

The Predicament of Life.

Dennis Schmidt and the Ethical Subject

Andrew Benjamin

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Here it will be necessary to establish, as and at the beginning, a set of manoeuvres; a moving backwards and forwards in the attempt to work towards the position that holds a thinking of the ethical and thus a thinking of the subject in place.¹ If there is a way to begin and thus to establish a point of departure which will continue to return then it can be located in one of the opening formulations advanced in Schmidt's text 'Hermeneutics as Original Ethics'.² It is a formulation that complicates the approach that is taken overall but which reveals, at the same time, the continuity of orientation. Ethics, for Schmidt, has become an issue. Marred by difficulties whose acuity demands another way of thinking leads to the position in which he claims that 'the very idea of ethics has become questionable.'³ For Schmidt this leads to the necessity of differentiating the ethical from the conceptual. Now, even though there are a number of ways to understand Schmidt's formulation what it sets in play, at the beginning, is the presence of the ethical as an 'idea'.

One path that is opened up here involves the claim that it is the ethical as an idea that 'has become questionable' such that what then becomes necessary is different form of thought such that what then emerges as a task is a way of thinking the ethical such that it then breaks any relation to the 'idea' and thus to the conceptual. This is Schmidt's position. There is however a different understanding that can be brought into play. Namely, it is not the ethical as conceptual that is problematic. Rather, the argument would then have to be that whatever current difficulties or impasses can be found within ethical thought they arise from the contemporary conceptualization of the ethical, and thus not from the conceptual *tout court*. Moreover, in light of this other possibility it will be argued that what is left out of most

conceptualizations, and equally in Schmidt's attempt to disassociate the ethical and the conceptual, is any sustained engagement with what will continually be identified as the *predicament* within which life is lived and thus within which life has to be thought. Hence, rather than break with the conceptual the project of the ethical demands a different thinking; another thinking within which on the level of the ideational or the conceptual there is the recovery of another possibility rather than a refusal of the concept.

The suggestion is therefore that while Schmidt is right to argue that the 'idea' of the ethical has become problematic, it does not then follow that it is then necessary to move from this recognition which is the identification of an impasse, to the either refusal of the conceptual or the privileging of either the aesthetic or the work of art as providing the basis of a new consideration of ethical life. To put the position emphatically, there is no reason to conclude from the presence of an impasse that beauty is the 'glimmer of an otherwise inconceivable ethical sense'.⁴ Such moves, even if they were wanted, founder in the attempt to give them a coherent formulation. It is however this position that has to be argued. This will occur by taking seriously the presence of what has been called the *predicament*, and then secondly by paying attention to specific aspects of Schmidt's interpretation of Kant. What gets displaced in that interpretation is both the role of the 'concept' within Kant's arguments in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* as well as the way the relation between the sensible and the supersensible is established. In regards to the former it needs to be remembered that even in the case of the symbol - and this is one of Schmidt's most important examples - there is neither a sustained nor a definitive separation from the role of concepts since the symbol is what Kant describes as the 'indirect presentation' of the conceptual. Once the 'indirect' is linked to the indeterminate, and then to a rethinking of contingency as that which occurs within the separation - a separation that becomes a relation of indetermination - between the sensible and the supersensible, what then emerges is the impossibility of any distancing of the conceptual. What matters however is how both the indirect and indeterminate relation are then to be thought. There is a necessity to take up this thinking. Thinking would have a different exigency. The conceptual while given and while already positioned would come to be rethought. Other possibilities for thought are recovered and sustained as a result. In sum, what this means is that there could be then no move to the aesthetic as though it took place

independently of the conceptual. Moreover it is the presence of relations of indetermination that allow the problem of subjectivism to be overcome and the realm of judgment to be maintained as effective. If an example were necessary note Kant in the First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* where he writes of the 'indeterminate principle of a purposive arrangement of nature'.⁵ It is, after all, the latter that allows for the reflective powers of judgment to be operative.

1.

