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INTERNALISM, EXTERNALISM AND THE NO-DEFEATER  
CONDITION\*

**ABSTRACT.** Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of 'internal' here? And of *which* conditions of *which* positive epistemic status are we speaking? I argue that an adequate answer to these questions requires reference to what I call the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by a subject's belief B just in case she does not believe that B is defeated. I close by stating succinctly the main positions taken in the I-E debate, identifying the basic points of disagreement and suggesting fruitful courses for future discussion.

For the last fifteen years or so, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate has captured the attention of many epistemologists. But despite various attempts to rectify matters, the debate remains mired in serious confusion. The terms 'internalism' and 'externalism' are still used loosely and in different ways in epistemology. Furthermore, there is no clear and accurate statement of the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. I present a new account of the I-E debate in epistemology, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the issues which divide internalists and externalists.

1. A ROUGH DESCRIPTION OF THE I-E DEBATE

The I-E debate is, roughly speaking, over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. Now as soon as the debate is described in this way, it becomes obvious that there are potentially many different I-E debates in epistemology – as many as there are different senses of 'internal' and different sorts of positive epistemic status; further, for each sort of positive epistemic status, there are a variety of possible views concerning which of the conditions necessary for it are considered by the internalist to be internal. So in order to discuss the I-E debate profitably, the above rough description of it must be made more precise in each of the following ways: first, the operative sense of 'internal'

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must be specified; second, the positive epistemic status in question must be singled out; and third, the necessary conditions which the internalist thinks are internal must be identified.

I alluded to other attempts to rectify the sorry state of the I-E debate. Consider, for example, papers by William Alston and Kihyeon Kim, each of which is entitled “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology”.<sup>1</sup> In these papers, both Alston and Kim make the above rough description of the I-E debate more precise in each of the three ways I noted. The sort of positive epistemic status on which Alston focuses is justification; and he says the internalist thinks *all* of the necessary conditions of justification are internal. As for the sense of ‘internal’ that is operative, Alston specifies *two*.<sup>2</sup> Thus, according to Alston, the I-E debate is over whether or not all of the conditions severally necessary and jointly sufficient for justification are internal in at least one of the two senses he specifies. Kim also focuses on justification but he settles on just one of the two senses of ‘internal’ Alston considers. However, Kim identifies three types of condition commonly supposed to be necessary for justification and says that one can be an internalist with respect to any one of these condition types.<sup>3</sup> Thus, Kim thinks there are at least three I-E debates: one for each of these three types of necessary condition of justification concerning whether or not conditions of that type are internal in the sense he specifies.

The most common sense of ‘internal’ is the sense on which Kim focuses. In this sense, a condition of the positive epistemic status of a belief is internal if and only if a typical subject has special epistemic access to whether or not the condition is satisfied; otherwise the condition is external. A person has such access to a fact if she can tell by reflection alone whether or not the fact obtains. Thus, a typical internal condition which might be satisfied by *S*’s belief that *p* is that *S* try her best to fulfill her intellectual duties in believing *p*. That *S*’s belief that *p* is formed in a reliable manner is a typical external condition. I join Kim in selecting this *access* sense of ‘internal’ as the one that is most useful in capturing what is at issue between internalists and externalists.

The remainder of my account of the I-E debate differs significantly from the accounts of both Alston and Kim. The positive epistemic status on which I focus is not justification<sup>4</sup> but warrant. By ‘warrant’ I mean that which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.<sup>5</sup> In Sections 2 and 3 I defend this preference for focusing on warrant. Then, in Sections 4 and 5, I specify which of the necessary conditions of warrant internalists say are internal; in doing so it will be necessary to refer to what I call the *no-defeater condition*. Finally, in Sections 6 and 7, I identify precisely the main disagreements between internalists and

externalists and propose what I think are the most fruitful courses to take in future discussions of these disagreements.

## 2. TWO WAYS OF CONSTRUING THE I-E DEBATE

Before considering why it is better to concentrate on the I-E debate with respect to warrant than on the I-E debate with respect to justification, let's convince ourselves that there really are (at least) these two ways of construing the debate and that they are significantly different. We can begin by noting that some philosophers define the positions in the I-E debate in terms of justification. One very common way of defining internalism is as what I will call strong internalism with respect to justification ( $\text{internalism}_{sj}$ ) where

*Internalism<sub>sj</sub>* is the view that each of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for justification is an internal condition.<sup>6</sup>

This is the definition of internalism proposed by William Alston,<sup>7</sup> Roderick Chisholm<sup>8</sup> and Ernest Sosa.<sup>9</sup> Since externalism is usually taken to be the complement of internalism,<sup>10</sup> externalism, according to this definition of internalism, is weak externalism with respect to justification ( $\text{externalism}_{wj}$ ) where

*Externalism<sub>wj</sub>* is the view that at least one of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for justification is an external condition.<sup>11</sup>

Note that  $\text{internalism}_{sj}$  and  $\text{externalism}_{wj}$  may be contrasted with  $\text{internalism}_{wj}$  and  $\text{externalism}_{sj}$  where

*Internalism<sub>wj</sub>* is the view that at least one of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for justification is an internal condition

and

*Externalism<sub>sj</sub>* is the view that each of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for justification is an external condition.

