Abstract
Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) the claim that naïve Meinongianism allows one to prove that anything exists. In §3, we have impossible worlds enter the stage and provide independent justification for their use. In §4, we introduce our revised comprehension principle: our CP has no restriction on the (sets of) properties that can characterize objects, but parameterizes them to worlds, therefore having modality explicitly built into it. In §5, we propose an application of the MMM apparatus to fictional objects and defend the naturalness of our treatment against alternative approaches. Finally, in §6, we consider David Lewis’ notorious objection to impossibilia, and provide a reply to it by resorting to an ersatz account of worlds.
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Notes
One should notice that also in classical logic we can have a perfectly good first-order existence predicate: \(E!x = _{{\text{df}}} \exists y\left( {y = x} \right)\). Besides, even if some Meinongians treat “exists” as primitive in the sense that it does not receive an explicit definition, in some forms of Meinongianism (e.g., Routley 1980) only concrete objects can exist, whereas abstract objects cannot. From this, we can infer that “exists”, in theories of this kind, means something like “has causal powers”, “is located in space and time”, etc.
Actually, to speak of “two couples of quantifiers”, as many do when exposing Meinongianism, is a bit misleading: the existentially loaded couple is explained away by defining it via the primitive neutral quantifiers and the existence predicate.
A dual difficulty comes from the incompleteness of fictional objects, which seems to threaten the Law of Excluded Middle, and/or Bivalence. We will not argue on the issue whether incomplete objects are impossible or not, even though endorsement of De Morgan laws suggests that they might be.
For a comprehensive perspective, one can check the monographic issue 38 (1997) of the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, entirely devoted to impossible worlds.
Fine (1984): 131.
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Berto, F. Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects. Int Ontology Metaphysics 9, 205–218 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0033-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0033-z