To begin this call upon thought, this other thinking of life, one which is consistent with what prompts Schmidt's overall project, involves beginning with where 'we' are. Life cannot be posed, let alone thought philosophically, without taking into consideration its taking place. (Life as *being-in-place*.) What would it be to think that there were just life? Let alone to think that life was already just. As though that which is proper to life did not have to be wrested from the givenness of facticity. Factual life is not to be identified with the every day. Were it to be then life would be logically identical with that which is lived. One would complete the other. Its potentiality and its actuality would be the same. The contention here is that there is another possibility for life, one that comes from an understanding of its *predicament*. What then is life's *predicament*? More emphatically, what is the *predicament* of ethical life? Life's *predicament* is the setting in which a concern with life finds itself. This claim is not simply one in which history is evoked. It is rather that the *predicament* is the moment in which the being of being human continues to attain actuality (or attempts the same). To which it should be added that the non-identity of *attempting* and *attaining* is of fundamental importance. It creates an ineliminable spacing at the centre of human activity. And this occasions a sense of attainment in which what is central are the processes of actualization and thus the processes in which what continues to appear is human being. In other words, to engage life philosophically, once what is distanced is the identification of life with that which occurs, which would be empiricism's crude gesture, is to think the problem of actualization. What this means is that life in its separation from its reduction either to the purely empirical - which would be life within naturalism - or to the immutability of fated being, has to be thought in terms of life's own potentialities. Those potentialities have to be

described. This is of course a project that has to be taken up. The argument would be that such a description involves staking a commitment to a determination of the being of being human in terms of commonality and place. *Being-in-place* and *being-in-common* would delimit the contours of a philosophical anthropology.⁶ The consequence of which is that exclusion and restriction from place and commonality have to be understood as restrictions on the actualization of a potentiality. The interplay of potentiality, actualization and restriction delimits the *predicament*. There is a constitutive spacing holding all of these elements in play.

Even if a start were made with an event that was in each instance original and thus allowing every beginning to be unique it still remains the case that this uniqueness is restricted (and restrictive) insofar as it only pertains to the irreplaceability of that event with another. Birth occurs once; equally death. And yet, despite the irreplaceability of that event, that uniqueness has a twofold articulation within the *predicament* within which it is occurring and where it continues. The continuity of becoming is itself a necessary condition; the actualization within that continuity of potentialities is always contingent. Potentialities need not be actualised. Hence the *predicament* is not just the condition of any claim to uniqueness. That *predicament* leaves its trace on the production of any singularity. This initial *predicament* is the one in which the subject finds itself and in so doing becomes itself. There is the continual becoming of the subject even though, as has to be noted, this becoming's actualization cannot be guaranteed in advance. Occurring here is the discontinuous continuity of the subject's coming-into-relation which is a setting informed by movement and is a forming movement that constitutes subjectivity. Rather than rush ahead it is essential to stay with the *predicament*, holding thereby to its presence as a question.

Any engagement with that question already comprises a further entry into Dennis Schmidt's work. He asks for a 'better definition of what is at stake in the question of ethical life'.⁷ He affirms that ethics 'is first and foremost.... a way of life'. (There is the ensuing demand therefore that life be thought.) Equally, he will identify a 'reawakening' of a specific sense of historical consciousness as 'the first step to recovering the possibility of an original ethics'.⁸ Addressing these 'stakes' or that to which an 'awakening' might occur - and this may be an awakening to a way of life or to the recognition of already being

there such that the recognition of the position is an awakening to a potentiality whose actualization had not occurred - all these possibilities have to be thought in terms of the recognition of a *predicament*, precisely because that is what formulations of this nature stage. While not presented in these terms the language of awakenings entails the recognition of potentialities that are yet to be fulfilled. Awakening occurs to a *predicament*.

If the question of the *predicament* is taken as orientating the possibility of thinking life then it has to presuppose that life is thought, and thus is there to be thought. Life is not there as the merely given. The move from the given to thought - and thought's own demands - is that which creates the problem. While Schmidt's approach necessitates a thinking of the *predicament*, that demand remains without any sustained response. This absence results from the way life is present within his writing as a philosophical topos. Note the following formulation in which Schmidt in identifying one of the strengths of Gadmer's analysis of the Kant's *Third Critique* argues the following:

Kant's analysis of aesthetic experience demonstrates that this awakening to life is so firmly lodged in feeling that it cannot be cognised by any theoretical reason that can be scientized, nor can it be translated into conceptual language.⁹