As far as I know, no epistemologists define internalism and externalism as  $\text{internalism}_{wj}$  and  $\text{externalism}_{sj}$ . However, identifying these views can be

helpful. For example, it enables us to point out that although Alston opposes Chisholm by rejecting internalism<sub>sj</sub>, he defends a sort of internalism<sub>wj</sub>.<sup>12</sup>

Other philosophers define the positions in the I-E debate in terms of warrant rather than in terms of justification. Keith Lehrer, for example, defines externalism as strong externalism with respect to warrant (externalism<sub>sw</sub>) where

*Externalism<sub>sw</sub>* is the view that each of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant is an external condition.<sup>13</sup>

Internalism, if we take it to be the complement of externalism so defined, is weak internalism with respect to warrant (internalism<sub>ww</sub>) where

*Internalism<sub>ww</sub>* is the view that at least one of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant is an internal condition.

And Alvin Plantinga defines internalism as strong internalism with respect to warrant (internalism<sub>sw</sub>) and externalism as weak externalism with respect to warrant (externalism<sub>sw</sub>) where

*Internalism<sub>sw</sub>* is the view that each of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant is an internal condition

and

*Externalism<sub>ww</sub>* is the view that at least one of the conditions which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant is an external condition.<sup>14</sup>

The difference between Plantinga's definitions and Lehrer's deserves comment which I will reserve for Section 4. What I want to draw attention to here is that they both define internalism and externalism *with respect to warrant*, not justification.

It is clear, therefore, that some participants in the I-E debate focus on justification and that others focus on warrant.<sup>15</sup> But ever since Gettier, it has been generally recognized by epistemologists that justification is not sufficient for warrant. Some philosophers deny even that it is *necessary* for warrant.<sup>16</sup> Obviously, if justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant, some conditions necessary for justification will not be necessary for warrant (and vice versa). As a result, a person could consistently hold that all of the conditions necessary for justification are internal without

holding the same of the conditions necessary for warrant.<sup>17</sup> In fact, a person could sensibly hold the former and not the latter even if she held that justification is necessary but not sufficient for warrant.

So the two construals of the I-E debate that I've identified are significantly different. And certain misunderstandings can be avoided merely by keeping the distinction between them in mind. For example, one confusion that sometimes occurs as a result of failing to distinguish these two construals of the debate is that of attributing internalism<sub>sw</sub> to internalists who hold only internalism<sub>sj</sub>.<sup>18</sup> Given that internalism<sub>sj</sub> is much more plausible than internalism<sub>sw</sub> this confusion could result in setting up a straw man internalist position for easy refutation.

### 3. WARRANT VS. JUSTIFICATION

Now let us consider some of the reasons it is better to construe the I-E debate as one with respect to warrant rather than justification. First, externalists often say very little about justification and focus instead on warrant whereas although internalists often focus on justification, they also lay out their views on warrant. This is because, thanks to Gettier, most internalist epistemologists say something about what must be added to a justified true belief to make it knowledge; according to them, warrant just is justification plus some fourth condition.<sup>19</sup> And even if internalists don't make explicit what they think this fourth condition amounts to, we have a fairly good idea of the sense in which they think warrant is internal. For they explain the sense in which they think justification is internal and then tell us that justification is necessary for warrant. However, there is no similar consensus among externalists about the relation of justification and warrant. Some externalists think of justification as external and necessary for warrant,<sup>20</sup> others think of it as internal but not necessary for warrant<sup>21</sup> and several say virtually nothing about justification or express uncertainty concerning its relation to warrant.<sup>22</sup> Thus, while it is clear that internalists and externalists disagree about whether or not warrant is internal, it is doubtful that, in general, they disagree about whether or not justification is internal. And given that justification is ignored by some of the more significant participants in the debate and that warrant is not, I think it is more helpful to construe the I-E debate as one about warrant.

The second reason that it is better to focus on warrant is that, as Alston has recently noted,

there does not seem to be enough commonality in [epistemologists'] pre-theoretical understanding of the nature of epistemic justification to warrant us in supposing that there is some uniquely identifiable item about which they hold different views.<sup>23</sup>

Rather than repeat here Alston's arguments for this claim,<sup>24</sup> I will, by way of support for his conclusion, draw your attention to some of the many varieties of epistemic justification discussed in the literature: Alston distinguishes between cognitive deontological and objective evaluative conceptions of epistemic justification,<sup>25</sup> Alvin Goldman distinguishes between strong and weak justification both of which are to be distinguished from regulative justification;<sup>26</sup> Ernest Sosa adds to Goldman's list metajustification and superweak justification;<sup>27</sup> Keith Lehrer considers personal justification, veridical justification, complete justification and undefeated justification;<sup>28</sup> and John Pollock notes that there is both subjective and objective justification.<sup>29</sup> Which, if any, of these is the subject of the I-E debate with respect to justification? Are any of these the same kind of justification but with different names? The fact that we lack ready answers to these questions lends support to Alston's claim that many of the supposed disagreements about justification are due to the fact that the disputants are unwittingly discussing different properties of beliefs.

