabling (strife) of world and earth. Earth calls for worlding the innermost ek-static ownness of which re-inforces earth’s rooting and self-secluding presencing unconditionality—a way to earth rather than on ‘earth’. The tension between them, one of call and response, is the materialisation of this emplaced seam that opens up as relationship between *techne* and *physis* the measuring of which shows as the self-sheltering presencing belongingness to thingness of things and places ([23], pp. 47–48, [14, 20, 24], pp. 57–64). Both world and earth mutually re-inforce their ek-static essence as a seam of withdrawing housed place.

43. The origin of *aletheia* that *Dasein* as worlding-being whose presencing is an issue for it can be attuned to only through letting earth own worlding as the uncanny belongingness that guards the homely place—as home-coming. Originary presencing, *aletheia*, is a near-ecology notion, whereby language retains a primordial song that nears the calling seam that emplaces worlding as withdrawing sense of unconditionality within world rather than the eco-nomic—the house management of, and ‘belonging’ to, a metaphysically-made worlding place on earth as controlling time (as history) and space (as territory).

44. Uncanniness constitutes an important dimension of the *essential forgetting* that involves the very occurrence of un-truth proper, namely that of the home, homelessness and be-longing other than historical time, be-longing that presences as art (*techne*) as the thingness of the art-work. The feeling of uncanniness is a mixture of strangeness and familiarity that any correctness essentially distorts, although we may quite often say about uncanniness that ‘there is something *wrong* about this’. In ‘What is Metaphysics’ Heidegger spoke about the encounter with Being that comes as anxiety. He distinguished anxiety from fear, the latter always having a being or an ‘object of an idea’ that grounds it, which is absent in anxiety, the origin of which remains oppressively unknown and primordial at that. Heidegger also talked about ‘boredom’, which also did not stem from any object of an idea ([30], pp. 99–101).

45. It is with this grasping of the origin of *aletheia* as withdrawing seam of worlding rootendess that the inner world of earth shows its dis-closing call for worlding as its root, that we need to read Heidegger’s reflections on Hölderlin’s poems. Heidegger meditates on the poetic essence of home-coming which involves

that uncanniness—the feeling that the familiar place, the home (*Heimat*), nevertheless looks strange. As genuine non-metaphysical home-coming to your place, the people look strange. The mountains that you used to see when you played in your childhood look strange. The strangeness that accompanies familiarity comes from some sense of presencing in which the ‘being there’ of mountains and people always already remains unconditioned by your time, your history, your perception, your being-in-a-world. But precisely because of the inescapability of this feeling of uncanniness or un-homeliness (*un-heim-lich*), there is a primordial sense of *place* which constitutes the root of *your* worlding (again, evoked very strongly in the desert) ([35], pp. 33, 41 referring to the concealed essence of the homeland sensed as a ‘gift of destiny’; [24]). The movement of *aletheia*, the truth of sheltering the uncanny in its concealedness, in its strangeness and familiarity, haunts every movement of correctness and incorrectness precisely as the uncanny earthy guarding origin of its worlding that is rooted in that which remains self-secluding and sheltered an essential due, essential injustice-*adikia*—that Anaximander referred to in his Fragment (see [6], ch. 4) Originary temporality, the ‘there-is’, which is seen from within ‘world’, is inaugurated, like the wave in the ocean, precisely by the boundary between that ‘world’ that is in time for the most part (ontic—wave) and the worlding-rootedness-as-earthing the beeness which is unconditioned by a perception of ‘time’. The temporality of worlding place remains uncanny to historical time. The uncanny, *Unheimlich*, then pertains to the temporal and spatial ‘aboutness’ of the movement of *aletheia* and involves a feeling of *place* that combines being-in-place-as-out-of-placeness—not as some exteriority to the contestable meaning of extant belonging to worldhood of historical time and territory but as the awkwardness of be-longing and estrangement. That *Dasein* ek-sists means that it is essentially a rooted, a temporal dweller in with others, and a custodian of, the uncanny withdrawing home (*oikos*). This out-of-placeness is the essence of place rather than a making-place, mere political geography of space on land, that already conditioning belongingness as a contestable, critique-bound, object of an idea of correctness. Custodianship as originary response to the cry of justice involves attunement as uncanny belongingness, genuinely other than ‘correctness’, to the pathos of place which involves *letting* place appropriates—longing to be [t]here that moves worlding. Knowing of a place would involve letting place worlding onto earth be, rather than steering a place *on* earth in which political metaphysical relations between people and between groups (so-called communities) is handled as the rupture of [in]correct justice-to-come. The call of justice and community becomes the call of erthing place to responding worlding which is other to the call of inclusion and exclusion that controls time and space.

46. As un-truth proper, *Dasein* lets the unconditional nowness, the flickering withdrawing strangeness of the seam, of the material place that houses it, be. *Dasein* ek-statically worlds be-long in caring-letting the secret essential inexpressibility of earthing place endure thereby enables the inexpressibility of worlding to endure, too. This is *Dasein*’s essential ek-static belongingness to the home—as what Heidegger would call later—the House of Being. *Dasein* measures into inexpressibility and thus letting-dwell, poetically dwells as earthing while looking up to the unconditionality of the sky that is mirrored in the sea and back to the surface of the

land on which it stands at home. In this way *Dasein* remains listening to the strange amidst the familiar ([24], pp. 218–223). The more familiar *Dasein* is with this place, attentively letting the richness of its rhythms, colours, tactile-ness, sounds, smells be—the more uncanny the showing of the essentially terrestrial presencing song discloses would be and the more uncanny the worlding would be-come endures this rooted inexpressibility. The more firm is the endurance of uncanniness the greater the belongingness to home. This strangeness of earthing presencing does *root* as a call for any worldling-responding-movement, but remains *essentially inexpressible* unconditioned by it in its unbounded (t)hereness and thus, *if endures non-metaphysically*, as essential withdrawing the song from within words. *As I shall argue in critically reading Wittgenstein, any inexpressibility that is being inhabited otherwise than the unconditionality of rooting terrestrial presencing, as a place, confines the relationship to language to that of steering-meaning, thereby rendering the enduring of inexpressibility non-essential, in that it becomes a mere deconstructive deferral of expressibility-to-come.*

### *The Gravity of Steering*

## IV

### The Ways of the City of Language

47. An argument about the creation of new possibilities of using language within the institutional context of law was developed by White who views law as an ongoing changing activity of ‘constitutive rhetoric’ ([59], pp. 687–696. For the centrality of Wittgenstein to critical political thought, see [50], introduction and Ch. 1.) In this he assumes a very Wittgensteinian tone to practical reasoning: you start by speaking the language of your audience, speaking the rules and principles and law and attempting and embark on actually changing this language—how things are talked about as part of being in a community of people—an *ethos*: here is what happens, here it what it means, here is why it means what I claim. White specifically refers to Wittgenstein here in his grasp of constitutive rhetoric as the practice of law: law invents something new out of new usage of existing language as a starting point, a gesture towards new possible meanings. Wittgenstein’s view of language explains and liberates critical *phronesis* and rhetoric as meaning-use making.

48. The late Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, as well as in the preparatory works for it and those works which followed it, demonstrated that any use of language always already bears the potential of inflecting, even undoing, itself. Wittgenstein replaces the early picture/logical notion of language, to which we will return, with the view of ‘language as a city’. With Wittgenstein’s famous imagery, language is like an ancient city with its ever changing maze of various districts, alleys, criss-crossing paths, overlapping sections and dark corners, layered buildings and sites, the visibility and linkages between which ceaselessly change; potential links are seen as we walk through the city in different directions with an imaginative attitude. Language is like a map that constantly re-maps, or re-writes, itself ([62], s. 18).

49. The city view of language is that language involves the ever-changing growing of practices and techniques that are constantly being learnt and unlearned. The walking of the city of language horizontally—walking of the everyday ([62], s. 120), exploring the possibilities of actual usage of words—is always richer than a verticality of generalisations, abstractions and transcendences that tend to stifle change. With the aid of such generalisations users of language make themselves blinded and then claim transcendent authority which makes them nearly immune to reflection that would have otherwise shown their language-use to be merely one among others. These dynamic techniques Wittgenstein called language-games and the *investigations* gives us many rich examples of their multiple instantiations. He demonstrates just how rich meaning can become depending on seeing and acting so as to modify the actual use of words. Language is always open to new ways of playing games, a technique that is acquired through play ([62], s. 23). For Wittgenstein these language games are ways of *acting* with words although, as we will see, that acting sprigs from earlier *seeing* ([64], s. 204). The *rules* of a language game can be understood and modified by those who play. The rules are always dependent on the relationship of similarities to, and distinctions from, other games and techniques. So just like a walk in a city or drawing of a map, language opens up to ‘the complicated network of similarities, overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail’ ([62], secs. 65–66, 71–77). This constant movement of boundaries redefines the multiplicity, the very creative use of language that resists the oppression of what Wittgenstein called the ‘craving for generality’.

50. These overlaps, criss-crosses and similarities of usages, Wittgenstein called ‘family resemblances’, exactly like sport games that can resemble one another. Furthermore, to inhabit a language is always already to inhabit what Wittgenstein called a ‘form of life’, that is being in a *world* within which understanding is already ready-to-hand as usage of words is practiced meaningfully and understandingly ([62], sec. 241). And here too, the boundaries between forms of life are constantly renegotiated. Any destabilisation of meanings and mis-understanding shows precisely that we are always already in language. As Tully puts it, any form of life—being-in-the-world—and with it, any sense and understanding that makes practiced sense language games and family resemblances, is aspectival, overlapping and internally negotiated ([54], pp. 7–17). Meaning changes as use changes.

51. The ever-changing paths of the city of language—the meticulous and slow ‘walking’ of it—inaugurate endless possibilities for meaning-use. These are immanent rather than conditioned by generalisations. The philosopher acts as a therapist who constantly disrupts the tendency of looking at what *is* in a stifled manner and thus the tempting crave to maintain the stronghold of generalisations. The philosopher ought to constantly and richly show possible inflections that expose the arbitrariness and contingency of transcendent principles, abstract metaphysical oppositions, methods or patterns. Rules of uncritically accepted conventional use eventually are inflected ([62], sec. 68). If meticulous, the walk of the city of language *would* encounter impasses, senselessness and misunderstandings. As new connections are being *seen* along the walk which Wittgenstein ‘took’ with his students in his lectures and dictations, the whole relationship of coherence within

the city of language, the whole lot, changes, and the myth of stability and dominant truthfulness, sense and understanding is totally replaced by emancipating openness. The process resembles a kaleidoscope. When one particle is destabilized the whole pattern of colour changes. Understanding is a dynamic process involving being always already conventionally in language, but in a manner coupled to the quite anarchical insight that there is *nothing* primordial that can serve as transcendent truth which is not itself indicative of uncritically accepted language use. *Being in* the aspectival language game, then, is the *primary* thing ([62], sec. 656). There is not transcendent truth, but only the immanent antagonism, inflections and ruptures from within conventional use.