Life therefore - the movement of life - remains within a setting defined by the impossibility of a certain form of 'translation'. An 'awakening' cannot be 'translated'. Within the framework of Schmidt's argument 'life' is given within that setting. This is a distinct motif in Schmidt's work. Life, Schmidt's 'life', continually finds itself in a radical separation from the theoretical or the conceptual. Two points however need to be made in this regard. Indeed, they are two points that will continue and thus they will have an effect on what follows. In the first instance the argument has to be that this claim amounts to what might be described as the absolutization of life that identifies life not just with the continuity of its self-realization, but that this realization is of necessity unfettered. There is just an awakening. Or at least not fettered in a way that demands philosophical engagement. Or were there to be a restriction it will be lifted, its hold obviated, by an encounter with the work of art in particular or the aesthetic more generally. In sum what this means is that if it can be argued that life's *predicament* pertains to the complex of relations given by the interplay

of potentiality, actualization and restriction then for Schmidt there will not be any form of restriction on the actualization of a potentiality. What is excised is twofold. In the first place it is the constitutive spacing that holds the *predicament* in place. It is a spacing in which the conditions that obtain have a necessity even though outcomes - actualizations etc. - have an essential contingency. (The good life, as a necessity, only ever has contingent outcomes.) Then secondly the excision of the *predicament* as the setting of life entails the corresponding absence of any criteria for judgements to be made in relation to life. (This is the risk within the aesthetic.)

The other response to the formulation that breaks the link between life and the conceptual has to begin with the argument that the identification of the impossibility of 'translation' into the 'conceptual' is itself already a conceptual claim about both the aesthetic and the work of art. Here it is vital to be precise. The argument is that this identification of the impossibility of such a 'translation' is not one that takes place on the level of the aesthetic. It is not therefore a position that can be identical with its being felt. Hence it has to be conceptual. And this is the case even if the sense of the conceptual remains at this stage an open question. The consequence is clear; there cannot be a separation of the aesthetic and the conceptual. They occur together and this is true even if their separation can be thought. It is a separation therefore that is conceptual. There is a spacing that holds them together and apart. There is therefore a prevailing sense of *at-the-same-timeness* that links feeling to the conceptual. It is a claim that in supervening on the aesthetic does so from the position of the conceptual. (Note here that this refusal of a link is in fact a conception of a relation that is lodged beyond a simple either/or.) After all, what type of claim is it that insists on non-translatability if it is itself not a feeling but in fact a theoretical claim. It cannot be one without the other; *at-the-same-timeness* prevails. Moreover, while it may be felt in terms of a form of separation, understanding that insistent separability is precisely that, an understanding. While Schmidt is drawing on positions in which Kant argues that 'the judgment of taste determines the object, independently of concepts' what has to be included is that this sense of independence still assumes a relation to the conceptual that is defined in terms of indetermination rather than determination¹⁰. However within the argumentation developed by Schmidt this evocation of the 'independent' occurs as though it involved no relation at all. Moreover, it is this independence that allows for the distinction between what he

identifies as the 'lyrical' as opposed to the purely 'ethical' subject. The latter is a sense of subjectivity and thus the ethical that is defined by a relation to the law. In Schmidt's formulation the 'lyrical subject is that form of the subject disclosed in relation to the realm of aesthetic experience.'¹¹ Remembering of course that what is taken to be the aesthetic is that which is thought in terms of a radical separation from any form of conceptual presence. (It is this separation that is in the end untenable.)

The nature of these subjects - the lyrical and ethical to the extent that there really are two - must be the point of focus. If it can be argued that there cannot be such a distinction within the subject then subjectivity, as an integral part of its *predicament* then involves the impossibility of ever effecting this distinction. The subject is both lyrical and ethical. As such whatever determinations these positions had as separate entities vanishes in the need to think what is at stake in their presence both as a site of negotiation and as an already present relation. Indeed, rather than there being a resultant critique of the law in the name of the aesthetic, which would be the almost inevitable outcome of the refusal of a relation between the ethical and the conceptual, there would be a critique of the law in the name of law. The latter is of course a possibility that could not occur were there to be the separation or independence that Schmidt envisages. Schmidt has to equate law with statute and the ethical with the prescriptive. Hence what cannot be thought is another possibility for either the law or for ethics that transformed the nature of law or the nature of the ethical. Critique becomes unthinkable. Responding to this delimitation by refusing the identification of law and statute opens up as a potentiality linking the conditioned nature of any law, conditioned because always contestable, to the unconditioned demand of justice. Establishing that connection links justice to the actualization of a potentiality within law. The latter is the potentiality for any law to be just. Occurring at the same time, of course, is the emergence of criteria of judgement.

2.

