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Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection

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Evidentialism, as understood by its chief contemporary proponents (i.e. Richard Feldman and Earl Conee), is the view that epistemic justification supervenes on the evidence one has¹—whether that evidence is other beliefs or experiences or feelings. Earl Conee argues that, unlike other views, evidentialism has a response to skepticism about the external world that escapes what can be called ‘the Great Pumpkin Objection’.² That objection says, of a response to skepticism, that those endorsing a silly view—such as the view that the gift-delivering Great Pumpkin rises each Halloween over the most sincere pumpkin patch—can offer exactly parallel responses to those who are skeptical of their Great Pumpkin beliefs.³ The obvious suggestion is that if one’s response to skepticism about the external world can be mimicked by those defending such a silly view, then that response to skepticism is inadequate.

There are two main ways to respond to the Great Pumpkin Objection when it is applied to your favored response to some sort of skepticism. You could say that the allegedly parallel response offered by those defending belief in a silly view does *not* successfully mimic your favored response to skepticism. Or you could admit that it does successfully mimic your favored response to skepticism and yet deny that this implies

¹ Conee and Feldman (2004: 1). Note that this use of the term ‘evidentialism’ is different from the way it is sometimes used in philosophy of religion to refer to the view that belief in God can be made rational or justified only on the basis of propositional evidence. In particular, as I’m using the term here (following Feldman and Conee), evidentialism does not say that justification (for belief in God or anything else) requires propositional evidence—i.e., evidence in the form of other beliefs. See Conee and Feldman (2004: 2).

² Conee doesn’t use this terminology though he considers this sort of objection.

³ This way of using the term ‘Great Pumpkin Objection’ was, so far as I know, introduced by Plantinga (1981). He uses it to describe an objection to Reformed Epistemology, the view that belief in God can be properly basic (i.e. justified noninferentially). The charge in that case was that if the Reformed Epistemologist’s response to *religious* skepticism were satisfactory, it could easily be mimicked by those defending silly views (the suggestion was that this shows that the Reformed Epistemologist’s response to religious skepticism is inadequate). Ernest Sosa (1997: section VI) considers a similar complaint about externalist responses to skepticism, although the example he uses has to do with crystal ball reading, not Great Pumpkin beliefs. Elsewhere I’ve called this sort of objection to such responses to skepticism the ‘Anything Goes’ objection. See Bergmann (2006: 229–33, 2008).

that your response to skepticism is inadequate. The former we can call ‘the unsuccessful-mimicry response’ and the latter we can call ‘the successful-mimicry response’. As I understand him, Conee adopts the unsuccessful-mimicry response in defending evidentialism against the Great Pumpkin Objection, arguing that those defending their silly view against skeptical opposition to it *cannot* successfully mimic the evidentialist response to external world skepticism. I will argue that Conee is mistaken about this.

In the first section, I say more about what evidentialism is and explain the basic idea of its response to external world skepticism.⁴ Then, in the second section, I present Conee’s explanation for how this evidentialist response to skepticism avoids the Great Pumpkin Objection. In the third section I argue that Conee’s explanation fails. In the final two sections I consider the implications this has for the adequacy of evidentialist responses to skepticism.

7.1 Evidentialism and skepticism

As noted above, evidentialists say that justification supervenes on the evidence one has. But that’s so only if they are speaking of propositional justification. Propositional justification is the justification a proposition has for a person, whether or not the person believes that proposition for the right reasons (i.e. on the basis of the evidence that makes it propositionally justified). In fact, a proposition can be justified for a person by the evidence she has even if the person doesn’t believe the proposition at all. All that matters for propositional justification, according to evidentialists, is what evidence the person has. It doesn’t matter what she believes or what she bases her belief on. But if we are speaking instead of doxastic justification—the kind of justification a belief has—then evidentialists will require that the belief is *based on* the evidence that makes its content propositionally justified for the person holding the belief. So evidentialists think of a belief’s doxastic justification as something that applies to a belief (not to an unbelieved proposition) and as being determined by two things: the evidence one has and what that belief is based on. Henceforth, in this chapter, when I speak of justification, I’ll have in mind doxastic justification, not propositional justification.⁵

In addition to saying that a belief’s justification supervenes on the evidence one has and what the belief is based on, evidentialists add that a belief is justified when it *epistemically fits* the evidence one has; it lacks justification when it fails to epistemically fit that evidence (henceforth when I say ‘fit’, ‘fittingness’, etc. I have in mind the epistemic variety). So a belief’s justification depends on one’s evidence; more

⁴ I focus on a particular version of evidentialism because that is what Conee does in defending his view.