52. It is in this way, where a possibility emerges out of encountering complexity and though the total impossibility of a total *description* that language enables its limits and there is nothing queer or mystical about it ([62] secs. 195–197). All philosophy can do, then, is to [mis]describe the world (my brackets) ([62] sec. 124). Brill calls this method ‘descriptive investigations’ ([10], pp. 7–32), namely descriptive of the variety and overlap of language game and the emergence of possibilities that move a kaleidoscope. Philosophy’s role of seeking clarity is to show that wherever a convention is formed there *is* inauguration of contradictions and if one were dwell slowly enough in her description she would reach the in-sight where a certain silencing made the positive linguistic formation possible. That moment would manifest itself as reaching the point of not knowing one’s way about and that can happen in every language game, whether it is, for example, one of justification or explanation, itself overlapping with the game of description of relations between usages of values ([62], sec. 203). Seeing and seizing of connections happens because we aim for the impossibility of complete clarity and with it the [impossible] total disappearance of philosophy ([62], secs. 109, 123–133). Importantly for critical practical reasoning, philosophy heads up against the limits of language and with it to the point where understanding gets into bumps ([62], secs. 116, 118–19). The impossibility of description opens possibilities in the face of the infinite complexity of games, family resemblances ([62], sec. 108) and forms of life that lead any description to hit an aspectival boundary. Any ‘truth’ becomes just an uncritically accepted manner of participating in a game and thus a fetter to the gesture of aspirational ‘total clarity’—a still correctness-bound [im] possibility.

53. Wittgenstein calls for the invention of intermediate cases or what he called ‘perspicuous representation’ that manifests itself as ‘*seeing* connections’ ([62], sec. 122, see [45], pp. 82–88; [9]). The notion of ‘intermediate’ resonates of course with the creativity that Aristotle’s *phronimos* must have in bending rules. Seeing intermediate cases would involve rule-breaking in language which, given family resemblances, can mean various degrees of re-writing, inflecting, changing and over-ruling.

54. For Wittgenstein, the meaning-use of language provides understanding and as such the discussion of values, similar to what Bernard Williams called ‘action guiding concepts’ ([60]), would itself be a technique in which words are used in a grammar of justification ([49]). There are other gestures that involve justification, interpretation and theory that presume epistemological reflection, all of which also

claim primordiality. For Wittgenstein, these are already conditioned by understanding that is achieved through meaning-use. However, the gestures of interpretation and theory also run the danger of rendering language use, at the moment of ignorance when words run out, authoritarian, vertical, abstracted and stifled, which, as we can discern, for ethics, politics and law might become fetters for emancipation. Understanding that comes from the technique of usage always conditions those gestures and show them to have no privileged status to other gestures that may indeed overlap with them.

55. Wittgenstein insisted that interpretation is not a source of understanding and that it must be grounded in understanding that stems from the ‘be-there’ of technique. For Wittgenstein, both theory and interpretation run the danger of stifling the use of language. I have not discussed this in detail here because my claim is that the interpretative, theoretical, applicatory, justificatory and explanatory are gestures that are correctness-bound. *A-fortiori*, if Wittgenstein’s city view of language is correctness-bound, interpretation and theory would be even more so: (see [46], ch. 5, [47], [55], pp. 35–42. For a discussion of how theory can enrich understanding when practice run out, see [15], pp. 7–17).

56. My argument is that Wittgenstein has managed to show that understanding and the grammar of justification constitute an unmediated and most immediate being in language-use. Any interpretation will already assume the inhabiting forms of life within which sense is practiced and can be practiced as the city view of language.

57. Furthermore, and crucially, through magnifying into the notions of seeing, saying and showing, I will attempt to show that Wittgenstein is the paragon of ‘post metaphysical’ thought, so loved by critical ethical, political legal thinking, but one that, because preoccupied with possibilities of meaning, and despite its overcoming the primordiality of interpretation, towards more immediate application of language use, is still captive in correctness-based potentiality and understanding.

## V

### Aspectival Language-Games and the Seeing-Saying of Steering

58. Although language games constitute acting in language, it is *seeing* that features centrally as the primordial moment of understanding. Wittgenstein’s account of the happening of critical reflection is grounded in the ‘dawning of *seeing*’ (seeing as, seeing aspects, seeing connections) all of which, I would argue, feature within an economy of orienting seeing to [in]correctness: *seeing-seeing as-saying-acting* towards possibilities of meaning. Such a continuum of seeing-saying in language, before interpretation and theory, constitutes the fountain of his defence of the city view of language, unmediated by stable generalisations or methods or principles according to which critical reflection is to be conducted. *For Wittgenstein the horizon that is inbuilt into the dawning of seeing makes the potentiality of the ‘not-yet’ seeing comported towards possibilities of correctness, and is thus correctness-based, however radically the perspicuous representations challenge any given*

*correctness*. In Wittgenstein, I argue, seeing is already comported to steering, applying, meanings. The feeling of emancipation that accompanies the radical dawning of new possibilities of meaning makes the whole movement of seeing-seeing/as-saying forgetting ever so easily its groundedness in—its being captive of—[in]correctness.

59. In the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations* (refer to as ‘II’) Wittgenstein poses the question ‘What does it mean to experience the meaning of a word?’ ([62] II 214.) Indeed that is a key question to my journey here, namely whether to experience the meaningfulness of a word can be earlier than experiencing that seeing that is already conditioned by anticipation of the word having a meaning.

60. For Wittgenstein, seeing meaning was first and foremost aspectival and he related this seeing to what he called ‘seeing aspects’. It is in the *dawning* of an aspect that experience of meaning-as-use begins critically.

61. How does it happen that potentiality in seeing becomes ‘seeing-as’, namely seeing of a new object of an idea by a subject who sees something as the ‘something’ it is? Something happens in the very movement of seeing and with it, understanding and truthfulness. It is in magnifying into such dawning of seeing which hunches towards ‘seeing-as’ that some unnoticed directionality towards correctness can be discerned, one that conditions seeing itself in a useful way for the rapture that characterises critical practical reasoning.

62. When we reflect on seeing and seeing understandingly, even in an initial manner, we can appreciate that there is *way* of seeing that precedes a reflection of ‘seeing as’. There is an event of seeing that responds to that which comes at us before it becomes ‘seeing-as’. It is this ‘*turning*’ from a primordial happening of *seeing understandingly*, a *kind of seeing that refuses the directionality towards dawning of a seeing that already anticipates ‘seeing as’ understandingly*, that I would like to dwell in and make felt. It is the origin of seeing, the happening of seeing and *how* it dawns, which is important, for it is through this event that the *kind* of understanding that pertains to the city view of language and with it critical reflection and practical reasoning, indeed the grammar of justification, explanation and normativity becomes possible. Could there not be a different and earlier kind of understanding and truthfulness? Could the turn within seeing itself be characterised as a moment of gathering *blindness* towards that earlier understanding that characterises our very constitution as a seeing-I, a seeing subject?

63. Wittgenstein’s famous example is that of Jastrow’s drawing that, mysteriously, although itself does not change, can be seen as either a rabbit or a duck ([62], II, 194). Wittgenstein attributes this to different aspects people may *have* while looking at the same drawing. Indeed, this can testify to a different ‘way of seeing’ before reflective interpretation and knowledge ([62], II, 204). Evidencing an aspect is that of *exclamation*, a spontaneous reaction to what we see and prior to any inference. ‘Seeing-as’ manifests as a direct exclamatory aspectival expression of our visual experience, with no inner entity, or a blueprint guiding. Such exclamation is one which is both a report and a cry of surprise, before anything *about* the perception is internally arranged ([62], 197, see [43], pp. 11–14). Any activity such as internal arrangement in us is already distanced in the sense of conditioning



principle, an ‘ought’ that conditions a way of seeing and, in turn, which constitutes a fetter to the very condition of possibility for the experience of the dawning of meaning. The spontaneous ‘howness’ or readiness-to-hand is an occasion of seeing that precedes any such internal arrangement.

64. To *notice* an aspect, then, is to *see* that, despite something not changing, we *see* it as something else or like something else. Importantly, again, *seeing* differently is earlier than *interpreting* differently ([62], II, pp. 193, 197).

65. There is a sense of confirmation that people feel in the awareness of ‘there is’ or ‘this is’ as in ‘this is a rabbit’ or ‘this is a duck’ with or without mindfulness of the fact that they actually under the captivity of an aspect. Therefore a mere experience of meaning by participating in a language game, in and as of itself, does not necessitate that reflective mindfulness that amounts to experiencing the meaning-ness that confirms that a given aspect conditions that experience. The actual use that dynamically bears meaning is secondary as it does not amount to experiencing the word ‘meaning’ in a primary way, namely in its capacity to carry an ‘as’ ([43], pp. 45–47). Such capacity finds the city view of language and any grammar of justification that instantiates it.

66. In perceiving and indeed articulating an experience of meaning, namely as one which is understood and which makes sense as such—as one which is seeing-understood-said ‘as that’ and which makes sense ‘as such’—we are already captive of some unreflective acceptance of the horizon of correctness, a sense that enables us to think the more reflexive correctness-based question of ‘is it truly a duck?’. The first correctness though has to do with sense only and is a condition for the happening of the second. Both, however, are united in a continuum of correctness (for a discussion between sense and truth in Wittgenstein see [66], pp. 185–187).

67. Of key importance is the notion of ‘aspect blindness’. This blindness is a lack of capacity for mindfulness that something conditions the ‘seeing of something as...’—a lack of a possibility of traversing this immediate exclamatory awareness that the sense of correct meaning is conditioned by an aspect that a person is under ([62], II, pp. 213–214, Wittgenstein likened aspect blindness to tone deafness). Of course, the aspect-blind person *would* be under an aspect and will *experience* meaning but it will not occur to her that meaning has become possible, and therefore contingent on her having an aspect ([62], II, p. 214). Because aspect-awareness is lacking, the aspect blind, like the tone-deaf can not experience what Wittgenstein called aspect *dawning*. Despite being able to experience two different ways of seeing, she will not be able to say, ‘before, I saw it as x and now I see it as y’ and that would affect the ability to imagine new connections, or igniting the *seeing* of new connections and with it loosening the seeing in a way that propels critical ability overcoming the captivity of an uncritically accepted conventional hunch ([62], II, p. 213, see [43], p. 31).

68. Aspect-dawning happens as sensibility to the alterity of another aspect. Dawning can happen, for example, as imagining something else so as to say with the exclamatory combination of report and cry, ‘oh! now I see it as a rabbit, now as a duck’ or, relationally, ‘I can clearly see how you see it as a duck and now I can see it as a duck too.’ Any ability to inflect language in a way that follows the dawning of an aspect in a complex way can have different manifestations, seeing something in

two ways or the possibility of an intermediate aspect that is unique as a result of being exposed to, or imagining, another aspect. The dawning of an aspect can indeed inaugurate an aspect ambivalence, plurality and conversion ([62], II, p. 206).

69. Crucially, the very seeing that precedes aspect dawning marks the occasion of a boundary, a limit, a loss of seeing, loss of way, a rupture, a moment of elimination of aspect that happens to the aspect-aware person. The beginning is always with seeing that traverses void-ness and loss of way. As such it does accommodate the rupture of alterity that characterises the dawning of practical reasoning that constitutes the condition of possibility for dynamic boundary within and between ethical-ethics, political-politics and a-legal/legal.

70. *Continuing aspect perception*, then, need not involve dawning of an aspect as the latter necessitates an aspect-change. Importantly, such idle continuing aspect perception is still continuous seeing and understanding which is not mediated by reflection or interpretation ([43], pp. 30–34).

