Measures of Assortativity The Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop

Ted Bergstrom and Yuji Tamira

University of California Santa Barbara and Australian National University

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- Suppose that a population has two or more types of individuals who form into subgroups, as determined by some assignment process.
- The degree of assortativity of an assignment process is a measure of the propensity of "likes to be matched with likes".
- This propensity depends, in general, both on the proportions of types in the population and on the nature of the process.
- We will explore alternative matching processes and measures of assortativity of these processes.

- There are two types.
- With probability *F* an individual selects a partner from an *assortative pool* that includes only members of this individual's type.
- With probability 1 F, an individual selects a partner at random from a *random pool* that includes everyone who did not join an assortative pool.
- Let's call F the assortativity of this process.

- If we observe the composition of matched pairs resulting from a two-pool assortative process, how could we estimate the assortativity *F*?
- Suppose we observe a population in which the proportion of Type 1's is p̂ and the proportion of Type 2's is 1 - p̂. Let π̂_{ij} be the observed fraction of all pairs that have one member of type i and one of type j.
- Then we can estimate F by

$$1 - rac{\hat{\pi}_{12}}{2\hat{
ho}(1-\hat{
ho})}.$$

Proof of this claim.

- The probability π_{12} that a randomly chosen pair has one member of each type is the probability that a randomly chosen individual from the population is either a type 1 who is matched with a type 2, or a type 2 matched with a type 1.
- The probability that a randomly chosen individual is of type 1 who is matched to a type 2 is the probability that a random draw is a type 1 who joins the random pool and happens to draw a type 2 for a partner. This probability is

$$p(1-F)(1-p)$$

• The probability that a randomly chosen individual is a type 2 matched with a type 1 is

$$(1-p)(1-F)p = p(1-F)(1-p).$$

Therefore

$$\pi_{12} = 2p(1-p)(1-F).$$

• Rearranging terms, we have

$$F = 1 - \frac{\pi_{12}}{2p(1-p)}$$

Since \hat{p} and $\hat{\pi}_{12}$ are maximum likelihood estimates of p and $\pi_{12},$ we estimate F as

$$\hat{F} = 1 - rac{\hat{\pi}_{12}}{2\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}.$$

- Coefficient of Inbreeding: "the correlation between homologous genes of uniting gametes under a given mating pattern."
 - (Sewall Wright's *F*-Statistic.) Wright applied this measure to inbreeding of kin by animal breeders as well as to preferential mating patterns based on phenotypic similarities
- *Coefficient of Relatedness* between two individuals: "the probability that a rare gene possessed by one is also possessed by the other."
 - Foundation of Hamilton's theory of kin selection.
- *Reduction in Heterozygosity* "the fractional reduction in heterozygosity relative to a random-mating population with the same allele frequencies." (Hartl and Clark, 1959).

- Index of Assortativity: The difference between the probability of being matched with a given type if one is also of this type and the probability of being matched with that type if one is of another type.
 - Useful way of thinking about evolutionary dynamics of random matching processes.

- The two-pool assortative process models assortative matching of genes, where two individuals might inherit the same gene in a given locus for one of two reasons.
 - They inherited this gene from a common ancestor. (They draw their partner from the same assortative pool)
 - They did not inherit the gene from a common ancestor, but happened to draw the same gene anyway. (They draw their partner the random pool).
 - In many structured environments, the probability that two individuals e.g. two siblings, two cousins, inherit the same gene in a given locus is constant and independent of proportions of the genes in the population.

Application to Evolutionary Dynamics: Hamilton's Helping Game

- Players are matched in pairs. Each player can exert a level of effort x to help the other. Where x_i is the effort level of player i, the reproductive fitness of player 1 is b(x₂) c(x₁) and that of player 2 is b(x₁) c(x₂).
- Assume *b* is an increasing, concave function and *c* an increasing convex function.
- Each player has its own type, which is the amount of help x that it will offer.
- Matching is assortative according to a two-pool process. With probability F, a player finds its match in an assortative pool consisting only of its own type. With probability 1 F it is matched with a random draw from those who were not assigned to assortative pools.

- If the reproduction rate of each type is increasing in its fitness, then there is a unique "evolutionary equilibrium" in which all individuals are of a type x^* such that x^* maximizes b(x)F c(x).
- Consider a population with some type x* individuals and some of other types. Let y be the expected value of b(x) that someone would receive from a random assignment.
- Expected payoff to a type x is b(x)F + y(1-F) c(x).
- Therefore If x^* maximizes b(x)F c(x), the x^* type will have a higher payoff than any other.

Variable assortativity.

• For a population with proportions p and 1 - p of types 1 and 2 in which the fraction π_{12} of pairs include one person of each type, define

$$F(p) = 1 - \frac{\pi_{12}}{2p(1-p)}$$

- For the two-pool assortative process, F(p) = F and is independent of p.
- The genetic processes studied by Wright and Hamilton also have F(p) independent of p and are equivalent to the two-pool process.
- As we will show, there are some interesting matching processes for which F(p) is not independent of p.