⁵ In their 1985 article, Feldman and Conee define the evidentialist position on propositional justification. But they go on in that article to speak of well-foundedness (their name for doxastic justification) and say of it what I say here of doxastic justification. Feldman makes clear in his (2004: 147–8) and his (2005: 274–5) that he understands this distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the way I’ve been describing it.

specifically, it depends on whether one's belief *fits* and is properly based on one's evidence.⁶ Moreover, evidence comes in degrees; and how justified one's belief is depends on how well one's belief fits one's evidence. If one's evidence *e* provides a really good reason (or very strong evidence) for one's belief *B*, then we say that *B* fits *e* very well and is justified to a high degree. If *e* provides only a moderate reason for *B*, then we say *B* fits *e* moderately well and is justified to only a moderate degree.

In defending the evidentialist's response to skepticism (which I'll discuss below) against the Great Pumpkin Objection, Conee decides (2004: 15) to focus on a particular version of evidentialism—what he calls 'Seeming Evidentialism' or SE.⁷ Generic evidentialism says that justification depends on *evidence one has* and it limits that to things of which one is aware (like beliefs, experiences, and feelings). SE goes further and limits evidence—of the sort that can confer justification on *S*'s belief that *p*—to all and only those things of which *S* is aware that *S* is spontaneously inclined to regard as indicative of *p*'s truth.⁸ It is a substantive thesis of SE that these things one is inclined to regard as indicative of *p*'s truth *are* indicative of *p*'s truth—so they count as good evidence for *p* and good reasons for *p*. This isn't to say that good evidence for *p* can't be overridden (for example by much stronger evidence for $\sim p$ or by evidence for thinking that one's evidence for *p* on a particular occasion is, contrary to how things seem, *not* indicative of *p*'s truth). Thus, SE is a version of evidentialism, as defined above, that limits evidence for *p* to all and only things one is aware of that seem to indicate *p*'s truth.⁹

So how does SE respond to external world skepticism? According to SE, if the skeptic's thesis or premises seem false to you or if the skeptic's arguments don't seem to you to support the skeptic's conclusions, then you don't have good evidence for skepticism. And if, in addition, it seems to you that the various components of the Standard View are correct, then you are reasonable in rejecting skepticism and accepting the Standard View. (The Standard View says—of most of the things you

⁶ To speak more carefully, *S*'s belief *B* is justified (according to evidentialists) if and only if *S* has some evidence *e* which is such that: (i) *B* is a fitting response to *e*, (ii) *B* is based on *e*, and (iii) *S* has no more inclusive body of evidence *e'* such that *B* is not a fitting response to *e'*. Clause (i) points out that a belief's justification depends on the evidence one has; clause (ii) emphasizes that justification depends on what the belief is based on; and clause (iii) makes it clear that it is one's total evidence that is relevant, not just some component of it. See Feldman and Conee (1985) where they make these points about well-foundedness (their name for doxastic justification).

⁷ Conee himself doesn't endorse SE in his (2004), though he does endorse evidentialism.

⁸ Suppose you feel (and are aware of) an inclination to believe *p*. If in response to this inclination you believe *p*, it's natural to think that you are regarding that inclination as indicative of *p*'s truth. Is a proponent of SE committed to saying that whenever you feel inclined to believe *p* and believe *p* on the basis of that inclination, you have evidence for *p*? I'm not sure what Conee would say about this way of interpreting SE. At the very least, it must be that the inclination to believe *p* makes *p* seem true to you—i.e. that you regard this inclination as being indicative of *p*'s truth.

⁹ The way I've explained SE here might be only one version of SE. Another version might be one that says evidence for *S*'s belief that *p* includes *all* (rather than *all and only*) those things of which *S* is aware that *S* is spontaneously inclined to regard as indicative of *p*'s truth. See Conee's (2004) discussion of SE. One serious worry about SE (which might explain why Conee doesn't endorse it) is that it makes justification far too easy to come by.

believe via memory, perception, testimony, introspection, reasoning, and rational insight—that they are true and known by you.) After all, you have evidence for the Standard View and no outweighing counterevidence for external world skepticism; and, as we’ve already noted, justification depends on evidence. If things were different—if the skeptic’s thesis or premises and arguments *did* seem to you to indicate the truth of skepticism—then perhaps you wouldn’t be justified in holding the Standard View. But that isn’t how things are.

