Being a Correct Presumption vs. Being Presumably the Case

Authors

  • Lilian Bermejo-Luque University of Granada

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v36i1.4294

Keywords:

Presumptions, Presumptive Inferences, LNMA

Abstract

I argue for the distinction between presuming that p and maintaining that presumably p. In order to make sense of this distinction, I defend a non-inferentialist conception of presumptions and offer an account of the correctness conditions for both presumptions and presumptive inferences. I characterize presumptions as a type of constative speech-act having certain semantic correctness conditions. In turn, regarding presumptive inferences, my strategy is to provide the correctness conditions for the use of an epistemic modal such as “presumably.” This epistemic modal is characterized as a force indicator for speech-acts of concluding in complex speech-acts of arguing involving presumptive inferences.

Author Biography

Lilian Bermejo-Luque, University of Granada

Research Fellow Department of Philosophy I

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Published

2016-03-30

Issue

Vol. 36 No. 1 (2016)

Section

Articles

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