The terms 'knowledge' and 'true belief', on the other hand, are not problematic to nearly this same degree.<sup>30</sup> This is not to say that there is agreement concerning an analysis of warrant. Rather, it is to say that there is greater agreement concerning what counts as a case of warrant than there is concerning what counts as a case of justification. There is much more reason to think that discussions of the analysis of warrant are focused on a single analysandum than there is to think discussions of justification are. By focusing on the I-E debate with respect to warrant rather than justification, we are more likely to get at the real sources of disagreement between internalists and externalists. If, on the other hand, we construe the I-E debate as one over the nature of the conditions necessary for justification, the confusion that inevitably accompanies discussions of justification will infect our understanding of the I-E debate.

Let me address two concerns which those who find themselves still resisting the shift of focus from justification to warrant might have.<sup>31</sup> The first is connected with the belief that the I-E debate, like epistemology generally in the last thirty years or so, has been concerned with justification, not warrant. Focus on warrant is viewed by those holding this belief as a change of topic, one that (for some reason that escapes me) is not welcome. It has even been suggested that Plantinga's two-volume work on warrant is responsible (at least in part) for this unfortunate turn of events. But is this right? Haven't we been speaking of warrant ever since Plato asked what in addition to true belief gets us knowledge? And hasn't all the effort since Gettier to come up with a fourth condition of knowledge been an attempt to determine what, in addition to justification, is necessary and sufficient

for warrant? Plantinga's technical use of the term 'warrant' as a name for that which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief may be novel. But his focus on warrant is not.

The other concern has to do with the fact that internalists often characterize their position as internalism with respect to justification, not warrant. The worry is that construing the I-E debate as a debate with respect to warrant misrepresents internalism. But note that (as I pointed out earlier) internalists typically contend both that there are some internal conditions necessary for what they think of as justification and that justification is necessary for warrant. And although it is not always clear that all internalists are speaking of the same sort of justification or that externalists are denying the internalist's claims with respect to justification, it is clear that all internalists think the internal conditions they propose are necessary for warrant and that externalists disagree with internalists on precisely this point.

#### 4. PROBLEMS WITH LEHRER'S AND PLANTINGA'S DEFINITIONS

Thus far I have described the I-E debate as one over whether or not certain of the conditions necessary for warrant are internal in the access sense. The question I want to consider now is, 'Which of these conditions are the relevant ones?'. Let's approach this question by considering again the definitions of internalism and externalism proposed by Lehrer and Plantinga. These definitions identify the relevant necessary conditions of warrant by means of the quantifiers *each* and *at least one*: Lehrer thinks that what is at issue between internalists and externalists is whether or not at least one of these conditions is internal; Plantinga thinks the issue is whether or not each of them is.

But note that both of these pairs of definitions are problematic. The pair defining internalism and externalism as internalism<sub>ww</sub> and externalism<sub>sw</sub> is problematic because several of the more prominent externalists reject externalism<sub>sw</sub>. Alvin Goldman, Robert Nozick and Alvin Plantinga each propose at least one internal condition as necessary for warrant. Goldman argues that a necessary condition of warrant for *S*'s belief that *p* is that *S* not believe that *p* is undermined.<sup>32</sup> Nozick mentions that a necessary condition of warrant for *S*'s belief that *p* is that *S* not believe that *p* does not track the truth.<sup>33</sup> Plantinga says that a necessary condition of warrant for *S*'s belief that *p* is that *S*'s defeater system – or at least that part of it which applies to *S*'s belief that *p* – is functioning properly in an appropriate cognitive environment.<sup>34</sup> And it follows from Plantinga's view of how our defeater systems work that a necessary condition of warrant

for *S*'s belief that *p* is that *S* not believe that her belief that *p* is defeated.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the conditions they propose are all something like *S does not believe her belief that p is defeated*. But whether or not a condition of this sort is satisfied by *S*'s belief that *p* is something to which *S* has special epistemic access. So these conditions proposed by Goldman, Nozick and Plantinga as necessary for warrant are internal conditions; these externalists do not hold externalism<sub>sw</sub>.