Notice that SE does *not* say that a belief is justified for a person only if that person recognizes that SE is true and that her beliefs are justified according to SE. There is no such requirement. A person’s beliefs are justified if she’s inclined to regard what she’s aware of as indicating the things she believes. It may be that she is aware of things that seem to indicate to her that SE itself is true. This could make it the case that she’s also justified in believing SE. But even apart from considering or believing SE, her beliefs via memory, perception, testimony, etc. could be justified in the way SE says they are. So, according to SE, a person can be justified in rejecting skepticism and accepting the Standard View even if she has never considered SE. In short, one doesn’t have to assume SE in order to respond to skepticism in the way deemed appropriate by SE.¹⁰

7.2 Trying to avoid the Great Pumpkin Objection

Now that we have an idea of how SE responds to external world skepticism, let’s look at how Conee presents and replies to what I have called ‘the Great Pumpkin Objection’ to that response. He begins by addressing the point just made that one needn’t assume SE in order to give the SE response to skepticism:

This point about not assuming a doctrine [such as SE] at the outset of epistemological theorizing may be granted. . . . Still, it may be replied, employing a procedure in which belief is counted as initially justified by evidentialism is as faulty a way to start as assuming a doctrine. This is ‘rule circularity’. It is mere self-affirmation. What the employed procedure counts as justifying turns out to ‘justify’ the doctrine that it is justifying. But this is merely ‘justification’ by its own standards. In light of this, employing a procedure that is sound according to evidentialism is no better epistemically than employing tarot card reading and counter-induction on their own behalf. (Conee 2004: 19)

Conee also uses (2004: 20) the example of conjecturalism—the view that ‘intentionally guessing that a proposition is true is a good reason to believe that it is true’—and notes that it too might justify itself just as SE does. The point of this complaint is that the SE response to external world skepticism can be mimicked by those defending *silly* views, such as tarot card reading or counter-induction or conjecturalism, against skepticism about those views. It’s true that in some possible worlds, these silly views aren’t

¹⁰ The SE response to skepticism, as described in the last two paragraphs, is presented by Conee (2004: 16–19).

self-affirming. But the point is that there are possible worlds in which they are self-affirming, and in those worlds, these sorts of defenses of such views would be exactly parallel to the response offered by SE. And, the complaint continues, given that these responses to skepticism about tarot card reading or counter-induction or conjecturalism are so obviously inadequate—even in worlds where the views are self-affirming—the same goes for the SE response to skepticism about the external world.

What response does Conee give to the Great Pumpkin Objection applied in this way to SE's response to skepticism? In his *initial response*, he points out (2004: 19) that there is a 'vital difference' between SE and these silly views: SE is not defended by pointing out that it is self-affirming; instead it is defended by evidence or good reason that seems to indicate that SE is true. And he claims that this is a good reason to accept SE. But, he goes on, 'there is no good reason to think that a tarot card reading, or a counter-inductive inference, provides good reason for its outcome' (2004: 19).

I find this initial response odd. Surely a supporter of tarot card reading (in a world where tarot card reading is self-affirming) could count the tarot cards as providing good reasons just as the proponent of SE counts the fact that something seems indicative of p as a good reason for p . Of course, the proponent of SE could defend her treatment of 'X seems to indicate p ' as a good reason for p by noting that 'X seems to indicate p ' seems to her to be a good reason for p . But the tarot card reader could likewise defend her treatment of a tarot card reading that p as a good reason for p : she could say that she has a tarot card reading that *a tarot card reading that p* is a good reason for p .

Later, in discussing conjecturalism, Conee concedes what I've just said against his initial response:

Conjecturalists too can claim that they have a solution . . . that begs no questions, and is not merely self-affirming. Conjecturalists can claim that some propositions about what we know are merely guessed, and thereby justified and known, simply by being guessed on purpose. . . . A conjecturalist can further claim that although conjecturalism is self-affirming—he himself has guessed its truth—the resulting epistemic support arises not from the sheer fact of self-affirmation, but rather from the good reason that guessing provides. (Conee 2004: 20)

So now we have a silly view mimicking not only SE's response to external world skepticism but also the initial response Conee gave to the Great Pumpkin Objection. What does Conee have to say at this point in response to this further development of the Great Pumpkin Objection?

The remaining problem with conjecturalism, according to Conee (2004: 20), is that 'we have ample reason to doubt that intentional guesses can provide epistemic reasons' and 'intuitively, guesses are not epistemic reasons, no matter what'. He then summarizes his response to the Great Pumpkin Objection as follows:

The crucial difference is that [seeming] evidentialism is supported by evidence, and evidence does give good reasons. Again, this is not mere proclamation, easily matched by any other approach. It is supported by reasons, according to our best understanding of reasons.