There is within Schmidt's extensive writings on the ethical a formulation of the ethical subject that is not defined in terms of the distinction between the lyrical and the ethical. Again, what is central is the interplay between life and the way that Kant's philosophical project allows for openings in which life, always as a philosophical *topos*, can be

thought. To begin with the former means beginning with the insistence of life that can be identified within Schmidt's writings. One fundamental instance can be found in the reference to Schiller's formulation concerning 'the deepest centre of life' which is for Schmidt 'the freedom that I am'. While explicating this formulation will in the end involve a return to Kant at this stage this 'I' opens up a thinking of the ethical subject. This is the 'I' whose possibility inheres in the actuality of 'ethical life'. Of the latter Schmidt writes that it has to be understood in terms 'of the preservation of the dignity of the human that resides in freedom'.¹² This is the claim within which the possibilities of the already noted 'awakenings' endure. Moreover, it is a claim that in bringing dignity and freedom together allows the question of the good to be posed. A question with its own attendant complications because of the way it is taken up by Schmidt. He writes that 'the question of the good remains as the question of the good of life itself'.¹³ It is the intentional ambivalence of this formulation that is both striking and significant. Note that he does not write the question 'of the good life'. Were he to have done so then his formulation would have recalled fundamental positions within both Greek and Roman ethics. And as a result the question of the possibility of attaining that life would then have emerged. In emerging 'the good life' though now as a potentiality rather than as an assumed state of affairs would have acquired a certain force. Rather, he writes specifically 'of the good of life'. Now while that formulation may be understood in terms of the 'good life' what it allows in addition is the more direct interpretation, namely the inscription of the good within the project of life itself; the project and thus the point of life.

What, after all, is 'the good of life'? For Schmidt, it is important to add, his formulation is, to use his own description, withdrawn from 'any conception of right or wrong'.¹⁴ Again, given this withdrawal how would 'the good of life' be understood? What is 'the good of life'? Two positions that have already been noted make an answer to this question possible. The first is the evocation of 'dignity'. There is in his argumentation an intrinsic link between ethical life and dignity. The second involves having to insist on the projective character of the formulation 'the good of life'. It is projective in a precise sense. There is no attribution of a telos to life. As though there were an end point. Rather, the argument would have to be that life is imbued at every moment with a project. That project however is an immanent presence. And precisely because of the nature of that presence it allows for the

claim that ‘the good of life’ is the possibility of dignity’s actuality and is thus the process of its actualization; a process that cannot have a necessary outcome. Good comes to be defined in terms of the continuity of actualization. And yet, lives lived without dignity are possible, moreover such a possibility is there as a constant threat. To rework this formulation it can be suggested that if dignity’s projective possibility is ‘the good of life’ then the concern then has to be the actualization of that good. Hence it is not just ‘the perseveration of dignity’, to return to Schmidt’s formulation, more significantly it is dignity’s actualization. To go further, it can be argued, that the preservation envisages actualization and that actualization envisages preservation. Their interplay opens up the *predicament* within which ‘we’ are. While it does not emerge as an object of thought for Schmidt, a position in part explained by a failure to engage with what is entailed by having to preserve dignity, the writings evince a clear understanding that what is involved is a setting of this kind precisely because he does connect what he calls ‘original ethics’ to a ‘moment’ in which what is disclosed is a ‘relation to time and history’. In the same context he evokes Heidegger on the necessity ‘for a critique of the present historical moment’.¹⁵ This is the context in which the language of a ‘reawakening’ also appears. The *predicament* begins to take on a more demanding quality since what are needed are criteria of judgement and thus the possibility of critique. This necessitates recourse to the conceptual on the one hand and the recognition, on the other, that life continually divides between potentiality and actuality. This would be the setting in which any awakening occurs. There cannot be a solitary awakening.

In order to continue it is essential to underscore that what is at stake here continues to centre on would what can be described, via a type of shorthand, not as an awakening but as a situated awakening. If there is the necessity for an awakening, then there has to be an account of sleep, of what prompts awakening, and that to which this awakening moves. Sleep becomes the naturalisation of normativity. Within this ‘sleep’ there are intimations of other possibilities. There are hints as much within dreams as there are in types of everydayness, and thus also in factual life and givenness. These hints, glimmerings of other possibilities, ecstatic instances, are simply moments whose fragility continues to allow them to be subdued. For if there were to be more than the hint, more than an intimation of another possibility, then they have to be defined in relation to what might be described as form creating. Not only does this entail that an image that is already

determined, that is already formed, is not that which is brought to the intimated. That would stall the possible by identifying with a pre-existing image. It is rather that there has to be an allowing and thus a holding open in which there are occurrences. Action and form creating when taken together allow the law to be distanced because of the law's failure to secure dignity let alone allow for its 'preservation'. All such claims are judgements and inhering within them are suggestions of that which is right and that which is wrong. Though these terms once rid of a simply moral character come to be terms that are bound up with the human being as an ontological presence; a presence that is both felt and thought; only always already placed with others. All these elements present are at the same time.

