Abstract
There has been some debate as to whether or not it is possible to keep a promise, and thus fulfil a duty, to supererogate. In this paper, I argue, in agreement with Jason Kawall, that such promises cannot be kept. However, I disagree with Kawall’s diagnosis of the problem and provide an alternative account. In the first section, I examine the debate between Kawall and David Heyd, who rejects Kawall’s claim that promises to supererogate cannot be kept. I disagree with Heyd’s argument, as it fails to get to the heart of the problem Kawall articulates. Kawall’s argument however fails to make clear the problem with promising to supererogate because his discussion relies on the plausibility of the following claim: that supererogatory actions cannot also fulfil obligations. I argue that this view is mistaken because there are clear examples of supererogatory actions that also fulfil obligations. In the final section, I give my alternative account of the problem, identifying exactly what is wrong with fulfilling a duty, and thus keeping a promise, to supererogate. My diagnosis emphasises the importance of identifying non-supererogatory actions when it comes to understanding the way in which supererogatory actions go above and beyond the call of duty.
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Notes
Kawall’s use of ‘fulfilling an obligation’ without qualification also includes such key statements as ‘[this action] is fulfilling an obligation, and thus cannot be supererogatory’ (2005: 390); ‘the fact that this action is fulfilling an obligation (even if it was not itself obligatory) precludes it from being supererogatory’ (2005: 391); ‘we are better to maintain what is widely-held as an essential mark of supererogation (that it is ‘beyond the call of duty’, and thus cannot fulfil an obligation)’ (2005:396); and ‘if we attempt to treat your action as supererogatory and thus as fulfilling the antecedent promise (and corresponding obligation) to perform a supererogatory action, it could not—for that very reason—be a supererogatory action (as a necessary condition of a supererogatory action is that it not fulfil an obligation)’ (2006: 156).
References
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Benn, C. What is Wrong with Promising to Supererogate. Philosophia 42, 55–61 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9480-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9480-z