(Conee 2004: 20)

This is how Conee concludes his response to the Great Pumpkin Objection. He doesn't consider any further responses that might be offered by proponents of the silly views. This leaves the impression that Conee thinks his account of the 'crucial difference' between the silly views and SE shows that the attempted mimicry fails.

7.3 Failing to avoid the Great Pumpkin Objection

Proponents of the Great Pumpkin Objection to SE say that a silly view like conjecturalism can offer the same responses to skepticism about itself (and what is believed on the basis of intentional guessing) as SE makes to skepticism about itself and the Standard View. In the previous section we saw that Conee replies with the following four points:

- (i) We have ample reason to doubt that intentional guesses provide epistemic reasons.
- (ii) Intuitively, guesses are not epistemic reasons, no matter what.
- (iii) SE is supported by evidence and evidence gives good reasons, according to our best understanding of reasons.
- (iv) Responses (i)–(iii) are not mere proclamation easily matched by another approach.

I assume that when Conee appeals to 'our best understanding of reasons,' he is not merely pointing out that we don't know any serious defenders of conjecturalism. The problem remains that it's possible for there to be serious defenders of conjecturalism and it's possible for conjecturalism to be self-affirming in all the ways it needs to be. Yet Conee thinks it would still be a silly view. Likewise, I assume Conee isn't pointing out that conjecturalism isn't in fact self-affirming. For, once again, it's possible for it to be self-affirming and that's all the Great Pumpkin Objection needs.

But then what does Conee have in mind? It's clear I think that the conjecturalist (in a world where conjecturalism is self-affirming) could easily make claims parallel to (i)–(iii) from the previous paragraph, the claims Conee identifies in support of SE. Point (iii) says that 'evidence gives good reasons, according to our best understanding of reasons'. This could be understood in at least two ways:

- (a) 'Having good evidence for p ' is pretty much equivalent in meaning to 'having a good reason for p '.
- (b) Evidence for p of the sort SE says there is (i.e. something's seeming to indicate p 's truth) gives good reasons for p according to our best understanding of reasons.

I doubt that (a) is the claim Conee had in mind in stating point (iii), especially since conjecturalists could happily accept (a). I think the best way (in this context) to understand (iii) is to read it as claiming (b), which is a substantial thesis about good reasons—a thesis that is distinctive of SE. Conjecturalists, of course, have their own substantial thesis about good reasons:

- (b*) Intentional guessing gives good reasons according to our best understanding of reasons.¹¹

Thus, conjecturalists could easily endorse the following claim in place of (iii):

- (iii*) Conjecturalism is supported by intentional guessing and intentional guessing gives good reasons, according to our best understanding of reasons.

As for point (ii), it says that ‘intuitively’ things are thus and so. That’s like saying ‘it seems that’ things are thus and so. It is an appeal to the sort of thing SE says are good reasons: namely, how things seem (intuitively). But conjecturalism could easily appeal to what it says are good reasons—that is intentional guesses—in place of intuitive seemings. Thus, instead of (ii) the conjecturalist could endorse the first or even both of the following two claims:

- (ii*) Intentional guessing tells us that intentional guesses *are* epistemic reasons.
 (ii**) Intentional guessing tells us that something’s seeming to indicate *p* is not an epistemic reason for *p*, no matter what.¹²

And just as point (i) follows naturally from points (ii) and (iii),¹³ so also the conjunction of (ii*) and (iii*) and the conjunction of (ii**) and (iii*) imply the following two points, respectively:

- (i*) We have ample reason to think that intentional guesses provide epistemic reasons.
 (i**) We have ample reason to doubt that something’s seeming to indicate *p* provides an epistemic reason for *p*.

In short, there’s no obstacle to a conjecturalist claiming (i*)–(iii*) in support of conjecturalism—or even (i**), (ii**), and (iii*) which are critical of SE—in place of Conee’s (i)–(iii) offered on behalf of SE.

But if it’s possible for a conjecturalist to easily claim (i*)–(iii*)—or (i**), (ii**), and (iii*)—in place of (i)–(iii), then Conee’s claim (iv) is false. For in that case, a silly alternative view (i.e. conjecturalism) *could*—contrary to (iv)—easily match proclamations (i)–(iii) made on behalf of SE.¹⁴ In fact, it looks like conjecturalism could (in a

¹¹ Notice that conjecturalists could easily hold (b*) in conjunction with (a).