3.

If there is a way through this problem then it resides in a specific thinking of the Kantian project. Schmidt will continue to distance the role of the conceptual within the Kantian project in ways that are consistent with his overall thinking. In regards to the latter a direct instance can be found in his text 'The Monstrous, Catastrophe, and Ethical Life: Hegel, Heidegger and Antigone'. Here Schmidt writes the following in relation to the Antigone:

the great achievement of Antigone is found in the way it condenses the riddles of ethical life while simultaneously showing that these conflicts emerge from a region that given ethical terms cannot grasp and that cannot be grasped by **the conceptual language of philosophy**. That is why both place great emphasis on the poetic character of this text.¹⁶ (My emphasis)

What can be left aside here is the accuracy of this as an interpretation of Antigone. What is of greater interest is twofold. First of all, note that he writes of 'given ethical terms' and then goes on to claim that certain ethical terms fall outside the hold of '**the conceptual language of philosophy**' (My emphasis). More significantly, in this particular text Schmidt is keen to argue that Hegel and Heidegger's contribution to a thinking of 'ethical life' is premised on this positioning of a limitation of the conceptual. And yet that positioning depends upon the suspension of the 'given'. This gift - and it is the locus created by the gift, a gift that could equally be understood as a staging of the *predicament* in which we are - that would have to be suspended in order to allow for the very

project that Schmidt wants. This is not a claim made by a 'lyrical subject'. This is a decision. As such, it is a conceptual claim. And yet, the conceptual is refused because the suspension of the given remains unthought. Nothing is being adduced here. Schmidt's formulations continue to set the measure. Again in another text, 'Schmidt argues that,

nature, as Kant comes to understand it in the Third Critique cannot be spoken of, or thought, according to the laws of conceptual language.¹⁷

This position has much greater extension than an interpretation of Kant. In a different context here makes the much more substantive claim that,

At the point where our rules and our conceptualizing powers break off, the ethical moment begins'.¹⁸

The stakes have become much greater. The ethical moment begins when there is a break down. But what does it mean for these powers to 'break off'. There is a further question, i.e. how is this moment to be understood in relation to dreams, awakening, etc.? Is this breakdown the same as the awakening? There is a clear path here that leads to an argument made in relation to Kant.

Note the formulation in the First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant advances the following decisive formulation:

The purposiveness of nature is thus a special a priori concept that has its origin strictly in the reflecting power of judgment. For we cannot ascribe to the products of nature anything like a relation of nature in them to ends, but can only use this concept in order to reflect on the connection of appearances in nature that are given in accordance with empirical laws. This concept is also entirely distinct from that of practical purposiveness (of human art as well as of morals), although it is certainly conceived of in terms of an analogy with that.¹⁹

What the above makes clear is that the conceptual powers do not 'break off'. They have to be rethought in terms of the 'purposiveness of

nature'. It is this passage that needs to be read in relation to §42 in which the 'beautiful soul' appears. The latter is the following:

This preeminence of the beauty of nature over the beauty of art in alone awakening an immediate interest, even if the former were to be surpassed by the latter in respect of form, is in agreement with the refined and well-founded thinking of all human beings who have cultivated their moral feeling. If a man who has enough taste to judge about products of beautiful art with the greatest correctness and refinement gladly leaves the room in which are to be found those beauties that sustain vanity and at best social joys and turns to the beautiful in nature, in order as it were to find here an ecstasy for his spirit in a line of thought that he can never fully develop, then we would consider this choice of his with esteem and presuppose in him a beautiful soul.²⁰

