Abstract
According to nearly all theorists writing on the subject, a certain derogatory content is regularly and systematically communicated by slurs. So united, the theorists disagree sharply on the elements of this content, on its provenance, and on its mechanism. I argue that the basic premiss of all these views, that there is any such derogatory content conveyed with the use of slurs, is highly dubious.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In the useful terminology of Torrengo (2020:1618) this consensus cuts across the ‘strict content’ and ‘broad content’ approaches to slurs. Moreover, some objectivists adopt a pragmatic explanation of derogation (see below).
To prevent a misunderstanding: I’m not claiming that the film director Quentin Tarantino has any special expertise in bigoted use, nor that any such expertise exists in the first place (Nunberg, 2018, 283). I am rather claiming that Tarantino has portrayed the repeated use fairly convincingly, and that we find this use entirely fluent and unproblematic.
See also Hom (2008:431).
Gestures and slurs: Hornsby (2002:140).
See Fox (2014).
As Arkes (1974) notes, Murphy’s definition was later adopted nearly verbatim in several influential rulings.
ADL tracker: https://bit.ly/2M84W7R ADL 2019 audit: https://www.adl.org/audit2019
Nexis Uni: http://www.nexisuni.com/
See Neufeld (2019) and references therein.
The same applies to the use of diminutives and slang, as I explain in the companion paper.
References
Anderson, L., & Lepore, E. (2013). Slurring words. Noûs, 47 (1), 25–48.
Arkes, H.P. (1974). Civility and the restriction of speech. Supreme Court Review, 281–336.
Black, M. (1962). Models and metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Bolinger, R.J. (2017). The pragmatics of slurs. Noûs, 51(3), 439–462.
Brown, P. (2000). Repetition. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 9(1–2), 223–226.
Camp, E. (2013). Slurring perspectives. Analytic Philosophy, 54 (3), 330–349.
Camp, E. (2015). Why metaphors make good insults: perspectives, presupposition, and pragmatics. Philosophical Studies, 174(1), 47–64.
Camp, E. (2018). A dual act analysis of slurs. In D. Sosa (Ed.) Bad words. New York: Oxford University Press.
Croom, A.M. (2015). The semantics of slurs: a refutation of coreferentialism. Ampersand, 2(1), 30–38.
Davies, C., & Arnold, J.E. (2019). Reference and informativeness. In C. Cummins N. Katsos (Eds.) The Oxford handbook of experimental semantics and pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
Engelhardt, P.E., Bailey, K.G.D., & Ferreira, F. (2006). Do speakers and listeners observe the Gricean maxim of quantity? Journal of Memory and Language, 54(4), 554–573.
Falbo, A. (2021). Slurs, neutral counterparts, and what you could have said. Analytic Philosophy, 00, 1–17. Forthcoming.
Fox, D. (2014). Cancelling the maxim of quantity. Semantics and Pragmatics, 7(5), 1–20.
Goodman, H.N. (1968). Languages of art. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
Grice, H.P. (1989). Logic and conversation. In Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press.
Hom, C. (2008). The semantics of racial epithets. Journal of Philosophy, 105(8), 416–440.
Hom, C. (2010). Pejoratives. Philosophy Compass, 5(2), 164–185.
Hom, C. (2012). A puzzle about pejoratives. Philosophical Studies, 159(3), 383–405.
Hom, C., & May, R. (2013). Moral and semantic innocence. Analytic Philosophy, 54(3), 293–313.
Horn, L.R. (2004). Implicature. In L.R. Horn G. Ward (Eds.) The handbook of pragmatics (pp. 3–28). Oxford: Blackwell.
Hornsby, J. (2002). Meaning and uselessness. In P. French H. Wettstein (Eds.) Midwest studies in philosophy, (Vol. 25 pp. 128–141). Oxford: Blackwell.
Jeshion, R.B. (2018). Slurs, dehumanization, and the expression of contempt. In D Sosa (Ed.) Bad words (pp. 77–107). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kennedy, R.L. (2002). Nigger. Vintage Books.
Lepore, E., & Stone, M. (2018). Pejorative tone. In D Sosa (Ed.) Bad words (pp. 132–154). New York: Oxford University Press.
Liu, C. (2021). Slurs as illocutionary force indicators. Philosophia. Forthcoming.
Neufeld, E. (2019). An essentialist theory of the meaning of slurs. Philosophers’s Imprint, 19, 35.
Nunberg, G. (2018). The social life of slurs. In D. Fogal, D.W. Harris, & M. Moss (Eds.) New work on speech acts (pp. 237–295). New York: Oxford Univeristy Press.
Popa-Wyatt, M., & Wyatt, J.L. (2018). Slurs, roles and power. Philosophical Studies, 175, 2879–2906.
Potts, C (2015). Presupposition and implicature. In S Lappin C Fox (Eds.) The handbook of contemporary semantic theory (pp. 168–202). Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Rubio-Fernandez, P. (2019). Overinformative speakers are cooperative. Cognitive Science, 43(11), e12797.
Schegloff, E.A. (1996). Confirming allusions. American Journal of Sociology, 102(1), 161–216.
Sennet, A., & Copp, D. (2020). Pejorative verbs and the prospects for a unified theory of slurs. Analytic Philosophy, 61(2), 130–151.
Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals. Oxford Univeristy Press.
Stern, J.J. (2000). Metaphor in Context. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Tannen, D. (2007). Talking voices, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press.
Torrengo, G. (2020). Slurs and semantic indeterminacy. Philosophia, 48, 1617–1627.
Whiting, D. (2013). It’s not what you said, it’s the way you said it: Slurs and conventional implicatures. Analytic Philosophy, 54(3), 364–377.
Williamson, T. (2009). Reference, inference, and the semantics of pejoratives. In J. Almog P. Leonardi (Eds.) The philosophy of David Kaplan (pp. 137–158). New York: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Berkovski, Y.S. Slurs and Redundancy. Philosophia 50, 1607–1622 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00484-1
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00484-1