The other pair of definitions of internalism and externalism with respect to warrant (the one defining them as internalism<sub>sw</sub> and externalism<sub>ww</sub>) is problematic insofar as none of the more prominent internalists holds internalism<sub>sw</sub>. Laurence Bonjour, Roderick Chisholm and Keith Lehrer<sup>36</sup> each propose at least one external condition as necessary for warrant. Bonjour says that one necessary condition of warrant for *S*'s belief that *p* is that there, in fact, be a good reason for thinking that *p* is true;<sup>37</sup> he goes on to add that a further necessary condition of warrant is that *S* believes this reason and thinks it is a good reason for thinking that *p* is true.<sup>38</sup> The latter condition is proposed as an internal condition. And it is contrasted with the former condition which is external (we do not in general have access to whether or not there is, in fact, a good reason for thinking a particular belief of ours is true). Chisholm and Lehrer each identify a condition necessary for warrant which is such that a person could not have special epistemic access to whether or not a belief of hers satisfied it unless she also had special epistemic access to which of her beliefs were false. According to Chisholm, the satisfaction of one of the necessary conditions of warrant for *S*'s belief that *p* depends, in part, on whether or not *p* is what he calls 'defectively evident' for *S*. But whether or not *p* is defectively evident for *S* depends on whether or not *p* is related in a particular way to any false proposition *S* believes.<sup>39</sup> And Lehrer says that one necessary condition of warrant for *S*'s belief that *p* is that it coheres with the rest of *S*'s belief system once all false beliefs in that system have been corrected.<sup>40</sup> But we do not have special epistemic access to which of our beliefs are false.<sup>41</sup> So these conditions proposed by Chisholm and Lehrer are, like Bonjour's, external conditions. Consequently, none of these internalists holds internalism<sub>sw</sub>. In fact, ever since Gettier, most definitions of warrant have included external conditions because that is what is required to deal with Gettier-style counterexamples.<sup>42</sup>

##### 5. THE NO-DEFEATER CONDITION

It seems therefore that the I-E debate is not over whether or not the necessary conditions of warrant highlighted by Lehrer or Plantinga are internal.



So which conditions are the relevant ones? Recall that the internal conditions which externalists (such as Goldman, Nozick and Plantinga) propose as necessary for warrant are all very much alike. Each says, in effect, that a person's belief that  $p$  is not warranted if she believes her belief that  $p$  is defeated. Let us call this condition the no-defeater condition (NDC) and define it roughly as follows:

*NDC* is satisfied by  $S$ 's belief that  $p$  if and only if  $S$  does not believe (and would not upon reflection) that her belief that  $p$  is defeated.<sup>43</sup>

Now it is interesting to note that, upon recognizing that some externalists acknowledge the necessity of NDC for warrant, internalists are not quick to identify them as allies. On the contrary, they point out that accepting that NDC is a necessary condition of warrant is not sufficiently internalist. Bonjour, Lehrer and Moser explicitly consider externalist positions which state that NDC is a necessary condition of warrant and conclude that there are further internal conditions which a belief must satisfy if it is to be warranted.<sup>44</sup>

This response by internalists to externalists who think that NDC is necessary for warrant suggests that internalism should be defined as what I call moderate internalism with respect to warrant (*internalism<sub>mw</sub>*) and that externalism should be defined as moderate externalism with respect to warrant (*externalism<sub>mw</sub>*) where

*Internalism<sub>mw</sub>* is the view that there is at least one internal condition other than NDC that is included among those severally necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant

and

*Externalism<sub>mw</sub>* is the view that there is no internal condition other than NDC that is included among those severally necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant.

Unlike Lehrer's and Plantinga's definitions, these definitions are consistent with our usual way of classifying philosophers as either internalist or externalist. It seems, therefore, that we should specify the necessary conditions of warrant which the internalist thinks are internal as *at least one other than NDC*.

## 6. THE ROOT DISAGREEMENTS

In sum, my way of making the rough description of the I-E debate more precise is as follows: it is a debate over whether or not at least one neces-

sary condition of warrant other than NDC is internal in the access sense. However, although I noted some problems with Lehrer's definition of externalism, I think that the necessary conditions of warrant he identifies are also worth singling out. According to Lehrer, externalists deny that even one of the necessary conditions of warrant is internal. And although not all externalists deny this, some do (whereas, contrary to what Plantinga suggests, no internalists hold that all of the necessary conditions of warrant are internal). In what follows, I will use Lehrer's definition of externalism along with the definitions of internalism and externalism I proposed in Section 5 to state succinctly the positions actually held by those participating in the I-E debate.

There are basically three groups of participants in the I-E debate with respect to warrant: *moderate internalists* who hold internalism<sub>mw</sub> but deny internalism<sub>sw</sub>; *moderate externalists* who hold externalism<sub>mw</sub> but deny externalism<sub>sw</sub>; and *strong externalists* who hold externalism<sub>sw</sub>.<sup>45</sup> Bonjour, Chisholm and Lehrer are examples of moderate internalists; Goldman, Nozick and Plantinga are examples of moderate externalists; and Alston, Armstrong and Dretske are examples of strong externalists.

This description of the positions involved helps us to see that the I-E debate with respect to warrant is focused on two main disagreements. One is between moderate internalists and externalists on the one hand and strong externalists on the other. It is over whether or not any internal conditions (in particular, NDC) are necessary for warrant. The other disagreement is between strong and moderate externalists on the one hand and moderate internalists on the other. It is over whether or not any internal conditions other than NDC are necessary for warrant.