What sense of finitude emerges in this passage? There is a limitation. How is it to be understood? It inheres not just in the move from objects to nature - from art works to nature - there is something else at stake. Kant is clear concerning the beautiful. It is not a predicate of an object rather it pertains to what he describes as the 'form' of the object. That is, it pertains to the object's generalizable conditions of intuitability. This is the position that underpins subjective universality. The turn to nature therefore is the turn to the possibility of form itself. The limitation is not linked to conceptual let alone to its suspension. On the contrary it pertains to a relation between the conditioned and the unconditioned. There is a relation; a setting in which the separation between them creates a space. Indeed, it inscribes a space that becomes a space of activity. However, the spacing that emerges here does so precisely because of the presence of that which is conceptual. Not conceptual in the way that concepts determine particulars but conceptual in the precise sense that the concept is an immanent condition. It occurs both in and as what might be described as the spacing of indetermination that demands not just the presence of the conceptual in terms of the presence of the unconditioned, but the recognition that the distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned is itself as much a felt and lived condition as it is a conceptual one. It is both, at the same time. Again there is a constitutive spacing and a pervasive sense of *at-the-same-timeness*.

The limit that emerges is clear from Schmidt's account of Kant. Within the argumentation that occurs in Kant's texts there is neither a breaking off nor a suspension of the conceptual. What there is a relation of indetermination between the unconditioned and the conditioned. Moreover, it is precisely the presence of relations of indetermination that establishes a link between the Second and Third Critiques.²¹ Schmidt does not follow Kant for whom there is always a relation between the aesthetic and the conceptual. What he does is assume that the recognition of an 'impasse' allows for the abandoning of the conceptual in the name of the aesthetic. (Again, this is position that is reached when the alternative could have been a reworking of the conceptual.) Not only is this a conceptual rather than an aesthetic response, it is also true that it has at least two important consequences. Firstly that the positioning he adopts remains unthought in the precise sense that what it always essential is the positing of that which while orientating the ethical is itself 'unintelligible' or unthinkable'.²² The second consequence is connected. What is lost in the process is what Schmidt's project knows it needs i.e. not just the capacity for judgment but their criteria. Those criteria can only emerge from the recognition of what has already been identified as a *predicament*. Hölderlin as Schmidt knows is prescient here. The famous line from *Die Titanen - Denn keiner trägt das Leben allein* - while opening a way towards a thinking of death does so in the precise sense of locating finitude within the ineliminability of relationality. 'We' die alone with others. It is the alone that is the mark of the other. That is the setting that has to be thought. That is 'our' *predicament*.

¹ It is rare that disagreements matter; rarer still that one learns from them. Engaging and disagreeing with Dennis Schmidt had been both a privilege and an education. His works continues as constant challenge. His writings sustain thought. Here the distance of disagreement has to be understood as mark of genuine respect.

² Dennis J. Schmidt. Hermeneutics as Original Ethics in *Difficulties of Ethical Life*. (HOE) Fordham University Press

³ HOE. Page 35

⁴ Dennis J. Schmidt. *Lyrical And Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the World, Freedom, And History*. (LES) SUNY Press. Albany. 2005. Page 9.

⁵ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. (Translated by Eric Matthews.) Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2001. Page 17.

⁶ While this position has been argued for in great detail in my *Virtue in Being*. SUNY Press. Albany. 2016, it also recalls, in part, Hannah Arendt's argument that: 'Existence can develop only in the shared life of human beings inhabiting a given world common to then all'. (Hannah Arendt. What is Existential Philosophy in *Essays in Understanding*. Schocken Books. New York. 1994. Page 186.

⁷ LES. Page 18.

⁸ HOE. Page 43.

⁹ Dennis J. Schmidt. *Between Word and Image: Heidegger, Klee, and Gadamer on Gesture and Genesis*. Indiana University Press. Page 124

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Page 104.

¹¹ LES. Page 8.

¹² HOE. Page 41

¹³ HOE. Page 41.

¹⁴ HOE. Page 41.

¹⁵ HOE. Page 42.

¹⁶ Dennis J. Schmidt. The Monstrous, Catastrophe, and Ethical Life: Hegel, Heidegger and Antigone. (MCEL) *Philosophy Today*, Volume 59, Issue 1 (Winter 2015). Page 62.

¹⁷ ref

¹⁸ LES Page 127.

¹⁹ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Page 68.

²⁰ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Page 179.

²¹ I have tried to develop an argument for their compatibility in regards to the relationship between the conditioned and the unconditioned in my *Virtue in Being*. SUNY Press. Albany. 2016.

²² See in this regard the discussion of 'death' and 'birth' at the end of MCEL. Specifically page 71.