71. As far as critical reflection is concerned, seeing connections is very much akin to continuous aspect perception that does accommodate aspect dawning. Continuous *meaning* perception happens as the readiness-to-hand of words for us. In this sense aspect blindness, as Mulhall suggests, manifests linguistically as meaning-blindness or as I would rather call it, meaning-ness-blindness ([43], p. 35). The inner and unique psychological dawning itself is experienced as part of a world of language and as such it depends on the prevalence of language behaviour for it to be understood in any way as ‘seeing-as’, both to oneself and to others. Only as inflection of already shared language can an aspect turn into an experience of meaning and as dawning of a new possibility of meaning ([43], pp. 36–48). Both the readiness-to-hand of the psychological experience and the experience of meaning are part of world. The midst of traversing this moment of dawning is already understood in a manner which is already pre-disposed to potential express-ability of ‘as’. Being in the midst of the ‘yes’ of dawning is already comported towards commerce with meaning which can be described *as* this or as that ([43], pp. 66–71).

72. The dependability of potential expressibility of shared language relates to Wittgenstein’s argument about the impossibility of totally ‘private’ language. Inner experiences are not a myth but rather dependent on language behaviour for their intelligibility (See Wittgenstein’s example of the beetle in a box, [62], sec. 293. See [43], p. 72). The very ability to memorise is dependent upon a person having learnt some shared world that would condition the possibility of sense and understanding to their actual and potential inner-worlding. There is no ‘inner’ that is separate but nor is that which is innermost own—psychological—completely subsumed by the behavioural. Psychological concepts constitute the aspectual elements of linguistic behaviour of language games and as such they can gain sense and understanding when expressed. Psychological dawnings are aspectual instances in which innermost, irreplaceable experiences of meaning are brought into language, on the continuum of seeing-saying/as-saying which can also be futurally encountered by others in a way that could be brought into their own psychologically irreplaceable dawnings. The constant immanence of negative and groundless potentiality that is predisposed to the expressivity of seeing-saying, characterises the

aspectival dawning of seeing connections and is at the heart of how critical reflection is immanent as the city of language is walked.

73. It is noticeable that Mulhall's view is based on a psychology of an experiencing *subject* who is accessible to itself through the seeing-saying of 'now I see it as...'. It is the *subject* who uses language in a way which describes, or reports, the directness of continuous aspect perception and in turn the continuous aspectival revision that accompanies the aspect dawning of the descriptive investigation and critical reflection. Aspect dawning can also persist for the sake of a subject that experiences the genuine rupture of alterity.

74. Wittgenstein's latter philosophy marvellously demystifies any ground, namely the very view that language is logically structured as the world. It is all about the dawning of seeing-seeing/as-saying that bring out possibilities of expressibility from existing conventional language use. On this view, the dawning of seeing is already comported to 'see-as' which is potential expressibility. Any outside for the late Wittgenstein would clearly turn out to be creatively and ethically crossing the limits of sense, or, by contrast, entrenching a transcendent principle which means oppressive stifling of meaning-use. There is nothing *worldly* in non-sensical exteriority and realising this emancipates as it throws the subject back to wrestle with the kaleidoscope of language.

75. In the latter philosophy for all its anarchic liberation of language use, then, the *inexpressible* does not have a positive role to play and is explained through the uniqueness of inner potential expressibility that stems from the irreplaceability, or uniqueness of the dawning of an aspect. Such irreplaceability of 'seeing as', as potentiality to be brought understandingly into sense-making language sustains positive value for practical reasoning and its movement of general and particular, inclusion and exclusion, by a subject who uses language creatively. A 'world' always re-emerges and re-contested with the aspectival dawning of seeing-seeing/as-saying.

76. As we shall see in Sect. VII, the *beginning* of the *nowness* of aspectival seeing may have its origin in the forgetfulness of an earlier beginning that is embedded in this *nowness*. Have we yet dwelt on the beginning truthfulness that characterises the *essencing of dawning* and in turn, the relation of dawning to seeing-saying and indeed, worlding? Is dawning of worlding a movement of aspectival inter-worldly potential correctness(s) and hence, world creation? Is not being-in-meaning-bearing world different to another kind of meaningfulness of worlding? Can there be seeing-saying that refuses the subject's perception-based directionality of seeing-seeing/as-saying of an aspect? Does not the dawning of the seeing towards aspect also give purchase precisely to a different dawning that uncannily refuses the very notion of truthfulness that is embedded in 'aspects'? Should we simply *dismiss* this question as a mystifying one or should we inquire as to the truthfulness, indeed the beginning of such mystery? *How, then, does the inexpressible begin now, that dawns as seeing-saying and what would be the significance of this question to the relationship between truthfulness, understanding and sense and to the process of dawning possibilities of meaning in practical reasoning in ethics, politics and law?* Is not practical reasoning as possibilities of language-use, and law as the institutional manifestation of practical reason, rooted

in the dawning of essential forgetfulness of the inexpressible, an essential error, one that makes the expressible important pointer at being already submerged in forgetting the beginning of mattering?

77. The radicalisation of seeing-saying/as-saying in which what is *shown* is the dawning of an aspect and, in turn the intermediate cases of seeing-connections that fuel critical practical reasoning, is *the dawning of steering*. Steering: the circumscribing of the dawning of seeing that, *although before any materialisation of meaning*, comports it to the gesture of possibility of positive meaning that makes correct sense—expressibility—and in turn, the possibility of critique, the seeing ‘eye’ of an ‘I’, that circumscribes dawning within the economy of correctness for the sake of a subject. To turn Wittgenstein’s metaphors on itself: the family resemblances of language games of correctness that, for all their enriching immanent antagonistic indeterminacy, remain steering games. But to hold as question-worthy the steering game which is captive of the horizon of correctness, however creatively this game is being engaged in—to point outside such horizon—would be to let the very notion of meaning-use—language game—to become question worthy. Such a question must raise the possibility that there must be a happening that *does* not make sense to steering seeing-seeing/as-saying and thus the moment the dawning of such happening is assimilated into a possibility within the correctness-bound seeing-saying there is violence, silencing and pain.

78. The aspectival seeing-seeing/as-saying that characterises the potentiality of worlding in Wittgenstein must now show itself to us. Forms of life are aspectival and that feature is what makes his view of ‘beginning’ emerge as ways *of* language, as a city view of infinite potentiality for the possibility of meaning. The very gesture of critique, and in turn, justice, normativity, and becoming-community, as the dawning of seeing as steering meaning, gives us possibilities of sense and understanding that are themselves embedded in the economy of correctness and in the correctness of steering economic thinking.

79. It was, then, the very notion of seeing that we had to contemplate, one that was so important for a Wittgenstein who was averse to any form of transcendence. We need to contemplate it more deeply, as the unsuccessfulness of *his oeuvre* is perhaps the *most* in-sight-full pointing to that most immediate experience of truthfulness and understanding that the philosophical tradition has forgotten.

## VI

### Hitting a Wall? Battling the Limits of Steering Seeing-Saying as the Showing-Pointing-Wondering at Non-sensicality

80. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein does seem to contemplate the possibility of another kind of understanding. In understanding a picture or a drawing, he says, there seems to be both understanding and failure to understand ([62], sec. 526). He evokes such ipseity in listening to music. There are variations in the tune which capture the gist of the piece, but it is inexpressible and unsayable and yet understood, a sense of enchantment with it, before any explanation. This basic

understanding is akin to the play of sound in the face of the vocabulary of grammar ([62], secs. 527,8). A kind of talk that is akin to experiencing music, has something *absolute* about the encounter with it, some sense of irreplaceable exactness but which is not reducible to a certain 'said'. The encounter with a poem or a piece of music constitutes an irreducible part of the happening of understanding that is characterised by irreplaceability which is at the same time inexpressible. This combination is what makes the seeing-saying different from the irreplaceability of a potentially expressible dawning of aspectival seeing-saying. The moment the subject explains the dawning to himself, that moment of turning a seeing-saying that already has a potential 'said' harboured by the very negativity of the rupture that generates the look, that moment when the 'as *what*' lures, the moment seeing is comported towards a potential said, there is a dawning that already 'gives an account of', making mattering 'this or that'. Critical reflection, while walking in the city of language, is already based on seeing-saying which is itself immanent in the irreplaceability of an *aspect* dawning. But when it comes to poems, Wittgenstein seems to lament something which is necessary and irreplaceable there but which at the same time does not imply any abstraction or transcendence. He also seems to acknowledge that this irreplaceability connotes a different happening of understanding, something that is 'expressed' only in those words in those places of the poem. For Wittgenstein, there are two essential movements of understanding, that of an understood 'said' and of something else which is irreplaceable, yet inexpressible and unexplainable and that is also being understood as such ([62], sec 531 and also 209, see also when he says that the limit of language is the impossibility to describe a fact that *corresponds* to a sentence without repeating the sentence [65], p. 13). Meaningfulness seems to become not so obviously harmonious to the primary notion of 'meaning' that, as we saw, is associated with 'seeing-aspects'. Wittgenstein senses queerness about a sense of hearing (and I would add seeing) of such a peculiar irreducible, inexpressible and irreplaceable notion of understanding ([62], secs. 532–534). When we read a poem, there is something that is in us, home to us, which is not reducible to skimming the lines for information. The sentences, says Wittgenstein, have a different ring to them. Intonation becomes very important, sometimes becoming like a talking-picture and talking-music (different from grammar?). Crucially, he says, it is not that I use the word, but rather that the words use me: 'How can the manner of expression fill words with meaning, ... Well, what I said was intended figuratively. Not that I chose the figure: if forced itself on me' ([62], II, p. 215). The forcing happens understandingly in a sense which demands a person to let it claim her rather than assimilating it into the dawning of an aspect. The seeing-*letting* happens *understandingly* before dawning of aspectival understanding. Is there a sense of understanding in which words always already claim me in a way that I can not explain but which is nevertheless absolutely mine, namely matter most?

81. I sense that in these passages Wittgenstein seems almost to express discomfort with the main thread of the city view of language at the heart of the *Investigations*. However, surprisingly, but as I will argue, tellingly, the themes of unsayability, silence, and with it something absolute, potent, wonderous and irreplaceable that is paradoxically associated with silence and inexpressibility, is a

central theme in Wittgenstein's earlier reflection where logic and correctness were very much an explicit aim of his endeavours. It is in the earlier work that we find the far stronger pointer to the positive possibility to 'otherwise' to, and nearer than, the economy of the how-what of the seeing-seeing/as-saying of correctness—a clue to significance before signification. Much of his reflection is explicitly devoted to the mystical, the non-sensical, that which can be *shown* but never *said*.

82. In his early work Wittgenstein had a logical picture correspondence theory of language. There were arguably two broad themes in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, published in 1921. The first is that the world was logically structured as facts which were made up of states of affairs that were expressible in logical propositions. The role of philosophy was to clarify and make logical order out of the unclear mess of actual use of language, thus approximating underlying clarity of simpler propositions and names—thus achieving correctness that consists of logical representations—pictures—the complexity of the world ([61], props. 2.12, 4.01, 4.021. 4.12). It is this *correct* underlying logic of true/false that moves language, thus overcoming its actual use ([61], props. 4.022–4.04. See the series of propositions about the picture view of the world all which conveys the sense of truth as correctness: 2.034–2.225) Quite explicitly the main goal is correctness and some sort of correspondence, representation: 'In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality' and 'The agreement or disagreement of [a picture's] sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity' ([61] 2.223 and 2.322). For the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*, propositions of logic are themselves pure tautologies, sense-less, have no sense and precisely because of that they can be sense-giving.