It is easy to see why the debate with respect to the former disagreement is called an I-E debate: it is between *pure* externalists and their opponents. As for the debate with respect to the latter disagreement, it seems the only reason it is called an I-E debate is that it divides those normally thought of as internalists from those normally thought of as externalists. But what is particularly externalist about claiming that NDC is the only internal condition necessary for warrant? Perhaps what this latter debate shows us is that the driving force behind internalism is the intuition, with respect to a select group of internal conditions (a group which doesn't include NDC), that they are necessary for warrant. It would be interesting to consider which internal conditions might be included in such a group. But that would take us too far afield from our present task. Here I will simply note that the debate with respect to the former disagreement (concerning whether or not *any* conditions of warrant are internal) divides externalists against one another whereas the debate with respect to the latter disagreement

(concerning whether or not any conditions of warrant *other than NDC* are internal) does not. For this reason I will call the debate concerning the former disagreement the *nonpartisan* I-E debate with respect to warrant and the debate concerning the latter disagreement the *partisan* I-E debate with respect to warrant.

#### 7. FRUITFUL COURSES FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION

What are the most fruitful courses for future discussions of these disagreements to take? Concerning the nonpartisan I-E debate I will be brief. It would seem from what has been said thus far that if any internal condition is necessary for warrant, NDC is. This suggests that the most important question to be discussed by the disputants in the nonpartisan I-E debate with respect to warrant is whether or not NDC is a necessary condition of warrant. Strong externalists have not given much *explicit* attention to this question.<sup>46</sup> This is a gap in the literature that needs to be filled.

The partisan I-E debate with respect to warrant is a little more complicated. The issue here is whether or not internal conditions other than NDC are necessary for warrant. A typical approach to this issue involves focusing on a particular internal condition other than NDC and considering arguments for and against the claim that it is necessary for warrant. I want to suggest a different approach, one that will bring moderate internalists and moderate externalists closer together.

It will be helpful to have before us some examples of internal conditions other than NDC that have been proposed as necessary for warrant. Two of the more prominent of these are what I will call the deontological justification condition (DJC) and the inferential justification condition (IJC). Let's define these roughly as follows:

*DJC* is satisfied by *S*'s belief that *p* if and only if *S* does not believe (and would not upon reflection) that, in believing that *p*, she has violated one of her intellectual duties<sup>47</sup>

and

*IJC* is satisfied by *S*'s belief that *p* if and only if *S* believes (or would upon reflection) that she has a good reason for *p*.

On the approach to the partisan I-E debate I have in mind, the participants focus on whether or not a belief's satisfying NDC is a sufficient condition for its satisfying DJC (or IJC or whatever internal condition other than NDC is thought to be necessary for warrant). Is it the case that any belief

which fails to satisfy DJC (or IJC or whatever) also fails to satisfy NDC? If so, then even if internalists are right in proposing DJC or IJC as necessary for warrant, they are mistaken in thinking that the moderate externalist position is false. For moderate externalists never meant to deny that internal conditions the satisfaction of which is guaranteed by the satisfaction of NDC are necessary for warrant. We could call conditions whose satisfaction is guaranteed by the satisfaction of NDC *subconditions* of NDC. And we could clarify our earlier definition of externalism<sub>mw</sub> as follows: it is the view that there is no internal condition other than NDC *and its subconditions* that is among those severally necessary and jointly sufficient for warrant. My proposal is that one fruitful course to take in future discussions of the partisan I-E debate with respect to warrant is to focus on whether or not those internal conditions other than NDC which *seem* necessary for warrant are subconditions of NDC.

Let's consider briefly why one might think that versions of DJC and IJC plausibly thought to be necessary for warrant are subconditions of NDC. Consider first DJC. Suppose *S*'s belief that *p* does in fact satisfy DJC. But suppose also that *S* believes that the likelihood of her holding true beliefs with respect to *p* given that she has fulfilled her intellectual duties is much lower than it would be if she didn't fulfill them. For example, suppose *S* believes she has the duty to believe whatever her parents tell her *even* if she thinks what her parents tell her is false. Then suppose her parents tell her that *p* is false but that *S* believes *p* (we may suppose she has good reason to think *p* is true). In such a case *S* believes that fulfilling the duty in question will *decrease* the likelihood of her holding true beliefs with respect to *p*. But then *S*'s belief that she has not fulfilled this duty does not indicate that her belief that *p* lacks warrant. This is because she does *not* think that, in violating that duty, she significantly diminishes the likelihood of her believing *p* if and only if *p* is true. This suggests that we should replace DJC with the following:

*DJC\** is satisfied by *S*'s belief that *p* if and only if *S* does not believe (and would not upon reflection) that, in believing that *p*, she has violated an intellectual duty violation of which will significantly diminish the likelihood of her now believing *p* if and only if *p* is true.