Empirical Example: Black-White Marriages

- U.S. Census ACS survey of married couples reports race of each member of a random sample of married couples in each state.
- Suppose that matching in each state is by a two-pool assortative process with uniform assortativity.
- Let p̂_i be the fraction of married individuals in the sample for state i who are black and 1 - p̂_i the fraction who are not.
- Let π_{BWi} is the fraction of observed marriages in state *i* that include one person of each race.
- Then estimate \hat{F}_i for state *i* by

$$\hat{\mathcal{F}}_i = 1 - rac{\hat{\pi}_{BWi}}{2\hat{
ho}_i(1-\hat{
ho}_i)}.$$

Table: Asssortativity for Selected States

	Fraction of Blacks	Fraction of Whites	
State	Married to Whites	Married to Blacks	Ê
Arizona	0.226	.0057	
California	0.136	.0070	0.86
New York	0.059	.0065	0.93
Mississippi	0.015	.0043	0.98

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- We regressed the state estimates *F_i* on 5 variables, all of which had statistically effects on assortativity. The regression "explained" about 75% of variation.
 - Former slave state with anti-miscegenation laws in force in 1967. (positive)
 - Index of residential segregation (measures differences in racial composition of census tracts) (positive).
 - Percent living in metropolitan areas (positive).
 - Percent of population who are black (positive).
 - Percent of population with college degrees (negative).
- Significance of percent of population who are black suggests that the simple two pool theory may not be adequate.

• Since evidence suggests the

$$\frac{\pi_{BW}}{2p(1-p)}$$

is not independent of p, it is worthwhile to consider alternative assortment theories.

• We consider two such processes.

- A non-uniform two pool assortative process in which one type is more likely to seek a partner in an assortative pool than the other.
- A "strangers-in-the-dark" process where meetings occur randomly, but the probability that they a meeting leads to a relationship is higher for two individuals of the same type than for two of different types.

- Suppose that one of the two types is more likely to join the assortative pool than the other.
- Let F_i be the probability that a type *i* joins the assortative pool for i = 1, 2 and let $G_i = 1 F_i$ be the probability that a type *i* joins the random pool.
- The probability that a couple consists of of one person of each type is

$$\pi_{12} = 2p(1-p)rac{G_1G_2}{pG_1+(1-p)G_2}.$$

• With this non-uniform two-pool process, we have

$$F(p) = 1 - rac{\pi_{12}}{2p(1-p)} = 1 - rac{G_1G_2}{pG_1 + (1-p)G_2},$$

which is not independent of p.

In this case, if G₁ > G₂, then F(p) is an increasing function of p.

- Preliminary estimates suggest that $G_W > G_B$, which means that whites are more likely to seek matches in segregated assortative pools than blacks.
- This is consistent with our regressions showing that *F* is higher in states with a larger percentage of blacks.

Strangers-in-the-Night Assortative Processes

- Pairs of individuals meet randomly. If they are of the same type, they form a pair with probability s. If they are of different types, they form a pair with probability m < s.
- Where p is the fraction of type 1's and q = 1 − p, the expected ratios of partnership types in the population are:

$$\pi_{11} = \frac{p^2 s}{(p^2 + q^2) + 2pqm}$$
$$\pi_{22} = \frac{q^2 s}{(p^2 + q^2) + 2pqm}$$
$$\pi_{12} = \frac{2pqm}{(p^2 + q^2) + 2pqm}$$

• For a strangers-in-the-night process where individuals who meet will pair up with probability *s* if they are the same type and probability *m* if they are of different types, the degree of assortativity is

$$F(p) = 1 - rac{\pi_{12}}{2p(1-p)} = rac{pq(s^2 - m^2)}{pq(s^2 - m^2) + sm}.$$

- Where s > m, F(p) is increasing in the size of the minority population and is maximized when p = 1/2.
- This is also consistent with our comparisons of the assortativity of black-white marriages in the U.S.

Estimating Strangers-in-the-Night parameters for Black-white marriages

• Where $\bar{\pi}_{ij}$ is the expected value of the random variable π_{ij} , we have _

$$\frac{m}{s} = \frac{\bar{\pi}_{BW}}{2\sqrt{\bar{\pi}_{BB}\bar{\pi}_{WW}}}$$

• Thus we estimate the ratio $\frac{m}{s}$ as

$$\left(\frac{\hat{m}}{s}\right) = \frac{\hat{\pi}_{BW}}{2\sqrt{\hat{\pi}_{BB}\hat{\pi}_{WW}}}$$

Table: Asssortativity Measures

	Fraction of Blacks	Fraction of Whites		Ratio
State	Married to Whites	Married to Blacks	Ê	m/s
Arizona	0.226	.0057	0.77	0.55
California	0.136	.0070	0.86	0.41
New York	0.059	.0065	0.93	0.26
Mississippi	0.015	.0043	0.98	0.14

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