¹² The conjecturalists I have in mind would endorse (ii**) only if intentional guessing did *in fact* tell us that something’s seeming to indicate *p* is not an epistemic reason for *p*, no matter what. And they would endorse (ii*) only if intentional guessing did *in fact* tell us that guesses are good reasons. In some worlds, intentional guessing *does* tell us these things.

¹³ How does point (i) follow naturally from points (ii) and (iii)? (iii) says, *inter alia*, that evidence for *p* (of the sort SE says there is—namely, *p*’s seeming to be true) gives good reasons for *p* (here I’m interpreting (iii) in accordance with (b) above). (ii) says that it seems (intuitively) that guesses are not good reasons, no matter what. From this it follows that we have good reason for thinking that guesses aren’t good reasons—and so good reason for doubting that guesses provide good reasons, which is what (i) says.

¹⁴ (i) is supportive of SE and (ii)–(iii) endorse criticisms of conjecturalism; all three claims are SE-acceptable (i.e. acceptable from the perspective of SE supporters). One way of offering conjecturalist claims parallel to

world where it is self-affirming) easily mimic *all* of the claims that SE makes in responding to skepticism. But if this is so, then Conee's way of avoiding the Great Pumpkin Objection fails. Conee wanted to respond to that objection by showing that SE's response to skepticism *cannot* be easily mimicked by defenders of a silly view like conjecturalism. Unfortunately for Conee, the Great Pumpkin Objection is not so easily dismissed.

7.4 A better response to the Great Pumpkin Objection

Do the points made in Section 7.3 imply that SE (and perhaps evidentialism more generally) has no adequate response to the Great Pumpkin Objection? No. For there's another sort of response available to the proponent of SE besides Conee's unsuccessful-mimicry response, namely, the *successful-mimicry* response. The supporter of SE can acknowledge what Conee mistakenly denies—that those defending silly views against skeptical objections *can* mimic exactly what SE says in response to skepticism about itself and the Standard View. And she can go on to argue that this acknowledged fact doesn't imply that the SE response to skepticism is inadequate.

As I'm thinking of the successful-mimicry response, the defender of SE can reply to the Great Pumpkin Objection as follows: 'As already noted, my beliefs in the claims endorsed by the Standard View are justified in virtue of being based on things of which I'm aware that seem to indicate their truth. Likewise for my belief in SE itself: it too is justified in virtue of being based on what seems to indicate its truth. Moreover, many others who have never heard of SE also have justified beliefs in claims endorsed by the Standard View. Their beliefs in those claims are justified in the same way my beliefs in those claims are justified: their beliefs are based on what seems to indicate the truth of their beliefs. Justification for beliefs depends on their being based on what seems to indicate their truth and this is so even if one doesn't recognize that it is so. Silly views (like conjecturalism) can be self-affirming in the way SE is self-affirming. But silly views are wrong about what justification supervenes on (I believe this on the basis of what seems to me to indicate that these silly views are wrong in this way). It's true that silly views can mimic everything I've just said in defending themselves against skepticism about their views. And this means that I can't show them, in a way that satisfies them, that they're mistaken and I'm right. But that needn't lead me to think SE is false or unjustified. SE is supported by the right sort of evidence after all (i.e. what seems to indicate its truth). Nor need it lead me to think conjecturalists are justified in their beliefs. Insofar as their beliefs are based only on intentional guesses and not on what seems to indicate the truth of their beliefs, they aren't justified. And this is so even

(i)–(iii) is to do what (i*)–(iii*) do: offer conjecturalist-acceptable support for conjecturalism and for *rejecting* criticisms of conjecturalism. Another way of offering conjecturalist claims parallel to (i)–(iii) is to do what is done in (i**), (ii**), and (iii*): offer conjecturalist-acceptable support for conjecturalism and endorse criticisms of SE.

though I can't show them, in a way they'll find convincing, that this is so—even though they can say things on behalf of their views that mimic exactly what I say on behalf of mine. It's not what we can say on behalf of our beliefs using the methods and skills associated with philosophy that makes them justified. It's whether they are based on what seems to indicate their truth.'

That, I believe, is a much better response to the Great Pumpkin Objection because it admits what's true—namely, that silly views can successfully mimic SE's response to skepticism. It won't satisfy all who are skeptical of SE. And it doesn't show supporters of silly views that they can't say on behalf of their views things parallel to what the supporter of SE says on behalf of her view. But, as I've argued elsewhere, comments of this sort apply to all nonskeptical positions that aren't ruled out as implausible on other grounds.¹⁵ And that's a reason for thinking that it's not a flaw in one's position for such comments to apply to it.