Now *DJC\** is more plausibly thought of as a necessary condition of warrant than is DJC. But consider the following argument a moderate externalist could offer in support of the claim that *DJC\** is a subcondition of NDC: Suppose *S*'s belief that *p* does *not* satisfy *DJC\**. This means that *S* believes (or would upon reflection) that, in believing that *p*, she

has violated a certain sort of intellectual duty. But then *S* believes that her belief that *p* is defeated. For given the sort of duty she thinks she has violated, *S* believes that, in believing that *p*, she is being hindered from now believing truly with respect to *p*; that is, she believes (or would upon reflection) that she has reason to doubt that her belief that *p* is likely to be true. Thus, if DJC\* is not satisfied by *S*'s belief that *p*, neither is NDC (which is to say that DJC\* is a subcondition of NDC).

Consider next IJC. One of the problems facing proponents of IJC is that many of the paradigm cases of warranted beliefs obviously fail to satisfy it. Many clear thinkers simply do not believe they have good reasons for holding their ordinary memory or sense perceptual beliefs; yet these beliefs are obviously warranted. In response to this sort of objection, internalists tend to weaken their claim in various ways. Lehrer's way of weakening IJC is I think one of the most plausible. He proposes something like the following as necessary for warrant:

*IJC\** is satisfied by *S*'s belief that *p* if and only if *S* believes (or would upon reflection) that, in believing that *p*, she is believing in a trustworthy manner.<sup>48</sup>

But a moderate externalist could argue as follows that IJC\* is a subcondition of NDC: Suppose *S*'s belief that *p* does not satisfy IJC\*. Then it is the case that *S* does not (and would not upon reflection) believe that, in believing that *p*, she is believing in a trustworthy manner. But if, even upon reflection, *S* would not believe that, in believing that *p*, she is believing in a trustworthy manner, then *S* either believes she is believing that *p* in an untrustworthy manner or *S* doubts she is believing that *p* in a trustworthy manner. Either way, *S* believes (or would upon reflection) that her belief that *p* is defeated. Hence, if IJC\* is not satisfied by *S*'s belief that *p*, neither is NDC (which is to say that IJC\* is a subcondition of NDC).

The above arguments for the moderate externalist position are merely suggestive; they are intended as a starting point for future discussion between moderate internalists and moderate externalists. Obviously, there are many questions that moderate externalists need to answer if these arguments are to be ultimately successful: In what sense does the satisfaction of NDC *guarantee* the satisfaction of its subconditions? Does it entail it? Will anything weaker than entailment be relevant? Will another version of NDC be required if *all* internal conditions plausibly thought to be necessary for warrant are to be subconditions of (some version of) NDC? If so, is this other version of NDC what moderate externalists had in mind in allowing that something like NDC is necessary for warrant? These questions and others must be addressed by moderate externalists. But even if

the above moderate externalist arguments are ultimately unsuccessful, this approach to the partisan I-E debate draws the two sides closer together.<sup>49</sup> It provides a way for each side to account for the error of the other in a more sympathetic manner: moderate internalists can grant that DJC\* and IJC\* *seem* like subconditions of NDC but insist that in fact they are not; and moderate externalists can admit that DJC\* and IJC\* are necessary for warrant but then point out that they are subconditions of NDC. The result is that the distance between the two positions decreases and internalists and externalists can be more understanding of what they think of as each others' errors.

The I-E debate is an important one. It is a manifestation of one of the main attempts by analytic epistemologists to regain their bearings after the collapse of Cartesian foundationalism and the appearance of the Gettier problem. But real progress in the dialogue between internalists and externalists will come only after the root disagreements driving the debate (those I identified in Section 6) are recognized and openly discussed.

#### NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Alston (1986) and Kim (1993).

<sup>2</sup> The two senses are those associated with perspectival internalism (the view that what confers justification is something the subject believes or knows) and access internalism (the view that what confers justification is something to which the subject has special epistemic access).

<sup>3</sup> The three types of condition Kim mentions as necessary for the justification of *S*'s belief *B* are something like the following: those requiring that there is a ground of *S*'s belief *B*, those requiring that the ground of *S*'s belief *B* is adequate and those requiring that *S*'s belief *B* is properly based on its ground. I say these are condition types because Kim wants the term 'ground' to be taken rather broadly (so that a variety of different conditions fall under each type).

Kim's paper causes a certain amount of confusion due to the fact that he uses the term 'ground' in two different ways (apparently without realizing he is doing so). He introduces his discussion of the above three types of condition by noting the fairly common view that a justified belief is one based on adequate grounds. This suggests that he is taking the term 'ground' to refer to that on which a belief is based. But in the remainder of the paper he uses the term 'ground' almost exclusively to refer to grounds of justification. One relevant difference between these two uses of the term is that a ground of justification is, by definition, adequate for justification whereas a ground of belief need not be (this presents some difficulties for making sense of the second type of condition Kim mentions). Another

difference is that the satisfaction of the conditions necessary and sufficient for justification may be thought of as the ground of justification whereas it is odd to think of the satisfaction of such conditions as that on which a belief is based.

<sup>4</sup> I have not made clear what justification is. Why I have not will be made clear in Section 3. For now it is necessary to note only that it is distinct from that which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. I take Edmund Gettier to have established this to the satisfaction of nearly everyone concerned (see Gettier 1963).