83. Second, the earlier work points to what is left *outside* worldly sense—out of sayable states of affairs. The sense *of* the world must lie outside it and thus any enduring sense that is not accidental must lie outside world and thus essentially must not make sense. It must be non-sensical ([61], prop. 6.41, see [42], ch. 4). Non-sensical propositions are outside the limits of language, and thus outside worldhood and outside the totality of propositions that make up language ([61], prop. 4.001). They are non-sayable—inexpressible and mystical.

84. The connection of non-sensicality with out-sidedness *seems* to be different to the later work, where there *is* no outside. Part of the immanence of the *Investigations*, is to be suspicious of any outside. Language generates possibilities out of itself in infinite ways and the moving aspectual dawning makes for the shifting boundary of potentiality that embattles the limits of language. But it is precisely in the needlessness of asking the question of non-sensicality that the later philosophy conceals its clinging to correctness behind the panoply of immanent inflecting usages. We can ask whether a potent limit which bothers the picture view of language ought not to also haunt the city view. Could it be that Wittgenstein has never abandoned the notion of truthfulness-as-correctness he was working with, but merely radicalised it into possibilities of correctness by the aspectual city view of language? To get a clue, we should look at the earlier phase/philosophy where correctness is explicit and look for pointers there to something otherwise than correctness, pointers unconvincingly rendered needless in the later philosophy.

85. Wittgenstein maintains that non-sensicality is meaningful to us, *matters* to us, despite being other to any possible sensical use of language, to any possible expression. ‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.’ ([61], prop. 6.522).

86. ‘A thought is a proposition with a sense’ said Wittgenstein ([61], prop. 4) and so non-sensical propositions can be *shown* but their saying can not be a sensical saying in a sense of a *said*. The only manner of having absolute force, namely sense that is not contingent upon expression of being-in-a-world, is by showing it through non-sensical propositions, namely through something that can not be seeing-seeing/as-saying but rather a proposition that relates to seeing-saying-showing and which is essentially mystical *vis-à-vis* any saying that is capable of sense which is part of a world ([61], prop. 4.1212). Seeing non-sensically refuses a turn within seeing towards seeing-as. In the last pages of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein points at non-sensicality which is highly important and ethical precisely because of some sense of importance and feelings that are not reducible to any expressibility. Famously, as we cannot speak about these propositions we must pass over them in silence ([61] prop. 7).

87. With the last part of the book, then, the meaning of silence changes, as it is silence which *shows* us, points us to non-sensicality that Wittgenstein claims is ethical. The ethical saying of value-ness is non-sensical and must not be accidental, must not be simply an instantiation of expression of world. Once ethical expression is made it is not, in itself, of absolute force and equal to any other expressed proposition ([61], props. 6.42, 6.421). Astonishingly, reading the last remarks of the *Tractatus* shows that grasping such ethical showing of non-sensicality seems to be *the most important thing in the book* ([61], props. 6.423, 6.43). There is a sense that non-sensical propositions matter and can be shown in a manner that indeed Wittgenstein could *see* and feel but which has to remain unsaid.

88. In the penultimate proposition to the book it becomes manifest that the non-sensical is that all-important possible impossibility of the work, *its all point*—the sense in which the whole *Tractatus* is grounded in Non-sense and thus in silence. The propositions in the book are steps of the sayable, a ladder of the sayable, to climb beyond them, throw the ladder and see the world aright ([61], prop. 6.54). They are themselves, indeed logic itself, is grounded in the un-sayable and yet presencing in the world some sense of out-worldliness, that in a truthful sense *embattles not merely the limits of this or that world but worldhood as such* and which is highly ethical. Again, while the later philosophy urges us, indeed forces us into immanent sayability, the early work point towards a beyondness, outsideness that is otherwise to its correctness, but, still from the perspective of truthfulness-as-correctness has to be viewed, mystically, as non-sense that wonderously matters to us, perhaps the most. Crucially, there must be something in the earlier philosophy, the traversing of which does not simply push us into the inflecting creativity of language use, but which can resist that pushing, which involves letting, and stands on its own feet as ‘there is’.

89. Some further clarification of non-sensicality and its relation to ethics comes in the subsequent ‘Lecture on Ethics’, which was given by Wittgenstein in 1929 as well as in a note on Heidegger that he gave that year. (Curiously the same year as Heidegger’s inaugural lecture, *What is Metaphysics?*) He advances the argument



that all judgments of relative value can be shown to be equally descriptive statements of facts. Ethical statements can be distinguished from statements of relative value in that they seem to point towards something absolute. However, the moment this absolute is said and expressed it becomes a mere statement of relative value. Once expressed, ethical statements become nothing more than additive factual propositions that could be assembled in a collection of a large book of ethics but none of them say the absolute because the absolute can only be said by misusing language. Being statements of facts, such propositions are of equal weight ([61], prop. 6.4). None *express* a judgement of absolute value although they do point at it.

90. Any articulation/expression that describes ethical goodness will be somewhat analogous to the use of the word 'goodness' in saying that 'somebody is a *good* pianist' or that 'this chair is a *good* chair' or 'he is a jolly *good* fellow', but at the same time it is more than all these statements and points, through simile to something more fundamental and at the same time inexpressible. However, unlike a normal simile, if we were to drop the simile there would be no facts remaining. All articulations of value would seem to stem from some absolute value of goodness with no referent but which, oddly, can be experienced. The absolutely valuable can only be encountered as that which is essentially inexpressible and non-sensical—valuable before expression through values. ([61], props. 6.42, 5.421). The entertainment of such statements and their presence, despite the nonsensicality, bears the ethical force. Note, again, that Wittgenstein does not say that the absolutely valuable *is not*, or that it has no presence, but only that it is essentially inexpressible. The very turning of what is ethical into a worldly ethical 'said', in reducing it to sense, also reinforces its importance.

91. In the *Tractatus*, both the mystical, and the non-sensical have the presence of *wonder*. Wittgenstein argues, and this is a very important formulation for us: 'It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists', and then he added that that mystical is feeling the world as a limited whole ([61], props. 6.44, 6.45). The presence of wonder *at* existence features strongly in the Lecture on Ethics too.

92. There is a crucial difference between, on the one hand, wonder at the saying of language that endures inexpressibility—bearing a message, and, on the other hand, wonder that imagines an outside to language. The difference is important because it has implications for how that which signifies the boundary to expressibility can be brought back into language. We will come back to this point shortly. But it is important to note that the first notion is *not* discussed by Wittgenstein. The wonder *that* the world exists is a statement which is outside, a statement which gives a feeling of *exteriority* to the wonderer who feels outside world.

93. In the lecture, Wittgenstein shares his own moments inhabited by the wondrous reflection of 'how extraordinary *that* anything should exist'. The other experience of such suspension he characterizes as the experience of feeling absolutely safe—that feeling that nothing can injure whatever happens, that feeling of being unsusceptible to any threat ([63], p. 4). Both of these statements connote nonsensicality. It would be nonsense, argues Wittgenstein, to articulate that I wonder at the existence of the world because I can not imagine it non-existing. Or, it would be nonsense to articulate that I am absolutely safe because it is impossible

that certain things will happen to me and at the same time to feel that I am absolutely safe *whatever* happens to me.

94. There is something deeply true and yet equally unsatisfying, in associating the unconditionality of ethical showing of non-sensical experience of wonder, showing that points outside to worldhood within which we can only talk about possibilities of meaning (taken to the utmost in his late philosophy). Such a stance either leads to an evasion of taking sides, because non-sensicality, *can not*, tellingly as yet, make inexpressibility a kind of a positive response to suffering. Thus, its only power of wonder is to constitute a realisation of void that can be traversed as wonder-ous and its effects are to destabilise any actual expressed grounds of actual response within the grammar of possibilities of language use introducing radical alterity to it, or, to use the language of the later philosophy, introducing radical Levinasian asymmetrical alterity as a rupture that, as we saw in Sect. II, precedes aspect dawning which again, of course, reduces it to worldhood. The outsideness of the wonder generates radicalisation for the sake of, and by, the steering subject who uses language. The nonsensicality and inexpressibility that claims exteriority, is valuable *not yet in itself* but only in so far as it generates the contingency of any grounds for an expressed proposition. *The positivity in the midst of ethical inexpressibility remains a vacuum, an exteriority which is a kind of transcendence—that still can not explain the ethical importance of a kind of truthfulness for the sake of which inexpressibility is endured.* The ‘otherness’ that it generates to the seeing-saying of possibility of expressibility is expressed in terms that do not enable us to do anything other than to fall back into radicalised worlding that is understood as seeing-seeing/as-saying of the later philosophy that indeed does not bother to mention the mystical anymore. This otherness could be made important but is only hinted at. The positively *mysterious* impetus remains somewhat of a *stale* wonder that the world exists and that traversing of which merely re-emerges as possibilities for different use which distort the genuine outsideness.

95. Wittgenstein’s early reflections on language, their combination of correctness *and* the mystical, presents a tension that highlight total ejection of truth as the birth of possibility of *other* meaning, thus constantly embattling the limit of any given correctness-based being in the world with others, and open to the possibility of worlding-otherwise, but which is still creativity within the economy of correctness. Wittgenstein points to, *yet eschews the seeing that is needed to overcome this limit as mere non-sensicality, which is a correctness-bound notion albeit at the limits of correctness.*

96. Wittgenstein thus escapes the *genuine* burden of inexpressibility as possible un-truth-proper as the presencing of worlding as it comes to be and endures—the quiet power of *speaking* in silence as the essential emptiness of beginning that matters. *Wittgenstein’s wonder and his notion of the mystical are not yet uncanny.* It does not transform truthfulness itself and neither did the later philosophy, despite its possibility of inflecting and undoing any possible truth. As in Sect. II, the place of potential outsideness that characterises the ethical rupture of the limit of sense is still in the house of humans’ steering possibilities of sense-meaning-correctness. He seems to be bothered by, but has not as yet explained, the kind of *truthfulness* in a poetic gesture and of that strange thingness in the worldliness of beings which is not ‘outside’ world and which is endured in the pointing ‘whilst’ of poetic saying. whose place as the call of justice always estrange the place of justice as [in]

correctness to come. Beginning of Wittgenstein, as the constant emergence of *ways of language* coupled to non-sensicality, is still captive to Socratic truth and, as we shall see, through its radicality symptomises the mature and entrenched forgetfulness of beginning entrenched by overwhelming the need to think-back the way to language. *As we will see, the very sensibility of being-in-a-world for Dasein always already involves a more primordial emplaced worlding ek-static movement that is mindful of the origin of withdrawing, self-sheltering rootedness, in a manner that uncannily calls as the song of words that remains strange to any steering meaning from within and as relations of emplaced [in]correctedness between, and, in turn ontic belonging to, worlds.*

97. The term ‘non-sensicality’ that is shown, pointed at from world, can not carry out the pointing as it simply throws thinking back to the creative steering city view of sense-making as the dawning of seeing-seeing/as-saying. Despite the inflection of use-meaning, the basic steering relationship to language remains unchanged and his understanding is all for the sake of human craving for possibilities of said(s)—[in] correctness coupled with total rejection of truth—perfect combination for critical thinking and practical reason. *That* kind of limitation indeed seems to bother him as if he felt that it is still very different from the *threshold* of presencing nearness and which roots the dawning of worlding and the meaningfulness of presencing. But his inability, if made thought-provoking, can point to *another understanding* and make it significant in a manner that remains uncanny to what he saw as a ‘limit’ of world, and a ‘limit’ of language, thus in turn grasping his earlier philosophy as showing, pointing at earlier and uncanny beginnings. The relationship between seeing, showing and saying and with it truthfulness itself, as indeed pointed at from the commerce of correctness, must be transformed.