7.5 A worry for evidentialism

Unfortunately, the successful-mimicry response to the Great Pumpkin Objection laid out in the previous section does not fit well with the evidentialist's sympathies toward internalism and toward certain objections to externalism. To see this, it will be helpful to compare SE's successful-mimicry response to the Great Pumpkin Objection with an externalist response to the Great Pumpkin Objection. SE says that a belief is justified if it satisfies the SE-condition—that is *being based on what seems to indicate the belief's truth*. An externalist view such as a proper function view says that a belief is justified if it satisfies the PF-condition—that is *being formed in accord with proper function*.¹⁶ Consider now how the SE reply to the Great Pumpkin Objection compares with the proper functionalist reply to that objection. Each will endorse the following five claims:

1. Beliefs are justified in virtue of satisfying the relevant justification-conferring condition (according to SE, this will be the SE-condition; according to proper functionalism, this will be the PF-condition). There's no need for the believer to know what the relevant condition is or that it's satisfied. It's enough for justification that it *is* satisfied by the subject's beliefs.
2. Belief in an epistemological view (be it SE or proper functionalism) is justified only if that belief itself satisfies the relevant condition (the SE-condition according to SE, the PF-condition according to proper functionalism).
3. Silly views can be self-affirming just as SE or proper functionalism can be self-affirming. But silly views aren't justified if they don't satisfy the relevant

¹⁵ See Bergmann (2006, 2008).

¹⁶ I defend a proper function analysis of justification in Bergmann (2004, 2006: ch. 5). The view I defend is a little more complicated than the view described here but this view will suffice for illustrative purposes.

condition (the SE-condition according to SE, the PF-condition according to proper functionalism).

4. Silly views like conjecturalism can mimic SE or proper functionalism, saying things parallel to each of the above remarks in its own defense, which means conjecturalists can't be shown, in a way that satisfies them, that they're mistaken.
5. Despite this, conjecturalism isn't a reasonable view in the way SE or proper functionalism is, for although conjecturalism is self-affirming, it doesn't satisfy the relevant justification-conferring conditions (the SE-condition according to SE or the PF-condition according to proper functionalism).

Notice that the key point made here by both SE and the proper functionalist in response to the Great Pumpkin Objection is that the silly view (conjecturalism) may be as self-affirming and as plausible from its proponents' own perspective as the correct view (whether that is SE or proper functionalism), but the silly view is not as reasonable as the correct view because it doesn't satisfy the condition that is in fact justification-conferring (the SE-condition according to SE or the PF-condition according to proper functionalists). *In short, the reasonability of your view depends not on whether it is, from your own perspective, plausible or confirmed; rather, it depends on whether your view satisfies the conditions that are in fact justification-conferring.* But when stated in that way, this sort of response to the Great Pumpkin Objection (whether offered by SE or by the proper functionalist) looks a lot like an externalist response. At the very least we can say this: it has precisely those features that make internalists unhappy with the externalist response to the Great Pumpkin Objection. It focuses on the actual epistemic facts of the matter—what justification in fact supervenes on and whether that supervenience base is in fact present—regardless of whether the believer's view is, from her own perspective, plausible and confirmed, regardless of what the believer *thinks* the epistemic facts are.

Should an evidentialist be worried by this? Maybe not. Maybe an evidentialist can avoid both internalism and externalism.¹⁷ Or maybe an evidentialist needn't buy into the internalist's dissatisfaction with the externalist response to the Great Pumpkin Objection. I suspect though that, for the reasons mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph, evidentialists won't be content with the successful-mimicry response to the Great Pumpkin Objection laid out in Section 7.4. But this should give them a reason to worry about evidentialism itself. For the alternative to the successful-mimicry response sketched in Section 7.4 will be something like Conee's unsuccessful-mimicry response described in Section 7.2, a response that is unsatisfactory for the reasons laid out in Section 7.3. Ultimately then, the Great Pumpkin Objection is more worrisome for evidentialists than it is for externalists. For unlike evidentialists, externalists can at least be comfortable with the successful-mimicry response.¹⁸

¹⁷ See Bergmann (2006: 55–7) for how a view on justification can be neither internalist nor externalist.

¹⁸ Thanks to Trent Dougherty for comments on an earlier draft.

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