<sup>5</sup> Alvin Plantinga (1993b, 3) uses ‘warrant’ in this sense. It should be noted that ‘justification’ has also been used in this way. For example, Roderick Chisholm (1986b, 89) introduces a technical sense of ‘epistemic justification’ defining it as that which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief (see also Chisholm 1982, 43 and Chisholm 1986a, 41–42). But he uses ‘justification’ to mean something other than that which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief in (Chisholm 1989). There he equates *being justified* with *being evident* (1989, 90) and he explicitly asserts that knowledge is not merely evident true belief (1989, 98). Because Chisholm has not persisted in his technical use of ‘justification’ and because Plantinga has placed more emphasis on his technical use of ‘warrant’ than Chisholm has on his similar use of ‘justification’, I will follow Plantinga’s lead.

<sup>6</sup> In this paper, when I say things like ‘each of the conditions necessary for justification’ or ‘each of the conditions necessary for warrant’, I do not mean to include those conditions which are necessary for anything whatsoever (such as the condition that a particular necessary truth is true) or which are necessary for having any kind of belief whatsoever (such as the condition that there exists some being who holds beliefs). I have in mind just those conditions which one might propose in giving an *informative* analysis of justification or warrant. I take an informative analysis of a concept to be one which stands to that concept in the sort of analysans-analysandum relation described by Felicia Ackerman (1992).

<sup>7</sup> Alston (1986, 185) says that “an ‘internalist’ position will restrict justifiers to items that are *within* something, more specifically, within the subject”. He goes on to specify two senses in which a justifier can be within a subject, one of which corresponds to being something to which a subject has special epistemic access. Alston uses the term ‘justifier’ to refer to that which confers justification. See Note 2.

<sup>8</sup> See Chisholm (1989, 76) where he says

The internalist assumes that, merely by reflecting upon his own conscious state, he can formulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, with respect to any possible belief he has, whether he is *justified* in having that belief.

One might object that, in this quotation, Chisholm is saying that it is the epistemic principles themselves (presumably ones which say that *S* is justified in believing that *p* if and only if certain conditions are satisfied), and not the conditions referred to by these principles, to which the internalist says we have special epistemic access. But Chisholm is saying internalists claim that we have access both to principles of this sort *and* to the conditions to which they refer. For he says that the internalist assumes that by reflection alone, a person can do something that *will* enable her to find out if she is justified in believing what she does. That is, the internalist thinks that by reflection alone, one *can* determine whether or not any particular belief of hers satisfies the conditions necessary and sufficient for justification.

<sup>9</sup> In (Sosa 1985, 193), he says

Internalism is the view that the justification-making properties of any justified belief must be (epistemically) internal to the mind of the subject who holds the belief; that is he could always know such properties of his belief by *reflection* . . .

<sup>10</sup> Although not by Keith Lehrer. See (Lehrer, 1988) where he argues that both internalism and externalism are false. This is because he has in mind strong versions of both internalism and externalism (with respect to warrant, not justification). The distinction between strong and weak versions of internalism and externalism with respect to warrant is discussed below.

<sup>11</sup> John Pollock (1986, 22–23) seems to be endorsing definitions of internalism and externalism similar to those just given when he says

... “internal states” ... are, roughly, states of ourselves to which we have “direct access” ... This suggests that the justifiability of a belief should be a function of our internal states. This is the thesis of *internalism*. ... *Externalism* is the denial of internalism.

But later (1986, 133) he makes it clear that the sort of direct access he is speaking of is *non-epistemic*. See (Plantinga 1993b, 176–81) for a critique of this way of defining internalism and externalism.

<sup>12</sup> Alston (1988a, 233–39) argues that some of the conditions which are necessary for justification are internal conditions.

<sup>13</sup> Lehrer (1990, 153) writes

The central tenet of externalism is that some relationship to the external world accounting for the truth of our belief suffices to convert true belief to knowledge without our having any idea of that relationship.

Lehrer here emphasizes only that externalists think a belief’s satisfaction of external conditions *suffices* to make it warranted. However, he also thinks of externalism as claiming that a belief’s satisfaction of external conditions is *necessary* to make it warranted. It’s just that he chooses to emphasize the more distinctive characteristic of externalism.

<sup>14</sup> According to Plantinga, “the internalist holds that a person has some kind of special epistemic access to warrant and the properties that ground it” (1993b, 5–6) and “externalism [is] the complement of internalism; the externalist holds that it is *not* the case that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special epistemic access to the fact that I have warrant, or to its ground” (1993b, 183). Thus, Plantinga thinks of internalism as internalism<sub>sw</sub>. For if even one of the conditions necessary for warrant were an external condition, there would be at least one property among those that ground warrant (namely, the property of satisfying that specific external condition necessary for warrant) to which a typical subject would lack special epistemic access.

<sup>15</sup> Even those who focus on justification make note of the fact that sometimes the debate is focused on warrant. See for example (Alston 1986, 185) and (Kim 1993, 307).