98. The seeing-saying-showing that grounds the critical movement as the city view of language as well as non-sensical propositions are about embattling the limit of possibility of meaning but the limit that is embattled is *not yet uncanny* and merely constitutes complementarity between steering meaning for contestable belonging to a ontic place and world and still ontic placeless exteriority.

99. It is the combination of irreplaceability and inexpressibility which is very important, a sense of responding in language to an appropriating temporality/spatiality/place of presencing event and sustaining uniqueness of it in being humble before the appropriation of it, humble before the *look of mattering*. Such a combination requires a different view of seeing-saying-showing—that of the attentive letting—that of gliding on the way to language.

### *The Grace of Gliding*

## VII

Language, Being historical and Memory of Be-ginning: ek-Static Guardianship of Be-ginning Amidst Forgetting Humanism

100. In his lecture ‘The Nature of Language’ Heidegger said:

We speak our language. How else can we be close to language except by speaking? Even so, our relation to language is vague, obscure almost speechless. As we ponder this curious situation, it can scarcely be avoided that every observation on the subject will at first sound strange and incomprehensible. It therefore might be helpful to us to rid ourselves of the habit of always hearing only what we already understand. Thus my proposal is addressed not only to all those who listen; it is addressed *still more* to him who tries to speak of language, all the more when he does so with the sole intent to show possibilities that will allow us to become mindful of language and our relation to it. (my emphasis). ([27], p. 58)]

101. Why is our relationship to language said to be ‘almost speechless’? Why Speechless? Why ‘almost’? There is a feeling that there is certain question-worthiness that conceals its own origin and that our impossibility to ask it is precisely what gives purchase to it, points to its presence. The moment of aboutness of ‘about-speech’ is a moment of questioning that remains hidden *through* the very speech which is thought about. In ‘Language’ Heidegger emphasises the need to be in the midst of the happening of language rather than to *give account* of the ‘nature of language’:

We do not wish to reduce the nature of language to a concept, so that this concept may provide a generally useful view of language that will lay to rest all further notions about it. ([19], p. 188)

102. This hesitance with which Heidegger approaches language stems from the troubled and complex manner in which the ‘now’ and ‘*beginning now*’, and the ‘now speaking about’. Our ‘now’ is already embedded in mature metaphysical thinking in which the predominance of phenomenology and technical relations enframe the relations to language. But this metaphysical ‘now’ always already harbours the strange presencing of withdrawal at its midst. The ‘now’, then, is multi-layered and internally troubled although always one. The essential ek-static mortal condition that always attunes to and indeed remembers, earlier than metaphysical ‘memory’, lurks as the unsaid of nowness. Speaking ‘now’ evokes the originary condition of uncanny ek-stasis which itself always calls as ancient remembrance that is instantiated into an uncanny call.

103. Memory: thinking *now*, then, is essentially thrown into the haunting single un-thought of metaphysical epochal history and memory (referred to as ‘history’) including that of the philosophers of these epochs. The now lurks in any metaphysical ‘now’, pointing at the mis-taken founding moment of this history. As a remembering pointer that estranges, as murmuring mattering the very thinking with correctness of the epoch, this un-thought remains estranged from metaphysics and constitutes the temporal ‘forward that thinks back’—the negativity of Being-historical (genuine history). Being-historical fatefully moves ‘history’ towards return to beginning.

104. Furthermore and crucially, Being-historical, as it presences, points to a temporality, and originary memory, other than the historical essencing of Being, that is at the lingering nowness of the sea, the unboundedness of which remains

unchanged. Un-truth proper belongs to the essential withdrawal of Being itself, withdrawal that persists with and without metaphysical mediation—oneness the unconditionality of which persists otherwise to the ‘inauguration’ of the tradition and which will survive its ‘demise’, a oneness that enacts the other-than-historical *aletheic* attuned worldliness of *Dasein*. This still nowness, the essence of truth as un-truth proper is a non-historical dimension and constitutes always the murmuring stillness of the emplaced seam of the [t]here. The uncanny emplaced seam of nowness as the [t]here of the origin of justice (*dike*) points to the presencing un-thought of the forgotten ([33], pp. 29, 40–44). Along the ‘historical’ duration and its ‘memory’, then, Being-historical brings forth the quiet power of the other-than-historical along-sidedness of the essential untruth-proper of beeness. Being-historical prompts a re-turn to the beginning of metaphysical forgetfulness showing that the whole tradition is but a wave in the nowness of the sea. However, at the same time, it points earlier than the tradition, to the possibility of living the essential inexpressible nowness without the historical temporality forced by the un-thought of successive metaphysical epochs—living ab-originally.

105. The metaphysical ‘chase’ of justice is always haunted by an earlier presencing uncanny calling by justice in art, a strife between world and earth that is always already emplaced [t]here and estranges historical metaphysical time and which as the traceless trace, that emptiness, that Being historical points to—a strange belonging to ek-static place amidst metaphysical ‘places’. This points even earlier, to the possibility of *genuine notion of different living without metaphysics*, namely the essentially inexpressible untruth-proper to be encountered as the mysterious everydayness of place without the mediation of the Being-historical that itself estranges metaphysical mediation—an ab-original worlding presencing of place as temporal but otherwise than historical sensibility.

106. In the duration of the mature epoch of metaphysics, world-world movement, the truthfulness that belongs to it, and with it steering relationship to language becomes nearly totally self-affirming, the originary strange presencing of Being-historical nearly totally abandons beings, buried under plenary metaphysico-technological making and unmaking of—controlling—time and space. But its nearly total abandonment already gives purchase to the most intense epoch of the prophetic *effacement* of the re-turning saving power—a second-ary-beginning by Being—through the violent sense of dismay that sets free, which takes the tradition back to its inauguration. The second-ary-beginning fatefully re-returns to the first/primary beginning that *sent* the secondary as fate long ago at the start of the forgetfulness of Being by the metaphysical tradition. The tradition has always contained the seeds of its own decay, self-inflicting violence and demise as the becoming, re-turning to its beginning after metaphysics matures. The second-ary-beginning effaces as the other kind of understanding and presencing that is nearly totally buried under technical relations of controlling material, time and space as well as under a cycle of entrenched notion of ‘freedom to steer’ in which ‘post foundational’ steering critique responds, ‘resists’, to ‘unnecessary suffering’ a near total cycle of explanation, justification and normativity of critique that covers-up forgetfulness.

107. This metaphysical tradition and its unfolding ‘history’ has transformed man’s relationship to Being and in turn to language, reducing both to a subject/object relationship and to commerce with the beingness of beings. But language always remembers, through pointing Being-historical at the seam of the essentially inexpressible song of be-ing despite it being submerged in the distanciality of the critical meaning-making of metaphysics.

108. In this multi-layered way Language speaks *now* precisely as the uncanny saying that refuses steering metaphysics and which constitutes a call for attunement to think-otherwise, to understand otherwise than through actual and potential denotation. As this saying, language remains the (un)thought there-ness of the *place* of withdrawal as the home of the singing-presencing of *logos*, a place that remains estranged from the metaphysically-rendered ‘*logos*’, namely that representational language and logic. ([37]) Mortals—ek-static dwellers in the place of the uncanny—despite their metaphysical will, remain anxiously attuned to the (un)thought of the originary withdrawal of presencing, the bestowed gift of worlding that remains unconditioned by, and strange to, ‘historical’ metaphysics and its ‘places’.

109. In ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947) Heidegger refers to language as the ‘house of Being’—the home, an essential *place* for *Dasein*, where thinking concerns the relationship between Being and man: ‘In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being in so far as they bring the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through their speech.’ ([18], p. 217) *Dasein*’s stake in language is not of a worlding-steering potential ‘I’ that uses words in this or that way as making-time and place on earth for itself to narrativise its belonging. Rather it is in letting itself be housed in the withdrawing nowness of the [t]here with other *Daseins*—as always-already-will-have-been called for worlding. As respondent, *Dasein* is fore-linguaged in a place of the whilst the measuring of which lets its ek-static essencing dwell.

110. Heidegger reminded us of the early Greek saying that mortals are *zoon logon echon*—animals that are endowed with the capacity of speech. Speaking *is* their essence. And yet, strangely, Heidegger comes up also with this passage:

‘But if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless. In the same way he must recognize the seduction of the public realm as well as the impotence of the private. *Before he speaks man must first let himself be claimed again by Being*, taking the risk that under this claim he will seldom have much to say. Only thus will the pricelessness of its essence be once more bestowed upon the word, and upon man a home for dwelling in the truth of Being.’ (my emphasis) ([18], p. 223)

111. This passage conveys an attentive and humble sense of a long forgotten sense of speaking silence that, as silence that does speak Being, in letting presencing be, an imperative of gliding in language. Man has to unlearn certain ways of speaking in order to re-learn this silent speech that constantly imposes silence on itself—that prevents its saying ever to become an actual or potential said. As Being-historical such speech always *points*, and thus re-turns, to originary essential withdrawing worlding condition of be-ness. Man forgot how to be claimed by Being

because of the birth and persistence of these successive metaphysical epochs and, with modernity, a technological epoch, each grounded on principles of what Heidegger called ‘*humanism*’—the epochal creation of metaphysical principles for the critical thinking of man’s world and ownness. The late Greeks the forms of Plato and Aristotelian metaphysics passed over to the Romans an ‘essence of man’ which was constantly articulated to distinguish their humanity, their *humanitas* from mere animals, marking both characteristics of the human but also aspirational qualities (for example, as ‘educated’ for the Romans, ‘Children of Christ’ for Christians, ‘man of society’ for Marx, an ‘individual’ in the Enlightenment, a being whose existence precedes its essence for existentialists). For humanism man is seen as a *homo animalis* just like he understands other animals. Thus there was the emergence of a possibility that there was always something *correct* which could be said about him. Its unique *humanitas* that essentially ek-statically resists steering correctness was thereby forgotten, its burden *seemingly* relieved, the sensibility of experiencing this *humanitas* buried, but in a way that can not eliminate it. The *humanitas* of the *homo humanus* has become a ‘characteristic’ which, with the violent steering power of self-understanding turned the authority of *physis* into that of extant ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’, temporality into control of time called ‘history’ and place into ownership of ontical space or territory. Place has become juridified human craft that is owned on a malleable earth, over which epochal humanism could violently celebrate its own achievements, justices and injustices. Imprisoned in the regenerating kind of controlling time and space that the history of humanism(s) brings about, the ‘humans’ have become obsessed with power and powerlessness—with territory and its spatial and material ‘authoritative’ control as sovereignty, membership and in our epoch with ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’ and other inclusion/exclusion subject-based language. These include also the Foucauldian making history of the ‘present’ which, despite opening places and spaces for resisting control and bio-power, is still phenomenological and obsessed with ‘life’, and still steering the ‘history’ of successive correctnesses but never with the essential Being-historical, namely the unthought that remains still and present [t]here, an absence that leaves Foucault’s account ultimately unresponsive to the double-concealment of presencing.

112. With Humanism, the *authority of beginning has become metaphysical*. With humanism, *zoon logon echon* was translated into *animal rationale*, with the problem that the *humanitas* of ‘rational’ was interpreted metaphysically, namely viewing reason as ‘originary’ relationship to the beingness of beings—the realm of derivative ontology (and its epistemology). Humans essentialised themselves as beings whose *beingness* constituted their essence and so established a relationship to language in which they approached beings in their beingness, giving account of themselves as part of beingness as a whole. The human relationship to language has become governed by epochal metaphysical principles that constituted their world and horizon of critical correctness. Humanisms and their correctness-preserving ‘history’ brought about the seemingly concrete *praxis* that conditions ‘economic’—representational, allocative (justice), and representational normativity—*oikos-nomos*’ or ‘house management’—the steering world and world change that grounds the response to ‘unnecessary’ suffering in ethics, politics and law. This steering has



forgotten the essencing of *nomos* (as mortal worlding) in the withdrawing *logos*—as guardian of withdrawing housing—the home-dweller of, presencing en-owning *logos*—*oikos logos*—the essencing of ecology that is nothing ‘logical’, but rather guardianship of Being-historical and untruth-proper in the midst of the economic thinking of humanism’s ‘history’ ([18], p. 262).

113. During ‘history’ art embodies also a strife the uncanniness of which happens as metaphysical ‘worlding’ that powerfully attempts to unsuccessfully condition the presencing of earth. However, as an originary call of justice, earth remains self-secluding historical unthought and too-near presencing that can not be disempowered. The saying of the work overcomes metaphysics, its saying opening up as the unthought of the whole tradition. The power and powerlessness that characterised world overcoming and creation under mature metaphysics have become the form of humanism most oblivious to ek-static worlding as *techne* the inexpressibility of the saying of which is rooted in unbounded and self-sheltered beginnings of *physis*, *terrestriality* which remains unconditioned, as emplaced uncanny seam *vis-a-vis* this ‘post foundational’ epoch in the ‘history’ of humanism.

114. As metaphysical, the authority of ‘world’, world overcoming within an epoch and towards the turning over to the next epoch, become that of *oikos-nomos*—house-management—that violently controls temporality through ‘historical’ analysis of subjection and liberation. Metaphysically-made ‘place’, ‘belonging’, sovereignty, ownership, responsibility and above all the connection to earth become *both* the place on which territorial communities are founded by a metaphysical sense of ‘injustice’ cloaked as ‘authority’, as well as the territorial place in which the articulation of injustice and *praxis* of ‘justice’ that ‘authoritatively’ responds as house management to the very suffering metaphysics generates. The perception of suffering as unnecessary just serves to indicate its rootless origins.

115. Thus, under the dominance of the mature forgetfulness of humanism(s), speech-law (*logos*) has become steering metaphysical and technological grounding of the true/false of logic. *Logos* has become a way of rationalising ‘human’ being—‘logos’ as the logic that justifies an account of the beingness of beings. Heidegger shows how each epoch has its own people dwelling together in ‘humanism’, its own durational ‘fallness’ into metaphysical principles that govern correctness, indeed its own controlled time and space. (For a seminal account of Heidegger’s epochal forgetfulness and re-turn to the Greek sending origin, see [52].)

116. Bringing of course not only Habermas but Derrida, Agamben, Levinas Nancy and Wittgenstein (and those who rely on Wittgenstein in Politics, e.g. Tully to evoke, how ironically, ab-originality into critical constitutionalism [54]), into this discussion, *the very gesture of radical critical reflection still explains and justifies and thus condition creativity in a manner that inhabits normative horizon that is metaphysical*. Heidegger saw the completion of the metaphysical tradition of humanism(s), the coming towards re-turn to the beginning of the tradition, as a period of antagonism that, with Nietzsche, seemingly overcomes any metaphysics, hailing ‘becoming’ over ‘being’. The most radicalised of contestation still constitutes an overcoming of metaphysics *as a metaphysical principle*, because of the prioritisation of the meaning of the beingness of beings and being-in-sequential historical time. The relationship to the meaning of beings is not yet overcome but

merely radicalised. This epoch of ‘post-metaphysical’ humanism in which the *act of making-meaning* as beginning self-cloaks its humanism in the voidness of the radicality of critique. Such beginning steers worldly correctnesses in language to the extent that in our days, our ‘now’, attentiveness to the uncanny call of inexpressible origin becomes needless—necessitating us to be *almost* speechless in contemplating our relationship to language. Anxiety and violence amidst technology and ‘post metaphysical’ antagonism becomes intense behind the façade of liberation from the essencing of truth, from the ‘there is’ of earth. Distances shrink with mobility and instantaneousness but nearness is at its most distanced. (see [20], pp. 163–167) The last epoch that completes the metaphysical tradition conceals its metaphysical nature—concealment that signals the near abandonment by Being—totally ‘critical’ dealings with beingness—‘post metaphysical’ and ‘post-foundational’ humanism. This mature decay of the West towards the completion of metaphysics and the re-turn to beginning is evident when even art, by and large, becomes technical standing-reserve (see [36] pp. 23–31). In this epoch, tragic near-total forgetfulness occurs within the radicality of rootless steering world-world movement. While in previous epochs, even the enlightenment, there was a yearning for beginning (Romanticism) this yearning is now nearly-totally been substituted by the ‘post-metaphysical’ radicality of post-foundational, seemingly non-transcendent critique.

117. It is time to reiterate the importance of autochthonous/terrestrial materiality of *aletheia*: a non-metaphysical response, namely to the *withdrawing* seam of the beginning of worlding would be to *point* to a place, without steering, in which inexpressibility originates and endures as such, a place in which subjectivity—the very kind of ‘seeing/seeing as’ the ‘post metaphysical’ correctness-based worlding Wittgenstein was still captive of and had to inhabit, namely the world-world movement—has no place.

118. Seeing *aletheia* as letting-worlding with world as the core point of potentiality and inexpressibility, care and death, a poetic saying that *endures* the inexpressibility that is still world-world relation—and hence meaning—based, would be subjected to an ongoing later Wittgensteinian criticism of being a merely arbitrarily conditioned—a sophisticated way of using ‘inexpressibility’ to uncritically accept an aspect. On such a view, any ‘*endurance*’ of inexpressibility as the ‘uncanny’ and potential negativity for overcoming existing ‘what’-coordinates of worldly contestation itself smacks of potential oppression and positive transcendence (see [66] p. 189). It would not endure the inexpressible as inexpressible presencing song. Such ‘*aletheia*’ would still be correctness-based, namely yet to be de-constructed. For it to be other than merely bearing potentiality of correctness the poetic saying would have to endure and always already merely point to a still earlier and more originary nearer presencing whose withdrawal, and the worlding the perceivedness of which responds to its call, can not be dependent on meaning. The relation to language has to be transformed into a attentive *letting* so that both the seeing and saying conveys nowness that has already withdrawn both essentially and as un-thought, historically, and which is endured as *essentially* inexpressible.

119. As far as a mere correctness-based ‘*aletheia*’ is concerned, we saw that an exteriority of *pure* potentiality that negates worldhood as such towards the inevitable injection back into worlding, radicalised as rupturous beginning ethically,

politically and legally, would also generate an Other to the mere arbitrary feeling of pathetic ‘suchness’ and ‘there is’ that is uncannily ‘correctly’ felt by the poet, one that that seemingly and oppressively hold to aspect-meaning rather than endures *presencing* the nearness of inexpressibility as inexpressibility. The belongingness to the beginning, the place, of the ‘there is’ of the inexpressibility of that presence endured by the poet would be deconstructed as just another oppressive expression of totality of being-with—just another radically potential speech way of speaking and thinking, indeed just another transcendence of a *metaphysics* of presence. Thus, the combination that constitutes a moment of radical beginning with seemingly no metaphysics as offered by Wittgenstein is the most radical expression of worlding and world overcoming that is complimentary ruptured by alterity even in relation to oppressive world-world poetic *pathos*. This alterity throws speech back into worldhood in a radical way. On this view of worlding, Wittgenstein does deal with the potential uncanniness from within world responding to it with the potentiality of traversing the mystical undecidability. Therefore, the beginning of inexpressibility that enables it to endure still remains question-worthy in a way that must not be grasped as the origin of worlding within contestable ‘what-worldhood’ or as exterior to such worldhood.

120. The beginning of the Wittgensteinian compound is still actual and potential beingness of beings—correctness of worldliness. The inexpressibility remains that of self-cloaking steering correctness and thus humanism, self cloaking because claiming to inflect a kind of what-understanding instantiation of world. In order to overcome this self-cloaking, refuse it in the *now*, and to genuinely let inexpressibility be, enduring it as moving *presencing* as the housing nearest, we need to ask some questions about worlding that are other to the kind of world-world offered by the Wittgensteinian compound. The understanding of the inexpressibility of mattering calls for an attentive orientation of worlding towards a non-metaphysical seam of material beginning that can not be conditioned by world. This seam presences in that the rooted belonging to its murmur would not be one which lends itself to correctness, thus being endured *both* as historical uncanny unthought (*Unheimliche*) vis a vis humanism and most-uncanny (*Unheimlichste*) as uncanny to itself as *presencing* withdrawal—indeed double concealment. As such, this seam would be emplaced ek-sistentially in an alongside manner that *essentially* estranges humanism’s control of time, space and ‘belongingness to place’. This ek-sistent place would materially, spatially and temporally world the ‘human’ otherwise than steering and into letting-awe, creating a sense of unconditional inexpressible belonging and responding the quiet and simple authority of the emplaced seam of earthing which does not yield to that of steering correctness responsibility and ownership. Mattering as originary justice would think back, and nearer than, world-world ‘uncanniness’ refusing its metaphysical historicity but also enable *the origin of worlding rootedness*. The unthought of the Wittgensteinian view of language is itself uncannily grounded in an essential way, the origin of the inexpressibility of *aletheia*, one which still manifests as Being-historical, indeed *mostly so* in relation to the radical negativity of ‘post-foundational’ humanism. The emplacement of worlding and the manner in which it begins as mattering—be-longing—as well as the manner in which this would affect the very *presencing* of

language to our nearest in an enduring inexpressible waying essentially and historically, has be grasped differently. Not doing so would mean that Heidegger did not succeed in his whole *oeuvre*, namely his claim that there *is* nearing inexpressibility presencing in art, one which can not be disempowered by human will or interpretation and which shows otherwise than in the dimension of correctness. Heidegger's writings, then, do point to a *genuine* simple manner of attuning to, and indeed inhabiting, a *pathos* of, singing be-longingness to place. This simple sense of longing-to-be estranges the correctness-bound rupturous opening to critical practical reasoning. Short of understanding *aletheia* as the seam of worlding rootedness, then, Heidegger's insights might well be contained within the deconstructive reflection that Wittgenstein gives us.