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, (Alston 1988b) and (Plantinga 1993b, 45).

<sup>17</sup> One could also consistently hold that *some* of the conditions necessary for justification are internal whereas *none* of the conditions necessary for warrant are. This is what Alston in fact holds. See references in Notes 12 and 16.

<sup>18</sup> Plantinga is guilty of this insofar as he defines the internalist position as internalism<sub>sw</sub> (see Note 14).

<sup>19</sup> See for example (Chisholm 1989, 90 and 98) and (Lehrer 1990, 147).

<sup>20</sup> See for example (Goldman 1979).

<sup>21</sup> See references to the works of Alston and Plantinga in Note 16.

<sup>22</sup> See for example (Armstrong 1973) and (Dretske 1981). Nozick (1981, 267) says that he isn’t sure whether justification is necessary for warrant.

<sup>23</sup> Alston (1993, 534).

<sup>24</sup> They are presented in section iii of (Alston 1993).



<sup>25</sup> Alston (1985).

<sup>26</sup> Goldman (1980, 1988).

<sup>27</sup> Sosa (1991b).

<sup>28</sup> Lehrer (1990, Chapter 7).

<sup>29</sup> Pollock (1986, chapter 5 (in particular pp. 141 and 168) and the Appendix).

<sup>30</sup> Alston (1993, 538, fn. 15) makes a similar point when he says, “there is a much stronger case for a more or less determinate pretheoretical conception of knowledge that we can use to locate our subject matter, than is the case with justification or rationality”. See also (Alston 1989, 5) where he notes that ‘know’ is on the lips of Everyman whereas ‘justification’ is a term of art in epistemology.

<sup>31</sup> These concerns – or something like them – were expressed to me by a number of the people I thank in the note to the title of this article, most forcefully and clearly by Alvin Goldman.

<sup>32</sup> Goldman (1986, 62–3, 111–12).

<sup>33</sup> Nozick (1981, 196).

<sup>34</sup> Plantinga (1993a, 40–42).

<sup>35</sup> Plantinga has confirmed this to me in conversation.

<sup>36</sup> I classify Lehrer as an internalist despite the fact that he says internalism is false (see Note 10). This is because, in saying that, he means only that internalism<sub>sw</sub> is false, which, as I argue in this paragraph, does not distinguish him from other paradigm internalists. Furthermore, Lehrer (1990, chapter 8) argues against all versions of externalism which, given the usual understanding of internalism as the complement of externalism, makes him an internalist.

<sup>37</sup> BonJour (1985, 31). The sort of reason he has in mind is something like: beliefs with feature *F* are highly likely to be true and the belief that *p* has feature *F*.

<sup>38</sup> BonJour (1985, 31). Actually, BonJour says these conditions are necessary for justification but he thinks justification is necessary for warrant (see 1985, 3–5).

<sup>39</sup> Chisholm (1989, 98).

<sup>40</sup> This follows from Lehrer’s definition of ‘undefeated justification’ and his equation of knowledge with it. See Lehrer (1990, 148–49).

<sup>41</sup> This is not to say we lack special epistemic access to our false beliefs, i.e., to the fact that these particular beliefs (which, unbeknownst to us, happen to be false) exist. Rather, we lack special epistemic access to the fact that they are false.

<sup>42</sup> This point or something like it has been made by others. See, for example, (Feldman 1993, 36–37; Ginet 1995, 403; Lehrer 1989, 131–32; Luper-Foy 1988, 358; and Plantinga 1993a, 36–37).

<sup>43</sup> This sort of NDC is to be distinguished from a version requiring that there be no true proposition such that if *S* believed it she would (or should) also believe that her belief that *p* is defeated. *That* version of NDC is something like what those proposing a defeasibility analysis of knowledge endorse as necessary for warrant. Because it is an *external* condition it is of no concern to us here.

<sup>44</sup> BonJour (1985, 37–41) considers a modified version of David Armstrong’s position (a version which merely adds NDC as a necessary condition of warrant). Lehrer (1990, 165–66) discusses Goldman’s acknowledgement of the necessity of NDC for warrant. And Moser (1985, 128–29) proposes and rejects a version of externalism which imposes NDC.

<sup>45</sup> Internalism<sub>sw</sub> is a possible fourth position but, as far as I know, no one endorses it (though several philosophers hold internalism<sub>sj</sub>).

<sup>46</sup> Alston (1988b, 178–79) seems to touch briefly on issues relevant to this question as does Dretske (1981, 123–28 and 1991, 27–29).

<sup>47</sup> It might be objected that not believing (even on reflection) that one has violated an intellectual duty is not sufficient for justification (understood deontologically). But note that to require more than this (for example, that there in fact be no violation of objective intellectual duty) is to run the risk of making DJC an *external* condition.

<sup>48</sup> Lehrer (1990, 121–24, 173–74).

<sup>49</sup> More accurately, it draws together moderate internalists and those on the opposite side of the partisan I-E debate who are *moderate* externalists.

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