121. It is the capacity to poetically dwell in what Heidegger calls in his earlier work authentic speech (*rede*), that sustains being-there-in-the-happening (see [22] sec. 34). Language conveys presencing that dis-closes itself to mortals' desire to be-long as worlding beings. As mattering, then, it is *language* as withdrawing autochthonous/material/terrestrial *logos* that sings the beginning in words through mortals guardianship—*der Sprache spricht* ([19], pp. 188–189) and not as humans who use language. The seeing of the call of language, then, thinks back earlier than the 'experience' of world-world that still can evokes only 'historically' within both ends of the tradition of humanism: as the Arendtian antagonistic politics of action with which she evokes the now lost authority of the Greek *polis*, and Wittgensteinian post-foundational humanism. Both views, and the possibilities for *praxis* they generate are captive to the self-cloaking necessity of metaphysics, blind to its un-thought, failing to see the origin of the *polis* as the district of the uncanny. and the pointing of *techne* amidst rootless making and unmaking of the language of humanism.

## VIII

### Enduring Inexpressibility on the Way to Language

122. Let us recall Wittgenstein's lament in the *investigations* concerning 'what it is to *experience* the meaning of a word' and listen to Heidegger: 'in experiences which we undergo *with* language, language itself brings itself to language.' (See [32], p. 406: 'The way to language wants to let language be experienced as language'. See also, [27], p. 59 and 77: 'What follows then is not a dissertation on language under a different heading... [but rather to]... take our first step into the country which holds possibilities of a thinking experience with language in readiness for us'):

Experience means *eundo assequi*, to obtain something along the way, to attain something by going on a way. What is it that the poet reaches? Not mere knowledge. He obtains entrance into the relation of word to thing. This relation is not, however, a connection between the thing that is on the one side and the word that is on the other. The word itself is the relation which in each instance retains the thing within itself in such a manner that it 'is' a thing ([27], p. 66)

123. Waying can also be attributed to Laotse: *All is way*. (Heidegger referred to the *Tao* in [27], p. 92. See also [48]). But—why *way*? Why should Heidegger insist, like Laotse, to focus on the presencing of worlding rootedness as a way? And why way *to* language rather than the city view of changing ways *of* language? On an initial reading, the phrase ‘the way *to* language’ strikes us as very enigmatic. It seems to convey that we have not, as yet, arrived at the happening of language. Language is on the way to language. In ‘the way to language’ the word ‘language’ seems to be a point of arrival. But ‘how is destination?’ In conventional language we follow a path to a given *place*, a locale, in which we will be in ‘language’.

124. Once we see the word ‘way’ in its clarity, namely a belonging to beginning’s essential singing withdrawal, however, we will hear something different in the phrase ‘way to language’. The movement of way as the seam nears and always ‘remembers’ as withdrawal of unboundedly *enduring* ‘there-ness’ of essential presencing inexpressibility of worlding. This sense of way does not originate from relations between things, spaces, words. A way is that of worlding into the *calling* open, that silent look of inner-worlds that remains nearest and its appropriating tracless trace are intimately encounterable but inexpressible—earlier than the phenomenological ‘life-experiences’ and steering (without limits, *a-peiron* (πεῖραρ *peirar*)—seam of oneness-with the ocean. Waying is letting the stake for innermost oneness as dwelled with others as en-owned as place by the open: not a way that is opened by man worlding as horizon of potential re-representations of meaning towards correctness-based possibility of making meaning together, but the open that presences, in dim delight that houses and which refuses the opening of critical and yet, metaphysical, hyper-reproduction of representations. Way is the enowning withdrawing sense of mattering of which man is essentially and ekstasically attuned to and let be—the call over which man has little control and the deepest sense of his mortality. ([25], pp. 102–109).

125. Language calls as an uncanny presencing saying-singing within words rather than as an opening for meaning; language appropriates [*Ereignis*]; language speaks as *techne*: language is the house where the non-historical presencing withdrawal beeness of beginning calls as a worlding way that is rooted in the withdrawing emplaced belongings of earthy-nearest, and as a historical way that unfolds as second-ary-beginning. Language points on its way always ahead of speaking beings, the poetic dwellers, the guardians of a way that is always immanent, not as a possibility of steering correctness, but as originary call that appropriates, as a *showing* of the presencing mysterious self-secluding saying of that which calls as belongingness to withdrawal of earth that makes the withdrawing boundary of a place.

126. Speaking occurs as a positive response to the call of the unbounded origin— as temporality that presences the appropriating mystery of beginning. ([17]). A response that makes the mystery conspicuous behind a veil, without ruining it, is active speech (*rede*) ([22]). The thrownness of mortals into their rooted worlding is the thrownness into the abyssal (*Abgrund*) that constitutes a withdrawing saying that calls them from the nearest and leaves the flicker of its trace or, traceless trace.

127. The movement of *aletheia* unfolds as the *there is* of originary withdrawal. That primordial withdrawal, the traceless trace of which constitutes a call is the

most-uncanny and nearest owning en-counter (*unheimlichste*), a call that remains uncanny to its guardians as the tracelessness of its trace of the threshold of unconditionality of earth. Thus, the gliding of *poetic dwelling* (*poiesis*): the responding saying does not merely bring the inexpressible into language as possible expressibility and the void that brings it about, but, rather, *and this is something that Wittgenstein being merely radicalised 'being-in-time' and world meaning making and un-making could feel the presence of but could not yet respond to*, bring it, *as presencing inexpressible*, into language. The responding saying endures the inexpressibility of the originary presencing of saying of withdrawing threshold of worlding rootedness *as a constitutive part of itself*. It endures the essential oppression of a sense of missing out, of essential belatedness but also historically as the unthought within the 'history' of metaphysics. A poetic response is belated but not in the sense of distorting falsity or contestability or radical alterity, but rather in remaining a showing, pointing in a manner that *guards* the traceless trace of the presencing of the withdrawing call of the home-coming—of the home as the coming-forth of standing before worlding rootedness as *techne*—always stands-before, understandingly as the mattering of *physis*. The appropriating concealedness is being sheltered. *Authentic speech* is not 'correct' in any way, but rather something that guards the most-uncanny emptiness of the withdrawal, and responds to the originary suffering that accompanies the inaccessible essential withdrawal of the '[t] here is' which matters most—care. Thus a poem, for example, always retains a trace that is uncanny even to its own uncanniness.

128. The responding saying first attunes (*Stimmung*) to self-sheltered appropriation, attunement which ek-statically be-longs to place and then *acknowledges* in awe its own belatedness and in doing that remains uncanny to, that is, shelters itself from, any possible dawning of seeing-seeing/as' that threatens to violently turn it into a possible 'said'. The withdrawal of the call is *retained* by the response imposing speaking silence on itself. The place of poetic dwelling is not for the sake of metaphysical '*nomos*' and *phronesis* and the metaphysical normative language of values and rights, but rather referred to by Heidegger as that law which encompasses language as a rightness and justice-as-injustice of the withdrawing mysterious emplaced seam (*dike/a-dikia*) ([32], p. 416). Dwelling is the way which nears the withdrawing presencing of place amidst dominance of Being and thinking with and through metaphysical time.

129. In 'on the way to language' Heidegger responds to the question of what a way is ([32], pp. 397–426). In this essay, the central movement that Heidegger wants to elucidate is 'To bring language as language to language'. Peter Hertz translates it as 'To speak about speech *qua* speech.' ([16], p. 120). I have used Hertz's formulation as it conveys the depth and indication of the notion that language might be waying in that it essentially self-transforms relationship to the gesture of speaking: '*to bring speech as speech to speech*'.

130. Let us magnify the interlacing movement of presencing (be-ing) that houses *Dasein's* worlding as the dis-closing gift of thereness (*es gibt*). Language speaks as a saying that appropriates as a call from that which is nearest to the *da of sein*, [t]here-ing as calling presencing. *Dasein's* nearest will always *already* have decisively appropriated *Dasein* as its innermost 't[h]ere', the call, in appropriating, en-owns its



waying-withdrawal that worlds, the enowning that ek-statically shows itself by pointing to what is the nearest, always-too-near, an uncanny ‘not’. The always-too-near-as-the-‘[t]here’ is an issue for *Dasein*, as a saying by language that has already shown by pointing to *Dasein*’s concerned circumspection ([32], p. 410). *Dasein* stands-before, understands, that saying which calls that shows itself, what Heidegger referred to as the ‘Showing of the Saying’, the en-owning saying of the song other to a saying of denotation-making shows in pointing to withdrawing origin.

131. Showing in pointing the presencing appropriation is the waying of the traceless trace which lets-clear as a dwelling *place*, a poetic ‘whilst’, a strife between world and its being rooted in the unconditioned essencing withdrawing beginning—‘there-issness’ of earth. Speaking language that manifests the earlier thrownness of *Dasein* into its ek-static worlding has already understood *Dasein* as dweller in the uncanny mystery with other *Da-seins*, a togetherness of ek-static temporal mortal dwellers in the mystery nearer to metaphysical and technological humanism’s human historical time and space, letting the mystery hold sway (see [6], chs. 8, 9).

132. Gliding (*Gelassenheit*): neither ‘active’ nor ‘passive’, which are steering notions, but rather *attentive letting to mattering, enduring-questioning of inexpressibility, as saying-response to, already looked at by the presencing traceless trace of pointing-showing, of appropriating en-owning presencing*. The metaphysically thrown *Dasein* essentially *sees* this showing in anxiety—haunted unthought and indeed in dreams as what Jung saw as the collective unconscious of ‘natural man’, the unbounded fullness of the expanse of emptiness that its ‘[t]here’ is only a pointing trace but which can not be turned into humanism’s ‘emptiness’—into potentiality that anticipates ‘seeing-as’ and meaning-making. *Dasein* dwells with other *Daseins* in the mystery of nearness of the ‘da’—[t]here. This who-how other than metaphysical togetherness of subjects or inter-subjects that ‘linger awhile’ lets language speak the traceless trace that can never just be either a becoming-subject or a becoming-community which self critiques as the renegotiation of the relationality and contestability of human world. Such critique doing is still an economic and rootless pursuit of mature metaphysics and humanism.

133. *Ereignis* is not an extant thing, ‘event’, nor merely ‘appropriation’, which is too much associated with property, but rather an en-owning waying movement that has a stake in ownness (*the essencing of ownership*) and which lets itself be owned in sustaining the call for ek-static attentive letting respondent. The respondent is ‘appropriated’ as un-homeliness (*Unheimliche*) that stems from caring mindfulness of finitude of its world in the face of the home of withdrawing *logos*—the originary singing boundary that points ek-statically from words. It is a waying movement, *Be-weg-gung*—the way ways. ([32], p. 415, see also [53]) as worlding-rootedness.

134. In the Hebrew the word *safa* means a lip but also a threshold/a boundary. The mystery is doubly concealing, a traceless trace of boundary that prevails between the saying that calls and the saying that responds that also contains its own humbleness in its refusal to turn into a mere potentiality of said(s). This attuned awe is called ‘letting’ (*Gelassenheit*) and this attentive letting of the rooting mystery to hold sway is speaking.



135. Let us look at the formulation which sings the uncanny originary movement of *a-lethia* as the song of essencing be-ginning as the waying housed by the familiar and strange home (*Heimat*)—that is essentially uncanny, a way to language, the circular waving movement of the calling nowness of hermeneutics *understood as enowning presencing longingness to home rather than as meaning-bearing*:

A: **To bring speech**—*seeing, listening and seizing, as attentive letting, the most-uncanny (Unheimlichste) that always already will have called the saying of art (techne)—a calling of rooting earth (physis) for worlding—the withdrawing movement of the emplacing seam of earth which points to the finitude of meaning-worldhood, a call rooting as the unconditioned and unbounded originary presencing. This calling-saying unfolds as the song of the withdrawing logos which shows as, and points to, the traceless trace of a rooting yet unconditioned place. ‘Bringing’ is the unlearning-relearning of turning of directionality of attentive resoluteness and concerned attunement that remains estranged from steering epochal mundane sustaining uncanniness towards it while remaining listening. ‘Bringing’ seizes the flicker mystery, holding on to the no-thing, that is, onto the lack of the traceless trace of the concealedness of originary song of logos as presencing seam of housing root—worlding rootedness.*

B: **as speech**, *as the essencing mystery’s edge/boundary of the withdrawing traceless trace of the self-sheltering saying—the boundary itself is the movement of appropriation of the seam of presencing earth—the root of worlding that historically always uncannily (Unheimliche) refuses ‘history’, as the historical-thinking-back the-unthought as the edge of humanism’s world-world movement. The boundary withdraws in a manner which encounters as ek-static mattering. Speech (language), then, is the boundary/edge which is the worlding place that houses Dasein both essentially and historically.*

C: **into speech** *the essence of the ‘activity’ of gliding nearer to mattering than the steering metaphysical ‘waying-meaning-making’ of normative praxis and phronesis—the attentive letting movement: the uncanny saying-gliding that is attuned (Stimmung) and lets-wait-attentively (Gelassenheit). Gliding endures inexpressibility pointing at, but remaining nearer than metaphors. Gliding sends a movement of waiting for beginning that survives the ‘historical’—metaphysical situatedness of the artist though not the worlding to which the saying of the work of art remains a pointer. This saying lets itself be appropriated and remains listening to the traceless trace of the call, measuring the emptiness of its secret ([24], p. 221). This saying responds to the call and shelters the self-concealed withdrawing call in its concealedness. In this responding saying the openness of an originary housing ek-static way of beeness is perceived temporally as the housing stillness of nowness. The artist and the work of art become the mouth, tongue and lips of the epochally unthought withdrawing logos—a prophet of re-turn to beginning. The essence of this saying essences as the undiminishable and essentially mysterious ‘there is’—as endurance of the inexpressibility that belatedly responds but continues to point, ahead of itself, towards the fateful emplaced seams as pathmarks as which it glides. It brings the ‘not’ into words in such a manner that keeps on the pointing towards the nearest thus maintaining the unfolding of the way that lets the inexpressibility of the traceless trace of the presencing call for home-coming hold sway. This saying*

*responds in also sheltering its own pointing refusing to become a said. Poetic dwelling as the essencing hermeneutic is a repetition that in a sense never-happens and thus constitutes letting-waiting, call-response that endures earlier than will, mind and judgement.*

## IX

### The Grace of Gliding in Place and the Gravity of Steering Time

136. Late in his life Wittgenstein wrote: ‘It is so difficult to find the *beginning*; Or, better: it is difficult to begin and the beginning. And not try to go further back’ ([64] sec. 471). But has Wittgenstein as yet, thought back the question of beginning historically or indeed, contemplated ‘beginning *now*’?

137. It is earth that sings and calls for thinking to mortals through Hermes ([28] p. 29). Art as way to language: the autochthonous/terrestrial/material origin of inexpressibility brings language as language to language. The guardianship of the ‘House of Being’ is to let the origin of inexpressibility of the uncanny seam of place en-owns as worlding to endure.

138. Heidegger’s absence of humanist ‘ethics’ is no accident, and his rooted thought ought not to be ‘rectified’ by left-Heideggerians to contain ethics. *Aletheia* grasped as the presencing of place is a primordial ethos of dwelling together temporally spatially and materially in the mystery of worlding earth community in a manner that can not be reduced to a ‘form of life’, or ‘world’ by the ‘ethics’ of humanism. Heidegger’s worlding does not bring about either left or right political persuasion, both of which are captive within the metaphysical view of worlding that can not explain the dwelling of worlding in the essentially inexpressibility of mattering.

139. Amidst the epochal forgetfulness of the dominance, contestation and overcoming of ‘worlds’ that are grounded in the beingness of beings and thus metaphysical principles that involve rootless and controlling metaphysical ‘time-making’, ‘space-making’, ‘place-making’, things-making; amidst the violence that the belongingness to these principles generate; amidst both the injustice and pain felt under the power of their governance and all-too-metaphysical ‘justice’ that responds to it in practical reasoning as Ethics, Politics and Law, thus continuing ‘history’ and metaphysical violent ‘forgiveness’; amidst the representational ‘emplacement’ and technological control of time, space and material—*techne*—art, in the irreducible rooted waying its worlding-saying, uncannily refuses humanism’s world-making. Art’s saying, *a-lethia*, points in its thinking-back futurally at beginning—the uncanny flickering inexpressible seam of place, of home, of presencing beeness that is always already essentially inexpressible as material dis-closing waying [t]here amidst the distanced beginnings of metaphysical ‘oughtness’ implied in the very gesture of critique which still manifests as the actual and potential correctness-based relationship between law and justice. As the inexpressible call of language the cry for justice (*dike*) always begins as be-longing to what *is* [t]here as care, rather than from metaphysics, normativity, explanation

and justification of what *ought* to be done. Art, as genuine forgiveness and uncanny home-coming, calls as the way to inexpressible earthy enduring song which is buried underneath metaphysical signification but always flickering in the calling song of all words—meaningful before meaning making and unmaking. Art's saying uncannily refuses metaphysics and can not be disempowered by it, because always glides in the presencing nowness of the murmuring seam, *the place*, towards the inner unboundedness and unconditionality which is otherwise than metaphysical 'world-world' historical 'time'. Although the work starts as resolute refusal *of* the metaphysical epoch of humanism, the showing/seeing/saying of a great work of art, its worlding, endures because responding to the nowness of earthy presencing mysterious seam as which all mortals dwells together—earlier to the seeing/seeing as/saying/showing relationality—nowness that refuses the philosophical tradition *as a whole*. Art's waying, responding to the inaccessibility of what matters most as the due of justice, imposes a strange silence on itself, paradoxically erasing its own 'historical' purchase as essential 'injustice' brought forth by the unthought that fuels Being-historical, thus opening up the astonishment of nowness, that always-will-have-been emplaced as worlding rootedness—gliding-pointing also, perhaps, at possible living together politically non-metaphysically as aboriginal temporality and spatiality of simple uncanniness of place.

140. Metaphysical time of successive 'nows' and durations does not have now-proper but only an opposition between being and becoming. Overcoming metaphysical 'historical' time gives us history, sense of unthought of time as Being historical that brings us to the gift (*es gibt*-[t]herenes) of nowness that can not be disempowered—the moving nowness of the dis-closing song of the temporal beeness of place—the unbounded temporality of presencing that overcomes being-in-time. The strife between world and earth in art endures the seam of inexpressibility that connects us through Being historical to the grasping of the lingering now, as he way to language—all is way that opens language to words singing the song of place. Like the mysterious beginning of a wave in the sea—as poetic dwelling (art)—language speaks as inexpressible. Any historical knowing—awareness as ontology of time and metaphysics with its violent epochal world-world relationality, the due of justice and steering practical reasoning, both re-returns to, and will have persisted as, ab-original ontology of the seam of place—worlding rootedness—perhaps, making Heidegger pointing even earlier making himself the prophet, first, and last philosophical mouth of Being—historical—indeed *perhaps*. Equally, Heidegger's political engagements with National Socialism—the latter being an ill-fated attempt to overcome mature metaphysics—his *volkish* question of who we are ourselves, has much bigger stake for our now that is currently allowed ([8]). His silence, his Being historical, has been silenced by mature metaphysics and reactions to it.

141. As temporality, spatiality and materiality, the uncanny earthing rootedness of home-coming, then, is the re-turn to beginning, to an ab-originality of place, in which the worlding of mortals attentively let presencing be and does not fatefully re-enact 'history' as recycling of suffering. Letting the temporalising presencing of a material place on earth unfold—dreaming the oneness with it—ab-original worlding rootedness without the need to overcome the 'time' and 'place' of

metaphysical mediation, also of course involves essential withdrawal of un-truth proper. However, because oneness originates from earth rather than from potential what-world and mind, the complementarity between world and worlding-rootedness, on its violence and practical engagement would not involve metaphysical steering of injustice and justice. Its very emergence as injustice in responsibility, ownership and authority lets steering-less law that has no metaphysical cravings attachments be. The configuration of injustice, ownership, responsibility, plurality, would evoke letting more readily with practical reasoning that demands attunement to earth rather than self affirming world-world ruptures. Aborigines who have not traversed the West's metaphysical violence have had a sense of presencing place which was violently obliterated by violent metaphysics and its humanistic time-thinking. Aborigines conceived mortals as originating from, as being remembered by, the earth, at one with it and sharing it like we, just about, share the air we breathe. The now firmly forgotten metaphysical violence to aborigines has the whole of metaphysical thought as its stake and not merely arguments about native title, itself hailed by critical lawyers.

142. Inspired by Simone Weil ([57], pp. 1–4) I sense the boundless *grace* in concerned gliding—worlding in the primordial presencing of emplaced withdrawal as the earthy site of poetic dwelling—on the way to language—both as the uncanniness of the refusal of Being-historical and essentially as untruth-proper. Grace is the descending movement of the authority of beginning that languages worlding into materiality rather than using language to explain and justify. Grace dwells on justice as a question of *Being*, that is from the insignificance of the I-steer and the 'seeing-as' of the 'subject' towards the genuine *founding* of the dwelling together in the seams of sites—in earthing-worlding. I sense gravity in metaphysics, including 'post-metaphysical' steering. Gravity is the violent power of rootless 'presencing' of metaphysical time and world over the worlding rootedness of place. Gravity disguises well when cares to steer fleeting inexpressibilities. Gravity steers the ways of language that steer time and space as metaphysical places and [in] correct-based belongingness to them, making language, through steering metaphysical practical ethics, politics and law in order to contain the harm metaphysics has long ago inaugurated. Gravity is the steering movement that is *dense and phenomenological*: power and powerlessness.

143. The cry of justice, the *place* of politics, both essentially and historically, is uncannily emplaced as a call of be-ginning—as the essential tension of nearness, and thus suffering, between two notions of truthfulness rather as a rupture within correctness ([7], 118–119). Justice, as primordial suffering of inexpressibility, a lack of evidence as a genuine Lyotardian *differand* is commonly understood in Wittgensteinian terms, namely as the pain of incommensurability that is inflicted because of the necessity to speak the evidence within the oppressing possibilities of litigation or common rules of judgment in disputes. ([41], pp. 9–10, on the 'edivent' in Heidegger see [26], pp. 445–446). However, the essential pain, and thus the origin of the negativity of political mattering—justice—is argued here to be dislocated from its rupturous place *within* post-foundational humanism thus enduring suffering because the now remains historically emplaced as out-of-'historical' 'place' always, as art, uncanny to the epochal principles, instantiating

the essential simple and forgotten call of earth to worlding. Bearing Hermes' message to mortals always nearer than mere interpretation, the *differand* stems from unyielding comportment of *techne* to *physis* as the fateful uncanny calling of aboriginal ontology of place amidst ontology of time—the essential inexpressibility of mattering as the most-uncanny autochthonous beginning.

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